politicians & bureaucrats Flashcards
bureaucrats
government officials, public servant, top civil servants
examples of bureaucrats
examples: public hospital director, supervisor of social work division, chief of police detectives, superintendent of a school system
difference between politicians and bureaucrats
politicians → policy formulators
bureaucrats → policy implementers
what is the most common assumption about bureaucrats?
bureaucrats are budget-maximizers
why are bureaucrats budget-maximizers? (3)
- bureaucrat’s wage and benefits may be tied to the size of the budget
- prestige & status
- larger budgets help in achieving their ”mission”
how does niskanen’s model of bureaucratic behavior characterize bureaucrats?
as budget-maximisers who exploit information asymmetries to their advantage
assumptions in niskanen’s model about bureaucrats (6)
- budget-maximizing bureaucrat
- politicians are interested in output
- preference for bureau’s output increases at a decreasing rate (diminishing marginal returns)
- public bureaucracy engages in costly production
- as the bureau becomes bigger & spends more, it becomes more inefficient (diminishing returns to scale)
- asymmetric information between politicians & bureaucrats
variations in niskanen’s model about bureaucrats (3)
- corrupt bureaucrat
- lazy bureaucrat
- proactive politicians
variables in niskanen’s model about bureaucrats (3)
- B: bureaucrat’s budget
- C: total costs
- E: per-capita expenditure level
corrupt bureaucrat
would produce competitive production level (socially efficient) but keep the profits (society doesn’t know TC) and keep difference B - TC
lazy bureaucrat
not interested in maximizing B or maximizing profits (B - C); will choose lower production level (society cannot monitor bureaucrat’s effort or costs)
proactive politicians
bilateral bargaining (reducing information asymmetry); niskanen’s assumption that politicians can’t know C is probably too strong
what relationship is information asymmetry common in?
the principal-agent relationship
principal-agent relationship
authority is located on one side (principal) and informational advantage on the other (agent)
moral hazard problem
agents can exploit their advantage to pursue their own interests, at odds with those of the principal
two types of control mechanisms to monitor agents
- before-the-fact mechanisms
- after-the-fact contractual arrangements
before-the-fact mechanism
principals avoid selecting an incompetent/corrupt agent by authenticating the promises made by the agent
example: advice, letters of recommendation, testimonials, credentials, etc.
after-the-fact contractual arrangements
making payment contingent on completion of specific tasks by specific dates
why is niskanen’s model unrealistic?
- politicians establish a bureaucracy to carry on their chosen policies
- don’t implement pre- or post- control mechanisms
types of “before-the-fact” control mechanisms (2)
- appointment process
- procedural controls
types of “after-the-fact” controls (3)
- public hearings
- appropriations/budgeting decisions
- allowing service recipients to bring bad behavior to attention of courts
enacting coalition
veto players
McCubbins, Noll & Weingast’s model for the relationship between veto players and bureaucrats
setting up a bureau & appointing the bureaucrats potentially requires the agreement among various veto players
bureaucratic drift
theory explaining the tendency for bureaucratic agencies to create policy deviating from the original mandate
coalition drift
the phenomenon of present legislation being overwritten by the changing views of political coalitions
what does size of bureaucratic drift depend on? (2)
- monitoring efforts/capabilities of the veto players
- control mechanisms implemented
bureaucratic drift vs. coalitional drift
- coalitional drift leads to frequent and sudden changes in power of bureaucracies
- both are tradeoffs
how do politicians try to protect bureaucrats from coalitional drifts?
- establishing long tenures
- giving them more admin power
- securing revenue sources
