Remedies Against Gov - Liability/Immunities of Cities+Counties Flashcards
1
Q
Monroe v. Pape - Holdings
A
- mostly known for its holding that Chicago police officers could be sued under §1983 even if their conduct was unauthorized by, or even in violation of, state law
- BUT with respect to cities, held Chicago could NOT be sued under §1983
2
Q
Monroe v. Pape - Reasoning
A
- based on 1871 Congress’ rejection of the Sherman Amendment (would’ve made cities and counties liable) - House firmly rejected this, said Congress didn’t have such power under the Constitution
- Court rested its holding on legislative intent, though, NOT on the issue of whether Congress had this power
- Court also declined to hear policy args for whether or not municipalities should be liable
3
Q
Monell v. DSS - Rule
A
- cities are “persons” under §1983, but not liable under respondeat superior -> only liable for actions consistent with their policy + custom
- SO, local govs CAN be sued directly under §1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief
->BUT this needs to be where, as here, the action alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers - can also be sued for constitutional deprivations pursuant to governmental “custom” even though such a custom hasn’t received formal approval through its official decisionmaking channels
4
Q
Monell - Facts
A
- female state employees brought 1983 claim (injunction and backpay) against Dept of Commerce, NYC, and mayor
- alleged that it was official policy to compel pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leave was required for medical reasons
- city of NY changed its policy, so the injunction became moot in district court, BUT issue of damages remained -> the district court initially denied relief because of Monroe v. Pape
5
Q
Monell - Reasoning
A
- revisits legislative history discussed in Monroe + comes out the other way - distinguishes Sherman Amendment (says was supposed to amend a different part of the act, would’ve essentially made city liable for damage any time it failed to keep the peace, vs. fact it wasn’t adopted doesn’t mean Congress didn’t want to hold cities responsible at all for their own violation of the Constitution)
-> arguing mistaken in Monroe because the rejection of the amendment had to do w/ HOW cities would be held accountable, not WHETHER they could be - BUT holding only applies if city’s own policy/custom resulted in the constitutional tort, not just for employing the tortfeasor (no respondeat superior)
-> text of statute says the person (here, city) must “cause” the violation
6
Q
Monell and Frankfurter
A
- Prof pointed out that what the court winds up doing under Monell with cities is similar to what Frankfurter wanted to do with individuals in Monroe - needs to be an official policy, ordinance, custom, etc. for city to be held liable (when it’s not custom or usage, + not something approved by the municipality, we don’t let people sue the municipality)
- needs to be an ordinance, or something that the department regularly does, not an individual transgression
7
Q
Monell - Stevens
A
- Stevens thinks there SHOULD be respondeat superior
- thinks there should be vicarious liability when a city official does something wrong, even if it was a single act or an act that wasn’t really authorized
- would provide more complete protection for the plaintiffs
- we discussed in class how this ISN’T really the same as what the Sherman Amendment would’ve meant - Sherman would’ve made you liable for whatever anyone does in the city, vs. respondeat superior it needs t o be your employee
8
Q
Monell - Dissent
A
- Rehnquist and Burger
- legislative history more muddled than majority says
- court cannot foresee consequences of suddenly exposing cities to liability 17 yrs after Monroe (this is something Congress could do, not the court)
9
Q
States as “Persons” Under §1983
A
- before Monell, Court assumed Monroe’s conclusion municipalities weren’t persons under 1983 also applied to states -> when Monell revised rule for localities, q arose whether states might also be held directly liable under 1983
- q is entangled w/ 11th Am. - read to deprive fed courts of jurisdiction over damage actions against states except where Congress makes a clear statement to impose liability pursuant to powers under 14th Am.
10
Q
Quern v. Jordan
A
- Court ruled that §1983 wasn’t a legislative override of 11th Am immunity (Congress hadn’t used its 14th Am ability to do this) -> 11th Am immunity DOES bar 1983 suits against states in FED court
- settles matters for fed court, but since 11th Am only restricts juris. of fed courts, q remained open if states could be sued in state court under 1983 -> answered in Will v Michigan
11
Q
Will v Michigan
A
- “persons” in 1983 doesn’t include states or state officials acting in their official capacities
- 1983 doesn’t show requisite intent to alter usual constitutional balance between states and national gov
- BUT see Hafer v. Melo
12
Q
Hafer v. Melo - Significance
A
- state officials can be held PERSONALLY liable for damages under §1983 based on actions taken under color of state law (in their official capacities)
- practically, means you should always sue in both official and personal capacities - don’t want to get stuck/lose your case just because you used the wrong adjective (bear in mind that despite reasoning below, distinction between personal and official capacity usually turns on pleading - generally speaking, pl can choose whom to sue + in what capacity)
13
Q
Hafer v. Melo - Facts
A
- Hafer elected as Auditor General of PA
- shortly after, fired Melo and others -> they file a 1983 suit seeking reinstatement and damages
14
Q
Hafer v. Melo - Holding
A
- state officer can be held personally liable for damages under 1983 based on actions taken under color of state law -> state officials sued in individual capacities are ‘persons’ within the meaning of §1983
15
Q
Hafer v. Melo - Reasoning
A
- distinguished between personal capacity and official capacity suits
-> argued official capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent -> should be treated as suits against the state (b/c real party in interest is gov rather than named official, + entity’s policy/custom must’ve played some part in the violation of the law)
-> vs. personal capacity suits seek to impose indiv. liability on gov officer for actions taken under color of state law (don’t need est. connection to gov policy or custom, enough to show the indiv caused the deprivation) - Hafer tried to overcome this reasoning by arguing 1983 liability turns not on capacity in which official is sued, but on capacity in which they acted when injuring the pl -> SCOTUS rejects this (one point of 1983 was to give remedy to parties deprived of con. rights by an officer’s abuse of position)
16
Q
Owen v. City of Independence - Rule
A
- cities do NOT get qualified immunity (no objective reasonableness/good faith defense)
- cities are held to a STRICT LIABILITY standard
17
Q
Owen v. City of Independence - Facts
A
- city council fired police chief without procedural due process
18
Q
Owen v. City of Independence - Holding and Reasoning
A
- Brennan
- immunities from §1983 extended only if common law extended them in 1871 - no tradition of qualified immunity for cities at that time
- also, pub pol concerns - ensures compensation for victims of city malfeasance (who would otherwise be out luck because city officials have qualified immunity)
- increases deterrence by encouraging city policies to err on the side of protecting citizens’ constitutional rights
- fairer to have loss borne by all taxpayers than a single govt employee (taxpaying public internalizes all benefits + costs of gov action)
- no fear of hindering officers’ individual decisionmaking, since officials themselves have qualified immunity (for personal liability) + possibility of municipal liability 1) probs won’t hinder them, + 2) is a valid consideration of officials
19
Q
Owen v. City of Independence - Dissent
A
- Powell, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist
- upset that in 2 yrs cities have gone from absolute immunity to strict liability, + emphasizing negative aspects of SL (subjects cities to damages for actions that may have been reasonable at the time, distorts municipal decisionmaking - risks paralyzing gov, unfair, + potentially ruinous since most municipalities don’t have a lot of $ to withstand liability)
