Cases (preponderance of evidence) Flashcards
PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with damages against Antonio Balmaceda. PCIB alleged that Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently obtained and encashed 34 Manager’s checks amounting to 11M+. PCIB also impleaded Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from Balmaceda’s alleged fraud. For failure to file an answer, Balmaceda was declared in default. On the other hand, Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmaceda’s scheme. Ramos admitted receiving money from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmaceda’s money. RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB. On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latter’s fraudulent manipulations. According to the CA, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee in some of the Manager’s checks does not suffice to prove that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraudulent scheme. It was also observed that other persons were also named as payees in the checks that Balmaceda acquired and encashed, and PCIB only chose to go after Ramos. With PCIB’s failure to prove Ramos’ actual participation in Balmaceda’s fraud, no legal and factual basis exists to hold him liable. PCIB insists that since Ramos’ defense – anchored on mere denial of any participation in Balmaceda’s wrongdoing – is an intrinsically weak defense, it was error for the CA to exonerate Ramos from any liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not appellate court may exonerate defendant on the basis of his mere denial of the imputed wrong in a civil case.
Yes. While mere denial by the defendant is intrinsically weak evidence, this does not mean that the complainant may just rely on the weakness of the defense presented by the former. The rule is that the party asserting a claim must still provide proof of his allegation. In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition. On its face, all that PCIB’s evidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos’ name as a payee when he filled up the application forms for the Manager’s checks. But, as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda made Ramos the payee on some of the Manager’s checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos was complicit in Balmaceda’s fraud; a number of other people were made payees on the other Manager’s checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos’ participation that would justify his separate treatment from the others.
Joel Primero, a truck driver employed by the Respondent, was involved in a vehicular accident which resulted to minor injuries of Petitioner Dra. dela Llana. The traffic investigation found that Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. More than one month after the incident, Petitioner was diagnose with whiplash injury which she attributed to the accident that had happened. Petitioner had to undergo physical therapy and eventually a spine surgery to treat the injury. However, while the surgery was successful, petitioner can no longer practice her profession. Consequently, petitioner sued the respondent for damages for the medical expenses and loss of earnings. At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. But on appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not mere assertion that damages suffered was caused by a certain event imputable against the defendant without explaining the causal link between the injury and the imputed act warrants a ruling in favor of the complainant.
No. In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car, (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below
COA conducted an expanded audit on the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the period July 1992 to March 1993. The Special Audit Office Report submitted by the audit team shown that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioners without the required disbursement vouchers. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, filed in the Sandiganbayan (SB) criminal cases for malversation of public funds against petitioners. SB convicted herein petitioners. The prosecution’s lone witness was Heidi L. Mendoza. On cross- examination, witness Mendoza testified that due to security reasons, the audit team failed to conduct entry and exit conference. SB convicted the petitioner and held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks without the required disbursement vouchers of the amounts covered by the 43 checks constitutes illegal withdrawals. Petitioners contend that SB committed a reversible error in not applying the “equipoise rule” which if applied would have resulted in the acquittal of the accused-petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not equipoise rule finds application in the instant case
There is therefore no merit in petitioners’ argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the equipoise rule.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Such is not the situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence that one of the petitioners failed to account for funds under his custody and control upon demand, specifically for the P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said funds. Petitioners are both accountable public officers within the meaning of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. No checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, their indispensable participation of petitioners in the issuance of the subject checks to effect illegal withdrawals of ARMM funds was therefore duly established by the prosecution and the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that they acted in conspiracy with petitioner Haron in embezzling and misappropriating such funds.
