Strict Liability (abnormally dangerous activites) Flashcards
Strict liability
-a general COA
requires:
(1) abnormally dangerous activity;
(2) causation linking the abnormally dangerous condition with the injury;
AND
(3) physical injury to persons, real property, or personal property
when SL only avail
cases of “abnormally dangerous activities,” a.k.a. “ultrahazardous activities.” Historically these cases were tied to liability by virtue of land ownership; the doctrine has moved away from that constraint (but see Mass., infra).
Courts analyze “abnormally dangerous activity” as a question of law with reference to five factors (not conjunctive, not disjunctive)
(1) the extent of the risk (i.e. loss) if loss materializes [high];
(2) ability of actor to eliminate risk by exercising care [low] (or inversely, burden to eliminate risk [high]);
(3) nature of the activity: whether it is abnormal, i.e. not common usage [yes, abnormal];
(4) location of the activity: whether appropriate [no, not appropriate];
5) social utility of the activity [low
Must result from a
dangerous condition
Thus if a loud dynamite blast causes a frightened pet mink to eat her young (it happens a lot, believe it or not), there is no strict liability, because the personal property loss is not occasioned by the explosive quality that makes dynamite abnormally dangerous.
causation
is especially important
One exception
Common carriers”:
(usually shippers of hazardous goods) may not be subject to strict liability. (Rationale: They don’t discriminate among cargo, and for economic efficiency reasons, we don’t want them to.) This is a majority rule that has been rejected in a very small number of jurisdictions
DEFENSES
At common law, assumption of risk was a complete defense to strict liability, but contributory negligence was not available. The effect of the adoption of comparative fault is disputed, because it is difficult for jurors to allocate “fault” to a strictly liable party. Nevertheless, the majority trend is to permit comparative fault as a partial defense, letting the jury sort it out.
Rylands v. Fletcher
Coal mine, water reservoir.Rylands is liable for the damage caused to Fletcher’s property by water flowing from his broken reservoir. A person is liable for all damage flowing from his actions, even if his intent and actions themselves are lawful. Fletcher has the right to be free from damage caused by “foreign water” flowing onto his property from the property of another. It does not matter that Rylands did not intend for this water to flow into Fletcher’s mines. If Rylands had not built the reservoir, the damage would never have been caused to Fletcher’s property. Rylands is liable for all consequences flowing from his otherwise lawful act, regardless of his intent.
*Thus strict liability emerged as a doctrine of landowner liability when a non-natural, dangerous instrumentality of extraordinary land use caused injury to a neighbor’s person or property.
Mass follow ryland v. fletcher doctrine?
yes
Mass. courts specifically disallow landowner strict liability when the injury results from
1) plaintiff’s fault, (2) an “act of God,” or (3) the unforeseeable conduct of a third party.
Plaintiff’s fault” equates to common law contributory negligence (though opposite the common law rejection of the defense), though whether Mass. will continue the rule as a complete defense after the adoption of comparative fault is an open question. “‘Act of God’” and “unforeseeable third-party conduct” both suggest failures of causation, so would have precluded liability at common law.
Mass extend SL to abnormally dangerous activites?
NO, not beyond landowner context.
Massachusetts has adopted strict liability for dog owners by statute, MA ST 140 s 15
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This statute goes beyond the usual statutory departure from the common law. Typically states impose strict liability only for a domestic animal with a known violent propensity
MA ST 111 s 197,
imposes strict liability for a landowner for the lead poisoning of a child under age six residing on the premises.
