Authoritarian Politics Lecture 6: Why Autocracies Implement ‘Democratic’ Institutions Flashcards
How can Parties help overcome the dictators credible commitment problem?
because When the party controls access to office - including the leader position itself - the dictator has good reasons to fulfill his promises, because he can be removed from office
Svolik proposes a different role for deliberative and decision-making institutions which are
committees, politburos or councils that are embedded in parties and legislatures.
What are two monitoring Mechanisms
A) Transparency through Regular Interaction
A) Transparency through Regular Interaction
Regular interaction within institutions typically involve deliberation over policy and periodic reviews of government revenue and spending. This transparency among ruling elites prevents misperceptions about the dictator’s intentions and actions that could escalate into conflict.
what are two monitoring mechanisms
A) Transparency through Regular Interaction
B) Detection of Non-Compliance
taken together, what do the two monitoring mechanisms reduce?
reduce the probability of conflict within the ruling elite and therefore enhance the survival of authoritarian regimes.
To ensure power-sharing detection of the dictators non-compliance must be coupled with
the credible threat to replace him
institutions have the potential to alleviate the credible commitment problem, their capacity to do so depends on
a balanced power distribution btwn dictators and his allies
to solve some of their problems, autocracies establish
seemingly democratic institutions, such as parties, legislatures and mass elections that engage citizens support
Ruling a country involves several important problems
Ruling a country involves several important problems
Implementing the policy decided by the ruling elite
Monitoring of local officials to ensure their cooperation
Gathering accurate information about opposition, how policies are working and what problems exist
What are the benefits of parties?
it benefefits both the ruling elite as well as citizens, party members and local officials
It creates support by
- mobilizing demostrations and elections
- implementing policies
- monitoring and gathering information on local conditions
Two ‘Democratic’ institutions in Authoritarian Regimes
- Parties
- Legislatures
What are the benefits of Legislatures
- arenas for policy bargaining (?)
- incentivize competition among party members and supporters
- competition motivates their performance
Why are there elections in autocracies?
most party led autocracies have regular elections, spend a lot of resources on campaigns and want to achieve high rates of voter support
Semi-competitive Electoral Systems (aka Electoral Authoritarianism or Competitive Authoritarianism, 61%)
- Permit all opposition parties to compete but use control of the media, interference with opposition campaigning, fraud, violence, and large-scale state spending to bias outcomes.
- Permit some parties to compete but not others.
- Permit no opposition parties but allow independents to contest elections.
- Permit competition among ruling-party candidates but not opposition parties.
Do elections in Autocracies usually determine who rules?
Even if there is some competition, elections usually do not determine who rules and what policies are implemented
Explain how elections signal dictator strength
- Presidential elections are costly signals of the dictator’s strength and aim at deterring elite defections from the ruling coalition.
- Big election wins demonstrate the capacity to mobilize and raise the perceived probability of regime survival.
- This deters elite and mass opponents who are less willing to pay the cost of oppositions.
- Wins against opposition generate the strongest signals of regime strength, but even elections without choice show that the dictatorship has the resources and organizational capacity to ensure mass voting
What are two functions of elections?
A) Signal Dictator Strength
B) Incentives for party officials
Explain how elections create Incentives for party officials
Legislative and local elections create incentives for party officeholders to extend their patron-client and information-gathering networks to the grassroots, which helps authoritarian regimes to survive.
Ruling-party candidates face real competition for party nominations or in semi-competitive elections which puts pressure on them to distribute benefits and local public goods in return for turnout and votes (‘fire alarms’)
Candidates have incentives to
convey the grievances and problems of their districts to party leaders build clientele networks to reach the grassroots comply with regime leaders
Autocracies establish seemingly ‘democratic’ institutions (i.e. parties, legislatures and elections) to solve
to solve the problems and dilemmas that come with policy implementation, monitoring, and information gathering.
Legislative and local elections solve what problem?
solve the principal-agent problem between the regime leaders and party officials when monitoring is expensive or impossible.
These institutional arrangements are used to
coopt and gather information from ordinary citizens.
Are they similar to democratic institutions?
Although they look ‘democratic’ they serve quite distinct purposes in autocracies that differ from their purposes in democracies
