Authoritarian Lecture 3: What explains Coups?

Question 1

What are the two theoretical perspectives explaining Coups

Answer 1

1. “Military Officers as agents”:
2. “Military Officers ‘interests and grievances’””

Question 1

How do most autocratic regimes begin?

Answer 1

(42%) begin by replacing existing autocracies

Question 2

Operationalization of “Military Officers as agents” Hypothesis

Answer 2

• coups should be more likely when there is protest and civil unrest
• good measures exist

Question 3

Operationalization of ‘Military officers’ interests and grievances’ Hypothesis:

Answer 3

Hard to measure, so use proxy variables instead:
The way the incumbent dictatorship achieved power is a proxy indicator of the congruence of interests between military officers and ruling elites - more togetherness means less grievances.
A measure of ethnic heterogeneity in the military may also affect soldiers’ grievances.
More grievances will increase the probability of coups.

Question 4

Outcome Variable: Leader-shuffling Coups

Answer 4

changing leaders in ongoing military dictatorships.
Not a siezure of power, bc ruling group remains the same
ex: Argentina militray Junta in 1970’s

Question 5

Outcome Variable: Regime-initiating Coups

Answer 5

elected leader is replaced by military officer.
Incumbent autocrat is replaced by military officer.
ex: Ousted monarchies in Egypt

Question 6

What can possibly blur understanding of coups

Answer 6

confounding regime-initiating and leader-shuffling cups blur

Question 7

What is Svoliks 2012 argugement that integrates two political mechanisms for the occurrence of military coups?

Answer 7

a. Moral Hazard in authoritarian Repression
The more indispensable soldiers become in the suppression of internal opposition, the greater their capacity to turn against the regime.
b. bargaining btwn the government and the military
Military coup only happens if the bargaining fails.

Question 8

What is the dilemma in Svoliks Argument?

Answer 8

both autocrat and the military prefer to avoid military intervention

Question 9

Military officers and therefore coups are primarily motivated by

Answer 9

their own interests.

Question 9

Operationalization of Svoliks argument

Answer 9

• evaluates his argument using one prominent source of mass threats: economic inequality
• Two different measures of military coups: entry and exit of leaders. Two distinct measures of economic inequality: the Gini coefficient and the Theil statistic. Plus controls.

Question 10

Why would both autocrat and the military prefer to avoid military intervention

Answer 10

The military cannot credibly threaten violence, the government cannot credibly ignorance of the military’s capacity to use force. As a result both actors resort to Brinkmanship

Question 11

Escalation and therefore military coups are more likely in

Answer 11

Military dictatorships (institutional integrity is already lost)
New democracies (popular support emboldens incumbent