reading 10 - civil war Flashcards
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
introduction
most ethnic conflicts are peaceful, political issues inevitably arise when diff linguistic and religious groups mix, the are usually managed peacefully (e.g. SU included ~120 ethnic groups, when it collapsed only a handful of cases of violent ethnic conflict)
C20 ethnic civil wars more important than ever before, civil wars more common than international wars in C20
ethnic conflicts can be bloody (5/10 deadliest civil wars were ethnic)
-> conflicts also source of disruption, conflict and refugees for neighbors
-> became major internatinoal issues, sparking foreign intervention
even ethnic riots can grow into threats to int’l securrity:e.g. Hindu-Muslim riots India 1947 -> ~10million refugees
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
what is ethnic conflict
anthropologists: groups are primarily ascriptive (membership is typically assigned at birth and difficult to change)
-> identities that are sticky
Smith: a group is an ethnic group if its members share: common name, believed common descent, elements of a shared culture (e.g. langugae, religion), common historical memories, a attachment to a particular territory
conflict is only ethnic if the involved sides are distinguished primarily on the basis of ethnicity
primordialists: some scholars argue that ethnic conflict is based on ancient hatreds that are impossible to eradicate (ethnicity seen as primordial identity that is essentiall unchangeable)
but complication:
- most people have multiple identiteis that are either nested (subgroups within larger groups) or overlapping + which identity is more important for an individual depends on situation
- idenities sometimes change: new ones emerging and old ones disappearing (esp with crisis)
-> instrumentalists: ethnic identity is not primordial but merely instrumental: people follow ethnic leaders when it is in their interest to do so + ethnic leaders try to create ethnic solidarity when it works for them
- means ethnic conflict can be blamed primarily on selfish leaders that mislea their followers in pursuit of their own power
3d pov = constructivism = mix of 1 and 2: ethnic identities are socially constructed, not natural but result of customs based on invented tradition: writers/scholars creating a myth-symbol complex (acepted history of group and criteria for establishing a member + identifies foes and enemies + glorifies symbols of group identity)
- reconciliates primordialists and instrumentalists: people belief ethnicity is primordial, but in fact socially constructed
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
an overview of ethnic conflicts
- 1995: 18% of minorities at risk were engaged in small-scale rebellion, 8% in large scale rebellion
- nrs dropped in the 1990s and 00s, increased again in the 2010s
what are these violent conflicts about? political power in a disputed territory (either take control over entire country or separate and form own state or own autonomous region)
*often goals and stakes unclear as rebels may disagree with each other (e.g. some Palestinians want to establish own state alongside Israel, others want to take it over)
- only rarely are conflicts religious in the sense that one group tries to impose its religion on another
- ethnic conflicts are not ‘merely’ economic: eco grievances may be there, but they are expressed in ethnic terms
ethnic conflict may be highly one-sided: a response to a imaginary, potential or highly exaggerated threat (e.g. Stalin saw Ukrainians as potential threat -> starved them in the 1930s with artificial famine)
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
causes of violent ethnic conflict - ethnic riots
two broad categories ethnic conflict:
- riots = little/no planning + careful selection of victims (killing may be brutal and age/gender is no concern)
- armed conflicts or civil wars
factors leading to ethnic riots:
- hostile relationship between groups
- authoritative social support (rioters need to be assured by public statements from community leaders in their group that the leaders agree killing member s of the other group is justified)
- stimulus, event that provokes fear, anger, or hatred
- e.g. event of violence against the group or political change
other scholars focus on social organization: community activists and extremist organizations that benefit from keeping tensions high, politicians that benefit from occasional violence, and criminals and thugs who can profit from it
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
causes of ethnic conflict - ethnic civil wars
social psychological approach: why do followers follow these extremist leaders instead of following moderate leaders who will work for peace?
- symbolic politics theory: when the groups myth-symbol complex points to theother groups as enemy, it leads to prejudice => predisposed hostility =>politicians can appeal to symbols to rouse people’s emotions against the enemy
social mobilization approach: consider opportunity and leadership + mobilization (how members get together the people and resources needed for collective action)
- people use social organizations and networks that already exist (e.g. political parties or religious organization)
- suc6ful mobilization efforts find ‘brokers’ that can link diff groups and networks together to help coordinate a single movement
instrumentalist approach: focus on opportunity and leadership
- opportunity for rebels to act: weak gov, large populations, inaccesible terrain = opening extremists need to attack
- extremist leaders seeking to grab or hold onto power -> stir up ethnic disagreements and provoke violence to create a rally around the flag effect
- extremist media: seek popularity by appealing to group loyalties, presenting news in terms of us vs them
- e.g. Slobodan Milosevic led upsurge of Serbian national identity that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia 1991
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
Sudan’s North-South civil war
= bloodiest ethnic conflict in recent decades
North = Muslim + led by long-dominant Arab elite
South (now South Sudan) = mix of Christian and animist ethnic groups
Sudan had all preconditions for ethnic war from every perspective:
- large population, huge land area, hostile neighbours and weak gov provided ample opportunity (instrumentalists)
- northerners’ myth-symbol complex glorifies Islamic identity for Sudan and blatant racial prejudice against southerners + southerners saw Islamist rule as disaster for themseves, fear spread Islam threaten identity (symbolists)
1955 independence, northern elites gained almost all gov jobs and benefits + formulated Muslim and Arab national identity, tried to impose it on the south -> violent resistance -> early 1960s civil ar
1969 military coup -> al-Numayri in power, signed peace agreement in 1972 granting autonomy to the south
late 1970s: secular coalition began crumbling + Sudan econ sagged -> Numayri began appealing to Islamist symbols to maintain power + formed coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood
1983 Numayri revoked South autonomy + imposed islamic law in the country -> rebellion in south
1985 he was overthrown -> brief period of democracy -> 1989 military dictatorship uner al-Bashir maintained Islamic law + continued war in the south
2005 comprehensive peace agreement -> 2011 South Sudan independence
BUT peace didn’t follow: new civil war in Sudan’s western region of Darfur + South Sudan 2013 also civil war
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
international security dimensions of ethnic conflicts
ethnic conflicts often have important international effects
- politics of ethnic conflicts transcend national boundaries: ethnic diasporas e.g. often fund/support cause
- creation of refugees: ethnic civil wars esp. many refugees bc it is often about control of disputed land -> massacres and evictions (ethnic cleansing) frequently used weapons
- refugees threaten international security: destabilize ethnic balance in recipient countries + refugees may turn refugee camps into bases from which to attck their former homeland (using humanitarian aid to supply war effort) - issue for international diplomacy: diplomats wrangle over how to prevent war -> diplomatic intervention (sometimes help prevent, sometimes escalate)
- peacekeeping (sometimes works too well: by enforcing ceasefire can make situation of neither peace nor war easier option than tough compromises that final agreements would require)
- violent intervention: indirect (provide supplies, weapons, military training to the side they favor (often ethically driven)) + direct (send own troops: e.g. Turkey invaded Cyprus when Cyprus’ ethnic Turks were threatened with being forcibly united ith Greece 1974)
ch 25 - ethnic conflict
conclusion: resolving ethnic civil wars
danger that ethnic wars may spread -> int’l intervention not always violent, often aimed at stopping the fighting or resolving underlying disputes
some argue the best way to stop ethnic conflict is to arrange a compromise settlement (power-sharing in central gov + regional autonomy forminority groups)
thers maintain ethnic civil wars only end when rebel minority is repressed or granted own state = civil conflict only ends when one side win
in most cases peace does result from a military victory => most effective foreign intervention is to help one side win
some ethnic conflicts are settled in a compromise deal among parties involved, but often those agreements collapse later
- powersharing sometimes succesful: e.g. South Africa 1994: ended apartheid + Northern Ireland 1998 powersharing between Protestant majority and Catholic minority (-> IRA put down arms)
- sometimes int’l effort to promote powersharing goes terribly wrong, e.g. 1994 Rwanda genocide wasc arried out by Hutu extremists trying to prevent implementation UN-sponsored power-sharing deal with minority Tutsi-led rebel group
-> best chance for negotiations to succeed comes when the conflict reaches a mutually hurting stalemate (neither side seems likely to win, but both are suffering)
nr of violent ethnic conflicts in the world is below its mid1990s peak, but new ones continue to crop up + ongoing ones remain diff to settle + those that have been settled are at risk of recurring
intrnational involvement is sometimes diriven by selfish motives + when they are trying to help not always succesful, it may even prolong the agony or cause it to get worse
new and old civil wars - a valid distinction?
intro
decline interstate armed conflict + rise frequency civil wars since end cold war -> new wave of interest in civil wars
post-cold war era civil wars = new civil wars
diff from old civil wars: criminal rather than political phenomena
article: tendency to fundamental differences between them is based on an uncritical adoption of categories and labels grounded in a double mischaracterization
- info about new/ongoing wars is typically biased and incomplete
- historical research on earlier wars tends to be disregarded
distinction drawn between post-cold war conflicts and their predecessors may be attribute more to the demise of readily available conceptual categories than to the existence of profound differences
new and old civil wars - a valid distinction?
- origins of the distinction
new civil wars = criminal, depoliticized, private and predatory
old civil wars = ideological, political, collective and even noble
dividing line: end of the cold war
this distinction is not just academic: it motivates specific policy demands including “humanitarian law-enforcement”
- see rebels as violent criminals vs political revolutionaries
e.g. For example, the 1999 agreement ending the civil war in Sierra Leone met with opposition from many human rights activists, journalists, and opinion makers who believed that the rebels were violent criminals and not political revolutionaries and that it was therefore immoral to grant them amnesty and invite them to participate in the new government.
new and old civil wars - a valid distinction?
3 dimensions of old vs new civil wars
- causes and motivation
- old: political, collective grievances, noble causes like “justice”
- new: motivated by private gain, greed and loot - support
- old: one side enjoyed broad popular support
- new: lack of popular support - violence
- old: controlled, disciplined violence
- new: gratuitous violence by undisciplined militias, private armies, and independent warlords for whom winning may not even be an objective
new and old civil wars - a valid distinction?
collective vs private causes and motivations
old civil wars
- motivat4ed by broad, well-defined, clearly articulated, universalistic, ideologies of social change
- econ: political actors seeking to ameliorate collective grievance
new civil wars
- motivated by concerns of simple private gain
- econ: rebels are bandits motivated by private greed
- some argue they lack purpose entirely
such arguments often based on incomplete/biased evidence from journalistic reports that tend to quote uncritically city-dwellers and members of progovernmental organizations
researchers that study new civil wars by conducting lengthy fieldwork in warzones (rather than interviewing officials and victims) provide nuanced accounts that fail to support the grievance/looting dichotomy
concept of looting is analytically problematic: unclear if it refers to the causes of war or the motivations of the combatants (or both)
- do people wage war to loot or do they loot to be able to wage war (then it is revolutionary taxation)
- not always clear who is doing the looting: elites, autonomous militias, armed peasants?
- linkages between looting and grievances are complex and fluid (can you call a riot a loot just because there was rioting)
- empirical problems: empirical indicators proxying for “lootable” resources
-> to say that civil war in Sierra Leone is mainly bc diamonds is a gross oversimplification
analogy: warlords vs bandits: warlord maintain some order, and gernelaly assume the burdens of gov in areas they control -> this is what happens in new civil wars when rebels take over territory: they are state builders rather than bandits
old civil wars: also criminal activities, looting and coercion => picture of ideologically oriented misrepresented:
- intellectuals are primarily motivated by ideology -> tend to assign overwhelmingly ideological motives to participants and civilians in civil wars
- adoption of ideological claims often superficial: at the mass level, local considerations > ideological ones
- THE HANDY PRESENCE OF COHERENT CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES ALONG THE FAMILIAR LEFT-RIGHT AXIS WHICH BLINDED CASUAL OBSERVERS TO THE COMPLEXITY AND MESSINESS OF CIVIL WARS, APPEARS TO HAVE LED TO A SIGNIFICANT OVERSTATEMENT OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT OF OLD CIVIL WARS via unwarrented inferences from the elite to the mass level
studies have concluded that men in combat are usually motivated by group pressures and regard for comrades, respect for leaders, concern for reputation and urge to contribute to success of the group
new and old civil wars - a valid distinction?
- popular support vs lack of support
old civil wars
- grew out of accumulated popular grievances -> were assumed to be based on considerable popular support (at least for the rebels)
- capture the “hearts and minds”
new civil wars
- fought by political actors who lack support
- borrows from COIN techniques of destabilization aimed at sowing fear and hatred
based on incomplete/biased information: interviews of refugees, gov pov, cities
- e.g. Mozambique reports that armed bandits don’t have support, but only asked in cities, in rural areas they had mass support
perception that rebellions in old civil wars had widespread popular support is being questioned: individual loyalties often informed by shifting, locally based cleavages,
- elites often articulate the meaning of rebellions in language of national cleavages, observers code them as mobilizing popular support along those cleavages, fieldworkers disagree
- locally segmented cleavages often aggregate in misleading ways: wealthy peasants may support one political actor in one region and its rival in a neighboring region
- individual motivations not necessarily informed by impersonal cleavage-related grievances, but often by local and personal conflicts
civil wars provide a medium for a variety of grievances to be realized within the space of the greater conflict
“In old civil
wars, popular support was shaped, won, and lost during the war, often
by means of coercion and violence and along lines of kinship and locality; it was not purely consensual, immutable, fixed, and primarily ideological. In this respect, old civil wars are not as different from new civil
wars as they appear to be.”
new and old civil wars - a valid distinction
- controlled vs gratuitous violence
“both the perception that violence in old civil wars is limited, disciplined, or understandable and the view that violence in new civil wars is senseless, gratuitous, and uncontrolled fails to find support in the available evidence”
new civil wars:
- horrific and senseless
- carried out by assorted militia and paramilitaries, mercenaries and independent warlords for whom winning the war may not even be an objective
such description often come with a culturalist shade: using knife and machete tends to horrify us more than more massive killings by aerial and field bombings
+ senseless violence new civil wars was not as gratuitous as seems: strategic calculations behind them (cut of hands that may otherwise vote or harvest)
supposedly such senseless violence just was not as prevalent in old civil wars
BUT
- perception that civil wars are particularly cruel predates new civil wars (violence is the central component of all civil wars, also old ones)
- practice of using local semi-independent militia is widespread among many “ideologically” oriented actors
- abduction of children to turn them into fighters seen in new but also old wars
new and old civil wars - a valid distinction
conclusion
differences tend to be less pronounced than usually argued
- demise of cold war potentially affected the way in which civil wars were fought, if not their frequency: disappearence of external funding -> foccus on local resources
- often overlooked that the end of the cold war affected how civil wars were interpreted and coded: removing coherent political categories -> exaggeration criminal aspects of recent civil wars
- demise of conceptual categories engendered by the cold war is an opportunity rather than a handicap: allows us to probe the core of civil wars unhindered by constraints of externally imposed lenses
research on civil wars needs to be grounded in sustained, systematic, long-term observation or ethnographic reconstruction at the mass level coupled with archival research
bc civil wars research vulnerable to trade-off between visibility and significance
“Highly visible information, such as elite
discourses or widely advertised atrocities, can be outwardly misleading
and is less significant than hard-to-collect evidence about crucial but
undertheorized and underresearched aspects of civil wars, such as the
type of warfare and actors, the forms of resource extraction, and the
patterns of violence. By illustrating the potential pitfalls of failing to do
so, this article argues that a research program for the study of civil wars
must embrace such approaches”
the banality of “ethnic war”
intro
look at violence former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda in the 1990s
argue that the whole concept of “ethnic warfare” may be severely misguided: is taken to imply a war of all against all (everyone in one ethnic group becomes dedicated, murderous enemy of everyone outside the group)
argue in stead that ethnic warfare more closely resembles nonethnic warfare: is waged by small groups of combatants, groups that claim to fight/kill in the name of a larger entity
violent conflicts Croatia and Bosnia: fighters drawn from street gangs, soccer hooligans, criminals
participation was required bc Yugoslav army substantially disintegrated early in the war and refused to fight
- group of well-armed thugs/bullies working under constraints set out by official security services would arrive or band together in a community + take control and persecute members of other ethnic groups
- gradually many under the thugs’ arbitrary and chaotic “protection” unwilling to be pressed into military service emigrated to safer places
- nationalism not impelling force but characteristic around which the marauders happened to have arrayed themselves
Rwanda 1994: ethnic Hutus engaged in genocide of ethnic Tutsis
- main momentum of killings was carried by relatively small nr of specially trained Hutus, working with criminal and hooligan opportunists who were coordinated by local officials acting on orders from above
- vast majority of Hutus seem to have stood by in considerable confusion and often indifference
-> mechanism of violence in Yugoslavia and Rwanda remarkably banal:
“Rather than reflecting deep historic passions and hatreds, the violence seems to have been the result of a situation in which common, opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly nonideological marauders were recruited and permitted free rein by political authorities.”
bc violence was carried out chiefly by small, ill-disciplined and essentially coward bands of thugs and bullies, policing would have been fairly easy for almost any organized, disciplined, sizeable army
BUT extreme aversion to casualties + misguided assumption that conflict stemmed from immutable ethnic hatreds -> international military intervention essentially imposible
the banality of ethnic war
- ethnic warfare in Croatia and Bosnia
wars in the former Yugoslavia
2 common explanations:
- elemental and ancient hatreds had only temporarily and superficially been kept in check by communism and with its demise murderous nationalism occurred (Kaplan)
- violence was a reaction to continuous nationalist propaganda spewed out by politicans and the media that played on old fears and hatreds
THE SHALLOWNESS OF MILITANT NATIONALISM IN YUGOSLAVIA
- support for militant nationalism not that deep (even at time of maximum notice and effect in early 1990s): rise of some militant nationalists in elections came more from ability to manipulate the system + disarray of their opposition (had more money + sometimes controlled the media)
*61% didn’t agree all nations should have an own state - unwise to take large, noisy crowds (heavily self-selected) as representing public opinion more generally + much of crowd behavior was manipulated: paid with free food etc. + poorly organized opposition also mounted massive demonstrations
- notion that each ethnic/national group in Yugoslavia is united by deep bonds of affection is substantially flawed
ARMED THUGS AND THE BANALITY OF WARFARE IN YUGOSLAVIA: violence mainly from actions of recently empowered and unpoliced thugs (rather than from a frenzy of nationalism)
- politicians have starte the wars, whipped up a fair amount of hatred, but fighting done by recruited thugs and hooligans rather than murerous hordes of ordinary citizens
- Serbian/Yugoslav army substantiall disintegrated early in the hostilities: when ordinary Serb soldiers were given opportunity to express presumed hatred or to act in response to violence, they professed they didn’t know why they were fighting and often mutinied or deserted en masse
- in Serbia young men reacted mainly by determined draft-dodging
- paramilitaries can be seen as effect of collapse of army morale, but also contributed to it: motive of robbery and inhuman treatment rather than defeating the enemy
- most dynamic/murderous Serbian units were notably composed of recruited criminals (not nationalists or locals or ordinary people)
- Rambo-like affection: each fighter dressed as if he had been cast as a thug by a movie director
THE STAGES OF WAR AND ETHNIC CLEANSING
what passed for ethnic warfare seems to have been far more banal creation of communities of criminal violence and pillage
4 stages:
- takeover: recruited thugs (operating under general framework of order provided by the army) emerge in area where former civil order had ceased to exist or where the policy actually//effectively were in alliance with them: only group willing to use force -> quickly took control + no coherent or unbiased police to protect members of other ethnic groups -> atrocities (also against co-ethnics opposing thug’s behavior)
- often the dominating forces could be remarkably small
- ordinary people: bewildered rather than enraged - carnival: thugs exercised absolute power in their small fiefdoms and lorded it over their new subjects: rape, arbitrary violence, murder, drunkenness
- often mercenaries, revenge-seekers (often police) would join in - revenge: some among the brutalized might wish to fight and seek revenge against their persecutors (who started to flee rather than improvise resistance bc that ended poorly), members of each group were proteted from murderous thugs from the other side
- often choice was being dominated by bigots of your own group or of another - occupation and desertion: life in areas controlled by thugs could be miserable sa they looked for further prey whatever their ethnic background + corruption and nepotism (so much that the war effort was substantially harmed in the Serb areas of Croatia and Bosnia)
- more and more people (moderate ones and young men unwilling to be impressed) would manage to emigrate to a safer place
the banality of ethnic war
- a comparison: Rwanda
1994 genocide inflicted by ethnic Hutus against Tutsis in Rwanda comes closer to the Hobbesian vision of all against all
(writings give impression it was all against all)
!not spontaneous eruption: basic elements of the genocidal process had been planned for years by Hutu extremists substantially in charge of the ruling party, gov bureaucracy and police
- Hutus and Hutu police were urged/order to engage in the killing
- Interahamwe: militia bands created and trained by Hutu extremists (genesis in soccer fan clubs)
- ranks were expanded by hordes of opportunists once the genocide began: street boys, rag-pickers, car-washers, homeless (“for these people the genocide was the best thing that could ever happen to them” had a form of authority to take revenge on socially powerful people as long as these where on the wrong side of the political fence)
- criminals were released from jail to participate in the destruction + prospect of enrrichment by looting used as incentive by leaders
- killers willing to kill Hutus suspected of not being loyal to the cause
!many Hutus did hide and protect Tutsi neighbors and sometimes strangers despite the pressure + that punishment could be brutal death
others closed the door and tried not to hear
at various points the killers numbered in the tens of thousands (would represent ~2% male Hutu population over 13 -> 98% male Hutu population not in this group)
even with higher estimates it would be less than 9% of the Hutu male population over 13
(also: kids and women joined -> nrs would be even lower)
!astoundingly high figures BUT still many/most did not participate in the killings
-> the chief dynamic for the depredations seems to have been furnished by marauding bands of violent, opportunistic, and often drunken thugs
the banality of ethnic war
conclusions
experiences former Yugoslavia + Rwanda suggest:
- ethnicity is important in “ethnic wars” more as an ordering device than as an impelling force
- not war of all against all
- it seemed a bit like Hobeesian state of nature, but not because people give into natural murderous enmity, but because they came under arbitrary control of armed thugs
- ethnicity simply the characteristic around which perpetrators and politicians happened to array themselves
- still: some locals did join in the progress, sometimes out of ethnic loyalty, sometimes for other reasons
- war conditions did often bring out the worst in people
- once thugs took over, former cross-ethnic relationships were often warily broken off - violence would probably have been fairly easy to police
- police may be needed to maintain order, but need not be numerous + rule need not be Leviathan-like: need to protect the many from the few rather than everyone (as Hobbes argues)
- bullies lacked organization, discipline, coherent tactics, strategy, deep motivation, broad support, ideological commitment, courage -> if controlled by military force most likely would flee (often happened in Yugoslavia and Rwanda)
- seems likely that a large, impressively armed, well-disciplined international policing force could have been effective in pacifying the thug-dominated conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda (never put in place bc: assumed wars were inexxplicable conflicts that could hardly be amliorated by well-meaning + int’l community low tolerance for casualties in peacekeeping) - wars did not necessarily derive from ethnic peculiarities of regions
= what happened in Yugoslavia and Rwanda could happen anywhere
- when criminals and sadists are given free rein, they can easily debase the conditions of life, and thugs are everywhere, at least in small nrs and small nrs is all that is necessary
- it is often possible to get ordinary people to participate in acts of cruelty when they are placed in a supportive environment - wars were by no means inevitable
- not inevitable historic necessities, but designed by politicians and local extremists who often didn’t know how to control the process they set in motion
- Sadowski: cultural strife is found about as much in developed countries as in poorer ones, but that strife is less likely to turn violent in prosperous societies (eco advancement tends to reduce cultural violence)
- actions of leading politicians and police organizations are most important (prosperous societies seem to do better in this regard)
extrapolations: degree to which analysis can be transferred to dozens of ethnic wars taking place in any given year remain to be seen, but that it works in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda is promising
- crucial mechanism the elite-encouraged rampages of opportunistic/drunk thugs may in many cases more adequately explain what passes for “ethnic war” than one that envisions such conflicts as Hobbesian all-against-all upheavals
- if some states came to depend on irregulars, it is bc they are unable to muster an adequate nr of recruits to field a real army rather than that they find this preferable + if they continue to rely on such corrupt, opportunistic, inept and often cowardly forces, they are likely eventually to go down in pathetic defeat
“The mistaken-even racist-notion that an entire ethnic group is
devotedly out to destroy another ethnic group can in such cases shatter any
ability to perceive nuance and variety, and it can be taken to suggest that efforts
to foster elite accommodation are essentially irrelevant and therefore bound to
prove futile. Further, the all-against-all image can discourage policing because
it implies that the entire ethnic group-rather than just a small, opportunistic,
and often cowardly subgroup-must be brought under control.”
