Cases (entries In Official Record) Flashcards
FACTS: Petitioner Lao, owner of a Fuso truck insured by respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc., filed a claim with the latter. However, the claim was denied by the insurance company on the ground that the driver of the insured truck, Leonardo Anit, as stated in the Police Blotter, did not possess a proper driver’s license at the time of the accident. The restriction in Leonardo Anit’s driver’s license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Since the insured truck he was driving weighed more than 4,500 kgs., he therefore violated the “authorized driver” clause of the insurance policy. Thus, petitioner filed an action for breach of contract and damages. During trial, Respondent offered as evidence the police blotter and presented the investigating police officer who made the entries on the said blotter report. On the other hand, petitioner offered in evidence the Motor Vehicle Accident Report stating that the driver at the time of the accident is not Anit but Giddie Boy. The said report was made three days after the accident or on April 27, 1985. RTC dismissed the complaint and this was affirmed by CA on appeal. Petitioner assails the admissibility and evidentiary weight given to the police blotter, as a basis for the factual finding of the RTC and the CA. He contends that the same entry was belied by the Motor Vehicle Accident Report and testimony of the investigating policeman himself.
ISSUE: Whether or not admissibility of a police blotter may be assailed on the ground that it contains entries that is contrary to another police report made by the same investigating officer who made the blotter.
HELD: Entries in police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated, and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its admissibility: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. In this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise presented in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him in comparison to the accident report he made three (3) days after the accident. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating officer for the alleged interchange of names.
FACTS: When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Private respondent Florencio Librea filed a “Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. He alleged that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. In order to prove his compliance with the residency requirement, petitioner presented as evidence his barangay certificate. The COMELEC in disqualifying the petitioner did not consider the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade. COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, “cannot be relied on.” Subsequently, petitioner presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not barangay certificate is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it is not notarized.
HELD: The answer is in the negative. Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides: Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to be admissible in evidence: (a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to “keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay.” Regarding the second requisite, it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay. Anent the third requisite, the BarangayCaptain’s exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
Petitioner simplicity and ligand claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal.#In support of the existence thereof, petitioners presented a copy of the Contrato Matrimonial which was issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente church. Petitioners insist that the Contrato Matrimonial is a public document because it is required by law to be recorded in the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office (NSO). Petitioners claim to have in their possession a duplicate original of the Contrato Matrimonial which should be regarded as original. Granting that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document, petitioners maintain that said document should be considered an ancient document which should be excluded from the requirement of authentication.”In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. In their Comment, respondents submit that the Contrato Matrimonial is a private document and the fact that marriages are required to be registered in the local civil registrar does not ipso facto make it a public document. Respondents assert that the certificate of baptism is likewise a private document which tends to prove only the administration of the sacrament of baptism and not the veracity of the declarations therein. Respondents moreover refute the certification issued by the local civil registry arguing that it does not prove filiation but only the fact that there is no record of Ligaya on file with said office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract or Contrato Matrimonial is sufficient to prove the fact of marriage.
HELD:Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.#As observed by the Court of Appeals, petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately however, she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old; 2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no evidence of alteration.”The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.”Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for
