Smith: War and ’Politics’: The French Army Mutinies of 1917 Flashcards
Were cases of ‘indiscipline’ rare in the French Army in 1917?
No, “units in nearly half of the divisions in the French army were touched by a crisis of indiscipline.”
What was the proximate cause of the ‘indiscipline’?
The failed offensive along the Chemin des Dames in the spring of 1917.
How was the ‘indiscipline’ most frequently manifested?
“The most common manifestation of this crisis involved soldiers refusing point-blank to take up positions in the front lines, and instead holding anti-war demonstrations.”
Who was responsible for the failed offensive along the Chemin des Dames in the spring of 1917?
General Robert Nivelle, who was removed on May 15, 1917.
Who replaced General Robert Nivelle?
General Philippe P6tain (who became a national hero after leading the defense of Verdun).
What actions did General Philippe P6tain undertake to address the ‘indiscipline’?
(1) Reforms in food distribution and leave policy; (2) speedy but legal courts martial for soldiers deemed ’leaders’ of the
unrest. (3) But most fundamentally, P6tain made it clear that there would be no more quixotic offensives until tanks and American support gave France a decisive military superiority.
In sum, how does traditional historiography (most influenced by Guy Pedroncini’s 1967 classic, Les Mutineries de 191Z’) treat the mutinies and their resolution?
P6tain could resolve the mutinies because their causes lay principally in military frustration at three years of a tried and failed offensive strategy, and not in the ’politics’ of outside subversion, pacifism, and defeatism. Resolving them thus proved a complex but essentially technical matter, one of effective military leadership. P6tain reestablished the conditions under which the French army could return to its Clausewitzian task of state administration by other means. According to Pedroncini, P6tain thus prevented the mutinies from invading the ’political’ realm and potentially igniting revolution, as happened in Russia.
Why is the traditional historiography skewed and incomplete?
Because of its focus on P6tain and the senior military leadership to the exclusion of “understanding the discontented soldiers as at least partly autonomous ’political’ actors in their own right.”
How does including an “understanding the discontented
soldiers as at least partly autonomous ’political’ actors in their own right” change our understanding of P6tain and his reforms?
P6tain’s achievement (the cure of reform coupled with judicial firmness) lies in his ability to receive and understand the signals sent to him from below. That is he was more reactive to the discontented soldiers than active, and therefore was in a situation he never fundamentally controlled.
What is some evidence that the mutinies were at least partly political, and not solely reactions to poor military leadership?
(1) Most of the mutinies occurred well after the decision had been made to wind down the Chemin des Dames offensive and after P6tain assumed command on May 15. (2) The Chemin des Dames offensive was similar to many previous offensives. Its original objectives were dramatic gains but were later recast as “nibbling”, which would be characterized by P6tain as attrition. P6tain’s first directive affirmed the
goal of ’the wearing down of the enemy, while wearing down
ourselves as little as possible’.
Were most of the mutinies right at the front lines?
No. Generally at various embarkation points - most often at the moment soldiers were ordered to enter the trenches.
Why were most of the mutinies at various embarkation points instead of when the soldiers were already in the trenches?
Once they were already in the trenches, it was too late for mutiny. “Compressed physical space, the possibility of constant surveillance, and the ubiquitous, arbitrary nature of shelling and rifle and machine-gun fire in an active sector meant that disobeying command was generally no less dangerous than obeying it.”
What is a example of some of the common demands of discontented French soldiers?
- Peace and the right to leaves, which are in arrears.
- No more butchery; we want liberty.
- On food, which is shameful.
- No more injustice.
- We don’t want the blacks [colonial troops who were rumored to have been called in to break up strikes by female textile workers] in Paris and in other regions mistreating our wives.
- We need peace to feed our wives and children and to be able to give bread to the women and orphans.
We demand peace, peace.
How does Smith view the actual significance of revolutionary or anti-capitalist rhetoric?
Somewhere between the interpretations of the high command, which attempted “to find a source of blame for the situation outside itself” and Pedroncini, who “argued
that this apparently socialist rhetoric exemplified simply a ’more human desire to save one’s life’”.
Were the desires of the mutineers logically consistent?
No. On the one hand, they sought peace. But on the other hand they sought not only the return of German conquests early in WWI, but also Alsace and Lorraine. Obviously, that could not happen without victory. [NOT IN THE TEXT, but maybe that was why P6tain’s approach eventually worked; the soldiers seemed to settle that this was the best reasonable outcome.]
