Authoritarian Politics Lecture 8: How Autocracies Fall Flashcards
How Autocratic Regimes End
Regime insiders and citizens must decide whether to challenge the regime and, if so, using which method. This is a strategic decision that considers the available support and resources, the chances of success as well as the risk and potential cost of failure.
In order from few supporters to many supporters
In order from few supporters to many supporters
Coup, popular uprising, insurgency, elections
How many coups fail?
around half
Coups are
easier to coordinate, but riskier
The high cost of failure and the uncertainty of success lessen their appeal where alternative mechanisms for ending dictatorships exist
Coup attempts have declined since
the end of the cold war when more autocracies began to allow semicompetitive elections.
Members of the inner circle will deflect opposition if:
P equation
in the equation, p is
p is the probability the status quo regime will survive
in the equation, q is
q is the probability of maintaining/acquiring office in the status quo regime
in the equation, r is
is the probability of achieving office in the new regime (for a partisan of the new)
in the equation, s is
is the probability that a partisan of the old regime achieves/retains office in the new regime
in the equation, t is
is the probability of the new regime turning out as anticipated
In the equation, what is Oj
is the benefit of office to a partisan of the status quo in the status quo regime
In the equation, what is Ok
is the benefit of office in a new regime to a partisan of the new regime
In the equation, what is Ol
is the benefit of office in a new regime to a partisan of the old regime
In the equation, what is c
is the cost of opposing the status quo regime.
Equation for the Interests of Others
Ordinary citizens’ decision-making differs from that of regime insiders in that they have little expectation of achieving office in the current regime or a future one. Therefore, their interests are simply: (refer to equation)
Perceptions about p (the probability of regime survival follow a tipping logic: Before the regime is challenged
before the regime is challenged, p is perceived as high and regime insiders and citizens want to avoid the costs of opposition
Equation for the Interests of Others, Bj is
is the benefit of the status quo in the status quo regime.
What are two ways for which economic crisis contribute to regime breakdown
- For regime insiders, shocks reduce the benefits from office Oj because wages fall, reduce q bc budget pressures reduce public employment, and reduce ~Oj
- for regular citizens, Bj is reduced which makes opposition more attractive - As more and more ppl show open opposition, perceptions of p also decline
How can dictators try and avoid these effects from economic crisies?
dictators can react strategically and redistribute the costs of crises. Extensive patron-client networks developed in party-led dictatorships help to continue distributing to those most essential for their survival while shifting the burden of the crisis to politically weaker parts of the population.
Even though personalism can help the dictator survive it can also
undermine prospects for regime survival after the dictator dies
The effects of personalism on regime survival depend on
Key regime features
The effects of personalism on regime survival depend on key regime features
- Military dictatorship + Low personalism
- Military dictatorship + High personalism
- Party-based dictatorship + Low personalism
- Party-based dictatorship + High personalism
Military dictatorship + Low personalism leads to
Frequent coups and dispersed weapons decrease regime survival.
Military dictatorship + High personalism leads to
Reduced risk of coups and concentration increase regime survival
Party-based dictatorship + Low personalism leads to
Norms of succession should increase regime survival.
Party-based dictatorship + High personalism leads to
Hollowing out of norms should decrease regime survival.
What happens after a dictator falls
this depends on the expected costs associated with losing power
- This depends on the expected costs associated with losing power. Differences in costs affect the willingness of dictators and members of the ruling elite to negotiate peaceful transitions when p decreases.
- The willingness to negotiate in turn affects how autocracies end and what kind of political system follows them.
The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Personalized Power - Dictator
Costs of losing power are very high (e.g. exile, prison, execution).
Unlikely to negotiate and rather cling to power until removed by force.
The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Military Dictatorships - Military officers
Military officers: Low costs if country democratizes, high cost if violent overthrow of regime. Prefer to negotiate if p decreases.
The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Military Dictatorships - Dictator:
Faces higher risk, prefers to cling to power. With more power sharing interests of officers will prevail -> democratize
With more power concentration interest of dictator -> unlikely to democratize
The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Party-led Dictatorships- Party officials:
: Low costs if country democratizes, high cost if new autocratic regime. Prefer to negotiate if p decreases.
The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Party-led Dictatorships- Dictator:
Faces higher risk, prefers to cling to power.
But harder than for military to remove dictator to negotiate -> unlikely to democratize.
With more power concentration, higher dependence on dictator -> unlikely to democratize.
