Mombauer Flashcards
Who was the chief of the German general staff in 1914?
Helmuth von Moltke.
Did Helmuth von Moltke appear eager for war in 1914?
Yes, He publicly said, “If only things would finally boil over - we are ready; the sooner, the better for us.”
Was Helmuth von Moltke certain that Germany would win the war?
No, “In private, the chief of staff would sometimes admit that he had doubts about Germany’s actual chances of wining a future war”
Was the German Foreign Office certain that Germany would win the war? Why?
The German Foreign Office was certain that Germany would win the war because they relied on Helmuth von Moltke’s public confidence in Germany’s military superiority.
How did Helmuth von Moltke evaluate his role in starting WWI?
He did not consider himself “a weak and insignificant figure”. Instead he considered himself one of the primary initiators. He complained that he was “condemned to inactivity in this war which I prepared and initiated.”
When some historians minimize the role Helmuth von Moltke played, what effect would that have on our understanding of the July Crisis of 1914?
It would minimize Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of war.
When does
It was immense. She writes, “And yet Moltke’s importance cannot be rated too highly … Moltke can be put centre stage.”
Where does Annika Mombauer believe Helmuth von Moltke importance lies?
“Moltke’s importance lies not so much in his abilities as a military leader and strategist - here the critics of the ‘Schlieffen school’ are probably right to denigrate him - but in his increasingly desperate pressuring for war before time ran out for Germany and her only strategic plan.”
When did does Helmuth von Moltke begin advocating for war?
He was disappointed that the Bosnian annexation crisis of 1908-9 was resolved peacefully, and during the Agadir crisis in 1911, advocated “the help of the sword”, and finally at a “war council meeting of 8 December 1912, when it was Moltke who advocated war ‘the sooner the better’ and ‘now or never’”.
Was Helmuth von Moltke physically present in Berlin during the July 1914 Crisis?
No, he was in Karlsbad for a four-week tour. Most of they other military leadership were also absent from Berlin.
Does the military leadership absence from Berlin in July 1914 mean they were uninvolved?
No, they were kept informed the entire time. Note that this does not mean the civilian decision-makers were victims of a military conspiracy, but that “military concerns and reasoning had become common currency, accepted without question by civilians and determining their decision-making”
What were some reasons that a general war would seem to be unlikely?
(1) Russia was unprepared (2) The Kaiser himself needed to be persuaded (3) Previous crises had not resulted in war. In the article, they included the Bosnian annexation crisis and the Morocco-Algeciras. Outside the article, the Morocco-Algeciras crisis is listed as the first Moroccan crisis. The later Agadir crisis in 1911, is sometimes called the second Moroccan crisis. All were ended without general war.
How does Annika Mombauer believe Helmuth von Moltke consider the July 1914 crisis?
“it seemed to present an opportunity, not a threat”
If the time for war was now because of “favorable circumstances for Germany”, what was the principle cause of “an increasingly uncertain future”?
“the Chancellor [Bethmann Hollweg] was convinced by Moltke’s argument that Russia posed a potential future threat and that Germany should therefore strike before it was too late.”
What is the Auswärtiges Amt
It is the German Foreign Office
Who was the German Chancellor?
Bethmann Hollweg (Theobald Theodor Friedrich Alfred von Bethmann Hollweg)
The German Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg declared that “in a way it was a preventive war.” Whose assessment did he rely on?
The military. “But if war was in any case hovering over us, if it had come in two years’ time, but even more dangerously and even more unavoidably, and if the military leaders declared that two it was still possible without being defeated, in two years’ time no longer! yes, the military!”
The Kaiser met with the Austrian ambassador on July 5. Who was the Austrian ambassador?
Szőgyény. From Wikipedia: it was indeed Szőgyény-Marich who delivered the historically important letter from the Austro-Hungarian Emperor Franz Joseph (dated 2.July) to the German counterpart, Wilhelm II at 5.July. The Kaiser’s pledge was confirmed the following day by Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann, the Under Secretary of State. Austria-Hungary had received the so-called ‘blank check’ promising German support for an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia.
After the Kaiser met with the Austrian ambassador, whom did he consult?
First three generals who remained in Berlin, and only then the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmerman.
After the Kaiser met with the Austrian ambassador, when he met with the German Generals, did the German generals tell the Kaiser that they were ready for war? When the generals asked if they were to make any additional preparations, what did the Kaiser say?
The generals told the Kaiser that they were ready for war. The Kaiser said that no additional preparations were to be made.
After meeting with the Kaiser, did the military believe war was unavoidable?
No, but they were “unaware of Bethmann Hollweg’s resolve and underestimated his determination to encourage the Austrian ally.”
Who informed Moltke and Waldersee of Szőgyény’s audience, the memorandum, and the ‘blank check’? What was reported?
General Hermann von Bertrab, the most senior general staff officer in Berlin told them “about the Austrian memorandum [requesting German support] and the Kaiser’s decision to back Austrian demands and to support her should Russia become involved in the conflict.” (the blank check). Bertrab also believed that “the Kaiser did not consider a Russian involvement likely”. Based on that belief, the Kaiser departed for his cruise.
Who was the German Military Attache in VIenna? What did he report to Moltke?
Karl von Rageneck. He reported that Vienna was preparing “an unacceptable ultimatum” and that “Russia would become actively involved” and that “This time war is certain”. Note that “German decision-makers, military and political, were not convinced.”
Were the German military staff kept informed of Austrian plans?
Yes, Karl von Rageneck received a number of specific questions, including from Waldersee. The German general staff learned that it appeared that the original Austro-Hungarian intention was that the conflict would be limited to Serbia and of the date of the planned delivery of the Ultimatum (originally 7/25, later changed to 7/23).
