Cases (confessions) Flashcards
FACTS: Accused, a member of the Integrated National Police (now PNP), was charged with murder before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for the death of Fancisco San Juan. During the trial, Cortez, the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, testified that the accused executed before him a counter-affidavit admitting the commission of the crime. Before Cortez was presented as witness, Defense counsel made an admission as to the authorship, authenticity, and voluntariness of the execution of the counter-affidavit of accused Ladiana, which was subscribed and sworn to before Cortez. However, Accused Ladiana allegedly did so in self-defense. The same counter-affidavit became the basis of SB in convicting the accused. The court a quo held that his Counter-Affidavit, in which he had admitted to having fired the fatal shots that caused the victim’s death, may be used as evidence against him. On appeal with the SC, petitioner argued that the counter-affidavit cannot be considered an extrajudicial confession as the same was executed during custodial investigation with the assistance of a counsel. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of the commission of an offense while invoking self-defense in a Counter-affidavit executed during preliminary investigation without the assistance of a counsel may be admitted as an extrajudicial confession against him.
The evidence cannot be admitted as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an admission. Sections 27 and 34 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence distinguish one from the other as follows: Section 27. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him or her. Section 34. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging his or her guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him or her.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt; in an admission, there is merely a statement of fact not directly involving an acknowledgment of guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which one is charged. 26 Thus, in the case at bar, a statement by the accused admitting the commission of the act charged against him but denying that it was done with criminal intent is an admission, not a confession. Petitioner admits shooting the victim — which eventually led to the latter’s death — but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him as the voluntariness of the execution thereof was admitted by the defense
Upon the sworn complaint of the victim Lucille Serrano, 4 information were filed against her uncle, the appellant for qualified rape. The records also show that the appellant executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay while detained at the barangay hall where he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997. However, the trial court did not ask the appellant whether he was assisted by counsel when he was brought to the Office of the Public P rosecutor for inquest investigation. Neither did the court a quo inquire about the circumstances and the appellants reasons for refusing to execute the said waiver. The records show that when the prosecution offered the appellants Sinumpaang Salaysay in evidence to prove that he confessed to having raped the victim in February 1997 and March 2, 1997, the appellant objected thereto on the ground that he was not assisted by counsel and that he was coerced into signing the same. The trial court convicted the appellant of rape on the basis of Lucelles sworn statement, the testimony of her mother, the appellants statement executed in the Barangay Chairmans Office, and the testimony of Dr. Armie Soreta-Umil.
ISSUE: Whether or not an admission made before a Barangay Chairman without the assistance of a counsel may be used against the accuse.
lthough the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not under arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his statement. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully apparent. As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, this covers investigation conducted by police authorities which will include investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such other police agencies in our government. The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that the appellants statement before the barangay chairman is inadmissible.
Herein accused were charged with murder. He was arrested pursuant to the testimony of two (2) eyewitnesses. During his custodial investigation the accused made an extrajudicial confession after the following was recited to him: “I would like to inform you Mr. Sayaboc that questions will be asked to you regarding an incident last December 2, 1994 at the Rooftop, Brgy. Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, in connection with the shooting of Joseph Galam, owner of the said Disco House as a result of his death. Before questions will be asked of you I would like to inform you about your ri[g]hts under the new Constitution of the Philippines, as follows: That you have the right to remain silent or refuse to answer the questions which you think will incriminate you; That you have the right to seek the services of a counsel of your own choice or if not, this office will provide you a lawyer if you wish.” The appellants argue that the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire proceedings. ISSUE: (1) #Whether or not an extrajudicial confession made during custodial investigation wherein the rights of the accused were merely recited to him may be admissible in evidence against such accused. (2) #Whether a counsel who remain silent at the time the extrajudicial confession was made qualifies as an independent counsel
1)”The answer is in the negative. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. The right to be informed requires “the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.” It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc, who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation, albeit for another offense. (2)”A counsel who remains silent all through-out the investigation shows that there is lacking of a faithful attempt at each stage of the investigation to make Sayaboc aware of the consequences of his actions. The right to a competent and independent counsel means that the counsel should satisfy himself, during the conduct of the investigation, that the suspect understands the import and consequences of answering the questions propounded. Counsel should be able, throughout the investigation, to explain the nature of the questions by conferring with his client and halting the investigation should the need arise. The duty of a lawyer includes ensuring that the suspect under custodial investigation is aware that the right of an accused to remain silent may be invoked at any time
: Petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The prosecution alleged that: (1) the petitioner as branch manager caused the preparation of promissory notes (PN) and cashier’s check in the name of one of their valued client; (2) that by forging the signature of such client, petitioner was able to obtain the proceeds of the loan evidenced by the PN. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement in the form of questions and answers admitting the commission of the allegations in the Information. Trial court convicted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed his conviction. Elevating the case before the SC, petitioner avers that the written statement should not be admitted as evidence against him as it was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him. ISSUE: Whether or not a statement of an accused-employee made during administrative investigation conducted by his employer may not be admitted an evidence against the former on the ground that it was made without the assistance of a counsel
e answer is in the negative. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility
FACTS:An Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner, Salazar, and Carpon. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner unlawfully deprived Cebuana of cash/money when she took out pawned items and released them to redeeming pledgors in exchange for redemption payments which she, however, did not turnover to the pawnshop, and instead pocketed them for her own gain. She gravely abused the confidence concurrent with her sensitive position as a vault custodian when she exploited her exclusive and unlimited access to the vault to facilitate the unlawful taking. Her position entailed a high degree of confidence reposed by Cebuana as she had been granted daily unsupervised access to the vault. Also, the petitioner knew the combinations of the branch’s vault and nobody was allowed to enter the vault without her presence. Without the authority and consent of her employer, she repeatedly took and appropriated for herself the redemption payments paid for the pawned items with the aggregate appraised value of ₱414,050.00. The accused submitted pawn tickets which were surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their respective pledgors. She submitted them during the spot audit along with a confession letter stating that portions of the ₱1,250,800.00 missing value of jewelry were actually already redeemed.ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial written confession was admissible
. A confession, whether judicial or extrajudicial, if voluntarily and freely made, constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience. The admissibility and validity of a confession, thus hinges on its voluntariness, a condition vividly present in this case.The language of the confession letter was straightforward, coherent and clear. It bore no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity and it was replete with details which could only be known to the petitioner. Moreover, it is obvious that losing one’s job in an administrative case is less cumbersome than risking one’s liberty by confessing to a crime one did not really commit. It is thus implausible for one to be cajoled into confessing to a wrongdoing at the mere prospect of losing his/her job. The petitioner’s declarations to Talampas show that she fully understood the consequences of her confession. She also executed the letter even before Finolan came to the Old Balara branch, thus, negating her claim that the latter threatened her with an administrative sanction.
