Authoritarian Politics Lecture 4: Power Concentration and Personalization Flashcards
If dictators are so dependent on their allies in the inner circle - how do they consolidate their power? Why are they not stopped from becoming more and more powerful?
It is the result of the problems and dilemmas inherent in authoritarian power sharing.
- And again, the likely outcomes of bargains over power sharing are shaped by features of the seizure group.
what are the problems and dilemmas inherent in authoritarian power sharing.
arise from the key features of authoritarian politics, i.e. the lack of credible institutional enforcement of commitments and the constant threat of resolving conflict with violence.
More Power sharing in Autocracies
Contested Autocracy:
- Balance between leader and ruling coalition
- Credible threat to remove leader
Less Power sharing in Autocracies
Established Autocrats:
- monopoly of power
- credible threat to remove leader
Personalist Dictatorship
Are autocracies unitary actors?
no.
- member vs member within seizure group/inner circle
- inner circle v dictator
What are the Dictators Interests
- maintain autocratic regime
- gain more relative power
What are the interests of the members of the inner circle
- maintain the autocratic regime
- gain more relative power
What are the two kinds of strategic interactions?
a. cooperative effort to keep everyone (in the autocratic regime) in power
b. non-cooperative effort to increase individual power and resources at the expense of others
What are Problems in Authoritarian Power sharing
- Choosing a leader
- Bargaining over distribution of resources and power
What is the problem with choosing a leader
- to govern, seizure groups must select a leader (dictator)
- the problem: is how to control the leader and credibly commit him to deliver to the group
- since there are no formal institutions (yet) credible threat to remove the dictator is the only possibility
- but the actual removal is uncertain and costly
How does a newly elected dictator change?
- he was ‘first among equals’, but now has agenda-setting power and control over resources
- since there are no formal institutions (yet) the promises he makes are not credible
- without trust he must increase his relative power at the expense of (some of) his allies
What is the problem with Bargaining over distribution of resources and power
Assuming a dictator could credibly share power, how much does he need to share to stay in power?
What are two ways a dictator can reduce shared amount of power
- reduce the number of supporters in the inner circle
- reduce the amount shared, without reducing the numer of supporters
(think pizza)
Strategic interactions depends on
the characteristics of the seizure group: threats are more credible when the seizure group is disciplined and unified
what are two ways in which unity/factionalsim affect bargaining and power sharing
- dictator can bargain separately with different factions, which weakens their bargaining position
- factionalism reduces the credibility of threats to the dictator