U4 AOS2 Pt 1 Flashcards

1
Q

Causes of climate change

A
  1. Burning fossil fuels
    releases CO2 → enhanced GHG effect → gl warming → CC
    - 85% (34% oil, 27% coal, 24% gas) of all E bought comes from burning FF → 9.5bn tonnes from ground to atm per yr
    - min progress w switching to renewables bc 2010-19 FF only dec 2% as prop of E use
    - consumption inc over time e.g. 50% of all GHG emissions = w/in last 30 yrs
    - gl temp inc 1.1C since pre-ind + 0.8C since early C20
  2. Deforestation → deplete C sinks + emit more GHG in process bc a) trees release C when die + b) wood burning = releases CO2
    o UNFAO est 18mil acres for. lost/yr
    o WWF est 15 GHG emissions = from defor → #2 anthropogenic source of C (contributes 6-17%)
    o 2010 Gl For Resources Assess report defor release 1bn tonnes C into atm/yr
  3. Agriculture
    a) cattle release methane → inc enhanced GHG effect → gl warming → CC
    b) inc use of fertilisers → inc nitrous oxide (x300 impact of CO2) → inc enhanced GHG effect → gl warming → CC
    - subsistence farming → 48% defor
    - commercial farming → 32% defor
    t/f total farming → 80% defor
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
2
Q

Details of resource exploitation as a key aspect of climate change

A

Three types:
o FF (oil, gas, coal = dirtiest) = 80% world’s energy consumption
o Subsoil minerals (iron, aluminium etc)
o Deforestation

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
3
Q

Consequences of resource exploitation as a key aspect of climate change

A

• 2019 UN Report → res extract occurring x3 faster than in 1970 + responsible for 50% gl GHG emissions + 80% biodiv loss

• Deforestation
→ deplete C sinks + emit more GHG in process bc a) trees release C when die + b) wood burning = releases CO2
o UNFAO est 18mil acres for. lost/yr
o WWF est 15 GHG emissions = from defor → #2 anthropogenic source of C (contributes 6-17%)
o 2010 Gl For Resources Assess report defor release 1bn tonnes C into atm/yr

• Soil erosion (hum activity inc rate 4-10x) caused by land degredation thru defor/tillage for agri/overgrazing
→ desertification:
o Sahara desert expanded 1.5mil sq km
o Gobi desert in Ch expanding at rate of 3370km/yr
→ inc pressure on food sec
→ sediment in waterways → inc flooding

• GHG inc – burning FF, defor + agri → gl temp = 1.1C inc above pre-ind + 0.8C above early C20

• Natural disasters = caused by defor ( loss of nat buffers) + drier cond  inc C emissions
o 2015 5mo bushfires in Indo emitted more GHG than J or Ger on 1yr

• Forced mig bc impacts of CC = food insec, flooding, forest fires etc
o Intl Org for Mig est mig due to CC will reach 150-200mil/yr by 2050

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
4
Q

Impact of nationalist interests as a key aspect of climate change on the US’s response

A
  • 2017 T announce US w/draw from PCA
  • 2021 Glasgow US X sign up to coal phase-out deal – this is bc coal mining = 53K jobs in the US → during T admin EPA sought to repeal Clean E Plan
  • CC denial – 2012 T tweet w 67K likes = “the concept of gl warming was created for and by Ch IOT to make US manufact non-comp” = EP + NS – links back to w/drawal from PCA
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
5
Q

Impact of nationalist interests as a key aspect of climate change on the Europe’s response

A

o 2010s coal consumption dec everywhere except Asia
o 2020 demand for gas plummet bc COVID
o 2021 demand for gas inc but supply down → price of gas inc
→ 18% inc in use of coal to gen E in Eur = 1st annual inc since 2017
→ 2021 record high E prod from coal = 15.3bn GHG = 40% of total GHG
o 2022 EU sanction R FF imports → R retaliate by exporting none to EU → problem bc ½ Eur’s coal comes from R → EU must source elsewhere but alt coal sources = cheaper than alt gas sources → resurgence of coal ind in EU
→ It PM Draghi + Ger announce might reopen closed coal plants
→ UK announce 3 coal plants planned to close in 2022 will stay open
→ EU climate chief justify temporary inc in coal consumption/prod bc still aim to meet 2030 goal of reducing coal consumption 55% below 1990 levels = problem bc prod more cumulative GHG emissions despite same endpoint

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
6
Q

Rationale for adapting to climate change

A

Some effects of CC = irreversible:
• No response to prep for inevitable impact of CC → lower gl agri yield 5-30% by 2050
• ½ gl pop could exp water shortages at least 1mo/yr by 2050
Adaption to CC = LT beneficial econ investment:
• investment in adaption of $1.8tr 2020-30 → generate $7.1tr benefits later
• $1 in CC prep → $4-7 savings in nat disaster response

→ must inc resiliency of soc + bio systems to help recovery from more extreme weather events + minimise damage

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
7
Q

Methods for adapting to climate change

A

• Flood protection installations
• Rainwater storage
• Altering building regulations e.g. higher foundations
• Buying out homeowners in flood-prone areas e.g. NJ
• Alterations to agri practices
• Migration

→ new policies utilising local knowledge of specific environ (cosmo view of development)

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
8
Q

Examples of adapting to climate change

A

• Toronto req new lg city buildings to incl green spaces on roof → cool city + reduce E consumption in summer 5-15%
• Mex govt pay farmers X fell trees → prevent landslides
• Japan build stadium on stilts → store excess water??
• 2015 PCA enshrine Green Climate Fund – goal = raise $100bn/yr by 2020 to help developing st adapt to CC

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
9
Q

Challenges to adapting to climate change

A

• UNDP est $86bn/yr needed for adaptation in dev states
• UN Environ Prog est adaptation will cost $140-300bn/yr by 2030
• 2017-18 only $30bn invested in adapt gl

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
10
Q

Rationale for reducing climate change

A

Limiting extent of CC (ideally 1.5C but max is 2C) is necessary to stop climate catastrophe

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
11
Q

Methods of reducing climate change

A

• Inc E efficiency
• Phasing out FF
• Switching to low-C energy sources
• Reforestation/afforestation
• Restoring grasslands (avoid defor)
• C capture + storage
• Emissions tax
• Subsidies
• Emissions trading schemes

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
12
Q

Details of PCA

A

• Key provisions:
o Peak gl emissions asap
o Adaptation
o Climate finance – pledge min $100bn/yr by 2020 to help LICs adapt
o A3: NDCs should be “ambitious”, “represent a progression over time” and set “with the view of achieving the purpose of this agreement”

• 195 UNFCCC members signed + 193 + EU ratified = 95% gl emissions

• Enhanced Transparency Framework → st must report of mitigation efforts every 2 yrs → subject to technical + peer scrutiny

• A7 = adaption
o Define goal = ensure capacity (e.g. renewable E), resilience (e.g. storm shelters) + reduce vulnerability (dec occurrence of extreme weather events)
o Encourages all st to create NAPs → plan + implement adaption strategies
→ NAP principles:
1. Approach should be st-driven, gender-sensitive + transparent
2. Based on science X business
3. X be prescriptive/duplicate other st models – must be tailored to facilitate st engagement w + ownership of adaptation process

• Article 9 = finance
o Should 50/50 bw adaption + mitigation efforts
o Reaffirmed HIC commitment to mobilise $100bn/yr by 2020 to LICs adaption

• Intl Co-op Intiatives
o mechanism to bypass st reluctance to address CC bc NIs
o prov NSAs w framework to contribute to CC response
e.g. Gl Covenant of Mayors = 9K cities, 127 st, 770mil residents

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
13
Q

Evidence of PCA’s effectiveness

A
  • 193 + EU nst ratified = covers 95% gl emissions
  • 1/3 reduction in GHG emission growth rate
  • 90% gl emissions covered by net-zero targets
  • Article 7 “formalises the intl consensus on the urgency of vulnerability reduction” (making CC a now problem) – Lesinkowski of McGill Uni
  • May 2021 125/154 developing st in process of planning/implementing NAPs
  • 90% NAPs ID terrestrial/wetland ecosystems + food security + 79% ID freshwater resources + human health = key priority → PCA improving understanding of what foci of policies should be
  • Adaptation financing inc from 2013 $52bn → 2019 $79bn
  • Mayor Reed of ATL promise city use 100% renew E by 2035 = overcoming
  • by 2018 EU had achieved dec GHG emissions 23% = almost 1/2 way to 55% goal
  • gl warming 2015 4-5C → currently 2.5C → 1.9C if current NDCs implemented properly + on time
  • Intl Co-op Initiatives → PMI’s actions centred around 2C, mitigation + adaptation
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
14
Q

Evidence of PCA’s lack of effectiveness

A
  • 3 major emitters = X parties of PCA (Iran, Turk + Iraq)
  • USAID report current commitments X suffient to meet max ceiling of 2C
  • July 2022 Climate Action Tracker report 0 st’s NDCs + policies = compatible with PCA 1.5C target + only 2/9 on track for 1.5-2C are HICs = largest emitters + Turk/ Iran = critically insufficient but X parties of PCA
  • Oct 2021 UNEP Emissions Gap Report:
    o updated NDCs only dec predicted 2030 emissions 7.5% when 55% is needed reduction amt
    o GHG emissions must be ½ by 2030 to have chance of meeting 1.5C
    o Net-zero pledges could lim warning to 2.2C but many NDCs delay action until 2030/are incomprehensive/lack clear plan (see below)
  • Climate Action Tracker report 73% net-zero targets = inadequate e.g. only party to incl intl shipping/aviation = UK
  • UNIPCC est $100bn/yr goal = x10 below amt needed
  • Adaptation financing progress slowing – 2018-2019 only inc $1bn/yr + stalled bc COVID
  • 2017-18 only $22/72bn climate aid prov by OECD st to LDCs = grants
  • Only OECD st to meet its expected climate finance contribution in grants = Norway = comparatively sml econ → total climate aid = $1bn
  • 2019 only ¼ climate finance → adaption = X 50/50 bw mitigation/adaptation
  • NDCs when compared to actual policies → on track for 2.7
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
15
Q

COP26 Details

A

• 31 Oct-13 Nov 2021
• 5yr check-up on PCA  expectation that ambition inc
• Est Glasgow Climate Pact
• Main issues to address:
o Future of coal
o X meet $ goal
o Carbon pricing – part of A6 seeking to est comprehensive intl carbon market
o Lack of ambition of NDCs – pre-G commitments on track for 2.2C if actually implemented
o Defor
o Methane
o Adaption
o Agri
o Net zero targets

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
16
Q

Evidence of COP26’s effectivness

A
  • Defor = 130 st/85% gl forests promise X defor by 2030
  • Finance = 450 financial instit responsible for $130tr assets promise align portfolios w 2030 net zero i.e. divesting from FF
  • Climate finance = promise $500bn in 5 yrs + x2 proportion to adaptation
  • Agree to meet again in 2022 + 2023
  • Coal = 40 st agree phase out coal in 2030s incl Pol, Viet, Chile, Sth Afr
  • US sign agreement to X finance FF proj overseas = sig bc #1 aid donor
  • GCP = 1st explicit mention of FF in a COP decision = 196 st sign
  • Apr 2022 Nature Journal report current pledges → 1.9C
  • Achieved consensus abt 1.5C = the “planetary boundary”
  • “elements of the G package are a lifeline for my country” climate envoy from Marshall Isl
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
17
Q

Evidence of COP26’s lack of effectiveness

A
  • X agreement for 50/50 mitigation/adaptation $ split
  • Methane scheme = Ch, R, Ind X sign up
  • Coal phase out = US, Ch, Aus, Ind X sign up + 2030s = vague → Juan Pablo Osornoi of Grpeace: “Overall this statement falls well short of the ambition needed on FF in this critical decade”
  • HICs blocked move to est ‘loss-and-damage’ funds to compensate LICs for irrev damage of CC esp bc X their fault
  • Apr 2022 Nature Journal warn 1.9C depends on st delivering promises on time + in full = esp worrying bc many X have policies yet that reflect commitments
  • NIs of Ind + Ch prove able to mold gl CC policy bc water down GCP coal promise from “phase out” → “phase down”
  • X agreement to end FF subsidies = problem bc IEA warn we need close 40% of 8.5K coal-fired pwr plants by 2030 to have chance @ 1.5
  • 1.5 warming = 3C warming in parts of Afr = unbearable
  • Currently 200 projects (“carbon bombs”) exploring for new FF = “locking in” climate disaster
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
18
Q

Reasons for UN’s lack of effectiveness

A

• X mechanism to force st to set specific target by specific date → X compulsion to set ambitious target
• NDCs = X binding → X penalty for failing to meet target
o PCA = “no action, just promises” – James Hansen, NASA scientist
• X sufficient to resolve CC
o “even if we meet every target… we will only get to part of the where we need to go” – Obama 2016
o “This deal alone won’t dig us out of the hole we’re in, but it makes the sides less steep” – exec director of Gr Peace
• Net-zero targets shift CC from what UNEP exec dir calls a “now problem” to a “future problem”
• St prioritise NIs → give climate aid to LDCs in form of loans + bilaterally to reap econ return
• X meeting A9 50/50 split goal bw mitigation/adaptation bc st who aren’t LDCs/low-lying isl st X receive any benefit from adaptation financing but mitigation efforts = good for everyone (NS + EP)
• Vague deadlines (coal phase-out 2030s, overall coal phase-down 2040s) → “the sml print seemingly gives countries enormous leeway to pick theirn own phase-out date, despite the shiny headline” - Juan Pablo Osornoi of Grpeace
• Commitments made by businesses = X binding
• Ukr war used as excuse to delay speed of coal phase out/down → exposing weakness of vague deadline

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
19
Q

Details of the EU’s 2020 climate + energy package

A

set 2007 enacted 2009

  1. 20% cut in GHG emissions from 1990 levels
    - Emissions Trading Scheme = covers power + industry sectors (45% EU’s GHG emissions) + targeted 21% reduction on 2005 levels
    - Effort Sharing Decision = binding national GHG reduction targets based on wealth for housing/waste/agri/transport
    - Car regulation
  2. 20% EU energy from renewables
    - Renewable Energy Directive
  3. 20% improvement in energy efficiency
    - Energy Efficiency Directive = set cohesive regulation abt E eff for rentals/household appliances/lighting/renovations on govt housing
How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
20
Q

Effectiveness of the EU’s 2020 climate + energy package

A

Positive:
- ETS generate 15.8bn EUR for member st = demos effectiveness of binding/financially incentivising GHG reduction scheme
- 80% 15.8bn EUR from ETS  climate + energy policy = financing adaptation + mitigation
- 2013-15 all member st compliant w ESD targets
- 2016 emissions 23% dec from 1990 levels = achieved goal1
- GDP grew 53% over same period
- EU share of gl emissions 17.3% 1990  9% 2018
- 2016 ETS industries emissions 26% dec below 2005 levels = achieve goal2
- 2016 renewable E = 17% = on track for 2020

Neutral:
- Carbon intensity ½ but gl dec 58%
- 10 st expected to have renewable E surplus
- 2017 avg car emission = 118.5g/km = 22g/km reduction since 2010 = meets <130g/km req but X close enough to 2020 goal of <95g/km

Limited:
- 2016 ESD only achieve 11% reduction of emissions
- 2016 estimates showed Malta/Belg/Fin/Ir X meet ESD targets by 2020 = only achieved bc COVID

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
21
Q

Reasons for lack of/effectiveness of EU’s 2020 climate + energy package

A

Firstly, the EU’s 2020 package was effective because their strategies were included in EU directives and thus were binding. Secondly, the EU had a clear follow-up process for when states fell short of targets, requiring they submit a corrective plan. Also, the EU made sure to pre-empt shortfalls by offering policy advice to Malta, Belgium, Finland and Ireland in 2016 when they were not on track for their 2020 target. Finally, the EU used financial incentives to encourage desired behaviours. For example, the ETS rewards emitting less than the maximum allowance and any shortfall bars states from selling any excess the next year, preventing states from racking up carbon debt without financial consequences.

However, the failures of the EU’s 2020 package can be attributed to the fact that while the EU’s master strategy was detailed, it did not supply member states with a specific plan for how they could reach their designated targets.

How well did you know this?
1
Not at all
2
3
4
5
Perfectly
22
Q

Details of the EU’s 2030 climate + energy package

A

o Adopted Oct 2014 after EU realise on track to exceed 2020 goals
o Dec 2019 EU Green Deal ramps up ambition:
→ net zero by 2050 target added
→ GHG emissions target inc to 50%

Targets:
1. 55% cut in GHG emissions from 1990 levels
2. 27% EU energy from renewables
3. 27% improvement in energy efficiency

Actions:
- June 2021 Eur Climate Law = 55% GHG emission reduction by 2030 = binding
- Sep 2020 Climate Target Plan = blueprint for reaching 55% + pledge spend 30% EU budget on CC
- From 2021 40% EU budget for comm agri policy + 30% from fisheries subsidies  adaptation + mitigation
- EU only make trade deals w st that uphold PCA targets
- Extra tax for importing E-intensive goods (2022 CBAM)
- Containers/cruiseships incl in ETS
- 1tr eur investment program (+ 750mil eur additional thru COVID recovery plan) for companies judged on sus criteria
- EU Renovation Wave = envisages overhaul of 220mil buildings by 2030 to improve eff/dec reliance on FF

23
Q

Details of the EU’s Fit for 55

A
  • Masterplan to get to 55% emission reduction by 2030
  • Launched 2021
  • Aims to reduce reliance on FF to enable future full divestment w/out impact of cost of living thru:
    o Expand use of renewables
    o Acc dev of EVs
    o Fund research into clean-E alts for aviation + shipping
  • Key elements
    o Revised ETS (adopted June 2022) = incl shipping/domestic heat/road transp + dec # credits available
    o Revised ESD (adopted June 2022) = stricter lims on non-ETS sector emissions + inc targets for all st expect Malta
    o Target remove min 310mil tns CO2 from atm by 2030 (C sinks)
    o From 2035 X buy FF-fueled cars new OR 2nd hand
    o Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (agreed to by Council Mar 2022)
    → Inc prices thru extra tariffs on imported goods that are covered by ETS but sourced from st w/out C price
    → 2023-25 transitional period
    → 2026 fully implemented
    o PENDING (as of 3 Aug 2022) :
    Renewable E Dir inc target to 40% by 2030
    Energy eff target inc 32  39%
    Acc deployment of EV charging stations – 1 every 60km
    Inc investment into sus aviation fuel R&D bc only 0.05% currently from bio/electrofuels
    Dec GHG intensity on ships 75% by 2050
    Social Climate Fund = support measures for vulnerables comm/sml bus/transp users during FF transition i.e. mitigate impact on cost of living
24
Q

Criticisms of the EU’s 2030 climate + energy package

A
  • ETS → ‘accounting tricks’ = st cont evade changing behaviour e.g. Malta bought from Bulg 2013,14,15
  • 55% = X ambitious enough for NGOs + green politicians who demand 65-70%
  • X address defor
  • 70% of budget still able to be used for counter-prod ventures e.g. all EU member st currently subsidise FF + EU allow ETS exemption on diesel
  • Targets ≠ action
  • “Pretending to save the climate but actually saving the econ” – DW vid abt Eur Gr deal  EU using cap mechanisms to encourage correct behaviour BUT reinforces cap mindset  justifying delaying action (cost of living, subsidies etc) = inimical to progress as rate needed
25
Q

Reasons for PMI’s response to climate change

A

• External regulation e.g. EU trading scheme
• Risk gl warming poses to tobacco leaf prod
• Reputation – inc expectation that cos are soc + environ responsible
• PCA set specific targets (2C) + addressed mitigation and adaptation - Intl Co-Op Initiatives

26
Q

Details of PMI’s response to climate change

A

1 Created the Good Agri Program aligned w SDGS

o Triple bottom line standards applied before all purchases from growers + suppliers
o Specific + time-bound aims:
→ 70% dec overall GHG emissions from 2010 levels by 2020
→ 0% coal use for tobacco curing by 2020
→ 0% defor from cultivation by 2020

o Monetary rewards for all empl for meeting emission reduction targets
o Set internal price on carbon $17/tn = low vs EU 90-130 eur/tn but high on business scale = typically $5-20/tn (updated every 1-2yrs)

o Partner w Swiss Red Cr → promo sus/resilience-building farming techniques (e.g. irrigation systems) in Mozambique to ensure food sec

27
Q

Effectiveness of PMI’s response to climate change

A

Evidence:
• 2010-15 10% improvement in fuel eff (7% of which in 2015 alone)
• 2010-18 dec CO2 emissions 36% in manufacturing
• 2021 PMI = 1 of 200 st on CDP’s A-List out of 9.6K submissions + 1/118 cos on water sec A list + 1/24 cos on forest A list

Overall evaluation:
PMI’s status as TNC means it can use econ power to influ own actions + actions of suppliers  improve own environ practices sig to be in line w PCA
H/e effectiveness lim by relatively sml scope of influ = impact minute

BUT X address root cause = capitalism

Also shows effectiveness of UN’s PCA/SDGs to bypass challenge of NIs + appeal directly to NSAs thru Intl Co-op Iniatives

28
Q

Aims of the Catholic Church’s response to climate change

A
  1. Radically overhaul current econ/soc structures = challenge cap/consumer mentality
  2. Help LDCs adapt
  3. Popularise a more intersectional view of CC to ensure protection of “our common home” + avert “a perfect storm that could rupture the bonds holding soc together”
  4. Encourage a multilat response thru “a renewed sense of shared responsibility for our wprld, and an effective solidarity based on justice”
29
Q

Details of the Catholic Church’s response climate change

A

• June 2015 PF issue papal encyclical ‘Laudato Si’ → earth = “immense pile of filth”
o Addressed challenge of CC denial – “a very solid scientific consensus” shows gl warming “mainly a result of human activity”
o Addressed challenge of cap – combatting CC req dec “unlimited appetites of consumerism”
o Addressed challenge of NIs/funding – polluting st need to help developing st
o Addressed challenge of prog being too slow – bemoaned current pol responses = remarkably weak

• Jan 2019 PF addressed 180 dips – complains current response = “remains v weak + a source of grave concern”

• Cath Ch divested from FF

• June 2019 PF declare “climate emergency” + meet w top oil execs + FF investors

30
Q

Effectiveness of the Catholic Church’s response to climate change

A

Positive:
• PCA adopted 6 mo after LS
• UNFCCC Exec Dir Christina Figueres: “PF’s encyclical underscores the moral imperative for urgent action on CC… this clarion call should guide the world towards a strong + durable univ climate agreement in Paris”
• June 2019 oil execs call on govts to put price on C to encourage low-C innovation

Limited:
• Oil execs X make any promises to voluntary reduce their own emissions

Overall evaluation:
Failed to change soc/econ system (e.g. EU response) so action is X at pac req + X achieve help to LDCs (e.g. problems w climate financing) BUT shifted view of CC from being a sci issue to a soc/moral issue = reflected in PCA/incl of climate objectives w/in SDGs (see Figueres’ comments above)

31
Q

Types of econ instability

A

• Recession (2 consecutive ¼ s of neg econ growth)
• High inflation
• Asset bubbles/bust
• Credit crunch
• BoP crisis
• Depression (severe recession)

32
Q

Characteristics of econ instability

A

• inc cyclical unemp (as opp to nat unemp = frictional + structural)
• dec consumer → dec spending
• dec investor confidence → dec capacity to prod
• bankruptcies

33
Q

How does capitalism’s boom/bust cycle contribute to economic instability?

A

Capitalism’s boom/bust cycles contributes to economic instability by creating the conditions that leave states’ more vulnerable and less equipped to restimulate their economy. Because a capitalist economy relies on supply vs demand to determine production, demand will inevitably become saturated during a boom period, creating an over-supply. This incentives companies to produce less, causing to job losses and a decrease in consumer confidence, which both lead to less spending and thus an economic contraction (bust). This links to broader economic stability, because when governments or the private sector attempt to pre-empt or cushion a bust, like during COVID, this often creates a market failure, exacerbating the bust later, whilst reducing the number of levers they can pull next time, like lowering interest rates or handing out stimulus. e.g. UK/Aus

34
Q

Define sovereignty

A

Legitimate or widely recognised ability to exercise effective control over a territory within defined borders. This is the primary organising principle of global politics, providing states with the authority to represent their territorial entity in the international community. Sovereignty can be challenged both internally (secessionist groups) or externally (invasion).

35
Q

Define multilateralism

A

Refers to a system of co-ordinating relations between three or more states, usually in pursuit of objectives in specific areas.

36
Q

Define globalisation

A

Refers to the acceleration and intensification of the exchange of goods, services, labour and capital, which promote global interdependence. This has been facilitated by rapid changes in communication and technology.

37
Q

Define national interest

A

Used as an all-embracing concept to justify policy preferences and actions, and includes the goals or objectives of foreign policy.

38
Q

Analyse the key aspects of climate change

A

Firstly, the exploitation of resources, namely the burning of fossil fuels, is a key aspect of climate change because it is making the crisis inevitable. Fossil fuels account for 85% of energy consumption globally, resulting in 9.5bn tonnes of CO2 being released from the ground into the atmosphere every year. This leads to an enhanced greenhouse effect, which contributes to global warming and thus causes climate change. This impact is evident in the fact that 50% of all GHG emissions ever were produced in the last 30 years, accelerating the world’s charge towards a climate crisis, with global atmospheric temperatures already 1.1C above pre-industrial levels and thus closing in the UN’s 1.5C limit.
Secondly, national interests is a key aspect of climate change both in the challenge it poses to the crisis’ effective resolution and the threat posed to national interests by the crisis itself. For example, after losing access to Russian gas in 2022, Germany and Italy prioritised protecting their economic prosperity by reopening coal-fired power plants, posing a challenge the effective resolution of climate change by increasing their GHG emissions and thus worsening the size of the problem. However, for small island nations, rising sea water levels as a result of global warming also demonstrates how climate change is linked to national interests in that it is a direct threat to their sovereignty.
Thirdly, methods of adaption and mitigation are a key aspect of climate change as they aim to resolve the causes of the crisis and also reduce the impact of its irreversible effects on human life and ecosystems. For example, methods of mitigation, such as transitioning to renewable energy, developing large-scale carbon capture technology, and instating carbon taxes will reduce the emission of GHGs and boost their absorption to bring the atmosphere to a ‘net zero’ status, stopping further global warming. Adaption methods, like flood protection installations, building regulations and migration, will improve resiliency to extreme weather events and protect people from harm’s way.

39
Q

Analyse the key aspects of economic instability

A

Firstly, because globalisation promotes increased international independence, it is a key aspect of economic instability by providing more avenues for contagion to spread. This creates economic instability because contagion prevents states’ ability to regulate their own economy and challenges its effective resolution since global interconnectedness means efforts of one states can be undermined by the actions of others. However, globalisation can also help resolve economic instability because its existence creates opportunities for international co-operation, such as through the IMF or G20.
Secondly, capitalism’s boom and bust cycle is a key aspect of economic instability by creating conditions that make the economies more vulnerable. In a capitalist economy where production is based on supply and demand, the demand during the boom period is eventually saturated, creating an over-supply which decreases consumer confidence, triggering a bust in which unemployment increases and monetary circulation stagnates. Because the boom/bust cycle is accepted as a natural part of a capitalist economy, periods of contraction are inevitable, and so this may put some states economic positions they can’t get out of.
Thirdly, key actors like the IMF and G20 are a key aspect of economic instability for their role attempting to stabilise the global economy. For example, the IMF provides loans to states experiencing balance of payment difficulties paired with austerity conditions in order to prevent states defaulting on their loans and thus spreading their economic instability globally, whilst also addressing the underlying causes of the crisis to deter it reoccurring.

40
Q

How has COVID created economic instability?

A
  1. The pandemic itself
    o Req partial shutdowns → restrictions apply to 93% gl workers → lose 8.8% work hrs → 3.4-7.6% neg econ growth gl
  2. Lockdowns
    o inc govt spending to supplement for lost work hrs/cushion econ impact → inc govt debt → inc vulnerability to future crises + LT impact
    o e.g. UK Q3 2021 GDP still 2.1% below Q4 2019 + 21.9% inc in GDP vs govt debt
  3. Politics
    o Pub confidence in govt’s eff response to health/econ crisis → impacts consumer/investor behaviour
    o E.g. Sw X serious lockdowns but econ shrink at similar lvl to Den bc lack of conf in govt
    o E.g. UK high mortality + Johnson govt parties → low conf → FTSE 100 (Brit stock market) exp 11.6% dec stock prices as of 2021 vs 2020
41
Q

Impact of COVID on unemployment

A
  • Youth unemp Q1 2020-Q3 2020 inc 4% vs 1% for non-youth
  • 33% indiv financial diff bc of COVID can be attributed to st’s GDP per cap + 47% to pub expenditure per cap → US exp 5.2% unemp inc bw 2019-20 bc less safety nets (despite $5.4tr fed help)
  • Gr exp 55.4% dec in tourism revenue → 80% households exp at least 1 job loss vs 40% unaffected
42
Q

Impact of COVID on consumer confidence?

A

Short term:
- Dec 2019 – May 2021 US 0.2% dec consumer spending vs 12.8% dec in UK

Long term:
- 75 central banks inc interest rates in past yr – avg 3.8 times each

43
Q

Impact of COVID on investor confidence

A

Short term
- UK share prices -2.2% change Q4 2019-Q3 2021

Long term
- UK share prices trending up since vax deployment

44
Q

Impact of COVID on economic growth + debt

A

Short term
- Ch – Q1 2020 GDP dec 6.9% = 1st dec since 1976 BUT 2020 overall 2.3% growth
- US GDP dec 19.2% 1st ½ 2020 BUT inc 15.4% 2nd half  -3.4% 2020 overall
- UK 2020 GDP -9.9% = largest dec of G7 st
- Majority of st in recession

Long term
- 3.4-7.6% neg econ growth gl
- Ch lose $680bn worth in econ growth
- US V-shape recovery facilitated by $5.4tr fed support  LT budget burden
- EU lost $2tr GDP output
- Ind lost $950bn
- UK grew 4.2% Q2 2021
- UK pub debt vs GDP inc 21.9% Q4 2019-Q3 2021
- All but 2 adv econ will recover by end 2022 vs only 8 emerging econs

45
Q

How is COVID different from typical economic instability crises?

A
  1. black swan event
  2. covid = mainly supply issue, X demand → harder for govts to influ → inflation in US reached 9.1% = highest in 40yrs
46
Q

US response to COVID

A

Fiscal
- Total $5.4tr govt spending
- Initial response = CARES Act → tax rebates/expanded unemp benefits/$25bn to prov food safety/$510bn to X corp bankrupt/$349bn to sml bus admin loans/$100bn for hospitals
- Aug 2020 T exec order $44bn extre unemp benefits/student loan + rent relief
- Dec 2020 $868bn govt funding bill = unemp benefits + incl $600 dir payment to indiv
- Mar 2020 B →Am Rescue Plan = $1.8tr (8.8% GDP) = pub health investment + fam support + unemp benefits + $1400 cash to eligible indiv

Monetary
- Fed Reserve dec IR to bw 0-0.25% + inc lending

47
Q

Effectiveness of US response to COVID

A

Effective:
- GDP dec 19.2% 1st ½ 2020 → GDP inc 15.3% 2nd ½ 2020
- Unemp 14.7% Apr 2020 → 6% Apr 2021 → 3.5% Aug 2022

Counter-productive:
- Pop reliant on temp social safety nets e.g. unemp benefits, rent relief
- Debt skyrocketed = 2019 108.8% → end 2020 160% → end 2021 150% (well above healthy 60%)
→ govt have less levers to pull for next crisis + ppl are more vulnerable

48
Q

UK response to COVID

A

Monetary
- 19 Mar 2020 BoEng cut IR to 0.1%

Fiscal
- $575.5bn across 6 diff lg stim packs → mainly targeted at sml bus + paying bus to keep ppl emp e.g. tax cuts + program offering to pay 80% of salaries for otherwise laid off workers
- $8.5bn tax credits for poor + unemp → $1200/yr more in pockets
- $2.5bn job program for ppl under 25yo
- 6mo VAT cut 20% → 5%

49
Q

Effectiveness of UK response to COVID

A

Effective:
- Unemp X exceed 5.2% = now at 3.6%

Limited:
- GDP dec 10% 2020 = lgst dec 30yrs + lgst in G7 → grew 4.2% Q2 2021

Counterproductive:
- GDP dec 10% 2020 = lgst dec 30yrs + lgst in G7 → grew 4.2% Q2 2021

50
Q

Germany’s response to COVID

A

Fiscal
- Mar 2020 Econ Stab Fund = $650bn
- June 2020 expanded:
-incl VAT cut 19% → 16% on all goods = cost $22.5bn
-$6bn inc to welfare programs
-$12.4bn reductions to renewable E fees for 2021+22

51
Q

Effectiveness of Germany’s response to COVID

A

Effective:
- Unemp stayed below 4%

Limited:
- Debt not too bad = 2019 60% → end 2020 68% → end 2021 79%
- GDP dec another 1.8% Q1 2021
- Consumer conf X returned – spending = 5.4% below pre-pandemic lvls
- Trade still 5% below pre-pandemic

52
Q

Australia’s response to COVID

A

Fiscal
- $223bn worth relief + stim packs:
-$4.4bn payments to sml/med bus → extended $16.5bn w payments up to $65.4K to cover wages
-$490 dir cash to ppl on govt benefits
-$85bn Jobkeeper
- Oct 2020 release budget:
- $12.9bn personal income tax cuts
- expand 1st Home Loan Deposit Scheme → guarantee homeloans for 10K more buyers
- invest $3.3bn in broadband/5G networks

Monetary
- Res Bank cut cash rate 0.1%

53
Q

Effectiveness of Australia’s response to COVID

A

Limited
- Unemp inc to 7.48% but stab to pre-pandemic levels =3.9%
- Aus GDP 2.8% behind pre-covid trendline
- GDP growth shows V shape recovery by Q3 but tapering downwards now bc current crisis

Counterproductive
- Feb 2021 housing price inc 2.1% = lgst inc in 17 yrs
- Consumer conf currently dec bc govt X use stim against for current crisis bc already big debt + low IR
- Debt skyrocket = 2019 47% → 2020 97% → 2021 84%

54
Q

How does the COVID crisis link to the current food/energy crisis?

A

Basically stim worked in ST but failed to prev current crisis + actually made it worse bc less levers to pull/ppl + govt more vulnerable