For What Wrongs Part 2

Question 1

Zinermon v. Burch - Facts

Answer 1

• 1990
• sued physicians, administrators, and staff members of the hospital (only sued the people)
• alleges pets deprived him of liberty without DP by admitting him to state mental hospital as “voluntary” mental patient when he was incompetent (+ Ds knew or should have known he was incompetent) to give informed consent to his admission
• D claim they are protected under Parratt-Hudson because deprivation was random/ unauthorized and they had postdeprivation tort remedies

Question 2

Zinermon v. Burch - Issue

Answer 2

• whether the Parratt rule necessarily means that Burch’s complaint fails to allege any deprivation of DP b/c he was constitutionally entitled to nothing more than what he received – an opportunity to sue petitioners in tort for his allegedly unlawful confinement (postdeprivation remedy)

Question 3

Zinermon v. Burch - Ruling

Answer 3

• Blackmun
• Burch’s complaint was sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 for violation of his procedural due process rights.

Question 4

Zinermon v. Burch - Types of DP Claims

Answer 4

1) Violation of incorporated Bill of Rights right
2) Violation of substantive due process
- For (1) and (2) the violation occurs as soon as the wrongful action is taken

3) Violation of procedural due process
- Only for (3) do state procedures matter: must look to the state process and determine if it was adequate (“due”)
- True b/c the third part of due process is a guarantee of fair procedure - existence of state remedies is relevant in a special sense, since what’s unconstitutional here isn’t the deprivation itself but the fact that it occurred w/o due process of law

Question 5

Zinermon v. Burch - Parratt

Answer 5

Doesn’t apply for three reasons:

1) Deprivation not unpredictable (procedure provided no means of assessing whether voluntary admittee was competent, + any deprivation occurs at predictable place and time: when signing the form)

2) Predeprivation procedure IS practicable here (if state CAN provide predep procedure, it generally must do so)

3) Conduct here, unlike in Parratt and Hudson, was not “unauthorized” – were exercising state delegated power.

Question 6

Zinermon v. Burch - Monroe

Answer 6

• Monroe - court rejected view that § 1983 applies only to violations of constitutional rights that are authorized by state law.
• Thus overlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to question of existence of cause of action under § 1983
• only instance in which alt state remedies ARE relevant is where state has failed to provide adequate process

Question 7

Maine v. Thiboutot - Rule

Answer 7

• § 1983 suits are available whenever any federal law has allegedly been violated, and §1988 attorney’s fees are available, too.

Question 8

Maine v. Thiboutot - Facts

Answer 8

• 1980
• Ps bring § 1983 suit (in state court) against Maine and its Comm’r of Human Services for depriving them of welfare benefits under the Social Security Act

Question 9

Maine v. Thiboutot - Reasoning

Answer 9

• Brennan
• Plain language of §1983: “the Constitution and laws” – finds support in dicta of previous cases
• Counter argument: leg history (esp the jurisdictional section) indicates this was limited to civil rights / equal protection laws
  ->But it’s inconclusive – yes congresspeople discussed “equality of rights” but not clear that this was the sole purpose
  ->The text is the text

Question 10

Maine v. Thiboutot - Attorney’s Fees

Answer 10

• §1988 attorney’s fees are also available veen when you’re not suing under a civil rights law
• also available if the suit is in state court, doesn’t need to be fed

Reasoning - plain text says any action to enforce a 1983 provision, + leg history indicates drafters understood 1983 to include statutory rights at time of passage

Question 11

Maine v. Thiboutot - Powell

Answer 11

• dissent
• pointed to a bunch of fed statutes that don’t provide for private enforcement but will typically involve state + local officials in their administration

3 broad categories:

• joint fed-state reg programs
• resource management programs administered cooperatively by fed and state
• fed grant programs that either subsidize state or local activities or provide matching funds for state + local programs meeting fed standards (SSA, Food Stamps)

Question 12

Maine v. Thiboutot - Fed Regulation

Answer 12

• book pointed out that b/c there are many coop fed programs, Maine risks disrupting fed reg objectives in certain circumstances

Question 13

Maine v. Thiboutot - Impact According to Prof

Answer 13

• when court doesn’t want to hear a statutory claim, they look to legislative intent – Prof says implied remedies
• Looks at each statute to prevent Powell’s fear from coming true – did Congress intend a private cause of action
• Laws are included, but doesn’t change things a whole lot because court winds up looking to whether there’s a private right of action

Question 14

1331 vs. 1343

Answer 14

• Prof tangent
• 1331 had jurisdictional amount requirement, 1343 did not
• 1343 was considered jurisdictional requirement for 1983
• Was feared 1343 would be used to get around 1331 jurisdictional requirement
• Wind up saying only cases relating to equal rights could be brought under 1343, + other things that were laws had to be brought under 1331 + meet that jurisdictional amount requirement
• Then, 1331 stopped having a jurisdictional amount requirement in 1980 or so

Question 15

Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Or. - Facts

Answer 15

• 1979
• claims state welfare regs violated SSA

Question 16

Chapman - Issue

Answer 16

• whether fed courts had jurisdiction over such claims under the jurisdictional counterpart to § 1983, 28 USC § 1343(3) (confers subject matter jurisdiction over actions to redress deprivation of any constitutional right or act of Congress “providing for equal rights”)

Question 17

Chapman - Holding

Answer 17

• 1343 didn’t include claims of incompatibility between state welfare regs and SSA

Question 18

Chapman - Reasoning

Answer 18

• ‘secured by the constitution’ as used in § 1343(3) didn’t include rights secured by supremacy clause of Article VI
  ->would go too far, + would also make additional lingo in 1343, “act of Congress providing for equal rights” superfluous
• SSA was not itself providing for equal rights w/ in meaning of § 1343(3)

Question 19

Chapman - Stevens

Answer 19

• argued that § 1983 was in fact an act of Congress providing for equal rights and thus that § 1343(3) created fed jurisdiction for every claim brought under § 1983

Question 20

Chapman - Powell

Answer 20

• argued § 1983 and § 1343(3) should have same scope, and that the better interp would be to limit § 1983 to reach of its jurisdictional counterpart

Question 21

Chapman - White

Answer 21

• said the two were not coextensive.
• Each should get the meaning indicated by its language.
• Was alone here in finding that the two should be read independently, but position ultimately prevailed in Thiboutot

Question 22

Middlesex Cty Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assoc. - Facts

Answer 22

• 1981
• Org of commercial fisherman sued various gov authorities to stop discharge of sewage and other pollutants into NY harbor and Hudson River -> sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages
• alleged violated 2 fed acts, both authorize citizen suits but only w/ notice provisions (pls failed to give notice, + dist ct denied on that grounds, though app ct reversed)

Question 23

Sea Clammers - Issue

Answer 23

• Whether an express congressional authorization of private suits under the environmental laws might be found in § 1983

Question 24

Sea Clammers - Holding

Answer 24

• Powell
• Congress’ express provision of the private COAs in the env statutes meant it intended to supplant remedy that would otherwise have been available under 1983

Question 25

Sea Clammers - Test

Answer 25

• emphasized need to eval leg intent in deciding whether the 1983 claims survive the private COAs in the env stats
• concept that existence of a private right of action to enforce the provisions of a fed regulatory statute turns chiefly on leg intent
• leg provision of unusually elaborate enforcement mechanisms, including citizen suits for injunctive relief, precluded finding of implied authorization of additional judicial remedies

Question 26

Sea Clammers - Stevens

Answer 26

• dissent
• said should focus on whether Congress intended to WITHDRAW 1983 cause of action, not preserve it

Question 27

Wright v. Roanoke Housing Authority - Facts

Answer 27

• 1987
• Low income tenants sue public housing authority, alleging had been overbilled for utilities in violation of a fed rent ceiling
• question = whether the fed rent ceiling could be enforced via § 1983

Question 28

Wright v. Roanoke housing Authority - Holding

Answer 28

• White
• the remedial mechanisms provided aren’t sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for enforcement of tenants’ rights secured by fed law
• note that White seemed to implicitly disagree w/ Sea Clammers - insisted §1983 would be avail absent express provision or other specific evidence from stat itself that Congress intended to foreclose private enforcement

Question 29

Gonzaga University v. Doe - Rule

Answer 29

• Federal statutory right is only enforceable under § 1983 if it would be found to exist as a private right within the statute itself.

Question 30

Gonzaga University - Facts

Answer 30

• 2002
• P brought § 1983 claim against Gonzaga for violating federal statute (releasing student records without consent).

Question 31

Gonzaga University - Reasoning

Answer 31

• Rehnquist
• § 1983 provides a remedy for “rights” – the implied right of action cases should guide the determination of when a statue confers a “right” enforceable under § 1983
• Unlike with implied rights of action, P need not show a statutory intent to create a remedy (since § 1983 provides a remedy)

No right here, because:
- No “individually focused terminology” (nothing like “no person shall be subject to”)
- Extensive administrative remedies
- Centralized review (congressional policy that would be thwarted by private rights of action)

Question 32

City of Palos Verdes v. Abrams - Facts

Answer 32

• 2005
• confirms restrictive approach of Gonzaga
• P sued locality, claiming denial of a zoning permit for a radio antenna on his property violated restrictions imposed on localities by Telecommunications Act of 1996

Question 33

City of Palos Verdes v. Abrams - Reasoning

Answer 33

• statute must create individually enforceable rights in the class of beneficiaries to which the P belongs
• BUT that showing only creates rebuttable presumption that right is enforceable under § 1983 -> can be refuted if D shows that Congress ‘didn’t intend’ that the newly created right be enforceable under § 1983 -> lack of congressional intent is the ordinary inference from a different statutory enforcement scheme

Question 34

City of Palos Verdes - As Applied to Case

Answer 34

• law explicitly authorized indiv enforcement, but on shorter timetable, arguably w/o compensatory damages, + def w/o attorneys fees -> court concluded differences in remedy precluded app of 1983 absent leg indication of purpose to provide that relief

Question 35

Vega v. Tekoh - Background Assumption

Answer 35

• long assumed con rights presumptively enforceable under Section 1983 -> tests like Gonzaga v. Doe only restrict enforcement of non-con rights
• BUT Vega called this into question

Question 36

Vega v. Tekoh - Holding

Answer 36

• held violations of Miranda v. Arizona NOT enforceable under Section 1983

Question 37

Vega - Reasoning

Answer 37

• acknowledged Miranda = constitutional rule that can’t be overridden by Congress

-BUT framed Miranda as a “prophylactic rule” -> said it extends beyond 5th Am reqs + theerefore “a violation of Miranda…does not constitute the ‘deprivation of [a] right…secured by the Constitution” under Section 1983

• then said Miranda could be among the OTHER “laws” protected by 1983, BUT would be enforceable “only where its benefits outweigh its costs” -> said costs of 1983 for Miranda (relitigation of issue already considered by state crim ct + possibility of friction between state + fed) not worth it

Question 38

Vega - Impact

Answer 38

• Court held in conclusion that Miranda may be enforced only by excluding ev in crim trial, NOT by 1983 action

Question 39

Vega - Footnote

Answer 39

• court questioned whether ANY “prophylactic” rule should be enforceable under Section 1983
• Referring to the test governing the enforcement of statutory rights, the Court doubted that “a prophylactic rule crafted by the Judiciary to protect a constitutional right . . . is always cognizable under § 1983,” given that federal statutory rights are not always cognizable.
• said “[i]t could be argued that a judicially created prophylactic rule cannot be the basis for a § 1983 suit.”
• then said need not decide that q though b/c even if CAN provide basis for 1983 claim, still need to eval if bens outweigh costs

Question 40

Vega - Kagan

Answer 40

• dissent
• “the Court strips individuals of the ability to seek a remedy for violations of the right recognized in Miranda. . . . The majority here, as elsewhere, injures the right by deny- ing the remedy.”