The Civil Rights Acts - Part 2 (Continuation of Liabilities and Immunities of Indiv Officers)

Question 1

Anderson v. Creighton - Facts

Answer 1

• 1987
• FBI agent Anderson sued for making an unlawful search -> filed pre-trial motion for summary judgment

Question 2

Anderson - Majority

Answer 2

• Scalia Opinion
• framed “driving force behind Harlow’s substantial reformulation of qualified immunity principles” as desire “that ‘insubstantial claims’ against government officials be resolved prior to discovery and on summary judgment if possible”
• Harlow required inquiry into “objective reasonableness” of the action in light of “clearly established” legal rules
• Wrt Anderson, Court emphasized relevant issue was objective q of whether an officer in A’s position could’ve believed the warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law + the info they possessed
  ->Explicitly stated that “Anderson’s subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant”

Question 3

Anderson - Dissent

Answer 3

• Stevens, Brennan + Marshall
• one of the more interesting points according to Prof – his objection is that reasonableness is already built into the search and seizure standard, so if you’re adding on top of this you’re essentially double-counting for the officer (double check whether this is Anderson or a different case – Prof presented it as this case, but unsure)

Question 4

Textbook Note on Objective Test and Factual Evaluations

Answer 4

• even though part of rationale for objective test was to decide the issue early, before discovery + trial, determination of whether def has violated clearly established law will sometimes depend on factual eval. of def’s motives for engaging in particular conduct
• Therefore, motive-based claims have potential to undermine some of what Court sought to achieve w/ more objective test, but potential tension reduced by Court’s adoption of heightened pleading standards in these circumstances
• keep in mind constitutional violations that have motive as part of the legal violation (1st Am retaliation, 14th Am discrimination) - instances where determining whether officer has violated clearly established law is tied to q of motive

Question 5

Prof’s View on Qualified Imm and Trial

Answer 5

• judges and legislators supposed to be protected from having to go to trial (absolute imm)
• vs. qualified immunity was supposed to protect you from damages, not from trial (you’d be tried like everyone else but couldn’t be made to pay)
• BUT court has shifted so qualified immunity also protects you from trial - Prof was not a fan

Question 6

Crawford-El v. Britton - Issue

Answer 6

• 1998
• whether Harlow-inspired protections against discovery and trial should be deployed when improper motivation is required, not to disprove qualified immunity, but to establish the underlying constitutional violation (think part of the point here is that whether or not you’ve violated clearly established law, + therefore don’t get qualified immunity, depends on whether or not you had the subjective motive)
• ex: racial discrimination requires proof of discriminatory animus, + 1st am. retaliation requires proof of a retaliatory motive – concept of cases in which subjective motivation is relevant, not to qualified immunity but to the existence of a constitutional violation

Question 7

Crawford-El - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 7

• said you COULD address improper motivation if it’s part of the constitutional violation
• specifically, didn’t make analogous change in proof of improper motivation where required by the underlying constitutional claim
• book noted though that court made clear subjective branch of qualified imm. completely eliminated (though there wasn’t really any doubt about this)
  ->”a defense of qualified immunity may not be rebutted by evidence that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated. Evidence concerning the defendant’s subjective intent is simply irrelevant to that defense” (noting b/c a bit odd how far they take this - even if malice, it’s completely irrelevant)

Question 8

Crawford-El - Burden of Proof

Answer 8

• DC Cir had ruled pl. alleging a constitutional violation that required proof of improper motive had to prove that motive by clear and convincing evidence -> SCOTUS disapproved of this req by vote of 5 to 4 (ruling seems to be in favor of those challenging qualified immunity – you don’t need to meet a higher standard in order to prove that the official you’re suing violated clearly established law + therefore can’t invoke qualified immunity)
• BUT book notes that court did say trial judges could order a reply or more definite statement from pl., + could insist that pl. put forward “specific, nonconclusory factual allegations” to establish the improper motive causing the cognizable injury in order to survive prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment (book said raised possibility that heightened PLEADING would be required even if heightened proof wasn’t)

Question 9

Ashcroft v. Iqbal - Facts

Answer 9

• 2009
• Bivens action brought by a noncitizen detainee following 9/11 terrorist attacks – claimed AG and FBI discriminated against him on basis of race, religion, + nat. origin by treating him as person of “high interest” to be confined to max security facility
• Claim required proof of purposeful discrimination by AG and Director
• defs invoked qualified immunity + moved to dismissed - couldn’t be held liable on theory of respondeat superior or deliberate indifference, only liable for intentional discrimination in the exercise of their supervisory responsibilities

Question 10

Ashcroft v. Iqbal - Impact

Answer 10

• book noted SCOTUS DID wind up imposing a heightened pleading requirement in this case, but for all civil litigation generally, not just civil rights litigation
• pls now need to be able to plausibly allege unconstitutional motivation before discovery + defs can potentially avoid discovery when specific allegations can’t be stated

Question 11

Ashcroft v. Iqbal - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 11

• Court found although complaint alleged AG and Director had adopted policy of detaining persons of “high interest” in max security facilities, it didn’t assert, apart from conclusory allegations, that they’d done so for discriminatory reasons
• Pl’s failure to make specific allegations of facts from which discriminatory motivation could be inferred led to Court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face”

Question 12

Mitchell v Forsyth - Facts

Answer 12

• 1985
• Former AG John Mitchell sued by person whose phone convos had been intercepted in a “national security” wiretap
• Mitchell claimed qualified imm. – argued uncertain legality of the wiretaps at time of the authorization

Question 13

Mitchell - Procedural Posture

Answer 13

• District Court rejected Mitchell’s claim – held Mitchell should’ve anticipated SCOTUS’ subsequent rejection of such wiretaps in United States v. United States District Court (1972 – book refers to this as “the Keith case”)
• District Court granted summary judgment against Mitchell on q of liability + scheduled trial for damages

Question 14

Mitchell - Issue

Answer 14

• whether trial court’s rejection of the immunity defense was immediately appealable (Mitchell claimed immediate appeal authorized by the “collateral order” doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. (SCOTUS 1949) )

Question 15

Mitchell - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 15

• agreed with Mitchell – argued Harlow court reframed qual. imm. to “permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment” + avoid “subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery” in cases where legal norms of violation not clearly established at t of offense
• Emphasized immunity from suit rather than defense to liability – “like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial” -> court said the reasoning that makes absolute imm. decisions immediately appealable applies equally to qual. imm. decisions – “in each case, the district court’s decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment”
• SCOTUS also held on merits that Mitchell was entitled to summary judgment on his claim of qualified immunity

Question 16

Johnson v. Jones - Facts

Answer 16

• 1995
• Jones = diabetic -> suffered insulin seizure in public -> got arrested by police who thought he was drunk + wound up in hospital with several broken ribs -> filed suit under §1983 against 5 policemen for excessive use of force during arrest + beating him at police station

Question 17

Johnson - Procedural Posture

Answer 17

• 3 officers moved for SJ on ground that Jones didn’t have evidence that they beat him or were present while others did -> Jones contested these factual assertions
• District Court denied the summary judgment motion on the ground that the record revealed genuine issues of disputed fact
• 3 officers immediately appealed -> Circuit Court distinguished from Mitchell + refused to accept jurisdiction

Question 18

Johnson - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 18

• SCOTUS agreed w/ Circuit Court – held courts were required to separate a “reviewable determination (that a given set of facts violates clearly established law) from [an] unreviewable determination (that an issue of fact is ‘genuine’)”
• Court said “simple ‘we didn’t do it’ case” presented early illustration of inappropriate interlocutory appeal

Question 19

Johnson v. Fankell

Answer 19

• 1997
• held that state courts don’t have to provide opportunity for interlocutory appeal
• reasoning was that the right to have a determination of the qualified immunity issue by the trial court “presumably has its source in §1983”, but the immediate appeal right in fed courts has its source in §1291 – the §1983 right fully protected by the state, vs. the other one is just a fed procedural right (i.e. doesn’t have to apply in a non-fed forum)

Question 20

1983 and Federal Officers

Answer 20

• §1983 applies in terms only to persons acting under color of state law
• However, under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (SCOTUS, 1971), damages actions may be brought against fed officers for violations of constitutional rights

Question 21

Butz v. Economou

Answer 21

• SCOTUS 1978
• Court concluded would be “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under §1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officers”
• Impact: book says for most purposes, immunities accorded to state + fed officers are the same, + the two lines of cases are cited interchangeably

Question 22

Instances in which Fed Officers Get Special Treatment

Answer 22

• Speech and Debate Cl (Congress)
• President’s absolute immunity from damages for official misconduct (no comparable immunity for state governors)
• BUT otherwise fed officers generally treated the same as their state + local counterparts under §1983
• Fed judges + law enforcement officers + executive personnel generally entitled to the same absolute or qualified immunity as exists under §1983 + meaning of such immunity generally the same in both contexts

Question 23

Gravel v. United States

Answer 23

• privilege from arrest has been read narrowly to permit the operation against senators + congressmen of ordinary criminal laws

Question 24

Speech and Debate Clause

Answer 24

• Article 1 Section 6
• protects members of Congress
• generally construed quite broadly + generally protects fed legislators + their aides from being prosecuted or punished in relation to any official acts

Question 25

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Answer 25

• 1982
• President’s absolute immunity from damages for official misconduct
• reasoned “unique position in the constitutional scheme” + entrusted with supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity”
• Also said would otherwise be easily identifiable target for damages suits + didn’t want cognizance of this personal vulnerability to distract President from job
• Concluded should have absolute immunity for all acts within the “outer perimeter” of presidential responsibility
• White dissented with Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun – argued scope of pres. Imm. should be determined by function, not office (might be appropriate for some acts, but abs. imm. for all too much, places Pres. Above law, + should instead have qual. imm. for some)

Question 26

Clinton v. Jones

Answer 26

• 1997
• Clinton claimed immunity from judicial process during his presidency in response to Paula Jones suit – argued could be sued for pre-presidential wrongdoings only after his term ended -> SCOTUS rejected this claim + relied on sound discretion of judges to protect sitting presidents from harassment + frivolous litigation

Question 27

Trump v. Vance

Answer 27

• State crim investigation – NY County DA’s Office served subpoena on Trump’s accounting firm -> Pres. intervened to argue sitting presidents get absolute immunity from state criminal process -> SCOTUS disagreed, invoked Clinton v. Jones + reasoned “properly tailored criminal subpoena” wouldn’t hamper performance of presidential duties

Question 28

Brousseau v. Haugen

Answer 28

• 2004
• Police officer (Brousseau) shot Kenneth Haugen in back as he attempted to flee law enforcement officers
• Haugen filed 1983 action in US District Court – alleged shot fired by Brousseau was excessive force + violated fed con. rights

Question 29

Brousseau - Procedural Posture

Answer 29

• District Court granted sj to officer, on grounds of qual. imm. -> 9th Cir. reversed under two-step process set out in Saucier v. Katz (2001) – found first that H’s 4th Am. rights had been violated + 2nd that right was clearly established + therefore no qual. imm.

Question 30

Brousseau - Broader Reasoning

Answer 30

• Standard for excessive force – Tennessee v. Garner (1985) + Graham v. Connor (1989) – establish claims of excessive force under 4th Am. to be judged under “objective reasonableness”
• SCOTUS says not reviewing the correctness of the merits, but rules 9th Cir. was wrong on the qual. imm. issue – “Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted” -> emphasizes inquiry “must be undertaken in the specific context of the case”
• Emphasizes that the right defendant is alleged to have violated must have already been “clearly established” in a particular sense – “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right”

Question 31

Brousseau - Application to the Case

Answer 31

• Asks whether at t of shooting, “it was ‘clearly established’ in th[e] more ‘particularized’ sense that she was violating Haugen’s Fourth Amendment right”
• Winds up saying in this particular case the right wasn’t clearly established + officer’s actions in “hazy” area, but seems highly problematic b/c court also says “result depends very much on the facts of each case” in this area, which would seem to suggest it is extremely difficult to have a 4th Am. case where the law is clearly established

Question 32

Brousseau - Prof’s View

Answer 32

• very unhappy with their application of Brousseau’s facts rather than pl’s - supposed to read in light most favorable to moving party at sj phase
• highlighted they essentially take Brousseau’s word for what she believed here, they’re not supposed to do this at this phase, that’s a factual thing the pl would dispute (whole bunch of info that they rely on in this case for which they don’t have any evidence at this stage)
• Appear to be using lack of malice to defend her, despite the fact that malice doesn’t matter under Harlow
• should’ve gone to a jury – there’s a lots of factual questions here, including what the officer believed + why the officer was acting, whether pl was a risk to others

Question 33

Brousseau - Stevens

Answer 33

• dissent
• thinks she clearly acted unreasonably, but not clear she’s entitled to qualified immunity + this is a question the jury should be grappling with for reasons Prof discussed above
• need the law to become clearly established so the officers know what they’re not allowed to do
• Also says they’ve previously rejected notion that you need the specific act in question to have been held unconstitutional (he’s arguing for higher level of generality)

Question 34

Hope v. Pelzer - Significance

Answer 34

• case in which SCOTUS expressly disapproved of the “materially similar” requirement the 11th Circuit had long applied (restricted “clearly established” law to that captured in local precedent “materially similar” to the case at hand)

Question 35

Hope v. Pelzer - Facts

Answer 35

• 2002
• Alabama Dept. of Corrections used “hitching post” to punish state inmates who refused to work or disrupted work squads – Hope was tied to post twice like this, both with extreme pain resulting -> Hope filed §1983 suit against the guards
• district court + 11th Cir held guards got qualified immunity

Question 36

Hope v. Pelzer - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 36

• SCOTUS reversed (Stevens opinion)
• Agreed the Alabama practices violated the 8th Amendment (pointed to Whitley v. Albers as precedent – “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”)
• Held 11th Cir. requirement for qual imm was “rigid gloss on the qualified immunity standard…not consistent with [SCOTUS’] cases”
  -> Said the req wasn’t necessary to ensure officers have notice prior to suit that conduct unlawful -> “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances”
  -> Said salient q was whether the state of the law provided the officers with “fair warning” that their conduct was illegal
• In this particular case, held there was fair notice (pointed to a 1974 11th Cir. case involving Mississippi practices of handcuffing inmates to fence + cells for long periods of time + forcing them to maintain awkward positions for long periods)
  -> Prof also noted obvious cruelty aspect in class
• Counseled against “rigid, overreliance on factual similarity”

Question 37

Excessive Use of Force

Answer 37

• Book pointed out that use of deadly force by police officers = sufficiently common that there many chances to flesh out unreasonableness of officer actions, but no two cases exactly alike -> level of generality super important in deciding “clearly established” law
• Problem especially acute in excessive force cases – Fourth Amendment standard of “objective reasonableness” (requires eval in light of totality of the circumstances)
• Book points out the underlying right already allows for reasonable mistakes by officers – problematic to provide additional protection through qualified immunity
• strong political constituency to limit qual imm for police officers in wake of George Floyd’s murder

Question 38

George Floyd Justice in Policing Act

Answer 38

• Would amend §1983 – says “shall not be a defense or immunity in any action brought under this section against a local [or state] law enforcement officer]” that def acted in good faith or reasonably believed conduct was lawful or that the rights, privs, + imms weren’t clearly established at the time of the conduct or that state of law was such that def could not reasonably have been expected to know whether the conduct was lawful
• Book says the change would go far beyond curtailing excesses of qual imm applied to highly unreasonable acts not precisely covered by precedent – would make even reasonable belief in lawfulness of one’s actions irrelevant + would apply beyond context of excessive force

Question 39

Taylor v. Barkes - Facts + Procedural Posture

Answer 39

• 2015
• Barkes committed suicide in jail -> family sued state officials for failing to supervise the private contractor that did intake screening at the facility
• Third Circuit denied qualified imm – found clearly established right to “proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention controls”

Question 40

Taylor v. Barkes - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 40

• SCOTUS reversed
• said none of its decisions clearly established such a right or even discussed it
• Then went on to say Third Circuit precedent on the right was unclear, but in the process, it said “Assuming for the sake of argument that a right can be ‘clearly established’ by circuit precedent despite disagreement in the [other] courts of appeals” -> book notes this point of circuits not being able to rely on own precedents hadn’t been doubted previously + now remains an open q

Question 41

Ziglar v. Abbasi

Answer 41

• 2017
• Supreme Court refused to allow a Bivens action against senior federal officials + prison wardens alleged to have subjected unauthorized noncitizens to intolerable conditions of confinement following 9/11
• Secondary claim made under 42 USC § 1985(3) – imposes liability on two or more persons who “conspire…for the purpose of depriving…any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws” –> SCOTUS rejected this claim on qualified immunity grounds – noted the suggestion in the case law that “officials employed by the same governmental department do not conspire when they speak to one another and work together in their official capacities” – didn’t adopt this conclusion but said b/c the conclusion was still viable the law wasn’t clearly established + defs entitled to qual imm
• Book says majority was a standard application of the clearly established rule, but Thomas dissented, saying they should review the qualified imm. precedents (he’d prefer they not have anything beyond what existed under 1871 common law)

Question 42

Wilson v. Lane and Suacier v. Katz - Significance

Answer 42

• imposed unusual sequence of decision for qualified immunity disputes
• Court hearing constitutional tort claim for money damages had to determine first whether constitutional right had been violated + if so, then decided whether defendant’s conduct nevertheless protected by qualified immunity
• Means that courts wound up adjudicating constitutional claims on their merits even when resolution didn’t affect ultimate outcome
• even though the result is weird, otherwise you could wind up with cases never being decided on the merits (the issue would just keep popping up + getting resolved on qualified imm.)
• OVERRULED IN PEARSON

Question 43

Wilson v. Lane

Answer 43

• pls claimed 4th Am rights violated when police invited Washington Post reporters to accompany them on a lawful search -> SCOTUS first ruled that media “ride-alongs” violated the 4th Amendment, but then found that, since the unconstitutionality of such actions wasn’t clearly established at the time, defs were protected by qualified immunity

Question 44

Wilson - Prof’s View

Answer 44

• Prof really doesn’t like mandatory rules on what you need to decide first – she’s pointing out that the constitutional issue may be very complex + sensitive while the qualified immunity issue is very clear -> might be preferable in some situations to just pass on the qualified immunity, dispose of the case + leave the constitutional violation for another day
• She acknowledged it did prevent the same issue from arising again and again though

Question 45

Pearson v. Callahan - Facts

Answer 45

• 2009
• dispute = question of search and seizure law – something known as “consent-once removed” (informant saw drugs, police allowed to enter w/o. warrant, but 10th Circuit said this only applied for undercover officers not informants - + that this was clearly established)

Question 46

Pearson - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 46

• SCOTUS essentially avoided the merits q (whether or not consent once-removed applied w/ informants as well as officers) + said regardless of merits this wasn’t established at t of conduct + therefore officers entitled to qualified immunity

Opinion largely focused on defects of the Wilson merits-first approach:
- Spending scarce judicial resources deciding difficult q’s that may not impact outcome of case
-Merits may be so fact-bound that resolving them has little precedential effect anyway
-Factual merits may be obscure at pleading stage, vs. qual imm possibly easier to resolve
-Briefing on law might be inadequate + judge might not give careful consideration to the merits if knows will be decided on qualified immunity anyway
-Potential difficulty of getting appellate review on merits when defendants who wished to appeal the rulings had prevailed on qualified immunity

BUT didn’t wholly forbid merits-first adjudication, just said lower court “should have the discretion to decide whether that procedure is worthwhile in particular cases”

Question 47

Reichle v. Howards

Answer 47

• 2012
• Repeated merits-avoidance approach of Pearson
• Dealt with retaliatory arrest claim under 1st Am
• Court wound up saying the law had been unsettled + therefore qualified immunity was available

Book emphasizes that in both cases, 10th Circuit took expansive view of “clearly established” law + correspondingly narrow view of qualified immunity, + Supreme Court unanimously reversed w/o reaching merits of the constitutional claims
-In both cases, SCOTUS left the circuit splits intact -> precludes “clearly established” law in future cases on similar facts

Question 48

Camreta v. Greene - Facts

Answer 48

• Arose out of suspected child abuse – jury hung, + mother sued child protective services worker + officer who’d interviewed child for damages
  -Ninth Circuit ruled officials violated 4th Am by failing to obtain warrant or parental permission to conduct the interview, but also ruled the defendants were protected by qualified immunity -> defs sought SCOTUS review on the merits

Question 49

Camreta - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 49

• SCOTUS held it “generally may review a lower court’s constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official granted immunity” (even though they prevail, can still get review by SCOTUS, though not necessarily circuit courts)
• First noted 28 USC §1254(1) authorized certiorari “upon the petition of any party” + no Article III issue as long as genuine case or controversy (true because even if qualified immunity, the ruling applies to your future conduct)
• Concept of qual imm in special category of appeals to SCOTUS brought by winners b/c they will impact future actions of gov officials
• Particularly noting the merits decisions are specifically designed to promote clarity -> counsels in favor of SCOTUS reviewing them

Court held that this particular case was moot thought, + also said “need not decide if an appellate court can also entertain an appeal from a party who has prevailed on immunity grounds”

Question 50

Camreta - Why No Decision on Circuit Courts?

Answer 50

• district court precedent isn’t binding/no precedential value - not as important to get an appeal
• courts of appeal don’t usually refer to this in determining whether constitutional rights are clearly established
• possibility SCOTUS doesn’t want to clog circuit courts (SCOTUS can always decide not to grant cert, circuit courts can’t)

Prof noted not clear the qualified immunity person can appeal to the court of appeals in these cases, but it’s also not clear that they can’t

Question 51

Camreta - Kennedy and Thomas

Answer 51

• dissent
• think there are Article III issues (not happy they’re allowed to appeal, + also doesn’t seem happy that the decisions on the merits get treated as having precedential effect)

Question 52

Bunning v. Melon

Answer 52

-Cadets sue supervisor of VMI to get the prayers stopped
-They say it’s unconstitutional for there to be a prayer + the court agrees -> issue an injunction
- Second thing they say – for damages, the defendant has qualified immunity
-But, the official retires + the cadets graduate – court says the injunction is moot but upholds the qualified immunity finding
-The prayers can’t continue because the court said they were unconstitutional – the injunction has been mooted out, so the VMI official can’t challenge it
-They’re not allowed to keep praying, but they haven’t had their full day in court because they weren’t able to appeal the injunction ruling up to SCOTUS -> this leads to the later decision in Camreta

Question 53

Objectives of Damages

Answer 53

• Compensate victims of official misconduct
• Work to deter repetition of such conduct in the future
• Also one way of affirming legal rights + educating the moral sentiments of the community
• All these goals are directly compromised by the recognition of immunity

Question 54

Compensation

Answer 54

SCOTUS has referred to this as “the basic purpose of a §1983 damages award”
-11th Amendment imposes restrictions on this front – protects states + state agencies
-Important implications of naming individuals as defendants – can be hard to identify the right one, especially if injury due to systemic failure
-Also introduces perceived unfairness of good faith error -> winds up restricting money damages b/c of qualified immunity

Question 55

Deterrence

Answer 55

• part of aim of damages -> granting immunity means you’re missing out on the opportunity to deter conduct

Question 56

Why has SCOTUS embraced qualified immunity?

Answer 56

Fear of overdeterrence (avoiding all acts that could potentially carry liability)
-This is generally a concern in torts (other actors also get deterred by money damages + might become overcautious, not just gov ones) but particularly concerning w/ officials b/c it’s often the “street-level officials” who get sued
-Book also notes distinction of often having a duty to act (vs. private cos or citizens don’t)
-Significant risk of error – often dealing w/ quick decisions
-Arg that officers can’t appropriate the benefits of their actions to themselves (in contrast to private co or actor), so if you disincentivize through damages, it leans more heavily towards overcautious behavior (b/c they don’t benefit from any risks) -> wind up not going beyond their “duty threshold”

Question 57

Carey v. Piphus

Answer 57

• 1978
• deals w/ when constitutional violation doesn’t produce ordinarily compensable injuries -> q of whether pls should be able to recover for value/importance of the rights themselves, w/o regard to personal injury
• Held that damage judgment must be limited in amount to compensation for the actual harm suffered – only nominal damages may be awarded to vindicate the declaration of rights
  -2 kids suspended w/o due process –> court of appeals ruled they were entitled to substantial damages w/o proof of injury
  -SCOTUS reversed – not reasonable to assume distress regardless of circumstances

Question 58

Memphis Community School District v. Stachura

Answer 58

• 1986
• teacher suspended after complaints from parents re sex ed -> claimed 1st Am. + due process violations -> trial judge told jury it could award damages based on value or importance of constitutional right violated (in addition to ordinary compensatory + punitive)
• o SCOTUS disapproved the instruction - Non-punitive damages under §1983 must be designed to compensate for actual injuries, not just vindicate jury’s perception of abstract importance of a constitutional right

Question 59

Official Immunity and Prospective Relief

Answer 59

*Book notes that most immunity decisions involve damages, but q’s occasionally arise regarding official immunity from prospective relief
-Traditional view, dating to at least Ex Parte Young, says unconstitutional acts by state officials can be enjoined
-But state legislatures have absolute immunity against §1983 injunctions (Tenney v. Brandhove (1951))
-Rule parallels Speech or Debate Clause immunity + applies only to legislative acts, not all acts done by legislators

Question 60

Pulliam v. Allen

Answer 60

• 1984
• suit was brought to enjoin state magistrate from practice of requiring bond for non-jailable offenses + incarcerating those who couldn’t make bail
  ->No adequate alternative remedy available due to short duration of each pretrial detention + recurring nature of the practice (ordinarily, either habeas or appeal would’ve been sufficiently “adequate” remedy to preclude equitable relief)

SCOTUS held judges don’t have absolute immunity against injunctions
- judges, like legislators, are absolutely immune from awards of damages for their official acts, but unlike legislators, they can be sued for injunctive or declaratory relief

Question 61

Pulliam and Congress

Answer 61

• Congress amended §§1983 and 1988 to overrule Pulliam
• See book for specifics of new text: basically, you can’t grant injunctive relief in action against judge unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable
• 1988 – attorneys’ fees – prevailing parties in 1983 cases have opportunity to get attorneys’ fees (Prof says this is one reason why people like to sue under this) – even if judge is immune from damages, would need to pay out attorneys’ fees -> this is why 1988 winds up getting amended