A century of explanations (By James Joll, Gordon Martel, in The Origins of the First World War) Flashcards
What magnified the focus on the war’s ‘immediate’ origins?
The so-called War Guilt Clause contained in article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. In the 1920s, it seemed that the entire edifice of the new post-war order had been erected on the foundation of the highly debateable argument that Germany and its allies were guilty of aggression in 1914.
Did the Allies try to arraign and indict the Kaiser after the war?
Yes, but the Netherlands resisted pressure (especially British pressure) and allowed him to remain there in exile until his death. But that is an indication of the Allies desire to blame Germany, and the Kaiser individually.
How could the Germans attempt to deflect responsibility for their role in WWI?
By showing that many governments acted in similar manners.
In the 1930s, academic consensus shifted its attention from the individuals at the center of the July 1914 crisis to what?
The nature of the International System and abstract forces like nationalism, imperialism, and militarism. It was hoped that the League of Nations could help improve the international system.
Fritz Fischer renewed the focus on the origins of WWI with his book (Germany’s Aims in the First World War, translated into English in 1967). What was his thesis?
It was Germany’s aggression that precipitated WWI. Germany saw the July 1914 Crisis as a the best possible opportunity to implement its ‘premeditated’ plans to dominate Europe. This renewed the focus away from abstraction to national responsibility.
Fritz Fischer’s second book was War of Illusions, translated into English in 1974. What was his thesis?
Germany’s domestic political and social pressures drove foreign policy.
How did newer scholarship differ from Fischer’s contemporaries?
Newer scholarship builds on greater knowledge of who made the decisions and how the decisions were made. So is is more personal.
Fischer’s approach assumes what?
That the eventual war aims of the Entente Powers developed gradually. That even Austria-Hungary had no specific war aims in 1914 other than defeating and subjugating Serbia. (The way Joll and Martel present this paragraph, it appears absurd that the Entente powers had no war aims influencing their behavior during the July 1914 crisis. For example, how quick they were to carve up the middle east.)
Where does Williamson place the blame?
Austria-Hungary. This view had not been popular since the early days of WWI. While it is acknowledged that the dual monarchy was backward, suppressing legitimate national desires , the focus had been that it was the alliance with Germany that turned a local dispute into a European war.
What are some possible reasons for why “Systemic Causes” became less a focus of WWI historians during the Cold War?
During the Cold War, there was also a system of alliances. There was also secret diplomacy, arms races, large standing armies, imperialism (loosely defined), competition in trade and commerce. Yet, the cold war never became total war.
Was the Austrian Ultimatum unique?
The historian Christopher Clark asserted that the terms of the 1914 Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia appeared lenient compared to the NATO demands in the Rambouillet Agreement of 1999. From Wikipedia: The Rambouillet Agreement … was a proposed peace agreement between the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia on the one hand and the delegation of political representatives of the ethnic Albanian majority population of Kosovo on the other. It was drafted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) … Among other things, the accords called for 30,000 NATO peacekeeping troops in Kosovo; an unhindered right of passage for NATO troops on Yugoslav territory; and immunity for NATO and its agents to Yugoslav law. The Kosovo Albanian side signed the agreement on 18 March 1999, however the refusal of the Yugoslav and Serbian side to sign the accords led to the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia.
Much of recent history has seemed to ‘rehabilitate’ the Austro-Hungarian empire from viewing as anachronistic, feudal, and bound to fall apart into its constituent nationalities. What is the alternative view (led by Christopher Clark)?
(1) With the rise of the European Union, a deeper respect for multi-nationalism emerged. (2) The empire attempted to work to the benefit if its varied constituencies. (3) “Its civilizing” mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (4) Dedicated and professional civil service. (5) It was its defeat in WWI that doomed the empire, not internal centrifugal forces. (6) A more balanced assessment of the relationship between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (Serbia as not an innocent victim and its conspirators were as much terrorists (less sympathetic after 9/11) as freedom fighters). (7) A contrast between the relatively stable Austro-Hungarian empire and the violet disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.
Is a connection between ‘official’ Serbia and underground movements such as the Black Hand now widely accepted?
Yes, though it is difficult to prove. Nonetheless, James Lyon argues to the contrary, ‘official’ Serbia was anxious to avoid confrontation with Austria-Hungary, and Nikola Pašić (Prime Minister of Kingdom of Serbia) regarded the “Black Hand” as an enemy, so he was unlikely to conspire with the organizers.
How much did the Russians encourage the Young Bosnians?
It is impossible to be sure. They saw national independence movements in the Balkans as an opportunity to extend their influence at the expense of Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire (especially Constantinople and the Straits). However, the “story of Russia, especially from 1903 to 1914, is a story of ill-fated attempts at reform and modernization” Russian decision-makers were aware of their weaknesses, so sought to maintain the status-quo.
Bottom Line: Can you blame the Russians for WWI?
“At the same time, an awareness of Russia’s military weaknesses meant that [Foreign Minister] Sazonov and the Czar desperately attempted to resolve the crisis without going to war. It was only when Austrian and German military moves seemed to place Russia in an untenably weak position that the decision to risk war was made.”
