electoral competition

Question 1

Downsian model of electoral competition

Answer 1

parties will converge in policy-wise to the median voter’s ideal point to maximize its probability of winning

Question 2

does convergence mean convergence to center of political spectrum?

Answer 2

no; distribution of political opinions in electorate affects content of policies adopted

Question 3

strong assumptions of MVT theorem (3)

Answer 3

1. parties can freely chose any position on the left-right scale
2. there are only 2 competing parties
3. there is only one dimension (left-right)

Question 4

constraints on policy positions (2)

Answer 4

1. parties cannot switch policy positions at whim (undermine credibility to voters)
2. party labels facilitate voting (what to expect)

Question 5

multi-party competition

Answer 5

every party converging at the median is not at equilibrium

Question 6

alternative to the downsian model of electoral competition

Answer 6

citizen-candidate model

Question 7

citizen-candidate model

Answer 7

1. candidates are ideological (care about policies)
2. no longer solely motivated by winning (at any “ideological cost”)
3. any voter can be a candidate; some decide to run

Question 8

assumptions of citizen-candidate model (4)

Answer 8

1. single-dimensional policy space
2. single-peaked preferences
3. ideological candidates
4. # of candidates is not fixed (endogenous)

Question 9

variables in the CCM (3)

Answer 9

1. B: direct benefit of office (salary, prestige, etc.)
2. C: cost of running for office (campaign expenditures, etc.)
3. p: proportion of the vote

Question 10

one-candidate equilibrium (CCM)

Answer 10

nash equilibrium where a candidate with peak at 0 runs unopposed and wins the election, if and only if B ≤ 2C

Question 11

two-candidate equilibrium (CCM)

Answer 11

nash equilibrium in which a candidate with a policy position x=−1 runs against a candidate with policy position x= 1 if and only if B > 2C − 2
+
each candidate has a probability of winning of 1/2

Question 12

three-candidate equilibrium (CCM)

Answer 12

if p = 1/3, there exists a nash equilibrium where three candidates with peaks xi = −1, xj = 0 & xk= 1, respectively, all run for office if and only if B > 3C
+
each candidate has a probability 1/3 of winning the election