U4 AOS2 Flashcards

Question 1

Q

What were the immediate obstacles to the CCP’s consolidation of power?

Answer

A

Lack of intl recog of CCP as official govt of Ch
Pop growth = 15mil/yr
Inflation 1949 = 85,000%
Breakdown of law and order during GMD rule bc corruption, blackmarket, crime syndicates (e.g. Green Gang) etc
Devastation of 12 yrs of war (WWII → CW) → destruction of infrast + communications
Industrial prod = 50% of pre-war levels
Large-scale unemp in cities
Food shortages esp in cities bc food prod = down 25%

Question 2

Q

How did the CCP create a new political system?

Answer

A

• 20-21 Sep 1949 CCP conference in B draft constitution → est provisional govt =
→ 11/24 initial govt ministers = non-CCP
• 1954 CCP create formal constitution → est pol structure + processes

Question 3

Q

What did China’s new political system look like?

Answer

A

The state:

President - Mao
Premier- Zhou Enlai
Standing Comm of NPC - 140 members
National People’s Congress - 3000 members + elects pres
Municipal assemblies + govts → implement local policies
Provincial assemblies + govts → implement local policies
Local county assemblies + govts → implement local policies

The party:

Chairman = Mao
Politburo Standing Comm = 5 members (incl Mao)
Politburo - 20-30 members → direct the Mil Aff Comm → closely supervises PLA
Central Comm - 100-300 regular/alt members incl Secretariat (led by Deng Xiaoping) → co-ord comm bw various levels of govt
National Party Congress
Regional Party Congress
Provincial Party Congress
Country + city Party Congress

Question 4

Q

What did Mao mean by a ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’?

Answer

A

new system = ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ = dem rights are afforded to the 4 classes of the ‘new dem coalition’ who M believed were engaged in rev:
o Peasantry
o Proletariat (workers)
o Petite-bourgeoisie (sml bus owners)
o National capitalists (‘loyal industrialists’ = expertise in econ/bus/ind)
BUT party will dictate ‘reactionaries’ (any dissident) on ppl’s behalf

→ used by M to justify CCP’s monopoly on pol power

Question 5

Q

How did the implementation of a new political system help the CCP consolidate power?

Answer

A

→intricate multi-level govt allow CCP greater scope to manage all of Ch (very big)
e.g. each CCP regional committee had a chairman, party secretary, pol commissar + mil commander
→ Ch under quasi-mil rule until 1954 when formal constitution established govt system that ran parallel to CCP structure
→ pop had X direct control over govt reps bc selected CCP reps who voted on their behalf → CCP cont electing own members to higher offices of power

Question 6

Q

How did the setting up an effective administration help the CCP consolidate power?

Answer

A

MZ policies X equipped to deal w demands of urban prole + CCP only exp governing = war conditions (nationalism = lesser priority now)

→ ex-GMD civ servants encouraged to stay w decent salaries + vision of ‘new Ch’
→ Ch expats abroad encouraged to return home bc vision of ‘new Ch’ modelled on W dem
→ ‘national capitalists’ = industrial managerial class = allowed to maintain control over prod bc expertise

Question 7

Q

How did enforcing law and order help the CCP consolidate power?

Answer

A

PLA use violence/Maoist peasant tactics to bring western prov incl Tibet + Xinjiang under single govt rule for 1st time ever (vs GMD only max control 1/3 terr + 2/3 pop)
PLA officers also pol commissars + members of govt

Question 8

Q

How did economic reforms help the CCP consolidate power?

Answer

A

May 1949 CCP intro new currency = yuan
Banks, transport, electricity, gas + foreign assets/industries = nationalised under dir govt regulation → govt able to impose stricter control over currency exchange, reduce circulation of paper cash + ban foreign currency → control inflation
Intro new pay system based on price of 5 key goods + price control on basic items → ensure ppl able to afford necessities + prevent inflation
Reformed tax system = reduce corruption in collection process + intro fairer tax levels

Question 9

Q

Timeline of the Korean War

Answer

A

25 June 1950 NK cross 38P → UN intervenes
15 Sep 1950 UN launch counter-off → soon capture Pyongyang
15 Oct 1950 350K troops from People’s Volunteers (expeditionary force of PLA) cross Yalu River → US cont advance nth bc think only 10K crossed
25 Nov 1950 200K Ch troops meet UN troops → overwhelm UN → retake NK w/in 7wks + capture Seoul by Jan 1951
Jan 1951-July 1951 bloody stalemate at 38P
July 1951 ceasefire
27 July 1953 formal armistice signed

Question 10

Q

Why did China intervene in the Korean War?

Answer

A

o Stop spread of imperialism esp to comm ally – CCP must present as a strong defender of Ch nationalism
o Maintain BZ bw Ch + hostile W powers (US/UN) in SK

Question 11

Q

Positives and negative of China’s involvement in the Korean War

Answer

A

Positives:
• Inc morale/support for CCP bc Ch finally “stood up” to the “biggest imperialist” = 3POP Nat

Negatives:
• Inc CCP paranoia bc aware of intl antagonism towards regime → justification for inc suppression of counter-rev voices thru more vigorous land reform approach (Fanshen)
• Human impact of war – 900K Ch troops killed/MIA/wounded + 500K killed
• Econ setbacks:
o 1951 US sponsor UN Res → imposed econ embargo on PRC until 1970s that sig hindered econ progress
o Cost of KW = same as amt spent domestically to rebuild from WWII + CW
• Ch iso from intl stage/dip circles

Question 12

Q

How did street committees play a role in cleanliness drives

Answer

A

massive influ → mobilise citizens to clean laneways/households/all areas of urban life → street comm off inspect households → commitment to rev questioned if fail to meet standard

Question 13

Q

What public health measures did the CCP put in place?

Answer

A

• Mass inoculations → dramatically dec cholera, smlpox + typhus
• Edu campaigns abt spitting → dec TB
• Discouraged public urination
• Nat campaign to edu midwives abt sterile birthing equip
• From 1949 close brothels + re-ed sex workers in ‘more useful occupations’
o Part of broader initiate to de-sexualise Ch soc bc believe sex = unnecessary distraction from rev
• Opium addicts → rehab
• Heavy punishment for selling opium

Question 14

Q

Aims of Fanshen/Land reform

Answer

A

Agitate inc class-consciousness among peasantry
Empower peasants to “turn over” the social order – cadres living amongst them + MZ’s confidence that “The peasants are clear-sighted…- the peasants keep clear accounts” → trust + support for CCP
Encourage revolutionary thinking – ‘Speak Bitterness’ meetings = “a mass edu of the peasants into socialism” (MZ)

Question 15

Q

Key features of the Agrarian Reform Law (28 June 1950)

Answer

A

→ est Ppl’s Tribunals = judge landlords
→ 1000s party cadres sent to countryside to org agitate peasants to “turn over” soc order thru land redist + denouncing landlords

Question 16

Q

What was the process of Fanshen?

Answer

A

Cadres live w poorest peasants + est PAs to understand local comm dynamics/needs + identify counter-revs
CCP host ‘Speak Bitterness’ meetings → peasants ‘stand up’ to pub express anger at landlord’s mistreatment/exploitative behaviour = encouraging peasantry to blame exploitative upper classes for poverty
Ppl’s Tribunal decides fate of accused → ‘local despots’ beaten/killed while fairer landlords must pay inc tax/reduce rent/cancel debts
→ landlords still allowed to keep up to ½ land if cultivated by immediate fam/rented to hired hands

Question 17

Q

Reasons for Thought Reform

Answer

A

Prominent intell opp CCP regime
• Hu Shi (founder of NCM) = in T working for JJ as GMD foreign min
• Liang Shuming critic MZ/CCP view of rev as peasant driven

Question 18

Q

Details of Thought Reform

Answer

A

Intro Sep 1951
Targeted intell class
Followed same process as Rectification Campaign: lecture → criticise their bourg attitudes in grp discussion → struggle sessions where intel forced to correct attitudes to align w Marx → ‘re-education’= hard labour if refuse
Publicly denounced well-known intell

Question 19

Q

Reasons for Sanfan

Answer

A

Ex-GMD members in govt = unreliable - “We need to have a good clean-up” – MZ

Question 20

Q

Details of Sanfan

Answer

A

Introduced in November 1951, Sanfan consisted of three evils: corruption, waste, bureaucratism. The campaign targeted government officials and party members. It was carried out by encouraging cadres to identify and criticise corrupt officials. As punishment, ‘major’ perpetrators were killed and ‘medium’ to ‘minor’ perpetrators were ‘re-educated’ in labour camps.

Question 21

Q

Reasons for Wufan

Answer

A

MZ believe ind/business sector = cause of govt corruption/disloyalty

Question 22

Q

Details of Wufan

Answer

A

Intro 1952
Targeted business owners + industrialists
450K businesses investigated → 340K found guilty of at least 1 anti
Usually lenient punishment (fines, imprisonment) but pressured to relinquish part/full ownership to st

Question 23

Q

Key features of mass campaigns

Answer

A

Purges and executions
Household and workplace registration
Class labels
Speak Frankness

Question 24

Q

Reasons for the First Five-Year Plan

Answer

A

• Devastation of 12 yrs of war (WWII → CW) → destruction of infrast + communications
• Industrial prod = 50% of pre-war levels
• Large-scale unemp in cities
• Food shortages esp in cities bc food prod = down 25%
• 1949-57 urban pop x2 (57mil → 100mil)
• GMD already set up national ind investment policy = Nat Resources Com. = 200K workers
• 14 Feb 1950 PRC sign treaty w USSR = mutual defence pact, $300mil loan, sci/ind/tech expertise, pol/econ strategists → help implement Stalinist dev model = ind growth funded by surpluses from collectivised agri
• By 1953 CCP already est stability thru:
o Social + pol campaigns
o Inflation under control
o Ensured mil control of Ch for 1st time ever

Question 25

Q

Aims of the First Five-Year Plan

Answer

A

Grow heavy ind thru Stalinist dev model thru construction of 700 diff industrial enterprises

Question 26

Q

When and how was the First Five-Year Plan announced?

Answer

A

1 Oct 1953

MZ announce PRC pivot to “general line for the transition to socialism”

Question 27

Q

When was the First Five-Year Plan in place?

Question 28

Q

How did the First Five-Year Plan create division within the party

Answer

A

• Spurred collectivisation debates:
o Liu Shaoqi + Chen Yuan = Gradualists → argue ‘no collect w/out mod’ bc believe X pt pushing collect if X have machinery to carry out mass-scale farming
o Mao + Chen Boda → believed collect should happen ASAP to pre-empt peasants’ “spontaneous tendencies towards capitalism” + a reinvigoration of rev zeal/LM spirit (progress thru struggle) was all that was needed to inc prod + overcome material deficiencies

• Gao Gang Affair
o GG = key ally of MZ + top off in Manch + member of Pb
o late 1952 appt head of State Planning Comm (oversaw 5YP) → well-trusted + respected
o MZ complain abt Liu’s push for slow collect → GG interpret this as command to conspire against Liu + other Generalists → recruit support from other top off + mil comm → plan is leaked to MZ + condemns “sinister wind” blowing amongst CCP
o 24 Dec 1953 MZ publicly scold GG + Liu attacks GG for running an ‘ind kingdom’ in Manch → GG arrested + impris
o Mar 1954 purged from CCP + suicide

Question 29

Q

Key aspects of First Five-Year Plan’s

Answer

A

Industrialisation plan:
Sectors of focus = coal, steel, petrochemicals, transport, infrast (e.g. vast rd + rail bridge across Yangzi River in Nanjing)

o Heavy ind = 89% 5YP budget
o Manufacturing = 11% 5YP budget

Agriculture plan:
• X funding to agri bc assume collectivised farming will inc prod organically → use gradual persuasion
• Peasants encouraged to form Mutual Aid Teams = 6-10 fams → share tools/draught animals during peak harvest/planting time
→ then encouraged to form co-ops:
o Lower agri producers co-ops = 20-40 households → maintain ownership but only profit on crops produced above ¼ harvest yield govt quota
o Higher agri producers co-ops = 100-300 households → X ownership + only paid for labour – instead co-ord + admin by CCP

Question 30

Q

Successes of the First Five-Year Plan

Answer

A

1957 gross ind output exceed initial goal by 21%
Total govt expenditure on ind x5 1950 vs 1957
Ind prod inc 10-16%/yr
Treaty w USSR → 10K Sov econ advisors + 28K Ch go to USSR for training
Ch prod own trucks, aircraft, cars + ships for 1st time

Question 31

Q

Failures of the First-Five Year Plan

Answer

A

• $300mil loan from USSR came w condition of concessions

• PRC had to pay for Sov econ advisors → take out more loans to cover costs
→ by 1955 Ch paying more to USSR than receiving BUT Sov funding = only 3% investment

• Funding for 5YP depended on agri prod = vulnerable + underperforming:
→ Farming prod only inc 4%/yr
→ Grain prod only inc 2-3%/yr
→ Soybeans/cotton prod = dec
= problem bc pop inc 2.2%/yr → X generating surplus anticipated to sell intl → fund ind mod = 5YP

• CCP losing support of peasants:
→ Losing ownership = X reflect their view of rev = centred on land reform/redist from LL to peasant
→ Felt exploited for benefit of ind in cities bc high grain taxes + low fixed prices → X profit from prod from land they still owned → impact on prod bc peasants prioritised farming little land they still owned >collect farms

Question 32

Q

How did Mao incite the High Tide of Socialism in rural areas?

Answer

A

• 1955 MZ opposed Pb consensus that Gradualism should be approach to agri collect
→ July 1955 appeal to rural pol cadres w speech ‘Question of Agri Co-op’:
“An upsurge in the new, socialist mass movements is imminent… on no account should we allow these comrades [the Gradualists] to use the Soviet experience [the need for mod/ind] as a cover for their idea of moving at a snail’s pace”

Question 33

Q

Outcomes of the High Tide of Socialism in rural areas

Answer

A

MZ appeal had ‘electrifying effect’ (Ryan) on pol cadres in countryside

→ MZ’s announced goal to collect ½ peasants by end 1957 = met + exceeded w 97% peasantry in co-ops by end 1956

Question 34

Q

How did Mao incite the High Tide of Socialism in urban areas?

Answer

A

late 1955 MZ want to intro more soc policies in cities → consult delegate of businessmen → suggest nationalising entire priv sector
Tactic = persuasion/intimidation but X law

Question 35

Q

Outcomes of the High Tide of Socialism in urban areas

Answer

A

Met w enthusiasm :
o MZ’s stated goal to trans all priv-owned enterprises → joint st/priv ownership by end 1957 = met by mid-Jan 1957 = 1mo after goal announced
o Busmen celebrate as hand over deeds
o 15 Jan 1957 200K ppl rally in TS square to celebrate soc triumph over cap

→ ev of impact of Sanfan bc created compliant bus class

Question 36

Q

How did the CCP’s response to Destalinisation threaten Mao’s power?

Answer

A

Sep 1956 @ 8th Party Congress CCP started lim M’s power:
o Dir ref to MZ Thought in constit removed
o Create new leadership team = Liu Shaoqi + Deng Xiaoping
o Zhou Enlai pub critic fast-paced collectivisation advocated for by M

Question 37

Q

What was happening in the USSR that contributed to Mao launching the Hundred Flowers Campaign?

Answer

A

De-Stalinisation - Feb 1956 Khrushev denounced S’s cult of personality
Mass pop uprisings in H + Pol

Question 38

Q

What was the core motivation of Mao’s Hundred Flowers Campaign

Answer

A

M paranoid High Tide would fade away

Question 39

Q

Aims of the Hundred Flowers Campaign

Answer

A

inc party awareness of pop needs/demands = essentially mass line but focused on intell class
allow pop to release frustrations w regime thru discussion/debate – X uprising = ‘vaccinating the masses’ against discontent
solve collectivisation debate
bring back tech expertise/innovation lost thru Wufan/Thought Reform
change M’s image to portray Comm as valuing freedom of speech bc felt vulnerable to deSt
reinvigorate rev zeal by shaking up party bureaucracy

Question 40

Q

How did Mao initially try to popularise the Hundred Flower’s Campaign and why did it fail?

Answer

A

Jan 1956 Zhou gave speech → encourage better rel bw party + intel
M tried to pop Zhou’s idea by reviving old Ch expression: “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” + even encouraged open discuss ideas of JJ + prev critic intel (Hu Shi + Liang Shuming)

BUT • X progress by end 1956 bc lack of support from CCP e.g. Peng Zhen (mayor of B) lim what PRC newppr Ppl’s Daily + intel class still suspicious

Question 41

Q

How did Mao garner popular support for the Hundred Flower’s Campaign

Answer

A

Feb 1957 M gave speech to the Supreme St Conference = non-CCP
M travel thru Ch urging that contradictions = inevitable but should be resolved peacefully + follow process of unity-criticism-unity
Apr 1957 Ppls daily give major endorsement when pub editorial promo HFC → critic starts arising → “’fine rain’ of criticism [that M was expecting] grew into a heavy downpour of resentment”(Ryan) → intel critic party/M/socialism + argue CCP X better than GMD or Imp

Question 42

Q

Consequence of the Hundred Flower’s Campaign: How and why did Mao end the campaign?

Answer

A

workers strike in cities = exactly what M X want

June 1957 Ppl’s Daily announce end of HFC bc denunciations X longer tolerated – published edited version of M’s 1940 ‘On Contradictions’
New distinguishment bw “fragrant flowers [non-antagonistic, constructive criticism of specific CCP practices/indiv] and poisonous weeds [antagonistic critic contrary to socialism/M/CCP’s dem dict]”
“Any word or deed at variance w socialism is completely wrong” - Mao

Question 43

Q

Consequence of the Hundred Flower’s Campaign: What was the Anti-Rightest Campaign?

Answer

A

systematic + organised
• Deng Xiaping appt head of campaign → round up 100,000s intell/students → struggle sessions
• Instit that employed intel req to meet quota of exposing 5% of staff as R otherwise suspected of R leanings
• 40% of GMD Rev Comm + Dem League members convicted of “anti-Comm, anti-ppl, anti-socialist bourg line”
• 300-400K ppl sent to be ‘re-edu thru labour’
o Some stay 10-20yrs
o Wider impact – immense pressure on spouses to divorce + tore apart fams

Question 44

Q

How did the end of the First Five-Year Plan influence the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

o Mid-1957 1st 5YP over → 2nd created + approved by govt econ
o Needed to address major flaws from 1st plan:
→ Agri X prod surplus anticipated to fund industrialisation
→ MZ concerned rev momentum + zeal being lost thru highly centralised/bureaucratic system needed to carry out plan
→ X solution to collectivisation debate
o Central Committee cautiously approve dec # of collect farms + approve 2nd 5YP BUT agree MZ’s 12yr collectivisation plan (aims to x2 cotton + grain thru rev zeal) could theoretically work
→ CCP indecisive/lacking pol direction → M’s enthusiasm takes advantage of this to redir party in his favour

Question 45

Q

How did the USSR influence the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

o 4 Oct 1957 USSR launch Sputnik + Khruschev declare USSR would overtake US in elec/steel/coal/iron/oil prod in 15yrs → creates hope for soc st be ind/gl leaders
o M inspo from this → speech in Moscow Nov 1957 celebrating “the E wind prevails over the west wind”
→ M set goal that Ch overtake Brit in steel prod in 15 yrs - X plan to do it but recog need to find og dev model that takes advantage of Ch’s manpower – need peasants onside again

Question 46

Q

How did the Mao’s Seeking Truth from Facts tour contribute to the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

• 4 mo tour → M motivated by carefully staged rallies  emboldens his perception that his rev path is correct
• M inspo by massive water project built by hand involving mils peasants = far exceeding off targets
→ M realise opp for him to bring CCP’s founding narr (triumph against imposs odds) to all of Ch → invigorate support for party + socialism

Question 47

Q

What were the key elements of ideology/revolutionary virtue that drove the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

o Backwardness = virtue bc need struggle to prog (LM spirit/Yenan Way)
o Pol will/rev enthusiasm can overcome material deficiencies
o Socialist rev #1 then econ system will organically follow
o Peasants = desperate + ignorant → drive forward rev bc most easily manipulated (“Poor people want … want revolution” + peasants = “a blank sheet” – Mao)

Question 48

Q

How did Mao promote the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

Early 1958 M lobby thru speeches to Sup St Conf, Nat Ppl’s C + central/prov party leaders abt need for rev virture in econ

Question 49

Q

What were Mao’s grand social/revolutionary goals for the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

reduce bureaucracy + ‘expert planners’ bc too much control suppressed rev zeal/loses rev focus – holding back ‘productive forces’ of ppl
Encouraged creative thinking + mass enthusiasm = must always be optimistic BUT warned against false reports → contradictory (M doesn’t mind but caused issues later bc officials lie)

Question 50

Q

What was Mao’s economic goal for the Greap Leap Forward?

Answer

A

Creation of a rural econ that is self sufficient → allow econ to “walk on two feet” w minimal investment bc generate own $ + dec need for “expert-planners”/intel/academics/bureaucrats

Question 51

Q

How did Mao hope to help the Chinese economy “walk on two feet” in the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

o Employ peasants for labour-intensive proj during off-season → build infra/prod sml goods/inc morale + enthusiasm for collective work
o Est collectives (like Yenan) → use local expertise to prod sml scale goods
o Create a “tech rev” – giving peasants skills/knowledge thru practical exp
→ creates “socialist-conscious, cultured labourers” w/ X need for intel or high-skilled experts who could critic the CCP

Question 52

Q

When was the Great Leap Foward officially launched?

Answer

A

5-23 May 1958 GLP launched at 2nd 8 P Congress

Question 53

Q

How was the Great Leap Forward naive?

Answer

A

Production targets for 2nd 5YP revised upwards w X analysis + “on a whim” (Lynch)
All slogans + promises of a utopian future w/ no concrete plans = the ‘General Line of the Great Leap Forward’

BUT
• Provincial leaders/party idealists loved it bc attn back to rural areas + leaping ahead of cap rivals → Central Comm delegate Xie Fuzhi: “We are supernatural”

Question 54

Q

Origins of the People’s Communes

Answer

A

o 28 Apr 1958 multi agri co-ops in Henan prov merge to address labour shortages (Sputnik Commune) → other peasant conglomerates copy
o Aug 1958 M touring Shandong Province → “The PC is great” → 17-30 Aug 1958 M successfully convince Pb to est PCs across Ch

Question 55

Q

Aim of the People’s Communes

Answer

A

end what M called the “Three Great Differences:
o City vs country
o Worker vs peasant
o Manual vs mental labour (comm work gave W sense of greater purpose/duty to comm/understanding of socialism)

Question 56

Q

Features of People’s Communes

Answer

A

o Size – 5K fams + up to 100K ppl per PC
o Modelled on socialist values/similar to MATs
→ Complete collective land, livestock + tool ownership
→ Large fields tilled by 100s-1000s ppl
→ Wages paid in work pts  exchange for everyday items
o Militarised workforce – org into 10-20 brigades comprised of dozens sml wok teams  ‘battle nature’ (farming)
o Transferred responsibilities of fam to st thru lg nurseries, comm kitchens + aged care (Happiness Homes)

Question 57

Q

Initial outcomes of the People’s Communes

Answer

A

o Reduced need for bureaucracy/”expert planners” to maintain soc order/unity
→ PCs admin its own pub welfare/edu/local defense/farming/sml ind
→ Militarisation of workforce → inc discipline + reemph LM spirit - “so many ppl came together. Their discipline was marvellous. Everyone came to work on time and all joined in with a will” (peasant Zhao Tongmin)
o Inc morale – “Whatever the aims of the CCP leadership, many ordinary ppl was genuinely enthusiastic abt the PCs” (Ryan)

Question 58

Q

Features of backyard steel production

Answer

A

o Mud furnaces
o Obsession finding scrap metal
o Mass deforestation
o Competitive culture to prod the most

Question 59

Q

Why did backyard steel production fail?

Answer

A

o Reduced agri prod bc took away farmers from work
o Failed to inc steel prod bc:
→ Ord ppl X metallurgists
→ Approach emph quantity> quality → quality v low (low purity + brittle)
→ Mud furnaces washed away in rain

Jan 1959 M go to Manch → learns steel must be prod in prof refineries but X rec stopping backyard steel drive

Question 60

Q

Features of communal kitchens

Answer

A

o Peasants encouraged to eat as much as poss

o Acting troupes/puppeteers/musicians prov entertainment

Question 61

Q

How were communal kitchens negative in the long-term?

Answer

A

Consumption = unsus → inc vulnerability to famine bc depleting food reserves w/out replacement (exacerbated by dec farming work bc steel drive)

→ become problem when Central Comm remove comm kitchens Dec 1958 at Wuhan Plenum despite grain levy 200mil tn more than actually available

Question 62

Q

Why did Lysenkoism fail?

Answer

A

o Plants cannot be acclimatised → vast fields wasted planting ill-suited crops
o Close planting X allow crops nutrient access
o Deep ploughing created a barren topsoil
→ dec yield + quality of soil

→ achieve goal of further inc grain yield after good harvest in 1958 bc that was luck of good weather

Question 63

Q

Outcomes of the Four Pests Campaign

Answer

A

inc prevalence of more damaging vermin bc dec sparrows allowed prey to thrive (esp locuses) + predators died off (lg birds)
→ Ch asked USSR for 200K sparrows
→ sparrows replaced w bedubugs in list

Question 64

Q

How and why did manipulating statistics come to be a problem in the Great Leap Forward?

Answer

A

o Best stats purged during HFC
o Officials stats replaced w ‘Good News Reporting’ stations
o Cadres in charge of PCs told to prod as much grain as poss – quotas basically a minimum → Area of land that usually would prod 1tn of rice grain now claim prod 15-30tn
o CCP officials shown ‘show fields’

→ inflated grain figures to fulfill quotas → false surplus:
o 1958 300 mil tn grain but reported 450mil tn
o 1959 170mil tn grain but reported 500mil tn

→ CCP inc grain levy from 30% → 90% → peasants have X food

Answer 64

A

o Economist Chen Yun doubted accuracy of grain claims – blamed M for creating culture of exaggeration/fear to admit failure
o Tian Jiaying (one of M’s secretaries): “This is ridiculous. It is shameful”

Answer 65

A

o Reaffirmed ‘General Line’ (aspirational slogans, X investment) = correct approach to agri
o Reduced grain levy 450mil tn → 370mil tn = 200mil tn above amt prod in 1959
o Intro incentives for peasants to be more prod – sml priv markets reopen + fam allowed time to cultivate sml veg plots
o X communal kitchens (problem bc ppl reliant on st for food + being asked to supply 200mil tn more grain than available)
o Investigative teams sent out from B but only suggest minor adjustments to GLP

Answer 66

A

June 1959 M visit home village in Hunan - some complaints but mostly ‘very good’

Peng Dehuai (Def Min + old friend of M) visit home village in Hunan → pov + qualor, elderly in Happiness Homes X beds + kids in nurseries crying bc cold + hunger → promises to appeal to party for change → letter to M ahead of Lushan Plenum

Answer 67

A

23 July 1959 after letting comrades critic GLP M ‘speaks frank’ - accepts blame but then blames comrades for X telling him truth - “If you have to shit – shit! If you have to fart – fart!” + warned further critic would be taken personally

M issue ultimatum threatening that further dissent would drive him to raise a new RA in the mountains to overthrow the govt

o 16 Aug 1959 CC doc condemn Peng = ‘anti-P element’ + reaffirm GL of the GLP (proof of M’s strengthening of power) → Peng replaced as Def Min
o Anti-Rightest Campaign revived → punish ‘little Peng Duahuais’

Answer 68

A

• a/t trying to revitalise Yenan spirit, GLP lacks same pragmatism (e.g. lack of an econ plan)
• Some historians view PCs = masterplan by CCP to exploit peasantry w inc efficiency → compromise on ideals
o “The state had become the ulti landlord” – Fairbank
o “The aim was to make slave driving more efficient” – Chang/Halliday
• Lysenkoism = antithesis of core M principle of rev being peasant driven/mass line bc listening to “expert planners” + ignoring local knowledge/common sense (rev becoming inc ideological - X prag)
• Peasant enthusiasm for CCP struggle to prog narrative = waning (X like Yenan)

Answer 69

A

The Great Leap Forward continued many of the CCP’s core policies but a larger scale and prioritising ideology above all. For example, the GLF is similar to the CCP development strategy in Yenan because it depended entirely on revolutionary spirit, with Mao attempting to reinvigorate the Long March spirit at a national level.
Secondly, the GLF refocused development on rural areas = pursuing comm + agri rev together
Thirdly, GLF pursues M’s ideal of peasants driven rev bc PCs reduced need for bur/expert planners + empowered peasantry. Li Zhusui recounted: “It was an exciting experience”.

Answer 70

A

Vague but determined/delusional optimism

‘Go all out, aim high, and achieve greater, faster, better, and more economical results in the building of socialism’ - Mao

Answer 71

A

o Stubborn/delusional commitment to GL of the GLP despite ev against
→ Jan 1959 M travel to Manch – learns steel must be prod in prof refineries but X stop steel drive = distraction from agri
→ Bad news = struggle that M believed necessary for peasants to prog – LM spirit
→ Lysenkoism reinvigorated after Lushan Plenum bc supports narr that Ch ppl’s ingenuity can overcome all obstacles
o Influenced fanatic cadres to extract as much grain as poss from peasants + blame suffering on their lack of ideo focus – toxic LM spirit
o M create culture of fear (mass campaigns, Lushan plenum, HFC, Gao Gang Affair)→ pol officials X able to tell truth of agri/famine situation
o Widespread across Ch  only consistent factor = govt policy

Answer 72

A

• Droughts, flood + locus plagues

Answer 73

A

Dec 1958 Wuhan Plenum concerns abt famine → dec gr levy 450mil → 370mil = 200mil tn grain more than available

July 1959 Lushan Plenum dec gr levy 370mil → 270mil = still 100mil tn more than available

→ extra pressure on peasantry at same time as losing st food support from comm kicthens

Answer 74

A

• New of famine suppressed bc nothing true unless M said so
o Intercepted mail
o Villages under lockdown – impris for ‘vagrancy’ if try to leave

Answer 75

A

Cannibalism – ‘famine culture’ of ‘swap child, make food’ – Becker
Husbands sold wives/daughter into prost for food
1000s kids orphaned/abandoned (left in pits)
30 mil ppl died – Becker: “in sheer terms of numbers, no other event comes close to this’

Answer 76

A

Liu: “We can’t go on like this”
chief econ Chen Yun report according to M “paints a v dark pic”
→ late-1960 CCP consensus GLP failed

Answer 77

A

o PCs ½ size
o Work units of 30ppl → inc personal purpose/responsibility
o Est household responsibility committee → allocate land to ind fams to farm = ‘save yourself production’
→ end of 1962 gr prod inc 6mil tn → 10mil tn
o inc wages for hard working ind/manu workers
→ 1963-65 heavy ind prod inc 17% + light ind 27%
o Prem Enlai allow gr imports from Aus + Ca
o Inc bureaucracy + cadres mandated to ensure accuracy of reported figures

Answer 78

A

July 1960 USSR w/draw Sov tech support → big loss of expertise needed for lg projects
14 July 1964 PRC end formal dip rel w USSR after M express concern USSR becoming ‘dict of the bourg’ + ‘taking the cap rd’

Answer 79

A

As stated by Cook, Lin Biao’s ‘Little Red Book’ was a “weapon of mass intruction” for the PLA, designed to strengthen Mao Zedong Thought amongst the military and encourage soldiers to revere Mao. Published in May 1964, some party members viewed it as a foolish distraction for PLA soldiers. However, by the end of 1966 1bn copies were in circulation.

Answer 80

A

in February 1964, Mao launched the ‘Learn From the PLA’ campaign through publication in the People’s Daily. Much like the Red Army, the campaign aimed to encourage ordinary citizens to emulate the PLA’s revolutionary virtue. This was achieved through the politicisation of the PLA, with commissars appointed to every level of the military to provide political instruction, the removal of visible ranks from uniforms, the establishment of political bureaus in schools, factories and workplaces, and sponsoring art festivals and theatre performances. This all contributed to increasing the PLA’s presence in Chinese wider society and influence over political education, providing them with a platform to project the ideal behaviour of the model communist citizen.

Answer 81

A

As coined by Mao, the ‘Learn from Lei Feng’ campaign aimed to provide the masses with a tangible hero to rally around and inspire them to replicate his revolutionary virtue in their everyday lives. Although Lei Feng’s diary was fabricated by a propaganda arm of the CCP, it embodied the Long March spirit and resonated with everyday citizens. Apparently, Lei was orphaned at an early age and exploited by landlords, but joined the PLA and lived a virtuous life, dedicating himself to the party and donating his wages to relief funds and construction projects.

Answer 82

A

As coined by Mao, the ‘Learn from Lei Feng’ campaign aimed to provide the masses with a tangible hero to rally around and inspire them to replicate his revolutionary virtue in their everyday lives. Although Lei Feng’s diary was fabricated by a propaganda arm of the CCP, it embodied the Long March spirit and resonated with everyday citizens. Apparently, Lei was orphaned at an early age and exploited by landlords, but joined the PLA and lived a virtuous life, dedicating himself to the party and donating his wages to relief funds and construction projects.

Answer 83

A

Mao installed artistic and political changes originally to support the SEM, appointing his wife Jiang Qing as Minister for Culture 2 days after the campaign’s official launch in Sep 1962. After a fact-finding mission in Shanghai, Jiang reported that ‘feudal’ and ‘reactionary’ values were at the forefront of Chinese culture. As a result, Mao was worried that the PRC’s economic progress would be undermined because ‘the superstructure - literature and art - has not changed. Further, Mao was concerned that subliminal anti-revolutionary messaging in Chinese culture was a barrier to the re-establishment of revolutionary integrity within the CCP, as ‘even party members are enthusiastically promoting feudal and capitalist art but ignoring socialist art’.

Answer 84

A

Jan 1965 Liu reconfirmed as Pres – ‘Chairman M + Chairman L are both our beloved leaders’ → M poss driven by discontent w shared power pos  want to triumph in P power struggle
M turned 76 in 1966 → inc awareness of own mortality – Lifton argues M on quest to achieve ‘rev immortality’ → CR mostly a question of history + M’s legacy w/in it
Monkey King – steals + eats peaches of immortality + covers 1000s miles in 1 leap

Answer 85

A

• Days before M16C – Kang Sheng contact Nie Yuanzi (activist @ B Uni) → assured her ‘high lvl backing’ for her activism → denounced B Uni Chancellor + put up big-char poster (“What are you up to in the CR?”) → 1st June endorsed by M + reprinted in PD

Answer 86

A

• Late May 1966 – immediate response to M16C
o Lin Biao encourage M fanaticism thru sensational claims – ‘Chairman M is a genius’
o Inc extreme/mil sentiment from students – talking abt bombs/grenades
o MS student grp attached to B Uni call themselves the RG  co-opted by other grps
o Chen Boda incite inc radicalism/violent rhetoric thru provocative editorials in PD – ‘whoever dares to opp [M] shall be obliterated’

• Mid-June 1966
o Inc violence – ‘a RT spread over campus… and the rev leaders + students were filled w joy” – rituals of seizing admin staff → dunce caps, splatter w ink, strip clothes off, beat them
o B = chaos → Liu ask M for help/expl of what CR is  M offer X guidance bc want disorder to destroy Liu politically
o Liu employ CCP work teams to suppress chaos  success initially BUT X address underlying tension
o M return from Huangzhou bc mad abt work teams

Answer 87

A

o Four olds campaign = ideas, culture, customs, habits (coined by Lin Biao)
o Social change → gender eq bc fem rev figures JQ + Nie Yuanzi + ‘linking up’ = freedom
o Cultural destruction → RG raid museums + deface symbols of antiquity incl C’s supposed grave
o Clothing – ‘bourg’ clothes + hair was forcibly cut/ripped off by RG
o Chess banned bc too Russian

Answer 88

A

o All convos start w “Long live Chairman Mao” + cont following quotes dep on soc class
o 2.2bn portraits prod
o Loudspeaker broadcast thoughts of M at streetcorners
o Ppl bow to M at morning and night bc think he is blessed w div power
o Carry LRB everywhere + consult it for any problem

Answer 89

A

o Teachers put thru brutal ‘struggle sessions’ – dehumanising signs likening them to snakes + dogs, extreme violence (beaten to death, buried alive etc), dunces caps

Answer 90

A

• 18 Aug 1966 Rally of 1mil+ RGs in TS
o Waved LRB + chanted slogans + did ‘rev dance’
o M appear on balcony of Gate of Heavenly Palace in RG outfit  fem MS students pin armband to him → M symbolically blessing mvmt
• Late Aug 1966 10mil+ young ppl travel to B to attend RG rallies to be ‘reviewed’ by M – encouraged by CCP bc given free acc + transport
• Millions young ppl ‘Linking up’ – sort of LM – CCP give free acc + transport for young ppl to see rev sites (J, Y, M’s birthplace) → witness extreme poverty of rural Ch = tangible focus for their rev zeal

Answer 91

A

• 1-8 Aug 1966 CC plenum → Sixteen Points
o X dir name Liu as ‘cap roader’ or ‘revisionist but alluded to him (‘some persons in charge’)
o Added structure to how issues outlined in M16C should be addressed

Answer 92

A

Lifton - CR = quest by M to achieve ‘rev immortality’ but origins/triggers = complex bc born from multi of M’s paranoias (argued by Spence + Ryan)

M X have plan – CR entirely dep on rev zeal to fuel chaos -> creating inc violent/fanatic culture/soc to support M’s pol endeavours -> econ conseq bc ppl X working
Ppl treated like they’re X even human like in WWII e.g. Liu’s treatment + Peng Dehuai assaulted x130 + violence vs teachers esp nametags w snake/dog

M focus of history encapsulates M’s tacit shift from prag –> ideal – X ideal in the sense of ‘book learner’/Marxist ideology, but instead creating own narr for Ch where he is at the centre
M wanted to change Ch soc into comm soc to create culture that supported his pol power

Answer 93

A

1966-68 650K ppl die in factional infighting
CCP restructured – Pb ceased to exist from Feb 1967 + replaced w ‘3 in 1’ leadership comms Mar 1967
Wrath of M/CoP around him = indiscrim → fam of P off targeted in violence e.g. Jan 1967 Wang Guangmei (Liu’s wife) lured to hospital → taken by RG to denunciation rally + Deng’s son thrown off building → para from waist down
Econ conseq bc rebel W X working – JQ encouraged this by claiming “to stop prod is rev itself”

Brainscape's Knowledge GenomeTM

U4 AOS2 Flashcards

Brainscape's Knowledge Genome^TM