Authoritarian Politics Lecture 8: How Autocracies Fall

Question 1

How Autocratic Regimes End

Answer 1

Regime insiders and citizens must decide whether to challenge the regime and, if so, using which method. This is a strategic decision that considers the available support and resources, the chances of success as well as the risk and potential cost of failure.

Question 2

In order from few supporters to many supporters

Answer 2

In order from few supporters to many supporters
Coup, popular uprising, insurgency, elections

Question 3

How many coups fail?

Answer 3

around half

Question 4

Coups are

Answer 4

easier to coordinate, but riskier
The high cost of failure and the uncertainty of success lessen their appeal where alternative mechanisms for ending dictatorships exist

Question 5

Coup attempts have declined since

Answer 5

the end of the cold war when more autocracies began to allow semicompetitive elections.

Question 6

Members of the inner circle will deflect opposition if:

Answer 6

P equation

Question 7

in the equation, p is

Answer 7

p is the probability the status quo regime will survive

Question 8

in the equation, q is

Answer 8

q is the probability of maintaining/acquiring office in the status quo regime

Question 9

in the equation, r is

Answer 9

is the probability of achieving office in the new regime (for a partisan of the new)

Question 10

in the equation, s is

Answer 10

is the probability that a partisan of the old regime achieves/retains office in the new regime

Question 11

in the equation, t is

Answer 11

is the probability of the new regime turning out as anticipated

Question 12

In the equation, what is Oj

Answer 12

is the benefit of office to a partisan of the status quo in the status quo regime

Question 13

In the equation, what is Ok

Answer 13

is the benefit of office in a new regime to a partisan of the new regime

Question 14

In the equation, what is Ol

Answer 14

is the benefit of office in a new regime to a partisan of the old regime

Question 15

In the equation, what is c

Answer 15

is the cost of opposing the status quo regime.

Question 16

Equation for the Interests of Others

Answer 16

Ordinary citizens’ decision-making differs from that of regime insiders in that they have little expectation of achieving office in the current regime or a future one. Therefore, their interests are simply: (refer to equation)

Question 17

Perceptions about p (the probability of regime survival follow a tipping logic: Before the regime is challenged

Answer 17

before the regime is challenged, p is perceived as high and regime insiders and citizens want to avoid the costs of opposition

Question 18

Equation for the Interests of Others, Bj is

Answer 18

is the benefit of the status quo in the status quo regime.

Question 19

What are two ways for which economic crisis contribute to regime breakdown

Answer 19

1. For regime insiders, shocks reduce the benefits from office Oj because wages fall, reduce q bc budget pressures reduce public employment, and reduce ~Oj
   - for regular citizens, Bj is reduced which makes opposition more attractive
2. As more and more ppl show open opposition, perceptions of p also decline

Question 20

How can dictators try and avoid these effects from economic crisies?

Answer 20

dictators can react strategically and redistribute the costs of crises. Extensive patron-client networks developed in party-led dictatorships help to continue distributing to those most essential for their survival while shifting the burden of the crisis to politically weaker parts of the population.

Question 21

Even though personalism can help the dictator survive it can also

Answer 21

undermine prospects for regime survival after the dictator dies

Question 22

The effects of personalism on regime survival depend on

Answer 22

Key regime features

Question 22

The effects of personalism on regime survival depend on key regime features

Answer 22

1. Military dictatorship + Low personalism
2. Military dictatorship + High personalism
3. Party-based dictatorship + Low personalism
4. Party-based dictatorship + High personalism

Question 23

Military dictatorship + Low personalism leads to

Answer 23

Frequent coups and dispersed weapons decrease regime survival.

Question 24

Military dictatorship + High personalism leads to

Answer 24

Reduced risk of coups and concentration increase regime survival

Question 25

Party-based dictatorship + Low personalism leads to

Answer 25

Norms of succession should increase regime survival.

Question 26

Party-based dictatorship + High personalism leads to

Answer 26

Hollowing out of norms should decrease regime survival.

Question 27

What happens after a dictator falls

Answer 27

this depends on the expected costs associated with losing power
- This depends on the expected costs associated with losing power. Differences in costs affect the willingness of dictators and members of the ruling elite to negotiate peaceful transitions when p decreases.
- The willingness to negotiate in turn affects how autocracies end and what kind of political system follows them.

Question 28

The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Personalized Power - Dictator

Answer 28

Costs of losing power are very high (e.g. exile, prison, execution).
Unlikely to negotiate and rather cling to power until removed by force.

Question 29

The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Military Dictatorships - Military officers

Answer 29

Military officers: Low costs if country democratizes, high cost if violent overthrow of regime. Prefer to negotiate if p decreases.

Question 30

The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Military Dictatorships - Dictator:

Answer 30

Faces higher risk, prefers to cling to power. With more power sharing interests of officers will prevail -> democratize
With more power concentration interest of dictator -> unlikely to democratize

Question 31

The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Party-led Dictatorships- Party officials:

Answer 31

: Low costs if country democratizes, high cost if new autocratic regime. Prefer to negotiate if p decreases.

Question 32

The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization: Party-led Dictatorships- Dictator:

Answer 32

Faces higher risk, prefers to cling to power.
But harder than for military to remove dictator to negotiate -> unlikely to democratize.
With more power concentration, higher dependence on dictator -> unlikely to democratize.