Are social factors the most important in determining the outcome of general elections? Flashcards
FOR POINTS
1) While it may no longer be true that ‘class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail’, class can still be considered a hugely significant factor in determining the way and whether people vote
2) Another social factor that has been a key determinant of voting is age, and this has been increasing in importance recently
3) Another important social factor affecting voting behaviour is ethnicity
4) Another social factor that is of significance is region
AGAINST POINTS
1) Social class has lost its significance as the key social factor in determining elections
2) However, age may not be as significant as suggested
3) However, in reality ethnic minorities are not a single homogenous group and when distinguishing between different ethnic minorities, a more nuanced picture is evident
4) However, since the 1980s, regional changes have begun to occur
FOR POINT 1
1) While it may no longer be true that ‘class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment and detail’, class can still be considered a hugely significant factor in determining the way and whether people vote
While this has broken down somewhat due to class and partisan dealignment, it is still possible to predict voting behaviour based on class. For example, in 2017, Labour held 72 of the 100 contingencies with the most working-class households
The fact that so many seats are considered ‘safe’ in UK general elections has a lot to do with the importance of class and other social factors; for example, all five constituencies in Liverpool are strong Labour seats with approximately 70% of the vote
AGAINST POINT 1
In the past, class and party dealignment were very apparent. Working-class people would generally vote for the Labour Party and middle-class people tended to vote conservative. For example, in the 1960s around two-thirds of the Conservative vote was made up of middle-class voters and a similar proportion of working-class voters voted for Labour. This figure has steadily declined since then however, and by 2019 the Conservatives did better among working-class voters (48%) than they did among middle-class voters (43%)
Equally, in relation to safe seats, the Conservatives dramatically increased their share of safe seats in working-class areas from 13 to 31 showing the link has weakened even further.
Moreover, it can be argued that the reason for the breakdown in class voting in 2017 and 2019 was actually the rise of issue-based voting - Brexit. Many working-class areas had voted Remain in the 2016 referendum. They voted Conservative because of a shift in their priorities Brexit was more important than class.
The preponderance of Labour MPs in Liverpool may equally be because of the age profile, the percentage of ethnic minority voters, and in response to negative representations of the city in the press: no one buys The Sun newspaper because of a 1989 article on the Hillsborough disaster, as well as PM Johnson’s comments about the city in a 2004 article in the Spectator
FOR POINT 2
There has been a clear link in recent elections, showing that older voters vote Conservative and younger voters vote Labour.
This was very evident in the 2017 election where 66% of 18-24-year-olds voted for Labour whereas the Conservatives won votes from 69% of voters aged 70+. Age was important in the 2017 election because turnout shot up dramatically in the 18-24 age group.
YouGov argued that ‘age was one of the most significant factors in the general election’.
AGAINST POINT 2
In 2019, Labour’s vote share among the 18-24 age bracket dropped nearly 10 points to 56, and the age at which a voter was more likely to have voter Conservative than Labour was 39, down from 47 in 2017. Also, in 2019 in the 35-54 age group Labour’s vote share fell by 11 points while the Conservatives gained 3 points.
Moreover, age could be a function of other short-term factors. Labour’s appeal to the young dramatically increased with the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader, suggesting that it is leadership that is the significant factor. Younger people were attracted to his authentic appeal and unspun personality, someone who wanted to do politics differently, to be up-front about his beliefs which he was unwilling to change to court popularity, and who was also more likely to keep his promises.
FOR POINT 3
Ethnic minorities have voted for the Labour Party because it seems to be relatively closely associated with more progressive equality legislation and support for immigration. Although ethnic minorities only make up 5% of the votes in the UK there are developing trends in how they vote.
In 1997 82% of black voters voted Labour compared with 12% who voted for the Conservatives. Similarly, the majority of Asian voters (66%) voted for the Labour Party and only 22% voted for the Conservatives.
Again in 2019, not being white was the main demographic predictor of not voting Conservative. A Conservative candidate was only half as likely to see the vote of an ethnic minority voters as of a white voter. Another way of understanding the importance of ethnicity in 2019 is that 1 in 5 Labour votes came from ethnic minority voters, whereas only 1 in 20 was for the Conservatives.
AGAINST POINT 3
Only one minority group did noticeably increase its support for the Conservatives in both 2017 and 2015 - British Indians, and Hindus in particular. From 30% in 2010, the Conservatives’ share of the votes of British Indians went up to 40% in 2017.
In 2019 this minority group was particularly unhappy with Corbyn’s stance on Kashmir. The group, British Hindu and Indian Votes Matter (BHIVM), mobilised hundreds of volunteers to campaign against Labour and believe they may have influenced up to 80 seats. In Harrow East, Bob Blackman outperformed colleagues across London by winning an increased majority on a 5% swing to the Conservatives. There was also a dramatic 15% swing to the Conservatives in Leicester East - a constituency where 6 out of 10 voters are of Indian origin.
Moreover, in 2019 Labour would have lost most of the Jewish vote (only 6% of Jews voted Labour according to ConservativeHome), although with the Jewish population accounting for approximately 250,000 in the UK, this is unlikely to explain the loss of more than a couple of seats.
Additionally, once again, it could be argued that ethnic voting is a function of the short-term factor of issues and policies. Ethnic ministries may
» Additionally, once again, it could be argued that ethnic voting is a function of the short-term factor of issues and policies. Ethnic voters may vote Labour because they have better policies towards immigration or more progressive equality legislation. In 2005, a substantial minority of Muslim voters switched their vote from Labour to the Liberal Democrats due to the Iraq War. This suggests that if a party changes its policies or campaigns strongly for an issue, they would be more appealing to an ethnic minority. On the other hand, if a party has policies or attitudes which negatively affect a minority group, e.g. Windrush Scandal, stop and search, Islamophobia or anti-Semitism, they will lose votes among this group.
FOR POINT 4
Since the 1980s, there has been a clear ‘North-South divide’: with the exception of London, Labour held only a handful of seats in the south, and Conservative support was very low in the north of England and in Scotland and Wales.
Additionally, Labour was the party of the urban cities, Scotland and Welsh mining towns, with Conservatives dominating the rural and suburban areas.
AGAINST POINT 4
In the Blair era, Labour began to do well in the South too, particularly in London and the South East, with their vote share increasing by 5 points across every region in the UK. In 2017 Labour did well in London and the South as well as swings in Wales, the North West and East. In 2019 the Conservatives broke new ground, moving into many traditional Labour heartlands, breaching Labour’s so-called ‘red wall’. Across the UK, Labour’s losses outweighed any gains made by the Conservatives. While the Conservatives did lose votes in the south of England and Scotland, these were balanced by gains in the rest of England and Wales.
Additionally, it could be argued that patterns of regional voting have as much to do with short-term factors as long-term, social factors. It could be that the policy changes and leadership of Blair were the reasons for his appeal widening to different areas in the UK. In 2017 and 2019 the issue of Brexit was a key factor in the changing pattern of votes. Additionally, the leadership of Corbyn was a positive factor in 2017 and a negative one in 2019. Thus, it can be suggested that regions are not an important social factor, as in reality, region differences are affected by short-term factors like leadership and policy.
