Authoritarian Politics Lecture 7: Institutions of Repression and Control Flashcards
What are the goals of such coercive institutions
have the goal to protect the dictator by making his threat of violence credible and by deterring opposition.
Examples of such special/ coercive institutions
the army, internal security police, and paramilitias
Overt Violence is
credible, but costly
Most repression is
preventative
most repression aims to
monitor and deter opposition e.g. by blocking negative information, by discovering plots before they can organize and by undermining opposition groups
Institutions of Direct Monitoring
- Internal security agencies and secret police
Institutions of Indirect Monitoring
Elections to periodically and indirectly inform about the performance of local officials. (Remember week 6.
Internal security agencies and secret police
constantly and directly inform about the loyalty and performance of high-level officials, party leaders, military officers and members of the ruling elite. Thy also spy on opposition and average citizens, but since the most dangerous threats come from within, much of the surveillance focuses on the inner circle. Most internal security forces are civilian, not military and rely on additional informers or internet monitors.
Internal Security Agencies and Secret Police are
costly, they also take some time to build - usually from scratch
Other tactics to deter opposition include
manipulation and censorship of information, intimidation, torture, imprisonment, and assassination, etc.
Does the military help with internal security?
No, Military usually does not want to do the job and pre-existing police and security forces may either be useless or disloyal.
Inner circle usually supports the creation of these services but
these institutions can turn into a threat if they are controlled by the dictator.
From internal security agencies the dictator can gain
- a valuable information advantage - which makes it less likely that any plots can be kept secret.
- He can also order his security forces to arrest or to use violence against his competitors.
Internal Security Agencies make rebelling against the dictator more costly
True. All of this makes rebelling against the dictator risky and costly, rendering constraints on the dictator’s power unlikely if not impossible.
Autocratic Regimes where dictators control internal security live how much longer?
7 years longer on average
What is a problem with using the military as a key institution to control and repress opposition?
Problem: Remember that the military can turn against the dictator himself.
What are three ways to overcome problem with military
Solution 1: Create new party for support and decrease dependency on military. (remeber)
Solution 2: Create paramilitary forces to counterbalance the military.
- 63 percent of dictators chose solution 2 and create presidential guards and paramilitary forces outside the regular military
Solution 3: Control the military and directly interfere with promotions
What are the three types of paramilitary forces
- armed civilian forces
- Party Militias
- Loyalist Paramilitary Forces
What are Armed civilian forces
Help the regular military fight against insurgents.
What are party militias
Help defend the regime. Mostly cheap party adjuncts with only rudimentary training and light weapons. Tasked with patrolling, keeping order and controlling ordinary citizens. Regime insiders create party militias to coopt those most likely to lead popular opposition (young men) by giving them a stake in regime survival. Since they are often undisciplined the can end up causing more trouble than good for the regime.
What are loyalist paramilitary forces
Help protect against coups from regular military officers. Newly recruited from co-partisans or co-ethnics which increases their identification with the dictator. Usually stationed near the dictator and highly visible. To further enhance their deterrent power, the dictator may provide them with better weapons and training
Two mechanisms why deterrence is successful:
- Paramilitary forces stand or fall with the dictator, ensuring loyalty and making threats of violence credible.
- More independent actors - regular military and loyalist paramilitary - increase collective action problem, making coups less likely
How may dictators try and control the military
by interfering with promotions.
Professional norms that determine promotions, recruitment and retirement are a source of autonomy from the dictator.
Professional norms that determine promotions, recruitment and retirement are a source of autonomy from the dictator.
This way, interest congruence between the military and the dictator is increased and the risk of coups decreased.
The problem with controlling the military
while interest congruence between the military and dictator is increased and the risks of coups are decreased, those who are disadvantaged by this interference, opposition and coups become more attractive
Linked Fate Hypothesis
Whereas loyalist paramilitaries should increase the likelihood of interference with promotions, other types of paramilitary force should not
Collective Action Hypothesis
All kinds of paramilitary should increase the dictator’s likelihood of interfering with military promotions.
In conclusion
Dictators use coercive institutions - the army, internal security police, and paramilitias - to protect the themselves by making his threat of violence credible and by deterring opposition. They are also tools of increasing personalization of power. However, they may also spark discontent and opposition
