STALIN POLITICAL AUTHORITY 1924-41 Flashcards
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
THE POWER STRUGGLE AND THE EMERGENCE OF STALIN
In December 1922, Lenin decided to dictate his ‘Testament, in the form of a letter to be read to the Party congress on his death. Lenin did not nominate a future leader but gave his critical opinion of other members of the Politburo: Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin and Trotsky.
He particularly criticised Stalin, who had become the Party’s first General Secretary in April 1922, partly because
of the Georgian affair and partly because Stalin had insulted Lenin’s wife, Krupskaya. Lenin referred to Stalin’s personal rudeness, unnecessary roughness and lack of finesse and suggeste that comrades should think about a way of removing Stalin from his post.
This Testament was never read in public as intended, since the Central Committee decided among themselves to suppress it. This played into Stalin’s hands.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
Dec 1922
A ‘Triumvirate’ alliance is formed between Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin, as the former seeks help to block Trotsky, who seems the most likely to succeed. Although Zinoviev and Kamenev share similar left-wing views on economic policy with Trotsky, they fear him because of his army support, arrogance and uncompromising personality.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
Apr 1923
At the 12th Party Congress (which Lenin is unable to attend) a new enlarged Central Committee of 40 members is elected; only three are strong supporters of Trotsky. Stalin uses his powers as General Secretary to build up supporters at local level, so ensuring that his nominees are elected to future congresses.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
Jan 1924
Lenin dies and Stalin gives Trotsky the wrong date for Lenin’s funeral; Trotsky is absent and Stalin gives the funeral oration. Stalin dismisses supporters of the Left Opposition.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
May 1924
Lenin’s widow, Krupskaya releases Lenis Testament to the Central Committee shorty before the 13th Party Congress Zinoviev and Kamenev argues against is publication (because it contains reference to their opposition in
1917) and Trotsky refuses to get involved. This aids Stalin.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE POWER STRUGGLE
Although various explanations have been given for Stalin’s emergence as leader, ideological factors clearly played a part in the leadership struggle. From 1921, the communists had been split over economic policy, a vital element in Marxist Theory.
Lenin’s New Economic Policy’ of 1921, which had allowed some private enterprise, had been controversial in that it conflicted with strict Marxist teaching. Whether or not Lenin intended this to be a temporary measure, to build the economy, as a precursor to full socialism was at the heart of the ideological debates of the 1920s.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
- While the left, as represented by Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, favoured abandoning the NEP, the right, led by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky supported its continuance. Stalin fluctuated from a left-leaning position to 1925, to temporary support for the right and the continuance of the NEP between 1925 and 1928, and back again to the left thereafter. This could suggest that
he was a pure opportunist, although the last move could be accounted for by the bread shortages and high food prices of that year, rather than a lack of ideological principles.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
- To this was added another ideological issue. Despite the early expectations that revolution in Russia would trigger others, the Soviet Union remained the only Communist State in the 1920s. Nevertheless Trotsky still held to the line that the Russians should be working to stir up revolution elsewhere and that there should be permanent revolution’ until a truly socialist society was created. Stalin, on the other hand had, by 1924, adopted the more
pragmatic view that there could be ‘socialism in one country’ and that efforts should be concentrated on building a workers’ paradise in the Soviet Union as an example to the rest of the world. This less orthodox attitude appealed to those who favoured stability and feared the permanent revolutionary turmoil that Trotsky appeared to be advocating.
13 . Political authority and government: new leaders and ideologies
- A further ideological issue concerned the nature of the leadership itself.
Marx had not envisaged a single leader as necessary in a socialist state and there were elements within the Party who felt it was time to abandon the strong central leadership principle. They argued that this might have been justified in order to win the civil war, but was no longer necessary after 1924. Instead, they sought collective control, through a committee of equals. While this view had ideological justification, it was mainly advanced by those who feared the
dominance of Trotsky and, in this way, the argument worked to Stalin’s advantage. For most of the 1920s, Stalin’s own ambition was grossly underestimated.
Whether we believe that Stalin was an opportunist who manipulated ideology, or a politician with genuine convictions, he certainly benefited from some of the principles laid down in the time of Lenin. The change from elections to appointments within the Party hierarchy, the ban on factions, and the growth of central control during the civil war provided the framework within which Stalin was able to rise to power.
17 .The political condition of the Soviet Union by 1941
By 1941 Stalin led a highly centralised and authoritarian one-party state.
Some of the foundations for this can certainly be seen in the Leninist era - Lenin had always favoured single-party rule. He had, for example,
fought against coalition government in 1917 and had forced the closure of the Constituent Assembly in 1918. Lenin’s Constitution only permitted the existence of one party - the Communist Party - and from 1918, in the circumstances of civil war, the Party increased its dominance over the institutions of the State.
17 .The political condition of the Soviet Union by 1941
Although Marxist doctrine had talked of the State withering away, Stalin not only upheld it, he went further than Lenin had ever done, extending one-party domination and redefining centralisation. Although Stalin’s new constitution of 1936 included democratic structures such as universal suffrage, it was made clear that
the Communist Party and its institutions were the only bodies that could put candidates up for election. This reinforced Stalin’s intent to preserve the one-party state.
17 .The political condition of the Soviet Union by 1941
The structure of government still provided for parallel appointments in both the government and Party hierarchy, but the nomenklatura system of privileges that was used to reward loyal officials had the effect of concentrating decision-making into a much smaller number of hands.
Furthermore, the ultimate source of all authority was increasingly
concentrated in the hands of Stalin, rather than the Party. This meant that, from the mid-1930s, he no longer depended on the Party, and was able to avoid calling Party congresses.
17 .The political condition of the Soviet Union by 1941
Centralisation meant that all power emanated from Stalin himself, working with individuals or small groups. Stalin seldom left Moscow and disliked mass meetings. Indeed, he added to his own mystique by restricting those who he had direct access with. Within the Stalinist state, no independent institutions were
permitted to emerge; no rival power centres were countenanced; and, where possible, younger officials, dependent on Stalin’s favour, were placed in positions of authority.
17 .The political condition of the Soviet Union by 1941
It has sometimes been suggested that the Soviet Union changed from a ‘one-party state with a powerful leader’ to a ‘personal dictatorship’ in the 1930s.
However, it must be remembered that Stalin relied on the workings of a highly bureaucratic structure and that, in some respects, the policies he pursued actually weakened his own control. The purges, for example, may have emanated from the centre, but they acquired a drive and momentum of their own in the hands of local officials. There was plenty of
corruption within the ranks too; lying, falsifying statistics and presenting inaccurate reports were endemic. Local officials would often protect one another against central demands and at the lower levels of administration, non-compliance with central orders was widespread.
17 .The political condition of the Soviet Union by 1941
As the 1930s drew to a close, a new challenge faced the Soviet Union: an expansionist Nazi Germany. However when the invasion came, on 22 June, Stalin was caught by surprise. Although he could not have been entirely unaware of the impending attack, and defence spending had increased from 16.5 per cent in 1937 to 32.6 per cent in 1940, he had ignored intelligence reports and seems to have miscalculated as to when the Germans would turn east.
The Soviet Union was not ready for war in 1941. The purges of the Red Army between 1936 and 1938 had
removed most senior officers and sapped the strength of the army. Soviet fighting capacity had also been affected by inadequate training and those who had promoted more advanced military theories, such as Tukhachevsky, an exponent of massed tank operations, had all been removed.
Furthermore, Stalin had re-established the ‘dual command’ of military units; bringing back the political commissars which had been abandoned in the late 1920s. This move had increased Party control yet hindered actual combat capabilities.
