reading 9 - terrorism and insurgency Flashcards
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
- the problem: insurgency and guerilla warfaer
counterinsurgency = COIN
insurgency = form of violent opposition to rule by a stronger force
(e.g. French resistance to Nazi occupation)
- insurgents usually seen as in the wrong: bc colonial framings and state-centrism
C21 new types of insurgency: goal of new insurgents to protect the status quo from foreign imposed regime change (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya)
+ traditional insurgencies also persist (e.g. june 2014 declaration Middle Eastern ‘Caliphate’ by ISIS in Iraq and Syria)
classical model = fights to control the state
asymmetric tactics: insurgens can’t conront oppossing power directly -> atack vulnerable points and hide among local population
= difficult to deal with: responding with violene or mass punishment is counterproductive, alienating the population and encouraging more locals to join insurgencies while underminng the legitimacy of the gov
key aim COIN = isolate insurgents from local sources of support, difficult bc most insurgents are locals
contemporary insurgencies more complex than traditional: not just one sate or regiona nd one insurgent group and one government, now not just rural but urban
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
- the cycle of interest in counterinsurgency
insurgencies against colonial rule -> attention to COIN
thereafter militaries neglected it
US flawed lens with Vietnam insurgency: underestimate the will and resilience of the people
most recent cycle of Western interest in COIN began with UN authorized intervention in Afghanistan and unauthorized intervention in Iraq after 9/11: they began to meet local opposition
- US reluctant to convert to COIN: traumatic experience battling highly motivated, low-tech insurgency Vietnam
- schlolars/practitioners (COINdinistas) argued for outside of the box approach with COIN strategies -> COIN employed in Iraq and Afghanistan
US now has put counterinsurgency largely aside: COINdinistas failed to establish counterinsurgency as a long term core mission
why did US military shift back to traditional role of preparing for inter-state conflicts?
- miliary disliked COIN: messy, inconclusive, deadly
- miliatyr culture of efficiency, organization and clear missions is diff to what it takes to do suc6ful COIN: empowering locals and letting US civilian agencies take the lead
- COIN gave lead to the Army and Marines, that never pleased the Air Force and Navy
- implementing COIN didn’t require highest technology weapons platforms, this clashed with US high-tech military culture
- concerns that fighting wars of choice led to neglect of more fundamental security challenges like Chinese and Russian adventurism
British military were quicker to implement COIN in Iraq and Afghanistan: saw themselves as good at COIN due to their colonial history (diputed), but was largely unsuccesful (somehow military had unlearned COIN)
despite recent Western detachment from COIN, insurgencies continue to rage
in corresponing COIN operations, there is a strong tendency towards military-centric strategies rather than the holistic approach advocated by many scholars/practitioners
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
- insurgency and counterinsurgency key definitions
insurgency = organised, violent subversion used to effect or prevent political control, as a challenge to established authority
or: organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region
counterinsurgency = military, law enforcement, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency, while addressing the root causes
or: blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
the state of the field
writings on COIN are both practitioners and scholars
advantages: deep understanding, real sense of operational evnironment, have spend time pondering successes an failures they experienced
disadvantages: writing for primarily military audience, often presuppose that what worked for them in one country will work automatically elsewhere, and some were embittered by experience and write as sort of theropy
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
hearts and minds
COIN = competition for the allegiance of the people (succesful COIN involves winning the hearts an minds of the local population)
- e.g. establish protection, respond to insurgents demands to take away their popularity
!winning legitimacy rather than popularity
gap between theory and practice: when Western powers have intervened militarily to support threatened gov, they have often perpetuated the gov’s human rights abuses, bolstered elites and harmed civilians
- when external power pushed for reforms it experienced it had little influence over another state’s domestic political choices
neglected second front : domestic political arena of the state conducting COIN: often insurgents triumphed bc counterinsurgents had lost hearts and minds of their home constituents, lackte the will to carry on
- e.g. US withdrawals from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
- what constitutes a victory in COIN?
Thompson: 5 principles of counterinsurgency that hint at what victory would be
- gov must have clear political aim: establish and maintain a free, independent and united country that is politically and economically stable and viable
- the government must function in accordance with the law
- the gov must have an overall plan
- gov must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerillas
- in the guerilla phase of insurgency, a gov must secure its base areas first
US has not consistently met all 5 principles in Afghanistan (Taliban resumed power, country not politically and economically stable and viable), Iraq and Iran
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
the role of military force in COIN
tactically important part of western COIN is not using force: military power to create the space for political progress
COIN should involve politics, economics, psychology, and as necessary, military force
to win mind and hearts military force is unproductive
+ when it is used it must be discriminating and precise
- western COIN aims to be discriminating, other states take the opposite approach: violent military operations (e.g. Russian campaigns in Chechnya, Syria)
crucial role of good intelligence in ensuring the appropriate use of force
yet this is often a real shortcoming of COIN efforts
*intelligence also about culture, workings, local politics, priorities of the population
US military preference for conventional warfare with high-tech weapons platforms, most of which not useful in insurgencies
since 1990s increasingly common to bring private military companies to assist with COIN (e.g. Russia: quasi-state Wagner Group)
+ civilian gov agencies, private security companies, aid agencies, NGOs, and the media all play roles in COIN campaigns
-> problems of coordination and difficulty of assuring all actors pursue the same agenda
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
- learning on the ground
Kilcullen: nature of counter-insurgency is not fixed but shifting because it evolves in response to changes in insurgency
key element COIN = allow forces ont he ground autonomy in responding to situations they encounter , to become ‘strategic corporals’
- UK: relatively easy bc small force and anti-doctrine bias in British armed forces -> basic rules, interpretation and implementation left to commanders in the field + tradition of regimental ‘lore’ (appraoches , hisotry and tactics of a regiment passed down to new soldiers)
- US: harder bc large forces: ther eis greater reliance on hierachies and written doctrine -> fewer roles for individual initiative = gradually became a learning military
-> failure to adapt at first, then soldiers used internet to share information and tactics -> US gov not happy (afraid of dataleaks, with happened with Wikileaks)
while US became more of a learning military, the UK seemed to have gone in diff direction: in practice they prefered the proactive use of force over more sanguine political tactics advocated in COIN
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
- counterinsurgency in the media age
media = arena of competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents
- globalization of media -> difficult to control
much COIN is about ‘spin control’: attempting to influence how events, campaigns and progress are reported
increasing democratization of media (anyone with internet can be a reporter), everything done by insurgents and COIN can be observed
-> every move of the individual soldier, contractor and official makes must be calibrated in terms of the overall COIN
!must be constant watchfulness for deep fake videos and social media posts that can have negative impacts on troop and home morale and on local acceptance
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
- similarities to peacebuilding
similar strategies and tactics -> military can potentially move between the two missions
- ideal ration between force and nonviolent activities is the same: 20% kinetic and 80% non-kinetic elements
- both operations are aimed at standing up and supporting weak governments
(in peacebuilding ops the temptation to take over from locals is often overwhelming bc short period of time to achieve peace) - in both operations there is a lot of knowledge at the tactical/operational level, but less at the strategic level -> tendency to apply ‘standard models’ with very mixed results
- efforts often undermined in both by problems of lack of cultural knowledge that rarely get solved in time - similar mixes of actors in involved in both types of operations
- same problem of how to drain away uncommitted supporters from the fanatics who will not be swayed
similarities -> forces regularly involved with peacebuilding find switch to COIN less traumatic than militaries primarily focussed on missions involving major wars
Kilcullen: modern counterinsurgency victory may need to be redefined as the disarming and reintegration of insurgents into society, combined with popular support for permanent, institutionalized anti-terrorist measures that contain risks of terrorist cells emerging from the former insurgent movement
Ch28 - counterinsurgency
conclusion: the future of COIN
COIN is still practiced in many parts of the world, but not in the ‘hearts and minds’ version favored by the West
most COIN today = violent affairs with host regime more concerned about staying in power than respecting human rights and institutionalizing participatory government
= not more succesfull
political question of whether after the bruising experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, the US and its allies would be willing to take on new insurgencies
currently looks unlikely (US focused on preparing for major war with peer competitors)
BUT would be a mistake to devalue COIN: no strategy better suite to confronting terrorists and guerrillas
Russia invasion Ukraine as insurgency + dismay with its failure breaking through Russian mainstream discourse
How al-Qaida Ends
intro
terrorism studies often driven/spurred by attacks -> descriptive analysis focused on one group
= little attention to analyzing al-Qaida across functional lines within a wider body of knowledge and research on terrorist groups
+ little attention to how the al-Qaida movement may end (and what this would imply)
how terrorism ends is understudied
in short: substantial history of how terrorism declines and ceases has not been analyzed for its potential relevance to al-Qaida
argument; past experience with decline of terrorist organizations is vital in dealing with the current threat + US and allies must tap into this experience to avoid prior mistakes and to effect al-Qaida’s demise
How al-Qaida Ends
previous research on how terrorism ends
overlapping themes and approaches in 3 areas
- links between beginnings and endings of groups
- search for predictable cycles or phases of terrorist activity
- comparison of historical counterterrorism cases
How al-Qaida Ends
previous research on how terrorism ends
- links between beginnings and endings
assumption that origins of terrorism persist throughout the life of terrorist organizations and shed light on sources of their eventual demise
= often oversimplification
- recognition of interplay of internal and external forces in the evolution of terrorism is also crucial: evolution from awareness to formation of terrorist group to carrying out a terrorist attack is complex
- process by which a terrorist group declines may be as much determined by innate factors as by external policies or actors
studies of the causes of terrorism frequently begin with psychologies of individual terrorists: relationship between their motivations and characteristics and means to end their violent attacks is implied but not always obvious
other approach: analyzing the organizational dynamics of the group : understand dynamic relations between members to gain insight on vulnerability of the group’s hierarchy, weakness of organizational structure
- many analysts question the relevance of this bc era of decentralized, nonhierarchical cell structures able to exploit info tech and tools of globalization
nature of the grievance that drives a terrorist organization has some bearng on the speed/likelihood of its decline: modern terrorist organizations don’t exist for long
- whether an organization supports left-wing/right-wing or ethnonationalist/separatist cause appears to matter for determining its lifespan: greater average longetvity seems to be result from support among local populance
high degree of terrorism research has been subsidized by gov and biased by later policy imperatives -> role of counterterrorism often overemphasized: degree to which terrorist groups evolve independent of gov action can be under apreciated
How al-Qaida Ends
previous research on how terrorism ends: cycles, stages, waves and phases
argues that terrorist attacks conform to a temporal pattern that provides insight into increases and decreases in nr of attacks
terrorist attacks run in cycles with peaks approx every 2y (correctly predicted enhanced danger of high-casualty attack prior to 9/11)
- doesn’t predict where, who and how the attack is carried out
apparent existence of global statistical patterns is interesting, but it provides no insight into the decline of specific terrorist groups
some experts: existence of developmental stages through which all terrorist groups evolve (e.g. emergence, escalation and de-escalation)
-> other experts: specific types of groups may possess own developmental stages
- e.g right-wing group have unique cyclical pattern (Sprinzak): hostility against enemy defined by who they are (not what they do), if gov defends the target population they become a “legitimate” target
other researchers study evolution of terrorist groups as types of social movements
Rapoport: waves of international terrorist activity last about a generation (approx 40 years)
- critical to the waves: transformation in communication or transportation patterns + new doctrine or culture
- Rapoport reluctant to predict end current wave of jihadist terrorism bc it is not secular
!!cyclical hypotheses difficult to formulate and to prove: much generalization and qualification -> relevance becomes remote
How al-Qaida Ends
previous research on how terrorism ends - comparative counterterrorism cases
= approach to assemble comparative case studies that draw parallel lessons about terrorist organizations
challenges:
- terrorism studies often look primarily at the attributes of a particular group or at the counterterrorist policies of a state ==> rarely are both equally well considered -> emphasis on counterterrorist techniques
- focus on relatively narrow functional question -> comparative terrorism cases can be superficial
- access to data is problematic: acquiring dangerous for researcher and their contact
- researchers operate at intersections of sensitive ideas -> difficult to maintain objective
- studying terrorism over diff contexts requires generalization -> risks distortions when making comparisons
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
7 broad explanations
(can be internal/external + can be multiple dynamics responsible for the same decline)
- capture or killing of the leader
- failure to transition to the next generation
- achievement of group’s aims
- transition to a legitimate political process
- undermining of popular support
- repression
- transition from terrorism to other forms of violence
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
- capture or killing of the leader
- effects vary depending on structure of the organization, if leader had cult of personality, presence of viable successor
- even when does not result in demise it is a turning point: shows depth and nature of group’s popular support
e.g.
- Shining Path: Guzman built Marxist movement with brutal campaign executing peasant leaders in Peru -> capture in 1992 dealt the group a crushing blow
- Kurdistan Working Party: ethnonationalist/separatist group led by Ocalan -> apprehended 1999 in Kenya -> sentenced to death (later commuted to life imprisonment) -> demonstrations -> Ocalan advised followers to refrain from violence -> renamed KADEK the group remains on the US terrorist list but now mainly political activities
- Real Irish Republican Army: McKevitt arrested in 2001 -> he and other imprisoned members declared further med resistance was futile and RIRA was at an end -> group continues to carry out attacks (but less)
- Aum Shinrikyo/Aleph = religious cult of Asahara -> arrested in 1995, sentenced to death 2004 -> group shrunk
from a counterterrorism perspective, the killing of a terrorist leader may backfire: creaig increased publicity for group cause + make leader martyr (e.g. Che Guevera) + imprisoned leaders may continue to communicate + followers may try to free them
-> if a leader is captured and jailed, undermining his credibility and cutting off inflammatory communications are critical to demoralize following
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
- inability to pass the cause on to the next generation
nature of group ideology seems to have relevance t cross-generational staying power of the group
- e.g. left-wing/anarchist groups 1970s trouble to articulate clear vision of their goals that could be handed down to successors
- rightwing groups (fascist/racist) also have difficulty persisting over generations (or at least hard to track across generations), but racist causes can persist long after disappearance of the group
right wing groups often organizational decentralization (individual operatives or small cells functioning independently)-> complicates conclusions about beginnings and endings of right-wing groups
BUT may also militate against truly effective generational transition
- furthermore: to support their activites, some right-wing groups engage in criminal behavior
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
- achievement of the cause
!!!!!!!!!!reading questions!!!!!!!
some groups end when they have achieved their cause
Laquer: terrorist groups that attained their objectives: 3 categories:
- those with narrow/clearly defined aims that were realistically attainable
- those with powerful outside protectors
- those facing imperial powers that were no longer willing or able to hol on to their colonies or protectorates
although it happens in a minority of cases, using terrorism to achieve an aim does sometimes succeed
e.g. Irgun Zvai Leumi (ETZEL/Irgun)
- founded in 1931 to protect Jews with force and to avance the cause of an independent Jewish state
- disbanded with creation state of Israel
- head (Begin) became prime minister of Israel
e.g. African National Congress (ANC)
- created in 1912, terrorist attacks since 1960s -> rightw-ing counterstrikes
- leader Nelson Mandela was imprisoned, later first president after end apartheid
- organization became legal political actor in 1990: had achieved end of apartheid
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
- negotiations toward a legitimate political process
opening of negotiations can be a catalyst for the decline or end of terrorist groups, can have diff effects:
- transitioned to political legitimacy
- e.g. Provisional Irish Republican Army, Palestine Liberation Organization
- by pursuit/achievement negotiated agreement - splintering of groups into factions that support the negotiations or their outcome, and those that don’t
- e.g. IRA splintered into the Real Irish Republican Army
- can be purpose of negotiation process from counterterrorist perspective: isolates and potentially strangles the most radical factions
- !!!!also counterproductive splintering: splintering on the “status-quo” side (the state usually)
- !!splinter groups can be more violent, adding a new “layer” of terrorism with respect to their own group or own government
what determines the outcome: nature of the organization, nature of the leadership, nature of public support for the cause , etc.
there must also be negotiable aims (not the case for all groups)
!negotiations don’t need to be formal and need not occur only with the leadership of a group: e.g. offer amnesty to those willing to stop engaging in violence and come forth with info about fellow operatives
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
- diminishment of popular support
terrorist groups generally can’t survive without either active (hiding members, raising money, joining organization) or passive (ignoring obvious signs of terrorist group activity, declining to cooperate with the police, sending money) support from a surrounding population
popular support can dissipate for a nr of reasons:
- people not especially interested in its political aims may fear gov counteraction
- gov may offer supporters of terrorist group a better alternative (reform movements, increased spending, creation jobs)
- populations can become uninterested in the ideology or objectives of a terrorist group (ideas may become outdated or irrelevant)
- terrorist attacks can cause revulsion among its actual/potential public constituency
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
- military force and the represion of terrorist groups
e.g. Russian group Narodnaya Volya, Shining Path and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
military force has taken 2 forms historically (typically combined)
- intervention = threat is located mainly beyond the borders of the target state
- repression = threat is considered mainly a domestic one
repression can be temporary or counterproductive or export of the problem to another country
democracies or liberal governments face particular difficulties in repressing terrorist groups: terrorists need to be “profiled”, there needs to be a method to distinguish terrorists from nonmembers = sensitive (discrimination)
+ repression can challenge civil liberties and human rights, undermine domestic support, polarize parties
How al-Qaida Ends
how other terrorist groups have ended
- transition to another modus operandi
use of terrorism -> criminal behavior or more classic conventional warfare
criminal behavior: acquiring material goods as an end (rather than as means of pursuing military ends)
- e.g. Abu Sayyaf int he Philippines: bombings and targeted executions -> taking foreign hostages in exchange for ransom
insurgency or conventional war (esp when they have state support)
- transitions in and out of insurgency are especially common among ethnonationalists/separatist groups whose connection to particular territory and grounding in an ethnic population provide a natural base
- operate as military unit and attack mainly other military targets
- conventional war: when the group is able to control the behavior of a state according to its own interest
to distinguish insurgency and terrorism: analyze group motivation, attraction to particular constituency, strength and degree to which its goals are associated with control of a territory
How al-Qaida Ends
Is al-Qaida unique among Terrorist organizations?
4
4 characteristics distinguish al-Qaida from its predecessors in nature or degree:
- fluid organization
- recruitment methods
- funding
- means of communication
How al-Qaida Ends
Is al-Qaida unique among Terrorist organizations?
fluid organization
as result of the war on terrorism al-Qaida has evolved into an increasingly diffuse network of affiliated groups driven by al-Qaida’s worldview
1996 became a “visible” organization (training camps + occupying territory in Afghanistan)
= perhaps error: in part explains immediate succes of US-led coalition’s war in Afghanistan
since then looks more like a “global jihad movement”: web-directed and cyber-linked groups and ad hoc cells with unusual resilience and international reach
unique al-Qaida: complexity, agility and global reach with fluid operational style based increasingly on common mission statement and objectives rather than on standard operating procedures and an organizational structure
some argue al-Qaida should not be seen as an organization: more like a nebula of independent entities that share ideology and cooperate
increased reliance on connections to other groups, can be seen as growing strength or as sign of weakness
size, nature, structure and reach of the coalition = subject to debate
How al-Qaida Ends
Is al-Qaida unique among Terrorist organizations?
- methods of recruitment
in many senses al-Qaida is closer to a social movement than a terrorist group
involvement mainly from local volunteers rather than from pressure by senior al-Qaida members
more a matter of “joining” than being recruited
-> tracing command and control relationships enormously difficult + C21 focus on structure and function neither timely nor sufficient
!attraction to the ideology/mission is necessary but not sufficient: social bonds play an important role = many al-Qaida operatives join because ties of kinship and friendships (facilitated by “bridging person”)
al-Qaida loose connectedness: not all go to camps or had training (fits with bin Laden’s discourse that he does not exercise command and control over his followers)
other concern = parallel development of Salafist networks apparently drawing European Muslims into combat against Western forces in Iraq -> fear they will return to attack Western targets in Europe
fear of members of an alienated diaspora that are vulnerable to messages bc aren’t trained in fundamental concepts of Islam + alienated from parents + feel isolated from community
How al-Qaida Ends
Is al-Qaida unique among Terrorist organizations?
- means of support
al-Qaida’s fiscal autonomy makes the network more autonomous than its late C20 state-sponsored predecessors
money channeled through charities, grants given to local terrorist groups, etc
most operations rely on small amount of seed money provided by the organization, supplemented by operatives engaged in petty crime and fraud
-> al-Qaida can be seen as franchise organization with a marketable brand
also: many autonomous businesses owned/controlled by al-Qaida = self-sustaining source for the movement
chocking off funds destined for al-Qaida through regulatory oversight = challenging:
- transfers through alternative remittance systems / underground banking / parallel banking / informal value transfer systems (rather than formal banking channels)
- value can be stored in commodities, moved through areas with partial or problematic state sovereignty
- use of charities (take small amount of donations) -> cut them off would harm genuinely needy recipients
How al-Qaida Ends
Is al-Qaida unique among Terrorist organizations?
- means of communication
uses tools of globalization (mobile phones, text messaging, instant messaging, websites, email, blogs, chat rooms) that an be used for administrative tasks, fundraising, research and logistical coordination of attacks
other terrorist groups also exploit these means, but al-Qaida especially good at it
websites to convey messages, claims of attacks and warnings to the American public + to educate future participants + embed instructions to operatives + rally sympathizers for the cause
internet = important to build and perpetuate the image of al-Qaida and in maintaining its reputation
- access to the media: facilitates psychological warfare against the West
- indoctrinating and teaching new recruits (training manual)
- websites and chatrooms to offer practical advice + facilitate fraternal bonds
-> members don’t need to join, you can participate with the stroke of a few keys
How al-Qaida Ends
earlier terrorist groups, al-Qaida and US policy implications
al-Qaida also echoes predecessors:
- international links and ideological drive of C19 anarchists
- open-ened aims of Aum Shinrikyo
- brilliance in public communications of the early PLO
- taste for mass casualty attacks from Hezbollah
al-Qaida is an amalgam of old and new
it is a mistake not to look at earlier groups to determine lessons:
- al-Qaida will not end if Osama bin Laden is killed: organizations that have been crippled after leader was killed had more of a hierarchical structure + some cult of a personality + lack viable successor (often talked about succession plan)
- would have important potential benefits, but would not kill all al-Qaida - al-Qaida does pass along generations: method of recruitment (attraction radicalized followers and linking with local networks)
- achievement of the cause, transition toward political role, amnesty or negotiation = hard to conceive: aims shift + no feasible terms nor sense of stalemate + don’t feel like they’re losing
- al-Qaida is hybrid/virtual organization -> treating it as unified whole is a mistake: gloss over local variation within terrorist groups and their different goals
- US should try to emphasize the diff with al-Qaida’s agenda and to drive a wedge between the movement and its recent adherents - reducing popular support is an effective means of hastening the demise of some terrorist groups
- democratization efforts unlikely to have rapid enough effect to counter the anger, frustration, and sense of humiliation of passive supporters
- no evidence that democratization correlates with a reduction of terrorism
- democratization without strong institutions and civil society could bring about radical Islamist governments (there are much worse things than terrorism)
- 2 vulnerabilities where cutting links between al-Qaida and supporters hold promise: means of funding and of communication = requires closer monitoring/countermeasuring the cyberspace
- al-Qaida and associates have made serious mistakes of timing, choice of targets and technique, yet US and allies have done very little to capitalize on them (no coordinated counterterrorist multimedia response e.g.)
- crucial moment of opportunity: polls indicate that may of al-Qaida’s potential constituents have been deeply repulsed by recent attacks
- not focus on American public diplomacy, but on international norms against killing civilians, work with local cultures and people to build on common goals and increase alienation from al-Qaida - use of military repression: al-Qaida ability to evolve limits military repression
- transitioning out of terrorism toward criminality or full insurgency = worrisome: in a way the network is already doing both (attempts to cutting of funding -> engage in illicit activities)
- Some argue al-Qaida already is a full insurgency to the extent that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an his associates in Iraq truly represent an arm of the movement (alliance negotiated between bin Laden and al-Zarqawi example of an effective strategic and public relations move for both parties giving new life to both movemetns)
How al-Qaida Ends
earlier terrorist groups, al-Qaida and US policy implications
- two potentially serious developments C21
- use of increasingly destructive weapons that push terrorist attacks well beyond the “nuisance” level
- growing likelihood that terrorism will lead to future systemic war
How al-Qaida Ends
earlier terrorist groups, al-Qaida and US policy implications
- how US should respond
How US should respond:
- dividing new local affiliates from al-Qaida by understanding and exploiting their differences with the movement rather than treating the movement like a monolith
- more effectively break the political and logistical connections between the movement and its supporters
al-Qaida will end when the West removes itself from the heart of this fight, shores up international norms against terrorism, undermines al-Qaida’s ties with its followers, and begins to exploit the movement’s abundant missteps
If it continues to treat it like it were utterly unprecedented it will continue to make predictable and avoidable mistakes in responding to this threat + miss important strategic opportunities
How al-Qaida Ends
conclusion
Terrorism is an illegitimate tactic that by its very nature is purposefully and ruthlessly employed. At the heart of a terrorist’s plan is seizing and maintaining the initiative.
Ignoring history is the surest way for a state to be manipulated by the tactic of terrorism
Speaking of an unprecedented “jihadist” threat, while arguably resonating in a U.S. domestic context, only perpetuates the image and perverse romanticism of the al-Qaida movement abroad
- al-Qaida has unique aspects but also parallels with previous terrorist groups
„Such an approach also further undermines any inclination by the United States to review and understand the relationship between historical instances of terrorism and the contemporary plotting of a strategy for accelerating al-Qaida’s demise. In short, formulating U.S. counterterrorism strategy as if no other state has ever faced an analogous threat is a serious blunder.”
US has not much experience with terrorism on its territory (comparatively speaking) -> shock is understandable BUT time for a learning curve is done
Short-term reactive thinking is misguided:
- extraordinary and expensive effort to end terrorism will be self-perpetuating
- inept identification of US aims will ensure that the application of means is unfocused and ill informed by past experience
failure to think through al-Qaida’s termination, and how US policy either advances or precludes it is an error
Terrorism, like war, never ends; however, individual terrorist campaigns and the groups that wage them always do.
