Exhaustion of Remedies

Question 1

Interplay of Section 1983 and Habeas Corpus - General Concept

Answer 1

• pure language of §1983 would theoretically apply to habeas, but it hasn’t been construed in this manner
• there are instances where the two overlap (ex: constitutional violations in conditions of custody can sometimes make one eligible for relief under §1983 or habeas corpus)

Question 2

Presier v. Rodriguez - Core Question and Practical Significance

Answer 2

• whether state prisoners seeking redress may obtain equitable relief under §1983 even though fed hc statute provides a specific fed remedy

significance of this q: 1983 doesn’t require you to exhaust state remedies, so if you can sue under this, you don’t need to seek redress in state forums first, vs. habeas corpus requires you to exhaust state options, so you wouldn’t be able to seek intervention in fed court if hc = exclusive remedy until you’ve gone through available state remedies

• additional Prof note that 1983 has res judicata, vs hc doesn’t, also damages only available in 1983

Question 3

Presier v. Rodriguez - Facts

Answer 3

• state prisoners deprived of good-conduct-time credits by NY State Dept of Correctional Services as result of disciplinary proceedings
• Brought actions in fed court pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 – alleged unconstitutionally deprived of the credits + sought injunctive relief to compel restoration of them (which would result in their immediate release from confinement in prison)

Question 4

Presier v. Rodriguez - Holding

Answer 4

• when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus

Question 5

Presier - Majority Reasoning

Answer 5

• argues suit is attacking the legality of their duration of their physical confinement -> therefore hc realm (respondents concede they could’ve proceeded through habeas corpus but argue §1983 available anyway – language clearly covered their suit, no reason to restrict it)
• also argues 1983 = general, vs. hc statute = more specific act designed by Congress to cover the situation of state prisoners challenging confinement on federal constitutional grounds
• policy rationale – argument that desire to reduce friction between state and fed courts in hc context by requiring exhaustion of state remedies means you shouldn’t be allowed to just switch over to § 1983 (technically admin rather than court here, but Stewart arguing broader principles of comity)
• pls had tried to rely on cases where others had challenged conditions of confinement under §1983 – Stewart rejects this, says these other cases were challenging conditions, not fact or duration of confinement

Question 6

Preiser - Damages

Answer 6

• holding was specifically restricted to instances of those seeking equitable relief, not damages – damages aren’t available in habeas corpus, so state prisoners can bring damages actions under §1983 in fed court without first exhausting available remedies in state court
• additional point that you’re seeking something other than release (Stewart suggests you could bring a damages claim simultaneously with a habeas claim or you could bring it first, Prof says potentially after too - Prof said he suggests damage claim first is better for habeas because you won’t be bound by res judicata in habeas regardless of how the damages claim comes out)

Question 7

Preiser - Dissent

Answer 7

• Brennan, Marshall, and Douglas
• inefficiency of the court’s rule – if someone is punished with both solitary confinement and loss of good-time-credits, they would need two separate lawsuits, one in state and one in federal, to challenge the constitutionality of the punishment (Prof also noted issue of friction, since first one to reach judgment would control, although she does think SCOTUS would resolve any disagreeing rulings)
• acknowledged worry that lack of exhaustion requirement for §1983 would swallow habeas exhaustion req, but says decision reached = inconsistent w/ purposes of the doctrine, + court paid insufficient attention to reasons for lack of exhaustion requirement under §1983 (designed to preserve + enhance expertise of fed courts in applying fed law, achieve greater uniformity of results, + minimize misapplications of fed law)
• focus of hc as on judicial relations, not administrative actions - points out attacking state admin actions is actually a classic 1983 suit (Prof emphasized he thinks role of habeas is dealing with state judiciary, keeping the state judiciary in their place, vs. here dealing with admin)

Question 8

Preiser and Prison Litigation Reform Act

Answer 8

• Patsy v. Board of Regents (1982) – reaffirmed that “exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required as a prerequisite to bringing an action pursuant to § 1983”
• BUT PLRA changed this for state inmates in 1995 - requires exhaustion of prison grievance remedies before lawsuit for cases challenging “prison conditions”
• Porter v. Nussle - (2002) – set out scope of “prison conditions” as “all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong”
• note that even if you’re seeking $, you still need exhaustion

Question 9

Instances in Which You Can Choose Between HC and 1983

Answer 9

• cases challenging prison living conditions (can sue for injunction or damages saying you’re being kept in unconstitutional conditions under 1983, could also seek habeas challenging unconstitutional confinement)
  -> these kinds of cases don’t really get you release from living conditions - state can fix through either improvement of conditions OR release
• Preiser is different solely because it’s dealing with good time credits (Prof noted Brennan points out how irrational this is)

Question 10

Heck v. Humphrey - Significance

Answer 10

• addressed disposition of §1983 suits for damages involving issues relevant to pending or completed state criminal proceedings

Question 11

Heck v. Humphrey - Facts

Answer 11

• Heck convicted in Indiana of voluntary manslaughter
• While his appeal was pending, he filed suit in fed court under §1983 against prosecutors + a police investigator – alleged “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” leading to his arrest + “knowingly destroyed” evidence that was exculpatory
• Sought compensatory + punitive damages, among other things

Question 12

Heck v. Humphrey - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 12

• Scalia op., held suit couldn’t be maintained
• said issue wasn’t whether exhaustion was required, but whether the suit for money damages was cognizable under §1983 at all
• common law of torts - court concluded law of malicious prosecution provided the best analogy, + this kind of action requires termination of prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused (hadn’t happened in Heck’s case)

Rationales:
- avoid parallel litigation over issues of probable cause + guilt
- precludes possibility that claimant would succeed in tort action despite having been convicted in the criminal proceeding (would contravene strong judicial policy against creating two conflicting resolutions arising out of same or identical transaction)
- didn’t want collateral attack on conviction through civil suit

Question 13

Heck v. Humphrey - Holding

Answer 13

• “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence:
  ->has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
  ->declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination,
  ->or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus”
• if this hasn’t happened, claim for damages isn’t cognizable under §1983

Question 14

Heck v. Humphrey - What This Means for Future Cases

Answer 14

• whenever state prisoner seeks damages in a suit, district court required to consider whether judgment in favor of pl “would necessarily imply” invalidity of conviction or sentence
• book noted though that litigation possible “so long as the plaintiff seeks to recover not for imprisonment, but instead only for those damages resulting directly from the unconstitutional conduct” (Prof’s ex of someone beaten up during arrest - can sue for damages for harm during arrest b/c not challenging its merits, suing for $ on something that DOESN’T render your conviction invalid)

Question 15

Heck v. Humphrey - Footnote 7

Answer 15

• suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the § 1983 plaintiff’s still-outstanding conviction - Scalia argues b/c of doctrines like harmless error, such a § 1983 action, even if successful, would not NECESSARILY imply pl’s conviction was unlawful.
• In order to recover compensatory damages, however, the § 1983 plaintiff must prove not only that the search was unlawful, but that it caused him actual, compensable injury, see Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, which, we hold today, does not encompass the “injury” of being convicted and imprisoned (until his conviction has been overturned)

Question 16

Edwards v. Balisok - Facts and Procedural Posture

Answer 16

• Balisok sought damages under § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional procedures used to take away good-time credits (didn’t seek restoration of the credits because of Preiser)
• 9th Cir ruled Heck inapplicable b/c claim only challenging the procedures used in a disciplinary hearing (9th Circuit thought if you’re only challenging procedures used in a disciplinary hearing, you can always use 1983)

Question 17

Edwards v Balisok - Holding + Reasoning

Answer 17

• SCOTUS reversed – said 9th Circuit had disregarded “possibility, clearly envisioned by Heck, that the nature of the challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment”
• book says this case possibly extended Heck
• in this case, Balisok alleged deceit + bias by prison hearing officer - if proven, would’ve implied invalidity of the disciplinary action that took away the credits

Question 18

Wilkinson v. Dotson - Facts

Answer 18

• Dotson and Johnson were both denied parole under standards adopted long after they’d been convicted + sentenced -> sought §1983 injunction on ground that retroactive application of the new parole guidelines denied them due process + violated the Ex Post Facto Clause
• district court held only cognizable on habeas

Question 19

Wilkinson - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 19

• Breyer op disagreed w/ district court
• reasoned here pls seeking relief that would render the state procedures used to deny them parole invalid, not necessarily result in their immediate or speedier release, + said favorable judgment wouldn’t “necessarily imply the invalidity of [their] conviction[s] or sentence[s]” -> therefore, neither at “the core of habeas corpus” + the §1983 actions can proceed

Question 20

District Attorney’s Office v. Osborn

Answer 20

• 2009
• SCOTUS deferred decision on whether §1983 or habeas was the correct route for asserting a constitutional right of post-conviction access to DNA testing
• concluded it was able to defer decision b/c pl’s due process claim lacked merit either way

Question 21

District Attorney’s Office v. Osborn - Alitoe Concurrence

Answer 21

• argued §1983 couldn’t be used for this purpose
• Argued seeking “discovery of evidence that has a material bearing on [the] conviction” (analogized to Brady claims + argued should be brought on habeas)
• Alito says if you allow this, you’ll also have to allow Brady petitioners to go through 1983 instead of going to habeas corpus
• Prof pointed out the difference though – think Ginsburg brings this up later (Brady technically by its nature necessarily implies invalidity of conviction, vs. DNA is similarish to the Wilkinson scenario where it could technically go either way)

Question 22

Skinner v. Switzer - Facts

Answer 22

• Skinner sentenced to death in 1995 of murdering girlfriend + her two sons, but lots of biological evidence collected + preserved but never tested
• State passed statute in 2001 allowing post-conviction testing on application -> Skinner applied twice but denied both times -> filed §1983 suit for injunctive relief against local prosecutor who had custody of the biological evidence – claimed state statute denied him procedural due process b/c completely foreclosed post-conviction DNA testing in cases where defendant could’ve sought testing prior to trial but didn’t

Question 23

Skinner - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 23

• SCOTUS (Ginsburg Op.) declined to address merits of Skinner’s due process claim, but did hold it was cognizable under §1983
• Reasoned success in the suit for DNA testing wouldn’t necessarily imply the invalidity of Skinner’s conviction (results not necessarily exculpatory, could be inconclusive or incriminating)
• Distinguished DNA testing from Brady – reasoned Brady evidence is by definition always favorable to the defendant + necessarily undermines conviction

Question 24

Nelson v. Campbell - Facts

Answer 24

• 2004
• Nelson claimed in §1983 proceeding his veins were severely compromised due to yrs of drug abuse + “cut down” procedure used in Alabama for lethal injection would violate 8th Am. -> filed 1983 suit shortly before execution seeking injunction against the procedure, temporary stay of execution, order requiring a copy of the protocol to be used to gain access to his veins, + order directing the prison officials to consult with medical experts + promulgate protocol that conformed to contemporary standards of medical care
• district court dismissed complaint on ground that it was the equivalent of a second or successive habeas petition unauthorized by AEDPA, + 11th Cir. agreed

Question 25

Nelson - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 25

• Said hadn’t had occasion to consider whether civil rights suits seeking to enjoin use of particular execution method fall w/in core of federal habeas or whether properly viewed as challenges to the conditions of a condemned inmate’s death sentence
• Noted suit seeking to enjoin a particular execution method doesn’t call into question validity of the sentence or conviction, although noted in AL constitutional challenge seeking to permanently enjoin use of lethal injection (which state had legislatively established as preferred method of execution) might be challenge to fact of sentence itself
• In this case, § 1983 is fine because the execution can still go forward, but O’Connor also argues that if AL only allowed one method, you can’t challenge that under 1983 because that would be a challenge to the execution itself (Prof doesn’t really seem to like this reasoning though – not the pl’s fault that the state has only authorized one method of execution, shouldn’t be penalized for this/deprived of the ability to challenge the cruel + unusual nature of the method)
• Expressly did not reach q of how to categorize method-of-execution claims generally, but said in this particular case, since §1983 would be appropriate suit to challenge “cut-down” procedure if used to gain veinous access for other purposes, it was appropriate in this case

Question 26

Bucklew v. Precythe

Answer 26

• 2019
• framed q of execution methods as “whether the State’s chosen method of execution cruelly superadds pain to the death sentence” -> need to show “feasible and readily implemented alternative method of execution that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain” + that “State has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological reason”

Question 27

Nance v. Ward - Issue

Answer 27

• alternative method proposed was not already authorized by state law, but SCOTUS held §1983 was still a proper vehicle for suit

Question 28

Nance - Facts

Answer 28

• GA only authorized lethal injection, + Nance’s veins were severely compromised (possible leakage of lethal drug -> intense pain + burning) + possibility that sedative would fail -> Nance proposed alternative of firing squad (not permissible under GA law)

Question 29

Nance - Procedural Posture

Answer 29

• 11th Circuit held b/c GA law didn’t permit firing squad, Nance’s claim amounted to argument he couldn’t be executed -> meant challenging death sentence itself + habeas = only remedy (which was foreclosed in this case b/c “second or successive” habeas petition not allowed under AEDPA)

Question 30

Nance - Ruling + Reasoning

Answer 30

• substance of claim pointed to §1983 (Nance not challenging the sentence itself, his claim “still places his execution in Georgia’s control”)
• Still the right vehicle even though GA would have to change its state laws to proceed with the execution
• Noted at end though that courts should police efforts to delay executions with §1983 claims – in deciding whether to grant stay of execution, courts required to consider whether challenge “could have been brought earlier” or reflected prisoner’s “attempt at manipulation”
• Prof noted that the opinion also said 1983 suits must be brought within state statute of limitations (Prof says she didn’t know this but will believe Kagan on this front)

Question 31

Nance - Barrett Dissent

Answer 31

• adopted 11th Cir’s position
• also argued should take state law as you find it + not make state amend its law in order to execute