Cases (Disputable Presumptions) Flashcards
Petitioners filed a complaint for nullity of the SPA authorizing Respondent to sell the subject disputed lots to Meridian, as well as the deed of sale entered into pursuant to the said SPA. Petitioner alleged that the said lot had already sold to them by their predecessor Luis Rosaroso. During trial the second wife of Luis, Lourdes testified deed of sale in favor of petitioners, was obtained through fraud, deceit and trickery. She explained that they signed the prepared deed out of pity because petitioners told them that it was necessary for a loan application. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The CA ruled that the first deed of sale in favor of petitioners was void because they failed to prove that they indeed tendered a consideration for the four (4) parcels of land. It relied on the testimony of Lourdes that petitioners did not pay her husband. The price or consideration for the sale was simulated to make it appear that payment had been tendered when in fact no payment was made at all.
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of a contract may be assailed on a mere testimony that it has no consideration.
No. Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions:
(1) private transactions have been fair and regular;
(2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and
(3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract.
These presumptions operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration, they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court. The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable presumption. It relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is self- serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.
Cipriano Trazona owned Lot No. 5053–H covered by Tax Declaration No. 07764. Sometime in 1997, when the heirs of Cipriano, herein petitioners, tried to secure a copy of Tax Declaration No. 07764, they were informed that Tax Declaration No. 07764 had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof, Tax Declaration No. 23959 was issued on 24 June 1996 in the name of Dionisio, the owner of the property adjacent to Cipriano’s lot. Apparently, respondents had caused the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 23959 by submitting a Deed of Absolute Sale supposedly executed by Cipriano in favor of Dionisio. The deed of sale covers a portion of Cipriano’s property which was encroached upon by Dioniso during the former’s lifetime, but the new tax declaration issued covers the whole property of Cipriano. Consequently, petitioners filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title, annulment of deed of sale, cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 23959. Petitioners alleged therein that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 27 June 1956 was a forgery. During the trial, petitioners presented an expert witness testifying to the forgery of Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. Based on RTC Judge’s observation Cipriano’s signature on the assailed deed bares a difference as compared to other documents bearing his signature. On appeal, CA ruled that petitioners had failed to prove by requisite evidence their allegation that the assailed deed was a forgery. The deed, being a notarized document, enjoyed the presumption of authenticity and due execution. Also, the fact that it was an ancient document that “remained unaltered after so many years, bodes well for its authenticity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presumption of regularity of a notarized ancient document may be assailed by the testimony of an expert witness and independent observation of the trial court as to the forgery of signature therein.
Yes. It is true that notarized documents are accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due execution. Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. In this case, clear and convincing evidence that is enough to overturn the presumption of regularity of the assailed deed was presented. First, the document examiner determined that the signature of Cipriano in the assailed deed had been forged. No issue has been raised about his expertise. Second, the RTC did not just rely on expert testimony in ruling that the signature was forged. It likewise supported its finding that the signature was forged through independent observation. Lastly, when the record management analyst from the Bureau of Archives presented the assailed deed, the paper was noted to be white, while its supposed contemporaries in the bunch from where it was taken had turned yellow with age. Further, when the analyst was asked the question of when the assailed deed was received by the Bureau of Archives, she answered that it was forwarded to them only on 28 September 1987 by RTC Region 7, Notarial Division.
Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in until they separated and lived apart. Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone in favor of Spouses Lacsamana over a property he alleges to be a part of their marital property regime is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent.Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her paraphernal funds. She added that she and Uy cohabited and attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject propertyUy died and is two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Rosca and respondent Jose Lacsamana also died. Meanwhile Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena (Buena). Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in this case.Both RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents
ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca alone, without Uy’s consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid
YES. Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other.While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca’s testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married.The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal. Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca’s paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy’s consent
An Information for estafa was filed by Leticia S. Arcilla (Leticia) against Dolores Diaz (Dolores) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on consignment basis from respondent. Leticia alleged that she is a businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return the unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. She averred that she entrusted merchandise worth P35,300.00 to Dolores as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed by the latter. However, petitioner was only able to remit the amount of P3,300.00 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored respondent’s demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods. In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not as an agent. She clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards (POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from respondent on installment basis and that, during each deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs and GCs. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from respondent on February 20, 1996.RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but held her civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of P32,000.00. CA upheld petitioner’s civil liability. It ruled that respondent was able to establish by preponderance of evidence her transaction with petitioner, as well as the latter’s failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case the items were not sold, the fact of which having been substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt. To this, the CA rejected petitioner’s attempt to discredit the said receipt which she denied executing on the ground that she was only made to sign blank documents, finding that even if petitioner was indeed made to sign such blank documents, such was merely a safety precaution employed by respondent in the event the former reneges on her obligation.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may be held civilly liable.
YES. In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3 (p) of the same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent’s possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly preponderates in respondent’s favo
