public goods & collective action in politics

Question 1

public good

Answer 1

production or consumption is private, “individual”

Question 2

private good

Answer 2

production or consumption is common, collective

Question 3

criteria distinguishing public from private good

Answer 3

1. crowding or rivalry
2. excludability
3. jointness of supply

Question 4

crowding or rivalry

Answer 4

consumption goes to one person (the consumer) vs. consumption by one not leaving less for others

Question 5

excludability

Answer 5

public goods → not possible (or very difficult) to exclude people from consumption of good

Question 6

jointness of supply

Answer 6

not possible to “divide” the available amount of a public good (like democracy or freedom)

Question 7

lagrange multiplier

Answer 7

shows how much the objective function would change for a marginal change in the constraint

Question 8

the rate at which each consumer wants to trade good 1 for good 2…?

Answer 8

equals the price ratios between the two goods for every consumer

Question 9

conditions required for a socially efficient provision

Answer 9

consumer’s MRS between a public & private good does not necessarily equal other consumers’ MRS between the two goods

Question 10

the price (cost) of a marginal increase in the quantity produced of the pure public good should not…?

Answer 10

should not equal any consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for a little more of the public good

Question 11

with public good…?

Answer 11

private provision ≠ socially efficient provision

Question 12

socially efficient equilibrium condition for a public good requires…?

Answer 12

consumers/social planner need to take into consideration the effect of individual decisions on other

Question 13

why would private provision of public goods not be socially efficient?

Answer 13

if A knows that B is willing to provide 20 units of the public good, A doesn’t contribute and vice versa → public good ultimately not provided

Question 14

examples of public good

Answer 14

• revolutions
• democracy
• election

Question 15

why are public goods problematic for rational choice perspective?

Answer 15

1. individual utility maximization
2. strategic interaction
3. social outcomes

Question 16

collective action problem

Answer 16

free-riding → any rational individual will have incentives to avoid contributing

Question 17

how is revolution a collective good?

Answer 17

1. individual can enjoy benefits whether or not they contribute
2. victory though is not dependent on a single person joining
3. any individual opposed to the incumbent regime has incentive to free-ride

Question 18

personal cost of revolting?

Answer 18

• torture
• imprisonment
• death

Question 19

does a revolution have actors? why or why not?

Answer 19

no actor named “the crowd” or “the opposition”

it is mass uprising resulting from multitudes of individual choices

Question 20

revolutionary threshold (Timur Kuran’s model of revolutions)

Answer 20

the # of other individuals who must join a revolt before a given individual is willing to participate

for other individuals, whether they revolt or not depends on the size of the opposition S

Question 21

solutions to the collective action problem?

Answer 21

1. excluding free-riders when possible
2. provide exclusive private benefits as incentives to group members (trade unions)
3. sanctions for free-riding & third-party enforcement (compulsory voting)

Question 22

drawback to excluding free-riders?

Answer 22

does not work for all public goods (clean air, collective security)

Question 23

drawback to sanctions for free-riding?

Answer 23

sanctions have to be costly enough + credible (third-party enforcer)