74a9-75b3 Flashcards
σκόπει δή, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει. φαμέν πού τι εἶναι ἴσον, οὐ ξύλον λέγω ξύλῳ οὐδὲ λίθον λίθῳ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα ἕτερόν τι, αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον· φῶμέν τι εἶναι ἢ μηδέν;
‘Then consider whether these things are so. We say, I suppose, that there is something equal - I don’t mean a log to a log, or a stone to a 10 stone, or anything else of such things, but something further besides all those, the equal itself: [74b] are we to say that there is something or nothing?”
φῶμεν μέντοι νὴ Δί᾽, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας, θαυμαστῶς γε.
ἦ καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν;
πάνυ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς.
“Certainly we say [so] yes by Zeus”, said Simmias,“amazingly”
“And do we know what it is?”
“Certainly”, he said.
πόθεν λαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἐξ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἢ ξύλα ἢ λίθους ἢ ἄλλα ἄττα ἰδόντες ἴσα, ἐκ τούτων ἐκεῖνο ἐνενοήσαμεν, ἕτερον ὂν τούτων; ἢ οὐχ ἕτερόν σοι φαίνεται; σκόπει δὲ καὶ τῇδε. ἆρ᾽ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται,
τῷ δ᾽ οὔ;
πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
“Having taken the knowledge of it from where? Surely from the things we were just mentioning: having seen either logs or stones or any other equal things, wasn’t it from these that we thought of that [object], it being other than them? Or doesn’t it seem ‘other’ to you? Look at it this way: don’t equal stones and logs, being the very same ones, sometimes seem equal to one, but not to another?”
“Yes, certainly.”
[74c] τί δέ; αὐτὰ τὰ ἴσα ἔστιν ὅτε ἄνισά σοι ἐφάνη, ἢ ἡ ἰσότης ἀνισότης;
οὐδεπώποτέ γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστίν, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ταῦτά τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον.
οὐδαμῶς μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.
[74c] “What then? Did the equals themselves ever seem to you unequal, or equality inequality?”
“Never yet, Socrates.”
“Then those equals, and the equal itself,” he said, “are not the same thing.”
“By no means, it seems to me, O Socrates.”
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκ τούτων γ᾽, ἔφη, τῶν ἴσων, ἑτέρων ὄντων ἐκείνου τοῦ ἴσου, ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐννενόηκάς τε καὶ εἴληφας;
ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.
οὐκοῦν ἢ ὁμοίου ὄντος τούτοις ἢ ἀνομοίου;
πάνυ γε.
διαφέρει δέ γε, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, οὐδέν· ἕως ἂν ἄλλο ἰδὼν ἀπὸ [74d] ταύτης τῆς ὄψεως ἄλλο ἐννοήσῃς, εἴτε ὅμοιον εἴτε ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη, αὐτὸ ἀνάμνησιν γεγονέναι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
“But still, it is from those equals,” he said, “being different from that equal, that you have thought of and got the knowledge of it?”
“You speak,” he said, “most truly.”
“It being either similar to them or dissimilar?”
“Certainly.”
“It makes no difference;” he said, “so long as having seen one thing, [74d] from this sight you think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must be,” he said, “ recollection.”
“Certainly.”
τί δέ; ἦ δ᾽ ὅς· ἦ πάσχομέν τι τοιοῦτον περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ξύλοις τε καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τοῖς ἴσοις; ἆρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὃ ἔστιν, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν;
καὶ πολύ γε, ἔφη, ἐνδεῖ.
“What then,” he said. Do we experience some such thing with regard to the instances both in the logs, and the equals we mentioned just now? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same way as what it is itself, or do they fall short of it at all in being such as the equal, or not?”
“Very far,” he said, “do they fall short of it.”
οὐκοῦν ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅταν τίς τι ἰδὼν ἐννοήσῃ ὅτι βούλεται μὲν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ὁρῶ εἶναι οἷον ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων, [74e] ἐνδεῖ δὲ καὶ οὐ δύναται τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ἴσον] οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν φαυλότερον, ἀναγκαῖόν που τὸν τοῦτο ἐννοοῦντα
τυχεῖν προειδότα ἐκεῖνο ᾧ φησιν αὐτὸ προσεοικέναι μέν, ἐνδεεστέρως δὲ ἔχειν;
ἀνάγκη.
“Then whenever anyone, having seen a thing, considers that this thing which I now see wants to be some other sort of thing than the things that are, and [74e] it fails and cannot be such as that equal, but is more trifling, it is necessary that the person considering this happens to have known before that thing to which it is like, bout is more deficient.”
“[There is] necessity”
τί οὖν; τὸ τοιοῦτον πεπόνθαμεν καὶ ἡμεῖς ἢ οὒ περί τε τὰ ἴσα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον;
παντάπασί γε.
ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα ἡμᾶς προειδέναι τὸ ἴσον πρὸ ἐκείνου τοῦ [75a] χρόνου ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἰδόντες τὰ ἴσα ἐνενοήσαμεν ὅτι ὀρέγεται μὲν πάντα ταῦτα εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἔχει δὲ ἐνδεεστέρως.
ἔστι ταῦτα.
“What then? have we too experienced some such thing or not, with regard to the equals and the equal itself?”
“Totally.”
“Then it is necessary that we previously have known the equal, before that [75a] time when we first, having seen the equals, thought that all of them were reaching out to be like the equal but were more lacking.”
“That is so.”
ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἔκ τινος ἄλλης τῶν αἰσθήσεων· ταὐτὸν δὲ πάντα ταῦτα λέγω.
ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρός γε ὃ βούλεται δηλῶσαι ὁ λόγος.
ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων δεῖ ἐννοῆσαι ὅτι [75b] πάντα τὰ ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκείνου τε ὀρέγεται τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἴσον, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐνδεέστερά ἐστιν· ἢ πῶς λέγομεν;
οὕτως.
“Yet we also agree on this: we haven’t derived the thought of it, nor is it possible to derive the thought, but from seeing or touching or some other of the senses. I’m saying all these as the same thing.”
“Yes, [they are the same], O Socrates, at least in regard to what the argument wishes to show.”
‘But of course it is from one’s sense-perceptions that one must think that [75b] all the things in the sense-perceptions are striving for that which is “equal” yet are inferior to it; or how shall we put it?”
Like that
πρὸ τοῦ ἄρα ἄρξασθαι ἡμᾶς ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ τἆλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι τυχεῖν ἔδει που εἰληφότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου ὅτι ἔστιν, εἰ ἐμέλλομεν τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἴσα ἐκεῖσε ἀνοίσειν, ὅτι προθυμεῖται μὲν πάντα τοιαῦτ᾽ εἶναι οἷον ἐκεῖνο, ἔστιν δὲ αὐτοῦ φαυλότερα.
“Then it must, surely, have been before we began to see and hear and perceiving otherwise that we happened to have got knowledge of the equal itself, what it is, if we were going to refer the equals from our sense perceptions to ther, supposing that all things are desiring to be like that, but are more trifling than it.”
ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ὦ Σώκρατες.
οὐκοῦν γενόμενοι εὐθὺς ἑωρῶμέν τε καὶ ἠκούομεν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις εἴχομεν;
πάνυ γε.
[75c] ἔδει δέ γε, φαμέν, πρὸ τούτων τὴν τοῦ ἴσου ἐπιστήμην εἰληφέναι;
ναί.
πρὶν γενέσθαι ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀνάγκη ἡμῖν αὐτὴν εἰληφέναι.
“[Its a necessity] from what’s been said before, Socrates.”
“Accordingly we were seeing and hearing, and had our other senses, weren’t we, just as soon as we came to be?”
“Certainly.”
[75c] “But it is necessary, we are saying, to have got knowledge of.the equal before these?’
“Yes.”
“Then it seems that [there is] necessity that we have got it before we were born.’
