Authoritarian Politics Lecture 5: Party Creation as Autocratic Survival Strategy Flashcards

1
Q

The power sharing bargain must be credible to both sides (T/F)

A

true. allies must believe that the dictator will comply, and the dictator must believe the allies will support him if he keeps his promises.

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2
Q

What is another problem with power sharing

A

the allies (military officers) cannot credibly promise to be loyal if they are internally factionalized

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3
Q

Who has bigger credibility problems? (D or M)

A

Although the dictator has a credibility problem in keeping his promises, the bigger problem is that the military cannot credibly commit to stay loyal and not to oust the dictator

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4
Q

Who has credibility problems?

A

both the dictator and the military

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4
Q

What is a solution to this power sharing problem

A

instead of getting rid of members of the inner circle, bring in new civilian allies for support!

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5
Q

Why does the Military have a bigger commitment problem?

A

because the military - if it is factionalized and/or undisciplined- has a control problem

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6
Q

what is the militaries control problem

A

It cannot prevent ‘rogue’ coups, i.e. coups by factions that are often lead by lower-ranked officers. (Why?)
If the dictator cannot trust the military officers’ ability to prevent rogue coups, there is little reason to comply and share power and resources - it will not protect him

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7
Q

what are several survival strategy eg when facing a factionalized support group

A
  1. give more money to the military
  2. promote loyal officers and retire or exile opponents
  3. create and control security police and paramiltary forces
  4. New Party Creation
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7
Q

What is the issue with strategies 1-3

A

they are risky because they are visible to the military and who may resist them

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8
Q

Why may New Party Creation be better?

A
  • creating. civilian support group (new Party) to decrease the dependence on the military
  • parties can mobilize mass civilian support in the form of demonstrations and elections
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9
Q

How can civillian support deter coups?

A

because military officers have a strong preference for unopposed coups

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10
Q

why do military officers have a strong preference for unopposed coups

A
  • because party members may also serve as informants which may increase to risk to execute a coup
  • Party official and party members have an interest in the dictator’s survival because they benefit in terms of positions, resources, and privileges.
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11
Q

If dictators really create new parties to guard themselves against the military, we should be able to observe the following

A

H1: Most newly created dictatorial support parties should be led either by the dictator himself or one of his relatives or close allies.
H2: Dictators create authoritarian support parties as part of an effort to marginalize armed supporters from policy-making.
H3: Parties should be created before elections that confirm the dictator as national executive.
H4: Military dictatorships led by junior officers should create more support parties than those led by higherranked officers.
H5: Dictator control over internal security services should be more likely in dictatorships that create a new support party than in those that do not.
H6: The establishment of new paramilitary forces to protect the dictator should be more likely in dictatorships that create a new support party than in those that do not.

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12
Q

Is the Creation of a New Party Initiated by the Dictator?

A

Yes, in three-quarters of all autocratic regimes in which a party was created after the seizure of power, either the dictator or a close relative led the party

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13
Q

Does the Creation of a New Party Happen Before Elections?

A

yes

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14
Q

Is Party Creation Part of a Strategy to Reduce the Dictator’s Vulnerability to Coups?

A

If yes, we should see them also engage in other coup-proofing strategies
72 % of dictators that create a new party, also take personal control of internal security Or an 25 % increase in probability when accounting for cross-country variation using fixed effects. 52 % of them also establish paramilitary forces Or an 33 % increase in probability when accounting for cross-country variation using fixed effects

15
Q

What are other coup-proofing strategies

A
  • taking personal control of internal security
  • establish paramilitary forces
16
Q

why do dictators create new parties

A

as a strategy to reduce their dependence on the military which cannot credibly commit to support when it is factionalized.

17
Q

Dictatorial ruling parties are

A

tools of autocratic survival

18
Q

What is the paradox?

A

Creating a new post-seizure party leads to greater personalization of power (the dictator himself decides over party offices and resources.)

19
Q

Pre-Seizure Parties

A
  • parties extend the life of autocracies because they help overcome the dictator’s credible commitment problem.
  • When the party controls access to office - including the leader position itself - the dictator has good reasons to fulfill his promises, because he can be removed from office.
20
Q

Why do pre seizure party allies have reason to remain loyal?

A

because they can expect benefits, including higher offices in the future.

21
Q

Post-Seizure Parties

A
  • this obviously only works if the dictator delegates power to the party - which is unlikely if the dictator is strong and is the one who created the party in the first place
  • Here, the dictator not only cannot credibly commit - he does not want or need to
22
Q

What is the paradox of post-seizure party creation?

A

What looks like a broadening of the support coalition by including civilians, is actually a move toward greater power concentration in the hands of the dictator: Threatening military supporters are replaced by less threatening civilian supporters - who depend entirely on the dictator.

22
Q

Post-seizure party creation is

A

s a survival strategy which allows the dictator to rid himself from his dependence on the military. Importantly, it reduces the probability of coups staged by regime insiders.

22
Q

what is the Main take away:

A

: even parties that do not solve the dictator’s credible commitment problem increase autocratic survival