A350 Flight Technical Bulletin Flashcards
Problems with not being able to submit the fuel app due to being logged on to the aircraft wi-fi which doesn’t start until 10,000’
To ensure connectivity, it is sometimes simplest to disable Wi-Fi altogether while on the ground and connect via mobile data instead
Avoid opening the escape hatch due to
It being difficult to re-attach
Flight crew should ensure that the eLog app is opened on both iPads when first arriving at the aircraft.
This is to allow the iPads to synchronise with each other and the Ground Server. If this is not done, then
it is possible for previously entered defects to be hidden on one of the iPads – which in turn can prevent subsequent aircraft acceptance for the next flight, or mistakenly flying with open defects.
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 46 – OIS > How To > How to exit from the Maintenance Applications
Engineers working on the aircraft during the turnaround often leave the Maintenance menu displayed on the OIS. If this is the case when you arrive, just press the
“OIS MENU” button on the OIS Keyboard to exit the Maintenance menu and return to a more familiar display. In case you need to return to the Maintenance menu then this is achieved by pressing SHIFT+OIS MENU. This information is also contained in the FCOM (see the reference above
A350 EFB Quick Reference Guide > Normal Procedures
Feedback indicates that the EFB laptops are often affected by varying degrees of synchronisation problems on first arriving at the aircraft.
All flight crew should familiarise themselves with the content of the A350 EFB Quick Reference Guide, which includes both ‘normal’ laptop starting procedures as well as an extensive troubleshooting guide that will, in most cases, successfully fix any EFB issues
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 31 – Control and Display System > Display Units > Normal Operations
The tactile function can only be used to interact with the OIS, which means that only those DUs which can display the OIS are touchscreen-enabled (i.e. CAPT and F/O outer DUs as well as the centre lower DU).
For example, when the MFDs are displayed on the centre lower DU, the tactile function is automatically disabled and instead the cursor must be used to interact with the FMS in the normal manner. Further information on the tactile function is available in the FCOM reference above
FCOM > Procedures > Normal Procedures > SOP > PCP > OIS Initialization
Following a prolonged period without electrical power (e.g. during a long turnaround or after overnight off-stand parking), once the aircraft is re-powered again, it is possible for the active FMS navigation database to ‘flip’ to the older of the two databases loaded. This occurs because the aircraft is fitted with an internal timer which, after approximately 7 hours without electrical power, will briefly lose track of the correct date (and return to 1st Jan 2000!). During this short period of temporal uncertainty, the FMCs will pick the earlier of the two databases during their automatic initialisation process. Consequently, it is important to
always check the ACFT STATUS page in the FMS iaw the PCP SOP, to confirm that the active FMS database is indeed the correct one for the current date
FCOM > Limitations > Aircraft General > Weights > Weight Limitations
If operating an empty (or near-empty) positioning sector, flight crew should be aware of the ballast requirements applicable to
the A350-1000.
FCOM > Limitations > Engines > Oil
In-service monitoring by Rolls-Royce has revealed a trend for the Trent XWB-97 engines to consume more oil than expected. Other A350-1000 operators have experienced an isolated number of in-flight turnbacks due to oil quantity depletion. Consequently, Airbus and Rolls-Royce have updated the minimum oil quantity limitations for dispatch, resulting in a requirement for both oil tanks to be full when the flight time is at or above 7 hours.
While this limitation is in place, the ETOPS transit check includes a requirement for the engineers to make a statement in the eLog confirming that the oil tanks have been filled to full. If this statement has not been made, then please contact
Maintrol / T5 Engineering
Fan Cowl Door (FCD keys)
FCOM > Normal Procedures > SOP > Preliminary Cockpit Preparation > Before Walkaround
The SOP for Preliminary Cockpit Preparation includes a requirement for the PM to check that the FCD keys (if installed) are onboard and stowed. FCD keys will only be installed from aircraft ‘WBM’ (MSN 563) onwards but, in the interim, this task has been included within the SOP by Airbus for fleet commonality purposes. On those aircraft not fitted with FCD keys, the check
can obviously be omitted!
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 22 AFS FMS > Controls and Indicators > MFD > FMS Pages > Fuel & Load Page When loading the Fuel & Load page, crews have noticed that the automatically calculated value in the FINAL reserve field is slightly higher than that shown on the Cirrus flight plan. This is because when calculating the final reserve fuel figure, the FMS assumes that the aircraft will hold at 1500 ft AGL in Conf 1 – and not in clean config as per the assumptions used in EASA regulations and OM A 8.18.9.
The use of Conf 1 for the calculation amounts to a discrepancy of ca. 15% that typically equates to approximately 400 kg – which matches the difference seen between Cirrus and the value calculated by the FMS. Therefore, under normal circumstances, when completing the FMS Fuel & Load page during Cockpit Preparation, crews should insert the Cirrus figure into the FINAL field.
Note that if the Cirrus flight plan includes an OPDEF with a fuel penalty, then all fuel figures shown on the Cirrus plan will have had this penalty already accounted for in the calculations.
However, if a failure occurs during the subsequent flight that requires an FMS fuel penalty to be applied, crews should consider removing any previously entered figures from the Fuel & Load page and allow the FMS to adjust the fuel plan as required.
Alternatively, the existing fuel figures from Cirrus could be corrected by the penalty factor.
A significant penalty will then
increase the reserve fuel quantity as well as the fuel to the alternate (so long as the flight plan to the alternate has been correctly completed).
Fuel imbalance / non-standard distribution after refuelling
FCOM > Procedures > Normal Procedures > SOP > Before Start Clearance
During refuelling, a significant imbalance has occasionally developed between the wing tanks (up to 2700 kg). Investigations have revealed that this imbalance has been caused by a slow gravity transfer from one of the wings tanks to the centre tank, which in turn has occurred due to the refuelling operative using a slightly incorrect sequence in pressurising the fuel lines on the bowser and making certain selections on the refuel panel. After refuelling, FCOM guidance (PRO-NOR-SOP-70 Before Start Clearance > Loadsheet) requires crews to check that, in addition to the correct quantity being loaded, the fuel is also correctly balanced. To correct a significant imbalance, engineering should attend the aircraft to manually balance the fuel. While there is no guidance on what constitutes a significant imbalance, it is worth bearing in mind that the FUEL WINGS NOT BALANCED alert will be triggered once the imbalance reaches 3000 kg (matching the FCOM limitation). If this occurs,
e.g. due to APU fuel burn from the left wing tank and/or fuel ‘sloshing’ during ground manoeuvring, then the only means of balancing the fuel via this procedure is to use the external refuel panel – which clearly requires returning to stand and getting an engineer to attend.
RR Trent XWB-97 oil ‘gulping’ during engine start
FCOM > Procedures > Normal Procedures > SOP > Engine Start
During the first minute of engine start, a significant drop in engine oil quantity can be seen on the ENG SD page. This effect is acknowledged by Rolls-Royce and is included in the FCOM. It is common to see a drop of the order of 8-10 qts and, as the FCOM states, under some circumstances the indication may even reach 0 before recovering to normal levels as the engine warms up. In practice, while oil quantities are being filled to full during each ETOPS transit check, it is unlikely that
an indication of 0 would be seen in BA operations. But the effect is noticeable and one to be aware of.
Before Takeoff -checklist display on the MFD
FCOM > Normal Procedures > SOP > Taxi
Due to display limitations, the Before Takeoff -checklist does not quite fit onto a single MFD page.
This has occasionally resulted in some crews omitting to tick the first few checklist items, following a seemingly uncommanded downward ‘jump’ of the checklist during taxi-out.
This ‘jump’ can be caused either by an accidental movement of the KCCU wheel or by the flight crew pressing the T.O CONFIG pb while the checklist is displayed on the MFD.
Pressing the T.O CONFIG pb causes the checklist to scroll to the bottom, consequently hiding the first few checklist lines from view.
To avoid this, crews should
(i) be aware of this potential trap, and
(ii) display the Before Takeoff -checklist only once the relevant procedural items in the Taxi SOP have been completed, i.e. A/BRK pb armed and T.O CONFIG pb pressed (iaw FCOM PRO-NOR-SOP-100).
Doing so should avoid any unintended scrolling of the checklist.
Reversion to Direct Law after shutdown of one engine during taxi out
FCOM > Normal Procedures > Supplementary Procedures > Engine > One Engine Taxi
In case of unforeseen delays during taxi out, some crews may decide to shut an engine down to conserve fuel. Doing so will result in reversion to Direct Law after ca. 5-10 minutes, because the FQMS is programmed to erase all weight data from itself after either engine is switched off.
Without valid weight data for the PRIMs, the aircraft cannot remain in Normal Law while on the ground and consequently reverts to Direct Law. Although perhaps a little alarming, this is not really an issue because the first line of the accompanying ECAM alert for F/CTL DIRECT LAW (PROT LOST) instructs the crew to re-enter the ZFW & ZFWCG values.
As soon as this is done, Normal Law is restored.
Depending on when the engine is started up again, the alert may trigger once more but it can be cleared by a further re-entry of the weight data.
It is also worth noting that
while the FCOM describes the procedures for planned one engine taxi at departure, a little interpolation may be necessary in the case where normal a two-engine taxi out is essentially converted into one-engine taxi at departure: In this situation, it can be useful to review the guidance and procedures for one-engine taxi at arrival first and then, having shut an engine down, to carefully follow the procedures for one-engine taxi at departure.
EFfect of Cost Index on cruise speed
The A350 has an advanced, highly efficient wing that is designed to fly at an optimum speed of approximately M0.85.
Airbus have advised us that, consequently, changing the Cost Index will not result in significant variations in cruise Mach number but will of course affect the climb and descent speeds. Only at
very high CI values will the cruise speed (and fuel consumption) be significantly affected
Automatic Emergency Descent (AED) function
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 22-AFS Flight Guidance > AP/FD Modes > Descent > EMER DES
The FCOM provides much detailed information about how the AED function operates as well as how the target descent altitude sent to the AFS-CP is determined.
This altitude is based on the 40NM MORA corrected by an envelope margin, with a minimum value of FL100. One aspect that the FCOM does not describe is what happens if the AED function activates while the aircraft is flying towards an area of rising or falling terrain elevation.
Airbus have advised us that the AFS-CP target altitude will be updated if the 40NM MORA value changes during the descent, and while the EMER DES vertical mode is engaged.
However, once the aircraft has levelled off and ALT mode has engaged, then there will be no further changes to the target altitude and, fairly obviously, the EMER DES mode will
not re-engage or climb the aircraft to avoid higher terrain ahead
At the time the A350 was designed, it was not possible to build a windshield heating system that adequately heated the full extent of the two forward-facing cockpit windshields. Consequently, the area near to, and on either side of the central pillar is prone to misting up in flight.
On a longer flight, this moisture can turn into a thin layer of frost.
This is a known phenomenon and is the reason why the aircraft is fitted with the WINDSHIELD DEFOG pb on the AIR overhead panel. Selecting the button ‘on’ will remove the frost and keep the entire window clear for the remainder of the flight. Aircraft from……. onwards are fitted with an improved windshield design that should make this frosting a less common occurrence
WBD / MSN 374
To avoid the possibility of non-compliance with datalink requirements (especially in the North Atlantic HLA), flight crew should ensure that the ‘HF VOICE’ memo is displayed on the WD – and here’s why:
All A350s are equipped with the HF datalink function. While this function is technically available, the slow data transmission rate of HF does not meet the necessary standards for flight in PBCS airspace – only Satcom and VHF datalink do so. Therefore, an aircraft operating with only an HF datalink connection would not be compliant with the datalink requirements applicable in the NAT HLA between FL290-410. In the event that Satcom and VHF datalink connections fail or become otherwise unavailable, the aircraft’s communication systems will automatically attempt to establish an HF datalink connection – if one of the active HF frequencies is set to DATA. Because an HF datalink connection is not compliant with PBCS requirements, we need to stop this automatic datalink ‘downgrade’ to HF. This can be achieved by ensuring that both HF frequencies are tuned to voice-only frequencies – which is confirmed by the display of ‘HF VOICE’ on the WD
After performing a long turn at a shallow bank angle (less than 5 deg), it is possible to see a discrepancy between the bank angle indicated on the PFD and that shown on the SFD.
The SFD corrects itself within about 30-45 seconds and no AML entry or maintenance action is required. This behaviour is now described in
the FCOM FCOM DSC-34-NAV-30-30 00003151.0001001
AFDX switch failures and numerous ECAM alerts
FCOM PRO-ABN-AVNCS AVIONICS NETWORK SWITCH/CABLE FAULT (NETWORK DEGRADED)
Occasionally a switch within the avionics network can fail (‘switches’ being elements of the network that manage communications between aircraft systems) – resulting in a series of ECAM alerts associated mainly with backup/secondary systems.
While the number of ECAMs may make the problem appear serious, on closer inspection the failures usually consist of redundant systems with limited impact on the operation. In the instances when this has happened, access to the ATC Mailbox has been lost – with a consequent loss of CPDLC and ADS capability (which can of course have implications for flight in the NAT HLA). At other times, the ATC Mailbox has remained available, but access to the ATC COM page (on the FMS) has been lost, resulting in an inability to connect to/converse with ATC.
In case you cannot access the ATC COM page, Airbus recommends
cycling the displays around using the CAPT(F/O) OIS ON CENTER pb. Doing so transfers the FMS pages to one/both of the outer DUs, where the ATC COM page should be usable again. Airbus monitors the fleet for AFDX failures on an on-going basis and endeavour to contact BA should a failure occur. Therefore, if you experience a series of seemingly disparate failures, Maintrol should usually be able to provide further information from Airbus to confirm what has occurred.
IFLD assessment: Why is the default autobrake setting in the LDG PERF app set to “BRK MED”?
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 46 – OIS > Controls and Indicators > OIS > EFB – LDG PERF
Most of the time we use BTV on landing. So why is the default autobrake setting in the LDG PERF application set to “BRK MED”, especially when the FCOM states that “[w]hen BTV is used, the flight crew selects Manual in order to compute the maximum braking performance.”?
As per the FCOM statement above, when using BTV it is absolutely correct to compute the landing performance with the braking mode set to ‘Manual’. However, in operational terms it can often be sensible to perform the computation using the more conservative “BRK MED” -setting. This is because there are a number of plausible reasons why BTV might revert to BRK MED on short finals.
If this reversion does occur, then
because the “BRK MED” setting was used by default, we can be assured that our computation is valid even in the event of reversion.
IFLD assessment: What CG value should be used in the LDG PERF application?
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > 46 – OIS > Controls and Indicators > OIS > EFB – LDG PERF
When using the LDG PERF application, the software asks the flight crew to enter a value for the LDG CG.
This information is not included on the preliminary loadsheet, and in practice can only be calculated if the crew were to use the LOADSHEET application (which would automatically populate the LDG CG field).
In the absence of specific FCOM guidance, crews can either:
• use the GWCG displayed on the Permanent Data of the SD page (because the CG will not change significantly between the time when the landing performance computation is usually done and actual landing), or
• use the ZFWCG value from the preliminary loadsheet as a close approximation of the LDG CG, especially if wishing to check landing performance a long time before landing.
Ground stability message
OM B 2.9.9.c Ground Stability Message / Ground Operations Manual 5.7.1.2 Ground Stability
If the weight difference between the content of the forward and aft holds exceeds a specified value, then an ACARS message may be sent to the aircraft containing the advisory note specified in OM B 2.9.9.c. Specifically, this note states that the SCCM should liaise with the ground staff upon arrival to establish the disembarkation procedure.
This note may also be shown on the Final Figures message.
Apart from advising the SCCM that the disembarkation may need to be amended after consulting the ground staff, no other actions are required from the flight crew.
If the loading is such that the weight differential is exceeded, the ground stability message is also transmitted to the arrival station and
the procedures in GOM 5.7.1.2 will be followed
Engine anti-ice (EAI) and the ICE NOT DETECTED -memo
FCOM > Aircraft Systems > Ice and Rain Protection > System Description > Ice Detection
Having turned the EAI on for flight through icing conditions, once back in clear air there is no need to wait for the ICE NOT DETECTED -memo before the EAI can be switched off again. The reason is the following:
The A350 is fitted with an Ice Detection system that constantly monitors and warns of ice accretion in flight. After switching the EAI on for flight through icing conditions, if no ice has been detected during the preceding 130 seconds, then the ICE NOT DETECTED -memo will be displayed on the WD.
On the other hand, if more than 0.5mm of ice builds up on the probes but for some reason the EAI is switched off, then an ECAM alert for A-ICE ICE DETECTED will be displayed, directing the crew to turn the EAI back on.
However, if no ice accretion is detected before this memo is displayed and once out of icing conditions, the EAI can still be switched off safe in the knowledge that no spurious ECAM alert(s) will be triggered
Approval of RNP AR approaches
OM A 8.23 and FCOM
Although the A350 fleet has generic approval for RNP AR operations, all flight crew should note that such procedures must not be flown unless specifically authorised for BA operations by OM C and/or Loreto briefing entry (refer to paragraph ii. of
OM A 8.23.4.f Operating Procedure for RNP AR Approaches).
Use of APP-DES | NAV mode
FCOM > Normal Procedures > SOP > Approach > Aircraft Guidance Management
As stated in FCOM, the APP-DES mode can only be used for flying RNP AR and RNAV Visual approaches. While this mode might be appealing to use for flying other curved approaches, such as the RNAV (GPS) Z 13L approach at JFK, this is unfortunately not permitted.
The underlying reason for this restriction is
largely down to a lack of certification: Unless the approach in the FMS database is coded as an AR approach, the lateral and vertical deviation scales will not be displayed on the PFD.
Therefore, if the APP-DES mode were to be used for a non-AR approach, there would be no approved means of monitoring the vertical profile when descending in IMC. (In contrast, the FINAL APP mode on the A320 – which is a close relative of the APP-DES mode – presents a vertical ‘brick’ to permit monitoring of the vertical profile, which meets the minimum certification requirement).
However, in the case of an RNAV visual approach, lateral and vertical navigation is based solely on visual cues and thus the APP-DES mode can be used legitimately for flying these approaches in, obviously, visual conditions.
If JFK were to one day become a regular destination for the A350 fleet (no, this is not a rumour!), then BA would obtain authorisation to fly the state-published RNP AR approach to 13L and include it within the FMS database. Having done so, crews could then take full advantage of the aircraft capability to fly this trickier approach with great ease.
Simultaneous operation of slats/flaps with landing gear
FCOM > Normal Procedures > SOP > Approach > Aircraft Guidance Management
Unlike on some other Airbus types, simultaneous operation of slats/flaps (collectively the high lift system or “HLS”) and the landing gear system (“LGS”) is not recommended on the A350.
The reason for this, according to Airbus, is that: “both the HLS and LGS are big consumers of hydraulic resources.
As a consequence, simultaneous operations of HLS and LGS is not recommended due to the very high demand on hydraulic consumption.
There are two consequences of simultaneous operations on HLS and LGS:.
• operation of the HLS and LGS will be slower
• such an intense use of the hydraulic system is not foreseen as routine operations for the endurance life of the hydraulic system.
Then, even if hydraulic system is able to supply full power to both HLS and LGS, such intensive use of the hydraulic system should remain for specific situations.”
So – while simultaneous use is not prohibited, it should be avoided where possible for the reasons stated
Spurious L/G GEAR NOT DOWN -warning on approach
FCOM > Abnormal and Emergency Procedures > L/G > L/G GEAR NOT DOWN
Some crews have received a L/G GEAR NOT DOWN -alert after selecting Flaps 3 on approach with the landing gear still up.
In all cases, the aircraft has been asked to slow down early while established on long finals.
However, the FCOM does not contain a specific restriction or limitation that would prohibit flight in this configuration – so why has the warning been triggered? The reason is that,
under normal circumstances, the aircraft uses four separate parameters to trigger the warning (see the reference above for details).
One of these is the radio altimeter reading, and if the aircraft descends below 750 ft RA with the gear still up, the alert will be triggered.
However, if one of the four parameters is not available, then the alert is triggered using only the three remaining parameters.
The radio altimeter only provides valid readings below 5500 ft AGL and, consequently, if above this height, then this parameter is discounted.
In practice this means that if ATC tell you to slow down on long finals and
• the aircraft is above the radio altimeter upper limit of 5500 ft AGL, and
• the gear is still up … then when you select Flaps 3, a spurious L/G GEAR NOT DOWN warning will be triggered.
Landing gear extension on final approach & braking Pre-Land Test (PLT)
FCOM > Normal Procedures > SOP > Approach > Aircraft Configuration Management
Flight data analysis indicates that, on occasions, crews have selected ‘gear down’ late on approach – and at a point which risks the braking PLT still being in progress at touchdown.
As described in the FCOM, the PLT tests all braking modes in sequence and lasts nearly 2 mins from selecting ‘gear down’ on approach.
Clearly, if the brakes happen to be pressurized at touchdown due to the PLT, tire degradation in the form of ‘bald spots’ can occur – and is obviously something to be avoided.
While the FCOM does not specify a minimum altitude for extending the landing gear, using a bottom line of ca. 2000 ft AAL on a standard 3 deg approach is advisable.
If intercepting the final approach from a particularly low platform altitude, then crews should agree
a point at which the gear will be lowered (e.g. shortly before glidepath intercept).
One engine taxi
FCOM > Normal Procedures > Supplementary Procedures > Engine
One engine taxi at arrival is very straightforward and, due to the amount of residual thrust produced by just one engine, presents no manoeuvring problems.
As always, an element of anticipation or “reading the road ahead” is required, but from the experience gained so far this is a very manageable technique and one we encourage you to consider.
Engine shutdown may be performed 5 minutes after “high thrust operations”, however as stated in FCOM PRO-NOR-SOP-250, “idle thrust and normal thrust to manoeuvre during taxi (i.e. at or near idle) are not considered high thrust operations”.
With a typical runway occupancy time of 60-70 seconds, this means that one engine could be shut down within approximately 4 min of vacating the runway. It is also worth noting that while the APU is not required to be on during one engine taxi, some inconvenient electrical load-shedding will occur if Engine 2 is shut down and the APU is off (refer to the FCOM procedure). One engine taxi at departure is also an approved FCOM procedure. That said, use of this procedure for departure requires
careful consideration. However, it may occasionally be helpful in conserving fuel in the event of unforeseen taxi delays.
Loss of G and Y hydraulic pressure after engine shutdown / quick restart
After landing, if both engines are shut down and then re-started within 5 minutes, the G and Y hydraulic systems will not be available after engine start (indicated by the HYD G+Y SYS PRESS LO ECAM warning).
This is due to hydraulic system logic which essentially forces both systems to briefly depressurise after the completion of a flight (which is defined by the shutdown of both engines after landing). While this is usually not an issue for us, an example of when this could turn into a problem is if there is a long wait before a stand becomes available after landing:
To conserve fuel, some crews might decide to shut both engines down while waiting on the taxiway and use the APU instead. However, if the situation then changes and the engines need to be restarted with little notice, the G and Y hydraulic systems will not be available – unless both engines were switched off for at least 5 minutes. This aspect of the hydraulic system is not currently described in the FCOM. The system logic will be corrected by a future software standard due for release in late 2023. In the interim, crews should bear this misbehaviour in mind, if faced with a situation akin to the one described above. Note: This misbehaviour is only seen
(i) after landing, and
(ii) if both engines are shut down and restarted within 5 minutes.
Remote hold (at departure) and/or one engine taxi procedures (either at departure or on arrival) are not affected.
Reporting suspected hard landings
FCOM > Limitations > Aircraft General > Weights > Hard and/or Overweight Landings
The A350 has a multitude of sensors to detect structural loads on the airframe. The aircraft analyses each landing automatically and if it suspects that a structural overload may have occurred, a report will be sent to Airbus and BA Engineering.
However, this transmission may take some time to reach its recipients, and hence there may well be a delay between the aircraft arriving on stand and engineering becoming aware of a potential hard landing.
The FCOM Limitations -section states that: “Any suspected hard landing must always be recorded in the AML and reported by ASR.” The initial engineering inspections are usually not onerous in the slightest, and indeed BA Engineering would very much prefer flight crew to err on the side of caution when deciding whether a landing was hard or not. Note that, unlike some other types, the A350 does not have an automatic print-out function to indicate a potential hard landing, and consequently the whole process is largely reliant on
the flight crew’s perception, judgement and proper reporting.
Recording of system resets in AML / eLog
Although not a specific requirement in OM A or the AML User Guide, BA Engineering have requested that flight crew should record any system reset in the AML, even if the reset was successful in restoring the affected system. This allows
trends to be monitored – e.g. if a system requires resets on consecutive occasions then a history of AML entries will allow the issue to be picked up and addressed appropriately.
Recording of Autolands in the eLog
OM A 8.22.12.d / A350 eLog User Guide
Following an autoland, crews should record the required details in the eLog by creating an entry before closing the flight (go to Reporting > Observations > Autoland carried out).
The entry should be made in the format specified in OM A 8.22.12.d Recording of Autolands.
Furthermore, when closing the flight, toggle the Autoland field to ‘Successful’ (assuming it was!) and copy the text from the Autoland defect into the ‘Remarks’ box. The A350 eLog User Guide (page 17 – Post Flight / Low Visibility Operations) has been updated to reflect these revised procedures.
The reason for this duplicated process is that the
the eLog currently has a software limitation which means that the necessary details are not automatically transmitted to the Engineering system which monitors autoland performance.
