Submarine Forces (SUBFOR) Security Flashcards
Discuss Nuclear Weapons/Nuclear Material Security Command and Control:
Commanding officers of Navy strategic weapons facilities, are direct supporting commanders to director, Strategic Systems Program Office (SSPO) for the day-to-day execution of nuclear weapons security within the strategic weapons facility.
The strategic weapons facility includes the limited area, waterfront restricted area, and actual convoy routes.
Navy regional/installation commanders are responsible for all aspects of security outside the strategic weapons facility and for general LE within the facility. The strategic weapons facility and the host installation shall coordinate AT responsibilities in incident-response plans. The SSPO is the Navy technical program manager for nuclear weapons security.
How often should a terrorism threat assessment (TA) be conducted at least?
Annually
The goal of a RAM program is to deter, detect, and _____ terrorist attacks.
Disrupt
First arriving unit to an incident will establish C2 and assume what role?
On scene commander
True or False: Ships typically develop in-port security plans (ISPs) whenever entering a port in the United States at a Navy installation.
False
Which of the following is physical reconnaissance?
Air and ground
Who is responsible for pre-mission route planning including checkpoints, choke points, alternate routes, and landing zone (LZ) identification?
Navigator
What term defines the capability of materiel or a system to withstand the damaging effects of CBR contamination and any decontaminants and procedures required to decontaminate it.
CBR hardness
What is residual radiation hazard from a nuclear explosion.
Fallout
What is the NEC for Chief Master-at-Arms?
P01A
What is the NEC for Antiterrorism Training Supervisor?
804A
The strategic weapons facility includes the limited area, _________, and actual convoy routes.
Waterfront restricted area
Operational Risk Management:
decision-making process that enhances operational capability by identifying hazards, assessing risks, and implementing controls to reduce the risk associated with any operation. With respect to AT planning, commanders can use ORM to guide decisions on where to improve AT capabilities.
The basic tenets of ORM follow:
- Accept risk when the benefits outweigh the cost.
- Accept no unnecessary risk.
- Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
- Make risk decisions at the right level.
Threat Assessments:
is developed by performing a thorough, in-depth threat analysis, at least annually, on personnel and assets for which a commander or civilian equivalent has AT responsibility.
The threat of an asset or area is determined by assessing at the operational and tactical levels of the following two components:
1. TAs should identify the probability and severity of the terrorist to inflict injury to a person or damage to a facility or asset by considering terrorist capability, intent, and objectives.
2. TAs should specify the type of weapon(s) or act(s) the terrorist could use to initiate the event (assassination, bomb, etc.)
Criticality Assessments:
identifies the DOD elements, personnel, and assets that require specific protective measures. Commanders incorporate this information into their AT protection plans to prescribe the means of the protection and to prioritize AT resource allocation.
When determining asset criticality, use of the following criteria can be used to assist in standardizing the process.
1. Importance.
2. Effect.
3. Recoverability.
4. Mission Functionality.
5. Substitutability.
6. Reparability.
Importance
Measures the value of the area or assets located in the area, considering their function, inherent nature, and monetary value
Effect.
Measures the ramification of a terrorist incident in the area, considering the psychological, economic, sociological, and military impacts.
Recoverability.
Measures the time required for the function occurring at that area to be restored, considering the availability of resources, parts, expertise and manpower, and redundancies. Even if a DOD asset is injured, damaged, or destroyed, it may have future value in the accomplishment of other DOD missions or be of great symbolic value to the DOD, the U.S. Government, and the American people. Consideration should therefore be given to the resources that may be expended to recover an asset and in some cases, repair it for return to service with the DOD in the future.
Mission Functionality.
Measures key positions, special facilities, specialized equipment, etc., used to fulfill assigned missions.
Substitutability
Are there substitutes available for personnel, facilities or materiel?
Can assigned missions be performed using substitutes? If the substitutes are less-capable, can the mission still be accomplished successfully?
Reparability.
If a DOD asset is injured or damaged, can it be repaired and rendered operable? How much time is required? How much would it cost? Could repairs be accomplished in a timely manner? Would repairs degrade asset performance, and if so, can the mission be accomplished in the degraded condition?
Vulnerability assessment
serves as the process the DOD components use to determine the susceptibility of assets to attack from threats identified in the terrorism TA. The end-state of the VA process is the identification of physical characteristics or procedures that render critical assets, areas, or special events vulnerable to a range of known or feasible terrorist capabilities.