Authoritarian Politics Lecture 7: Institutions of Repression and Control

Question 1

What are the goals of such coercive institutions

Answer 1

have the goal to protect the dictator by making his threat of violence credible and by deterring opposition.

Question 1

Examples of such special/ coercive institutions

Answer 1

the army, internal security police, and paramilitias

Question 2

Overt Violence is

Answer 2

credible, but costly

Question 3

Most repression is

Answer 3

preventative

Question 4

most repression aims to

Answer 4

monitor and deter opposition e.g. by blocking negative information, by discovering plots before they can organize and by undermining opposition groups

Question 5

Institutions of Direct Monitoring

Answer 5

• Internal security agencies and secret police

Question 6

Institutions of Indirect Monitoring

Answer 6

Elections to periodically and indirectly inform about the performance of local officials. (Remember week 6.

Question 7

Internal security agencies and secret police

Answer 7

constantly and directly inform about the loyalty and performance of high-level officials, party leaders, military officers and members of the ruling elite. Thy also spy on opposition and average citizens, but since the most dangerous threats come from within, much of the surveillance focuses on the inner circle. Most internal security forces are civilian, not military and rely on additional informers or internet monitors.

Question 8

Internal Security Agencies and Secret Police are

Answer 8

costly, they also take some time to build - usually from scratch

Question 8

Other tactics to deter opposition include

Answer 8

manipulation and censorship of information, intimidation, torture, imprisonment, and assassination, etc.

Question 9

Does the military help with internal security?

Answer 9

No, Military usually does not want to do the job and pre-existing police and security forces may either be useless or disloyal.

Question 10

Inner circle usually supports the creation of these services but

Answer 10

these institutions can turn into a threat if they are controlled by the dictator.

Question 11

From internal security agencies the dictator can gain

Answer 11

• a valuable information advantage - which makes it less likely that any plots can be kept secret.
• He can also order his security forces to arrest or to use violence against his competitors.

Question 12

Internal Security Agencies make rebelling against the dictator more costly

Answer 12

True. All of this makes rebelling against the dictator risky and costly, rendering constraints on the dictator’s power unlikely if not impossible.

Question 13

Autocratic Regimes where dictators control internal security live how much longer?

Answer 13

7 years longer on average

Question 14

What is a problem with using the military as a key institution to control and repress opposition?

Answer 14

Problem: Remember that the military can turn against the dictator himself.

Question 15

What are three ways to overcome problem with military

Answer 15

Solution 1: Create new party for support and decrease dependency on military. (remeber)
Solution 2: Create paramilitary forces to counterbalance the military.
- 63 percent of dictators chose solution 2 and create presidential guards and paramilitary forces outside the regular military
Solution 3: Control the military and directly interfere with promotions

Question 16

What are the three types of paramilitary forces

Answer 16

1. armed civilian forces
2. Party Militias
3. Loyalist Paramilitary Forces

Question 16

What are Armed civilian forces

Answer 16

Help the regular military fight against insurgents.

Question 17

What are party militias

Answer 17

Help defend the regime. Mostly cheap party adjuncts with only rudimentary training and light weapons. Tasked with patrolling, keeping order and controlling ordinary citizens. Regime insiders create party militias to coopt those most likely to lead popular opposition (young men) by giving them a stake in regime survival. Since they are often undisciplined the can end up causing more trouble than good for the regime.

Question 18

What are loyalist paramilitary forces

Answer 18

Help protect against coups from regular military officers. Newly recruited from co-partisans or co-ethnics which increases their identification with the dictator. Usually stationed near the dictator and highly visible. To further enhance their deterrent power, the dictator may provide them with better weapons and training

Question 19

Two mechanisms why deterrence is successful:

Answer 19

1. Paramilitary forces stand or fall with the dictator, ensuring loyalty and making threats of violence credible.
2. More independent actors - regular military and loyalist paramilitary - increase collective action problem, making coups less likely

Question 20

How may dictators try and control the military

Answer 20

by interfering with promotions.
Professional norms that determine promotions, recruitment and retirement are a source of autonomy from the dictator.
Professional norms that determine promotions, recruitment and retirement are a source of autonomy from the dictator.
This way, interest congruence between the military and the dictator is increased and the risk of coups decreased.

Question 21

The problem with controlling the military

Answer 21

while interest congruence between the military and dictator is increased and the risks of coups are decreased, those who are disadvantaged by this interference, opposition and coups become more attractive

Question 22

Linked Fate Hypothesis

Answer 22

Whereas loyalist paramilitaries should increase the likelihood of interference with promotions, other types of paramilitary force should not

Question 23

Collective Action Hypothesis

Answer 23

All kinds of paramilitary should increase the dictator’s likelihood of interfering with military promotions.

Question 24

In conclusion

Answer 24

Dictators use coercive institutions - the army, internal security police, and paramilitias - to protect the themselves by making his threat of violence credible and by deterring opposition. They are also tools of increasing personalization of power. However, they may also spark discontent and opposition