Social Preferences in Dictator and Ultimatum Games Flashcards

1
Q

What does it mean if an individual has social preferences?

A

Individuals behave as if they value the payoff of others positively or negatively

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2
Q

Where are social preferences relevant?

A
  • Donations to charities
  • Tipping waiters, delivery drivers
  • Voluntary unpaid work
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3
Q

How do economists study social preferences?

A

Through studies of games like
- dictator game
- ultimatum game
- Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
- Public Goods Game

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4
Q

What does standard economic theory predict player 1 does in the dictator game?

A

keep all the money

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5
Q

Player 1 has utilitarian preferences, what does their utility function look like?

A

U1 (x, y) = square root of x + square root of y.
Player 1’s utility increasing in both Player 1’s and Player 2’s attainment.
The utility maximizing choice for Player 1 is to split the money equally.

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6
Q

Player 1’s preference exhibit envy

A

U1 (x, y) = square root x minus square root y.
Player 1’s utility goes down when player 2’s attainment goes up. The utility maximizing choice for Player 1 is to keep all the money to oneself.
Player 1 has a disutility from player 2 getting anything

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7
Q

Player 1 has altruistic preferences

A

U1 (x, y) = 3/5 square root x + 2/5 square root y
- Player 1’s utility is increasing in both Player 1’s and Player 2’s attainment.
- Given the weight - Player 1 puts on own and other’s payoffs, the utility maximizing choice for Player 1 is to keep EUR 7 for herself and to give EUR 3 to Player 2
- Player 1 wants to keep inequality to a minimum - keep preference to as close as possible to Player 2’s preference: which leads to a fair split

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8
Q

Player 1 has Rawlsian preferences

A

U1 (x, y) = min (square root x, square root y)
- Player 1 tries to maximize utility associated with the allocation.
- The utility maximizing choice for Player 1 is to choose a fair split of 5 euro for each Player

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9
Q

Player 1 has Inequality averse preferences

A

U1 (x, y) = -|square root x - square root y|
- Player 1 tries to minimize difference between the two players’ utilities.
- The utility maximizing choice for Player 1 is to choose a fair split of 5 euro for each player

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10
Q

What can be taken away from the dictator game?

A
  • We can reject the hypothesis that all individuals are selfish
  • we also can reject the hypothesis that all individuals split endowment 50/50
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11
Q

Which three social preferences are inequality averse?

A

Utilitarians, Rawlsians, and Altruists

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12
Q

What is a strategic game?

A

(=Normal-form): Each player chooses her plan of action once and for all; All players decisions are made simultaneously (e.g. Prisoners’ Dilemma)

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13
Q

What is an extensive game?

A

Specifies possible orders of events; Each player considers plan of action throughout game (not only at the beginning of the game but also) whenever she has to make a decision; we will assume that players are perfectly informed of the others’ moves when they have to make a decision (e.g. Ultimatum game)

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14
Q

What is an ultimatum game?

A

It is an abstraction of (one-shot) negotiation/bargaining
Player 1 is the Proposer, Player 2 is the Responder
Player 1 has a fixed amount of money (say $10) and can offer some fraction to Player 2 ($0 and $10)
- If player 2 accepts, they split the money as proposed
- If player 2 rejects, both get 0

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15
Q

What is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?

A

A strategy profile that constitutes a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame
- it is found by backward induction

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16
Q

What is player 2’s best response in each subgame? - Utilitarian preferences in the Ultimatum game

A

Player 2’s response in each subgame is to Accept, as regardless what the exact allocation proposed by Player 1 is if Player 2 accepts at least one Player gets a positive monetary payoff
Note: they derive the same utility from the other’s monetary payoff as from their own

17
Q

What is Player 1’s best response considering what he expects Player 2 to do when his turn comes? - Utilitarian preferences in the Ultimatum game

A

If Player 1 knows Player 2’s utility function, he knows that Player 2 will accept any allocation. Player 2 will accept any allocation. Player 1 considers his own utility from all possible allocations (knowing that Player 2 accepts). Player derives the highest possible utility from an equal (5,5) split
SPNE: Player 1 offers $5 to Player 2. Player 2 accepts all offers.

18
Q

What were the findings from behavioural experiments in 15 small scale societies?

A

model of individuals caring about own payoff only is rejected in all of these societies

19
Q

What do comparisons across societies show?

A
  • Individuals’ social and economic environments shape behaviours.
  • Difference in behaviour seem to be better explained by difference in economic and social environments than by individual characteristics such as age, sex, etc.
20
Q

Does economic analysis assume exogenously given (fixed) preferences or endogenous (depend on environment) - why is comparisons across societies important?

A

Economic analysis assumes exogenously given (fixed) preferences
- However, such studies show preferences are endogenous - depend on the environment

21
Q

What does ultimatum game with restricted proposals show

A

Intentions matter

22
Q

Comparing Proposer behaviour in Ultimatum and Dictator games

A

Proposers’ mean offer in Ultimatum games is higher than in Dictator games, suggesting threat of rejection by Responder plays a role (altruism only unlikely to explain Proposers’ behaviour)

23
Q

What motivates Responders to reject (small) positive offers?

A

In one-shot games: rejection of positive offers not compatible with assumption of maximising own payoff & also not compatible with altruism.
Possible interpretation: Responder dislikes being treated unfairly, emotional reaction, inequality aversion

24
Q

Player 2 (Responder) with utilitarian preference will accept/reject any allocation?

A

accept any allocation