Younger v. Harris Abstention Flashcards

1
Q

Younger Abstention - General Concept

A
  • absent prosecutorial bad faith or harassment, a federal court normally cannot enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution
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2
Q

Douglas v. City of Jeanette - Facts

A
  • SCOTUS 1943
  • Jehovah’s witnesses distributed religious literature without a permit in violation of a Jeanette, PA criminal ordinance -> filed class action in fed district ct trying to enjoin the threatened prosecution
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3
Q

Douglas v. City of Jeanette - Holding

A
  • SCOTUS held injunction unavaible
  • argued courts of equity don’t ordinarily enjoin crim. proceedings – would only be available if showing of danger of irreparable injury “both great and immediate”
  • in this case, “does not appear…that petitioners have been threatened with any injury other than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith”
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4
Q

Problem with Douglas According to Prof

A
  • makes it almost impossible to get the constitutionality of a state criminal statute reviewed in fed court
  • Prof also thinks this is a major problem with Younger
  • says in Douglas, the same day this case was decided, they’d also decided the constitutional issue in another case, Murdoch - in this particular case, didn’t hurt for them not to address it b/c they’d already decided it
    -> problem though in her view b/c they wind up saying fed cts don’t like to enjoin crim stats, + Douglas shouldn’t be much but grows into major Younger abstention problem
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5
Q

Pre-Dombrowski

A
  • could argue Douglas and the habeas exhaustion requirement seemed to leave little room for fed ct intervention in state crim proceedings prior to their final disposition in state court
  • functional justification: avoid piecemeal review + inevitable disruption of ongoing state proceedings
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6
Q

Dombrowski v, Pfister - Facts

A
  • 1965
  • civil rights workers needed injunction against Louisiana statutes that prosecution was being threatened under
  • complaint alleged state authorities were threatening prosecution of the Ps under these laws, not w/ any expectations of securing valid convictions, but in order to harass the civil rights org and dissuade its members from civil rights activities
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7
Q

Dombrowski - Significance

A
  • seen as a liberal victory at the time
  • BUT accidental cutback in Prof’s view - essentially unintentionally affirming the Douglas idea that you should only be able to enjoin state criminal proceedings in special circumstances (otherwise, should theoretically be able to bring a 1983 suit - 1983 is an exception to the AIA under Mitchum)
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8
Q

Dombrowski - Rule

A
  • appears to be that injunctions of state criminal prosecutions ARE generally disfavored -> you need more threatened injury “than that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith”
  • BUT you can establish irreparable injury if the statute is overbroad + has a chilling effect on 1st Am freedom of expression
  • > also noted bad faith prosecution here
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9
Q

Dombrowski - Reasoning

A
  • Brennan
  • EPY established fed cts def have power to enjoin state enforcement of an unconstitutional statute
  • BUT fed interference w/ good faith State prosecution particularly inconsistent w/ federal framework (Douglas) - should generally assume state cts follow Con. + no need to enjoin unless irreparable injury
  • BUT in this case, defense against state crim pros “will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights” - “substantial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression”-> IRREPARABLE INJURY
    ->”The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure.”
  • also noted district court could always modify injunction to allow prosecution if the state later adopts a clarifying construction of the statute
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10
Q

Dombrowski - Ruling

A
  • “We hold the abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the present one, where, unlike Douglas v. City of Jeannette, statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities.”
  • “We conclude that on the allegations of the complaint, if true, abstention and the denial of injunctive relief may well result in the denial of any effective safeguards against the loss of protected freedoms of expression, and cannot be justified.”
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11
Q

Dombrowski and Douglas

A
  • theoretically, under Douglas, bad faith alone could have decided Dombrowski -> to this extent, Brennan offered much broader basis for fed ct intervention
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12
Q

Prof’s Point Re Irreparable Harm

A
  • has always been true generally that you need irreparable injury to get an injunction , BUT Prof said this has always been measured with regard to whether there’s an adequate remedy in the FEDERAL courts, not if there’s also one in the state courts -> she’s displeased w/ Dombrowski for including the state courts as adequate
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13
Q

Dombrowski - Harlan Dissent

A
  • arguing problem b/c now state can’t carry on prosecutions under statutes challengeable on 1st Am vagueness grounds w/o prior approval of fed cts
  • emphasizing comity - says such fed supervision of state cts = unwarranted
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14
Q

Younger v. Harris - Facts

A
  • 1971
  • California Criminal Syndicalism Act - prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime or unlawful acts of violence or terrorism
  • John Harris = a socialist -> gets indicted under the statute
  • Harris claimed the law had a “chilling effect” on his freedom of speech -> filed complaint in fed district court -> 3-judge panel, relying on Dombrowski, struck down the Act because of vagueness and overbreadth + restrained the District Attorney from further prosecuting the pending action against Harris
  • note that there are other pls involved whose cases get dismissed for lack of standing (since they’re not being actively prosecuted)
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15
Q

Younger - Rule

A
  • absent prosecutorial bad faith or harassment, a fed court normally can’t enjoin a pending state criminal prosecution
  • only if the def will face irreparable harm should a fed ct intervene in proceedings that are already underway in state court
  • at the time of Younger, this only applies where prosecution underway
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16
Q

Younger - Core Holding

A
  • district court’s judgment “must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.”
  • “We express no view about the circumstances under which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun”
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17
Q

Younger - Reasoning

A
  • Black opinion

Reasons for abstaining:
- Anti-Injunction Act, from 1793, shows longstanding policy against interference by federal courts in state trials of state cases (court declines to decide if applicable in Younger - later says doesn’t bar 1983 actions in Mitchum)

  • courts of equity shouldn’t act when there’s an adequate remedy at law and there’s no irreparable injury (Prof’s point re should be ad rem in FED ct)
    -> irreparable injury must be “both great and immediate” (cost, anxiety, + inconvenience of defense in crim pro not enough, must be an injury that can’t be eliminated by defense in a single prosecution)
  • respect for state functions - comity - “Our Federalism” (“a system in which there is sensistivity to the legitimate interests of both state and national governments, and in which the national government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the state”)
  • also emphasized “federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional”
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18
Q

Fenner v. Boykin

A
  • 1926
  • suit had been brought in fed dist ct seeking enjoin state pros. under recently enacted state law that allegedly interfered w/ free flow of interstate commerce
  • held that such a suit, even with respect to state criminal proceedings not yet formally instituted, could be proper only under very special circumstances
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19
Q

Fenner - Reasoning

A
  • gets quoted in Younger
  • “Ex parte Young, and following cases have established the doctrine that, when absolutely necessary for protection of constitutional rights, courts of the United States have power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal actions.”
  • BUT “may not be done except under extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.”
  • ordinarily, shouldn’t be any interference - state officers are charged w/ duty of prosecuting those who violate state laws, + accused should try to defend in state ct, even though involves a challenge of the validity of some statute, unless “plainly appears that this course would not afford adequate protection.”
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20
Q

Younger - Dombrowski

A
  • reframes Dombrowski
  • basically argues anything in Dombrowski that suggested you could get an injunction where a statute was overbroad + had a chilling effect on expression, without bad faith + without meeting “long-established standards” for equitable relief, are just dicta
  • “‘chilling effect’…should not by itself justify federal intervention”
  • argues to be able to test stats otherwise in fed cts (challenging stat on its face + getting inj until state adopts limiting construction) = “fundamentally at odds with the function of the federal courts in our constitutional plan” (seems to argue otherwise wouldn’t really have case or controversy concrete enough to decide the con issues)
  • “we hold that the Dombrowski decision should not be regarded as having upset the settled doctrines that have always confined very narrowly the availability of injunctive relief against state criminal prosecutions”
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21
Q

Younger - Brennan

A
  • in book, his concurrence basically just says no bad faith so Harris can bring his claim fairly in state court
  • BUT Prof was of the opinion that Brennan is the reason Younger was technically limited at first to pending prosecutions
  • she thinks Brennan intended to create a pending vs. non-pending line that would allow Dombrowski to survive
  • also said this case was argued three times - thinks Brennan ultimately gave up disagreeing + concurred, but wanted to do so in a way that could influence verdict
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22
Q

Fenner v. Boykin - Former System

A
  • used to be some sort of system in which the state prosecution could continue but you could concurrently bring a suit challenging its constitutionality in fed court
  • state would have total control over own prosecution, but if statute was declared unconstitutional in fed court that would prevail
  • think Prof may have preferred this system (she’s concerned about Younger b/c it removes ability to review constitutional challenges in fed cts, vs Boykin method allows both to be decided)
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23
Q

Creep of Younger

A
  • Prof’s point in class - starts out as just no injunction against pending state crim proceedings, but expands to non-pending, to declaratory relief, + think even civil context
24
Q

Samuels v. Mackel

A
  • 1971
  • companion case decided on same day as Younger
  • held that policies of Younger ALSO foreclosed federal declaratory relief against pending state prosecutions
  • “ordinarily a declaratory judgment will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings that the longstanding policy limiting injunctions was designed to avoid”
  • two reasons for this: declaratory judgment can be used as basis for injunction, and even if not, has same practical effect as a formal injunction (res judicata - taking the q out of state’s hands)
  • restricted itself to pending prosecutions - explicitly said no view expressed on propriety of declaratory relief when no state proceeding pending at t fed suit begun
25
Q

Prof’s View on Samuels v. Mackell

A
  • seemed iffy - she said declaratory judgment is “a lighter touch”, but acknowledged it has similar effects
  • also noted almost all of the time, if there’s a rule about injunctions, it applies to declaratory judgments as well
26
Q

Mitchum v. Foster

A
  • decides 1983 DOES fall within the “expressly authorized” exception of the Anti-Injunction Act
  • think Prof hinted although this wasn’t decided in Younger, it was pretty much made necessary by it (b/c otherwise could’ve just decided Younger on the AIA basis)
  • court also says as much in op. - if NOT within AIA exception, would need to overrule Younger + companion cases to the extent they suggest “permissibility of injunctive relief against pending criminal prosecutions in certain limited and exceptional circumstances”
  • not that it also kind of reaffirms Younger though - says at end it’s not questioning/qualifying “principles of equity, comity, or federalism that must restrain” fed cts asked to enjoin state proceedings, just saying they have power to do so
27
Q

Mitchum - Leg History of 1983

A
  • emphasizes leg history as making it clear that Congress saw 1983 as altering relationship of fed + state wrt federally created rights - “concerned that state instrumentalities could not protect those rights” + “state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights” + “these failings extended to the state courts”
  • “vast transformation” of concepts of federalism that prevailed when AIA enacted
28
Q

Steffel v. Thompson - Facts

A
  • Pet + others distributed pamphlets on Vietnam at shopping center -> declined to leave when asked -> police called + told them leave or they’d be arrested
  • came back two days later -> police called again -> pet’s companion stayed + was arrested, + pet told if he came back, he’d be arrested on crim trespass charge
  • pet wants to do so again
29
Q

Steffel - Prof’s View on Race to Courthouse

A
  • Prof pointed out this technically isn’t a race to the courthouse case because no violation has occurred yet - petitioner only told if he does it again, they’ll prosecute
  • standing issue -> Brennan overcame by saying that the threats were not “imaginary or speculative” (also separates S from the side pls in Younger whose cases got dismissed)
30
Q

Steffel - Issue

A
  • whether declaratory relief is precluded when a state prosecution has been threatened, but is not pending, and a showing of bad faith enforcement or other special circumstances has not been made
  • technically wasn’t asking for injunction here
31
Q

Steffel - Holding

A
  • Brennan opinion
  • Younger doesn’t apply when prosecution is merely threatened
  • regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, federal declaratory relief is not precluded when no state prosecution is pending and a federal plaintiff demonstrates a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state criminal statute (Prof did note Brennan would’ve granted inj here)
32
Q

Steffel - Reasoning

A
  • when no state proceeding pending, + thus considerations of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality, the propriety of granting federal declaratory relief may properly be considered independently of a request for injunctive relief

Emphasizes difference from Younger + Samuels - no pros pending, so:
- fed intervention doesn’t result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of state crim justice system

  • fed intervention can’t be interpreted as reflecting negatively on state ct ability to enforce con principles
  • “while a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is pending may place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding”
33
Q

Steffel - Declaratory Relief

A
  • discusses Declaratory Judgment Act
  • basically, lots of text re declaratory relief being comparatively less forceful than injunctions + less intrusive on state admin of crim laws (Prof was a bit skeptical)
  • also emphasizes DON’T need to meet all traditional prereqs for injunction to get declaratory relief (don’t need irreparable injury)

“even though a declaratory judgment has ‘the force and effect of a final judgment,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2201, it is a much milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance with it may be inappropriate, but is not contempt.”

-“[W]hen no state prosecution is pending and the only question is whether declaratory relief is appropriate[,] . . . the congressional scheme that makes the federal courts the primary guardians of constitutional rights, and the express congressional authorization of declaratory relief, afforded because it is a less harsh and abrasive remedy than the injunction, become the factors of primary significance.” Perez v. Ledesma, (1971) (separate opinion of BRENNAN, J.).”)

34
Q

Steffel - Summary of Reasons Younger Didn’t Apply

A

-No other forum where you should be obligated to raise the claim
-There’s no state proceeding to disrupt
-State has an interest in unencumbered enforcement of its laws, which could be disrupted by a DJ on an as applied basis. But as applied rulings are minimally disruptive.
-Declaratory relief isn’t like injunctive relief anyway (because the lower court analyzed them together)
*Alternative to the “strong medicine of the injunction” — less intrusive
oInfluences prosecutorial decisions + res judicata. Not a legal bar
*Congress wants DJ where injunctions are inappropriate
*Though the DJ might be the basis for an injunction (White and Rehqnuist’s opinions)

35
Q

Steffel - White Concurrence

A
  • basically emphasizing that declaratory judgment does have some effect

“I would anticipate that a final declaratory judgment entered by a federal court holding particular conduct of the federal plaintiff to be immune on federal constitutional grounds from prosecution under state law should be accorded res judicata effect in any later prosecution of that very conduct.”

“Neither can I, at this stage, agree that the federal court, having rendered a declaratory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, could not enjoin a later state prosecution for conduct that the federal court has declared immune. Declaratory Judgment Act provides that a “declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree,” 28 U.S.C. § 2201; eminent authority anticipated that declaratory judgments would be res judicata. There is every reason for not reducing declaratory judgments to mere advisory opinions.”

36
Q

Steffel - Rehnquist

A
  • concurrence
  • basically, he seems to be arguing even if you’re allowed to get your declaratory judgment, you don’t get to later use it as a fed shield in a state prosecution
  • doesn’t think the Steffel decision “can properly be raised to support the issuance of a federal injunction based upon a favorable declaratory judgment. “

“A declaratory judgment is simply a statement of rights, not a binding order supplemented by continuing sanctions. State authorities may choose to be guided by the judgment of a lower federal court, but they are not compelled to follow the decision by threat of contempt or other penalties.”

(think Prof disagreed with him on this)

37
Q

Hicks v. Miranda - Significance

A
  • book framed this as blurring the pending/nonpending line established by Younger and Steffel
38
Q

Hicks - Facts

A
  • 1975
  • Police seized four copies of a film from an adult theater – criminal charges against two employees, + separate judicial proceedings to have the film declared legally obscene (court then determined after hearing it was + ordered all copies seized)
    -Theater owners didn’t appeal the judgment, went straight to fed court for declaration of the obscenity statute’s unconstitutionality, injunction against its enforcement, + order requiring return of the copies of the films
    -State court crim. complaint amended to add the theater owners as defendants after suit filed
    -Fed court granted relief sought
39
Q

Hicks - Holding

A
  • SCOTUS reversed – White opinion held “where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force”
40
Q

Hicks - Stewart Dissent

A
  • Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined
  • “failure to evaluate the state and federal interests as of the time the state prosecution was commenced”
    -“open invitation to state officials to institute state proceedings in order to defeat federal jurisdiction”
    -Seems like he would’ve been okay with states proceeding after the federal case started, but couldn’t be allowed to defeat fed jurisdiction
    -Steffel – says in these kinds of cases, “federal court is called upon to vindicate federal constitutional rights when no other remedy is available to the federal plaintiff
41
Q

Prof’s View on Hicks

A
  • emphasized that this ruins Brennan’s pending vs. non-pending line - no longer means race to the courthouse b/c even if fed pls win, they still don’t get to have things heard in fed court
  • as soon as you file, the state DA can bring proceedings in state court (Prof did acknowledge can’t necessarily assume this though – state DA could theoretically not notice, or might not know about Hicks v. Miranda; has quite a while to do it because of the “before any proceedings of substance on the merits” timeline)
42
Q

Doran v. Salem Inn - Facts

A

-1975
-Decided six days after Hicks v. Miranda
-Involved 3 corporations operating topless bars on Long Island – town passed ordinance against topless dancing, + corporations made dancers wear bikini tops + meanwhile brought fed suit under §1983 to declare ordinance invalid + enjoin enforcement, but day after complaint filed, one corp. resumed topless dancing + was prosecuted
- dist ct ruled ordinance uncon on its face under 1st Am + issued prelim inj restraining enforcement, + ct of app affirmed

43
Q

Doran - Ruling + Reasoning

A
  • wrt the corporation that had been prosecuted, SCOTUS held Younger and Hicks barred both injunctive + declaratory relief
    -> fact that fed action was begun first didn’t matter b/c was only “in an embryonic stage” + “no contested matter had been decided”
  • wrt the other two corporations, SCOTUS held they were entitled to relief
    -> held on the facts of the case that the issuance of injunction was not subject to Younger restrictions
44
Q

Doran - Expanded Reasoning for Pls Not Prosecuted

A

*Prior to final judgment, no established declaratory judgment comparable to prelim. injunction – w/o prelim. relief, pls might suffer unnecessary + substantial irreparable harm (in this particular case, pls had alleged substantial loss of business, possibly bankruptcy)
*Also noted neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can interfere w/ prosecution against other parties who violate the statute (state can enforce against all except the particular pls who got the injunction)
*Noted standard in granting prelim. injunction stringent (irreparable injury + likely to succeed on merits), but standard of review of district court’s decision only abuse of discretion

  • side note that pls in this case DID still have to get past the high bar of irreparable injury for injunction, but they’d alleged would go out of business if prelim inj not granted
45
Q

Huffman v. Pursue Ltd

A
  • SCOTUS 1975
  • SCOTUS concluded there was a pending state proceeding even though final judgment had been entered in the trial court
  • Rehnquist opinion – argued all the evils Younger is designed to prevent would apply in deciding something before the state appeals process had concluded (vs. before or during trial) + also noted potential of casting aspersion on state appellate courts’ capabilities + good faith
46
Q

Wooley v. Maynard

A
  • Maynards had religious objections to “Live Free or Die” motto on state license plates -> put tape over the words -> George Maynard convicted 3 times of obscuring a license plate + none of them were appealed
  • Successfully sued in fed court under §1983 to enjoin future enforcement of statute
  • State argued that needed to exhaust all state appeals under Huffman – SCOTUS distinguished because only seeking future relief, not seeking to prevent enforcement of state court judgment
  • since he’d already served all his sentences, treated as a no violation scenario for Younger purposes
47
Q

Application of Younger to Civil Proceedings

A
  • in series of early cases, Court applied Younger to a variety of civil proceedings closely allied to enforcement of the criminal law
48
Q

Huffman v. Pursue Ltd. - Civil Holding

A

YOUNGER APPLIED TO PUBLIC NUISANCE CASE (SAID IT WAS CRIMINAL-LIKE) (NOT PENDING)

49
Q

Huffman - Reasoning

A

Rehnquist for 5-majority:
-Found Younger applicable -> deal here w/ state proceeding which in important respects is more akin to crim prosecution than are most civil cases
-State was a party and the public nuisance action was both in aid of and closely related to criminal obscenity statutes
-Fact that theater, if condemned, would have no subsequent access to the fed courts through fed habeas was though immaterial

50
Q

Judice v. Vail

A
  • 1977
  • Younger applied to civil contempt proceedings because of the state interest
  • invoked Huffman

Rehnquist for 5-majority:
-Whether disobedience of a court-sanctioned subpoena, and the resulting process leading to a finding of contempt, is labeled civil, quasi-criminal, or criminal in nature, the state’s interest was of sufficiently great import to require Younger abstention

51
Q

Trainor v. Hernandez

A
  • 1977
  • White, closely divided court
  • Younger applies to pending attachment proceeding
52
Q

Trainor - Reasoning

A
  • “the fact remains that the State was a party to the suit in its role of administering its public assistance programs”
  • for fed ct to proceed would “confront the State with a choice of engaging in duplicative litigation, …or of interrupting its enforcement proceedings pending decision of the federal court at some unknown time in the future”, also taking away its own ability to eval constitutionality of the statute

-“disruption of suits by the State in its sovereign capacity, when combined with the negative reflection on the State’s ability to adjudicate federal claims that occurs whenever a federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding, leads us to the conclusion that the interests of comity and federalism on which Younger and Samuels v. Mackell primarily rest apply in full force here. “

53
Q

Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Assoc.

A
  • 1982
  • applied Younger to a bar disciplinary proceeding
  • held that the policies underlying Younger were ‘fully applicable’ to state bar disciplinary proceedings
  • Those proceedings were essentially ‘judicial’ in nature and afforded ample opportunity for fed constitutional objections to be raised and heard
  • Abstention was therefore required
54
Q

New Orleans Public Service v. Council of City of New Orleans

A
  • 1989
  • counterpoint - book uses this to show Younger doesn’t automatically apply to all civil proceedings in which state is a party
  • here, declined to apply Younger to local gov ratemaking proceeding (ratemaking seen as legislative rather than judicial)
55
Q

Sprint Communications v. Jacobs

A
  • Prof said this ironed things out
  • 2013, Ginsburg op

Three circumstances appropriate for Younger abstention:
1 - precluded fed intrusion into ongoing state crim prosecutions
2 - the one claimed here - involved application of Younger to pending ‘civil enforcement proceedings’
3 - prohibited disruption of civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions, such as the contempt proceedings in Judice v. Vail

56
Q

Sprint Communications - Civil Enforcement Proceedings

A
  • “Our decisions applying Younger to instances of civil enforcement have generally concerned state proceedings ‘akin to a criminal prosecution’ in ‘important respects.’”
  • note that it distinguishes this case in part on the grounds that it was initiated by a private corporation, not “the State in its sovereign capacity”, + also not “akin to a criminal prosecution”
  • no state authority conducted an investigation into Sprint’s activities, and no state actor lodged a formal complaint against Sprint
57
Q

Sprint Communications - Interpretation of Civ Enf Rejected

A

Court says precedents should NOT be interpreted to say Younger applies wherever:

There is (1) “an ongoing state judicial proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests, and (3) . . . provide[s] an adequate opportunity to raise [federal] challenges.”