U3 AOS2 Pt 2 Flashcards
Define sovereignty
Legitimate or widely recognised ability to exercise effective control of a territory within recognised borders. This is the primary organising principle of global politics, providing states with the authority to represent their territorial entity within the international community. State sovereignty can be challenged internally (for example, secessionist groups) or externally (for example, one state invades another).
Define power
Refers to the ability of one global actor to influence the actions of another global actor. Power can be exercised in a range of types and forms
Define National Interest
Used as an all-embracing concept to justify policy preferences and actions, and includes the goals or objectives of foreign policy.
Define Security
Traditionally refers to protection of state’s borders from intruders and the maintenance of sovereignty. Has evolved to include softer forms of security, such as access to resources (economic security) and protection of ecosystems (environmental security)
Define Idealism
School of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by moral principle, as opposed to practical and pragmatic considerations.
Define Pragmatism
School of thought in which foreign policy is influenced above all else by practical and pragmatic considerations, as opposed to moral principles.
Describe Taiwan and China’s trade relationship
1991-2020 T investment → Ch = $188bn
2016 T invest $10bn tech
2010 FTA
→ Ch = T’s #1 export market + T = Ch’s #7
→ 2020 record high trade = T export $155.55bn = 43.9% of all exports vs 40.2% 2016 despite DPP election
→ exports to Ch = 30% trade + 15% GDP
Describe SK and China’s trade relationship
2015 FTA
→ $300bn bilat trade
Ch dominant bc 2017 boycotts cost SK econ $6.8bn vs $800mil for Ch
BUT impact LT IS bc 2020 Pew poll → 75% SK hold neg view abt Ch
Describe Japan and China’s RR
2019 $2.6bn trade deal
BUT RR deteriorate 2020 b/c J fear Ch’s inc mil agro will spillover - proven true when Ch launched missile into J’s EEZ during Pelosi’s visit to T
BUT econ r/ship = stronger than ever
- Ch = J’s #1 export market since 2020 + J = Ch’s #2
- Q1 2022 12,000 J businesses in Ch
→ J X share same concerns as W abt Ch surveillance
- J govt work w/ Tiktok + purchase Ch electric busses
- Huawei launched new devices for J market
Describe China’s use of aid in the PI
2011-18 Ch #3 provider of aid in PI = $1.26bn
80% concessional loans 20% grants
Used to secure sov claims
→ $243mil aid to Van since 2013 → 1/2 PI st to recog Ch sov over SCS
→ offered $500mil Kiribati 2019 to recog 1CP
Used to pursue EP (common prosp)
→ 2017 Ch construction activity = x6 more than $958mil spent in aid
Used to improve IS
→ 2018 Aus critic Ch for “debt-trap dip” (Ch responsible for 50% V debt) but Tonga PM rebuke Aus for scandalising Ch for “helping poor and needy countries”
Describe the BRI
$1.5tr project
2600 proj in 100+ st
138st sign MOU since 2013
est to add 0.2-0.3% GDP growth + 6.3% gl trade
Impact of BRI
Esp pop in SS Afr - 39st sign MOU → 63% Afr view Ch influence in Afr as somewhat/very pos
BUT soft power deficit → W st distrust Ch motives
IMF report Dj = st of ‘debt distress’ w 70% GDP debt
2021 Sri Lankan port seizure - reported by W news like NYT as ev of Ch’s expansionist agenda
e.g. 2020 Aus fed govt cancel VIC’s 2018 MOU
Describe china’s use of soft power in Africa
Globally spends $10bn/yr soft power projection = promo attractive image in media
Offer cheaper TV rates in Afr vs BBC/AlJazeera → Ch st-owned CGTV claims acc for 10/24mil pay TV subs in Afr
Largest prov of scholarship for Afr students to study abroad = 16%
Ch host 80K Afr students 2018 vs 2K 2003
→ 63% Afr hold somewhat/very pos view of Ch influence in Afr
→ 4 Afr st adopt Ch’s dev model
Interpretations structure
Dominant interpretation:
1. who said it + what is their view
2. rationale
3. policy implications (evidence)
4. which NI sub-goal does it prioritise
Competing interpretation
Dominant interpretation:
1. who said it + what is their view
2. rationale
3. policy implications (past actions/hypothetical)
4. which NI sub-goal does it prioritise
What is China’s GINI coefficient?
38.5 in 2016
EP interests in SCS
7-11bn barrels of oil
190tr cubic feet of gas
90% ME trade travels thru area
RR interests in SCS
surrounded by US allies
US conduct FoN exercises in SCS regularly
Ev of Phillipines drifting from Ch
2020 Duterte addess UNGA - support 2016 UNCLOS ruling + “firmly reject attempts to undermine it” = bad for IS
Aug 2021 Duterte cancels plan to end US visiting troops agreement
Ch’s continued use of military in the SCS post-2016
2018 naval drills w/ 40+ ships = ‘monthly exercises’
Apr 2020 Ch CG sink V fishing boat
Feb 2021 Ph find 200 Ch mil vessels around Whitsun Reef
How much land has Ch reclaimed in the SCS?
3000+ acres since Dec 2014
Public opinion on China
Pew:
2015 51% Aus prefer econ rel w Ch>Us → 31% 2021
2015 27% Aus prefer econ rel 2 US>Ch → 59% 2021
Gap further widened in J, SK + Ca
Pew Poll 2020 75% SK neg view towards Ch
Gallup Instit 2020 83% SK view Ch’s FP as destabilising
Pew Poll 2020 86% J unfavourable view towards Ch (vs 42% in 2002)
Pew Poll % that have no confidence in Xi doing right thing w world affairs inc by 15%+ in 7 W nations
63% Afr feel somewhat/v pos abt Ch influence in Afr
2018 Tonga PM laud Ch for helping “poor and needy nations” ($1.26bn aid in PI 2011-18)
Ev of progress towards Digital Silk Rd/transitioning econ
2019 Ch produce 70% photovoltaics (cells for solar panels)
Ch account for 23% cross-border data flows = x2 of US
Ch’s mil budget
2022 $230bn (#2 behind US)
x2 mil spending 2009-18
China’s use of economic power to build soft power
Ch pay Daily Telegraoh 750K GBP/yr for 4-8pg monthly insert ‘Ch Watch’
→ reach 6.6 mil readers in J’s Mainichi Shiumbun newsppr + 1.7mil in US’s NYT
→ X effective bc 2020 Pew 86% J unfavourable view towards Ch + US who have unfavourable view of Ch inc 27% bw 2019-20
BUT effective in Afr - prov 16% scholarships for Afr students study overseas + 63% have somewhat/v pos view of Ch influence in Afr
China’s actions in pursuit of NS with South Korea
2017 Ch close 75/99 Lotte supermarkets + boycott tourism + Hyundai/Kia bc SK deployment of THAAD
BUT
Coercive tactics → SK closer rel w US 2021 → aquire aircraft carrier + test submarine missiles
Evaluate effectiveness of China’s actions in pursuit of NS with South Korea
Achieved goal of elim immediate threat to Ch’s nuke capacity BUT damages LT NS bc inc US mil presence/capabilities of SK
China’s actions in pursuit of NS with Taiwan
- 2017 1600 ballistic missiles deployed along TS
- 400K Ch troops stationed along TS vs 88K total T troops
- 2019 Ch aquire 1st helicopter dock amphibious assault ship
- 18 Apr 2018 ‘live fire drills’ = mock invasion of T
- 2021 950 incursions into T’s ADIZ (inc x2 from 2020)
- Nat day weekend → 149 mil aircraft in strike formation
Evaluate the effectiveness of China’s actions in pursuit of NS with Taiwan
A/t Ch’s hard power approach is somewhat pos for NS b/c supports CCP’s ‘strong china’ narr + maintain SQ, inc dom pressure on CCP to keep proj strong img/inc aggressiveness + soft power deficit limits/is counterprod for full achievement.
- only 6% T support immediate ind
- PD reports on 400,000 troops @ TS
- Oct 2021 Nat day weekend → 149 mil aircraft in strike formation = VERY IDEALISTIC
BUT
- inc US influ:
2017 US-T Rel Act → delegit sov claims
2020 $5.1bn/2021$750mil in arms sales to T → mil threat to terr integrity
T/f PRC hard power stategy fulfilling vicious cycle of inc aggressiveness to appease domestic patriotism + maintain sov SQ. H/e largely ineff b/c X soft power driving T towards US = undermining EC + legit
Middle-class expectation - factor shaping NS + EP
Wages inc avg 10% since 2005
Only 12.5% Ch labour force = college ed vs 24% US
Xi: “middle-income trap”
Aging population - factor shaping EP
2033 → 1/3 pop > 60yrs
Bw 2020-35 Chg will lose 70 mill working-age adults + gain 130 mil sr citizens
Age related spending must x3 by 2050 (10% → 30% of GDP)
→ need to modernise econ
History of econ growth - factor shaping EP
1978-2014 800mil ppl lifted out of pov
Econ growth peak 2007 = 15% → in 6%s since 2014
Econ/resource necessity - factor shaping EP
Tech ind relies on T imports of semi-conductors
World’s largest energy importer
→ 14th year plan = 2025 Made in China
Environmental pollution - factor shaping NS
60% groundwater according to CCP = “unfit for human contact”
Lost ½ rivers
40% farmland = destroyed thru overuse
→ world’s largest importer of agricultural prod
History - factor shaping RR + EP
‘Century of shame’ = 1st Opium War 1839 → end of Ch CW in 1949 = foreign powers devestate Ch
‘Middle Kingdom’ → Ch 1800s responsible for 30% gl trade + regional st capitulate to demands vs 1950s = 3%
US politics - factor shaping RR + IS
2016 Trump → isolationist policy → vacuum of US influence on gl stage
2020 Biden → intl policy
2021 first overseas trip by Sec of St + Sec of Def → SK + J
US lost wars in Iraq + Afghanistan → belief that W power is in decline → Xi escalates aggressiveness of Ch agenda e.g. WW dip
Debate on NS
- CCP - terr integrity = essential for NS → pursue 1CP
rationale:
- “T is a part of Ch” (2005 Anti-Secessionist Law)
- SCS = historical 9DL + 80% trade thru SCS = Ch
policy:
- defend all threats to sov
- inc mil presence/agro - Dem Prog Party of T (DPP) → T = ind + sov st → reject 1CP
rationale:
- quasi-ind since 1949
- own nat ID (67% T ID as T)
policy:
- resist mil threats
- Ch should drop all sov claims to T
- allow T intl ‘living space’
Debate on EP
- Xi - inc govt control over econ thru more SOEs → redist $ to low-middle income Ch
rationale:
- wealthiest 1% own 30.6% national $ vs 20.9% 20 yrs ago
- 600mil ppl live on
Debate on RR
- Left of CCP - maintain ‘close as lips + teeth’ r/ship w/ NK
rationale:
- historical ally b/c shared ideology
- geopol importance b/c BZ b/w Ch + 28,500 US troops in SK
policy:
- shield NK from intl scrutiny + sanctions
- maintain T r/ship to ensure regime stability (64.5% of NK T = w/ Ch) - Zhao Lingman - Ch should abandon NK
rationale:
- NK = dip liability (“neg equity”)
- damage to Ch’s rep → inc difficulty of maintaining dip r/ship w/ West
- inc dep in US econ → X afford to provoke US
Debate on IS
- traditional CCP (inspo = Deng) → ‘hide your strength, bide your time’
rationale:
- Ch priority = econ devt → must maintain intl trust → trade/dip → ‘peaceful rise’
policy:
- avoid confrontation
- seek co-op w/ US
- ‘good neighbour’ policy w/ AP region → inc econ dep thru being attractive + trustworthy TP - Xi → ‘peace thru strength’ = use fear/force to pursue gl power status
rationale:
- US as unipolar power = lim Ch’s growth
- need to satisfy nat aspiration → must deliver on “ch dream”
policy:
- inc mil in T, ECS. SCS
- BRI
- Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Examples of China’s political power
- removal of Xi’s term limits w/ only 2 rejections + 3 abstain
- XJT enshrined in constitution + taught in schools/workplaces
- censorship/control of internet - websites conn to pro-dem in HK, pro-ind in T or Dalai Lama = blocked
Minority groups vs CCP debate on NS
- CCP - cultural autonomy = sec threat
rationale → min grps = conn to terror
policy → inc mil presence (1 PLA soldier for every 20 Xinjiang res)
→ re-ed camps, Islam banned from being taught, only Mandarin in schools = ‘cultural genocide’ - Uighurs/Tibetans - NS still poss w/ rel div + should be allowed to express cultural ID
policy → CCP should stop ‘cultural gen’ policies
→ 2019 Urumqi riots = 200 ppl killed
Impact of Ch’s dip power on NS/IS
2022 before leaving office High Commissioner on HR published report denouncing Ch’s actions in Xinjiang → Ch vetoed UNCHR’s endorsement of report
