weak, fragile & failed states

Question 1

aspects of state capacity (4)

Answer 1

1. monopoly of legitimate violence (max weber)
2. ability to tax & regulate economic activity
3. infrastructural power
4. rational/autonomous bureaucracy (max weber)

Question 2

pre-colonial institutions in Africa

Answer 2

• some states had a centralized and hierarchical structure
• other societies without state organization

Question 3

nature of european colonization in africa

Answer 3

limited institutional impact, rules through local institutions

Question 4

post african independence

Answer 4

• most states continued to rely on pre-colonial institutions
• new states initially tried to limit tribal institutions
• eventually had to rely on them for public good provision

Question 5

central thesis

Answer 5

states with more complex and centralized pre-colonial institutions perform better (today)

Question 6

mechanisms (4)

Answer 6

1. states with more established pre-colonial institutions had higher accountability
2. states with stronger pre-colonial institutions more easily provide public goods
3. states with stronger pre-colonial institutions developed legal mechanisms to solve conflict & enforce property right
4. stronger pre-colonial states were better able to establish relationships with colonial powers

Question 7

how did stronger pre-colonial states establish relationships with colonial powers? (3)

Answer 7

1. colonial authorities collaborated with local authorities
2. local authorities could rapidly adapt western production tech
3. local authorities able to obtain economic and political concessions from colonial powers (more autonomy)

Question 8

Alesina et al. (2011) argument of colonial powers’ impact on 3rd world development

Answer 8

creation of artificial states ⇒ failed states today

Question 9

Michalopoulous & Papaioannu (2018)

Answer 9

african regions with stronger pre-colonial institutions exhibit better performance

Question 10

Gerring et al. (2011)’s question

Answer 10

why would colonial powers allow these pre-colonial institutions to survive?

Question 11

Gerring et al. (2011)’s argument

Answer 11

1. when pre-colonial institutions were strong (some state capacity, developed bureaucracy, etc.) → the colonial power preferred to rule through them
2. when pre-colonial institutions were weak/fragile → colonial powers preferred direct government

Question 12

indirect government

Answer 12

colonial powers let pre-colonial institutions survive & ruled through them

Question 13

direct government

Answer 13

colonial powers replacing institutions with those resembling them

Question 14

explanations for maintaining pre-colonial institutions (3)

Answer 14

1. principal-agent relationship
2. keeping public order
3. incentive compatibility

Question 15

principal-agent relationship explanation

Answer 15

the colony already has a degree of institutional development
+
allows public goods, taxes, chain of command, easier monitoring, lower cost

Question 16

keeping public order explanation

Answer 16

can provide colonial rule with certain degree of legitimacy/undermine revolt

Question 17

incentive compatibility explanation

Answer 17

pre-colonial authorities have incentives to cooperate with colonial powers

Question 18

independent variable (analysis of former british colonies)

Answer 18

index of pre-colonial development

Question 19

dependent variables (analysis of former british colonies) (4)

Answer 19

1. # of pre-colonial courts that continued to operate during colonial times
2. # of british-style courts during colonial times
3. # of police forces from the colonial power operating in the colony
4. total index of metropolis intervention/involvement in the life of the colony

Question 20

controls (analysis of former british colonies) (5)

Answer 20

1. % of european population
2. total population
3. duration of colonial rule
4. territory (area)
5. weather

Question 21

higher pre-colonial state development led to…?

Answer 21

1. lower indirect government
2. higher direct government

Question 22

Besley and Persson (2014)

Answer 22

the elites decide on the strength of the state

Question 23

Olson’s theory

Answer 23

equates the state with organized banditry

Question 24

Acemoglu and Robinson argument

Answer 24

competition and conflict between state & civil society is the main driver for state capacity emergence

Question 25

when balance between state & society not achieved…? (3)

Answer 25

1. despotic leviathan
2. absent leviathan
3. shackled leviathan

Question 26

despotic leviathan

Answer 26

the more power the state enjoys & the weaker the people are

Question 27

absent leviathan

Answer 27

social norms against political hierarchy (fear of “slippery slope”)

Question 28

shackled leviathan

Answer 28

the state’s non-elite public obtains control of the state by instituting checks and balances

Question 29

powers of society in game between civil society & elite state (2)

Answer 29

1. norms
2. ability to overcome collective actions

Question 30

powers of state in game between civil society & elite state (3)

Answer 30

1. judicial power
2. military power
3. regulate

Question 31

case study: kuba kingdom

Answer 31

• well-developed state institutions
• no effect on economic outcomes

Question 32

case study: north & south vietnam

Answer 32

• northern vietnam ruled by strong centralized state & village was main admin unit
• southern vietnam had patron-client model w/ informal, personalized power relations
  +
  northern (dai viet) had better economic outcomes & higher local cooperation norms