reading 6 - nuclear deterrence Flashcards
“nuclear deterrence for the future” - Schelling pp. 50-52
most significant event of the past 60y is the one that didn’t happen: use of a nuclear weapon in conflict (which is rather spectacular)
-> what contributed to this achievement? many peril-filled years in which nuclear weapons were not used had become an asset of global diplomacy to be treasured, preserved, and maintained
multiple times they might have been used:
- Korean War: Eisenhower admin didn’t like taboo on use nuclear weapons
- US policy had changed considerably by the time Johnson became president: effort to build enough conventional military strength within NATO to stop Soviet advance without using nukes
- Soviets words about nukes, but actions: huge amounts of money in conventional weaponry
- Golda Meier didn’t authorize the use of Isreal’s nukes when Egyptian armies were on the Israeli side of the Suez canal (even though no civilians near)
- Thatcher decided not to use nukes in the Falkands
MAINTAINING THE STREAK?
expect more countries to dev nukes -> how to determine if they share commitment to avoid the use of nukes?
- from US perspective: country should reconsider decision not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty + should not talk about using nukes
- institutions sponsor meetings on arms control: learn about dangers, that it is against your own self-interest (would like to see Iranian delegation participating in CISAC (National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control) meetings)
- countries will need to think about custodial problems: who is responsible / in control (US only learned this in 15y)
- terrorist shouldn’t be able to acquire them + should see that they are more useful for deterrence and persuasion than for destruction
My hope for CISAC is that it will see its mission broadly:
educating itself, U.S. leaders, and anyone who will be in a position to influence the decision to use a nuclear weapon
if terrorists acquire nukes, it will prob be bc they construct them -> high-level team -> hopefully realize they need to think strategically about usage
This means we may be living in a world for the next 60
years in which deterrence is just as relevant as it was for the
past 60 years. One difference will be that the United States
will find itself being deterred rather than just deterring others (hopefully)
Promoting stability or courting disaster? - Sagan, Waltz and Betts
question whether Iran should go nuclear
- Waltz
= nuclear optimist
- nuclear weapons haven’t proliferated: spread like wildfire
- it doesn’t matter who has nuclear weapons (for conventional weapons it does matter): it’s been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation
why would Iran want nuclear weapons?
- not a safer region in the world: borders Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, both instable -> make any neighbor feel uneasy about what is going to happen next
- no way to deter the US other than by having nuclear weapons
“it would be strange if Iran didn’t strive to get nuclear weapons and I don’t think we have to worry if they do. Because deterrence has worked 100% of the time. we can deter small nuclear powers - after all, we have deterred big nuclear powers”
could Iranian nukes function for coercive purposes in the region?
-> no one has discovered how to use nuclear weapons other than for deterrence, blackmail for money might work, “if you don’t do x i will drop a nuke on you” is simply not plausible
(about Sagan’s world of nuclear-power-without-nuclear-weapons: very bad world: every country is poised to hide nuclear weapons and make them as quickly as possible in times of need)
Promoting stability or courting disaster? - Sagan, Waltz and Betts
question whether Iran should go nuclear
Sagan
nuclear weapons are horribly destructive + not controlled by statesmen: managed by imperfect, normal human beings inside imperfect, normal organizations
we fail currently to look inside the black box of decisionmaking and controls in Iran (same individuals running arms supply operations to terrorists)
the more we think it inevitable that Iran is going to acquire nukes, the more we are tempted (wishful) to say maybe it won’t matter -> less willing to take necessary diplomatic/strategic steps that could potentially stop Iran from getting nukes
yes, deterrence worked with SU and China, but they were monolithic governments most of the time (when there were revolutions there were threats to safety and control over nukes)
why should we worry about nukes in the hands of Iran?
- stability-instability paradox = nukes promote aggression of the state that has
- vulnerability-invulnerability paradox = problem of terrorist theft: for nukes to have deterrent effect, they must be invulnerable to a first strike from an adversary to allow for the possibility of retaliation
(Israel working on reducing vulnerability of nuclear arsenal in response to possibility of Iranian nukes) - potential loose controls and sales of nuclear weapons of terrorists (who do not have incentives to take good care of the nukes)
(these problems occurred when Pakistan got nukes)
what should we do?
- if a state already has developed nuclear weapons => clean needles approach: provide tech for blocking unauthorized detonation e.g. to safeguard the weaponry (also happened with US-SU)
- before a state gets nukes we shouldn’t give up on diplomatic options: US policy of regime change potentially by force is incompatible with nuclear non-proliferation policy (bc it encourages the believe that nukes are necessary to deter the US) -> reduce Iranian fear of US by taking regime change by force off the table (*does lead to risk that other states will threaten to go nuclear unless x)
- prob long term incentive to keep wanting nukes : develop nuclear power without nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but move just a little closer to getting the bomb by doing this
would like to see a world in which all nuclear states become latent states (states without arsenals but with the capability to build them if necessary) = we should be moving backwards towards a nuclear-power-without-nuclear-weapons world
about the possibility of Iran using a policy of ambiguity about nukes unlikely for technical reasons: they will have diff knowing that they actually have a nuclear deterrent without testing, their arsenal would be primitive
Promoting stability or courting disaster? - Sagan, Waltz and Betts
question whether Iran should go nuclear
Iran case
IAEA: all countries in good standing with the treaty can pursue nuclear energy for peaceful means
Iran: allows nspectors to look at their nuclear program, but not to do any inspection = cause for great suspicion
-> Sagan: Iranians not in good standing with the treaty bc they were caught cheating (didn’treport what they had purchased from A.Q. Khan + not letting inspectors into all their facilities) -> Iran has foregone that right
Iran is in the treaty, so has no right to nuclear weapons
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
intro
lack of understanding how the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons arose and is maintained and what its future prospects are
deterrence = wrong or incomplete account:
- non-use when there was no need to fear nuclear retaliation (e.g. US in Vietnam and in the 1991 Persian Gulf War)
- nuclear weapons haven’t deterred attacks by non-nuclear states against nuclear states (e.g. China attacked US forces in the Korean War + North Vietnam attacked US forces in the Vietnam war)
- widespread normative opprobrium against nukes -> expectations nukes wouldn’t be used against them - most non-nuclear states don’t live daily in a nuclear security dilemma
- why have so many states not developed nuclear weapons when they could have done so?
Tannenwald: normative element must be taken into account
normative prohibition against nukes -> delegitimizes them as weapons of war + embeds deterrence in a set of norms that stabilize and restrain self-help behavior of states
- counterhypothesis = realists: only material factors matter + norms are functin ofpower and interests (no independent analytical leverage)
!norms do not determine outcomes, they shape the realms of possibility
how does the taboo operate?
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
the nuclear taboo
widespread popular revulsion against nuclear weapons + widely held inhibitions on their use
taboo on the global level: collective level of international community = the taboo is a systemic phenomenon
visible in: public opinion, international agreements and regimes, diplomatic statements
nuclear taboo = de factor prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons
- nuclear taboo isn’t the not usage of nukes, it is the normative belief about usage of nukes
norm = shared expectation aout behavior (standard of right or wrong) = prescriptions/proscriptions of behavior
- taboo = particularly forceful normative prohibition concerned with protection from certain behavior
!taboo is generally used with stronger/more developed prohibition (taken for granted + expectations of awful sanctions)
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
- 3 normative effects
- regulative (constraining)
- constitutive
- permissive (constitutive effects)
!both constitutive and causal effects influence outcomes, though in diff ways
REGULATIVE
- emphasized by rationalist approaches to IR
- norms constrain or “regulate antecedently existing activities”
- injunction against using nuclear weapons first (-> constrains behavior even if no rules)
CONSTITUTIVE
- emphasized by constructivists
- rules and norms through actors practices create/define forms of behavior, roles and identities
- taboo helps to define category of unacceptable weapons of mass destruction
- taboo part of broader discourse defining what it means to be a civilized member of the international community
PERMISSIVE
= subset of constitutive effects
- secondary, indirect, “shadow” effects = often unintended consequences
- norms divert our normative gaze, shield other practices from attention (e.g. non-nuclear weapons)
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
alternative explanations: materialism vs the taboo
dominant explanation non-use = rational deterrence = materialist
- problematic: takes interests as exogeneously given -> unale to explain criteria for “deterrence”: what goes into leaders’ calculations of “unacceptable costs”
- doesn’t account for cases of non-use mentioned at the outset
diff materialist account = material factors as fear of long-term consequences, public opinoin constraints, domestic considerations (e.g. shortage of bombs) -> non-use
- better than deterrence: can account for cases where not both sides had nukes
“norms”/taboo explanation: norms and non-norms factors can account for non-use
*influence taboo hard to isolate: may influence material factors
any sufficient explanation must synthesize material and normative factors, entailing deterrence, “nondeterrence” material factors, and the taboo
US documentary record decisionmaking non-use
- rationalists would expect: cost-benefit thinking non-norms factors: fear of escalation, global war, long-term retaliation, weapons availability, military utility
= logic of consequences - taboo would expect: reference to taboo, “this is wrong”, perceived cost as exogenously given constraint on decision making + burden of proof in arguments about responsibilities and legitimacy
= logic of appropriateness
overlapping predictions + support for both explanations BUT taboo explanation more powerful: captures more of the evidence (it doesn’t claim material factors on’t matter)
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
intro cases
represent diff stages of the taboo + both use and non-use and mutually assured destruction and not
- Japan 1945 no taboo
- Korean War: norm was beginning to emerge + operated mostl instrumentally
- Vietnam War: taboo operated at more constittuive level
- Persian Gulf War 1991: nuclear weapons unacceptable
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the legitimacy of the bomb
US decision to use atomic bombs to end the war against Japan in 1945
there was no special stigma attached to nuclear weapons
- nukes extension of stratgic bombin during war that had elevated the scale of destruction
- nukes didn’t pose great moal problems for decision makers: accumulated barbarities WW2 had already swept away moral codes and laws of war
-> no compelling not to use it, it seemed legitimate (except for some scientists and officials)
burden of proof was on those who opposed using nukes
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
The Korean War: the emerging taboo
1950, before this there were opportunities for use of nukes but weren’t utilized
North Korean attack South Korea + surprise entry of Chinese troops end nov 1950
leaders felt some inhibitions, US discussed using nukes throughout thfirst year of the war + took step making it possible, but privately ruled out using them in Korea
generals were divided
- military reasons against using them: e.g. stockpile too small to risk use in Asia rather than Europe, fear nuke wouldn’t be decisive
- political obstacle = global public horror nukes -> fear using nukes would destroy support for the US in future war with the SU (instrumental concern)
- some leaders were uncomfy with nuking cities as violation of perceived American values
overall picture: Tuman and advisors sought to avoid using nukes in ways that they didn’t at the end of WW2, calls for a more aggressive China policy (incl. using nukes) were rejected
inhibitions about nukes may have operated in more indirect ways as well: e.g. influencing perceptions about suitable targets (those opposed to nukes thought there weren’t, those in favor said there were)
why was the state of readiness for tactical nuclear warfare low?
US planning for nuclear warfare lagged in the years before Korea, inhibitions baout using nukes may have delayed readiness and planning
when Eisenhower took office attitude changedsomewhat: tactical nukes had become available + Eisenhower saw them as rapid and less costly way to force an end to the conflict BUT emerging taboo posed obstacle -> Eisenhower wanted to end the taboo (saying nukes are just another weapon)
- gov approved a contingency plan for a major attack on China including use of nukes to force an end to the conflict if talks broke down (*truce was signed in time)
-> NONUSE DUE IN PART TO FORTUNE OF EVENTS IN CHINA THAT THEY DECIDED TO TERMINATE THE CONFLICT - Eisenhower pro-nuke statements not just for deterrence: they weren’t meant for the public
nuclear taboo -> nondecisionamking = constraining effect by preventing casual resort to nuclear weapons -> bought time for other things to happen
this early period of the cold war long-term consequences concerns were remote, not prominent
“In sum, during the Korean War, an emerging taboo shaped how U.S. leaders de- fined their interests. In contrast to the moral opprobrium Truman personally felt, the taboo operated mostly instrumentally for Eisenhower and Dulles, constraining a ca- sual resort to tactical nuclear weapons.”
= regulative/constraining effect of the taboo was most prominent
+ early dev of constitutive effects (see political debate about nukes as unordinary weapons + implications for American values and identity)
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
The Vietnam war
= a hard test for the taboo
US chose to lose a humiliating/destructive war against a small non-nuclear adversary while not using nukes
- leaders didn’t even come close, gave little serious consideration
- no lack of warheads or suitable targets
- fear of nuclear retaliation not a prominent concern
material constraint = risk of wider war with China (fear it would bring them into the war)
*risk wasn’t perceived as that big
long-term consequences argument: US leaders worried that they would be forced to use nukes first with unpredictable consequences
uncertanty + disagreement over escalation risks -> political nd normative concerns became salient: fear it would jeopardize US moral and leadership position
nuclear taboo was becoming entrenched among high officials of the Kennedy and Johnson admins
“we never seriously considered using nuclear weapons in Vietnam”
commitment to no first use
one attempt by Johnson admin to look more closely at nukes (to relieve siege of marine garrison at Khe Sanh early 1968) was aborted quickly in a public relations nightmare: rumors wirled resulting in popular outcry
people in favor of using nukes argued that leaders did not think rationally about nuclear options
officials claimed non-use wasn’t bc world public opinoin, but because they thought it was wrong (neither militarily desirable nor morally acceptable)
Nixon admin: taboo operated primarily instrumental, his admin didn’t have personal reluctance to use nukes
- admin did seriously consider using nukes to end the war (even though Kissinger denies)
*see e.g. Operation Duck Hook - didn’t bc it would lead to domestic and international uproar that would have damaged foreign policy on all fronts = he was constrained by abhorrence and opposition of others, of their normative concerns (Haig feared this moral perspective would undermine deterrence)
Vietnam war: the burden of proof now required justifying even just thinking about nuclear weapons
Tannenwald - nuclear tabo
the 1991 Gulf War:
war to overturn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
US leaders ruled out using nuclear weapons even though Iraq was a non-nuclear adversary
important case: first post-cold war conflict, Iraq huge army led to fear US military losses, war legitimized in party by goal of destroying Iraq nukes + over the conflict US made (vague) nuclear threats + desert scenario favorable conditions for use small nukes (wouldn’t hurt civilians)
hardly any consideration of nuclear use by top US officials
why?
- realist: US had other alternatives and didn’t need them (argument is true, but why aren’t nukes seen as just another type of weapon)
- uncertain long-term consequences = material constraining factor BUT diff to separate from taboo issues in debates: officials articulated importance taboo
- taboo had clear constraining effects: “you lose the moral high ground if you use one of those stupid things” - senior army planner
- constitutive effects taboo: using nukes would violate US conception of itself as moral, civilized nation, taboo had become a goal for a civilized state
- permissive/secondary effects taboo: traditional threshold between unclear and conventional tech increasingly blurred: officials were willing to contemplate policies of great destructiveness in Iraq = destructiveness nukes was not a prominent feature of the reasoning
*micronukes may be less destructive than some newer “conventional” weapons
= part of the effect of the taboo is that it legitimizes other practices
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
norms and causal mechanisms
causal mechanisms:
- domestic public opinion
- world opinion (US leaders perceived favorable world opinion as crucial to sustaining their legitimate leadership of the western alliance)
- personal conviction (informed by beliefs about American values and conceptions of the appropriate behavior of civilized nations)
norms work through 3 pathways:
- force
- self-interest
- legitimacy
public opposition to nukes was based on mix (self-interested) fear, horror and moral opprobrium + perception that nukes are diff
Tannenwald - nuclear taboo
conclusion
pluasible evidence for role of developing nuclear taboo in inhibiting US ressort to nuclear weapons after 1945
has helped to restrain use of nukess through appearing as a “constraint” to actors + constitutive processes of stigmatization and categorizzation
“categorization. Ultimately, in delegitimizing nuclear weapons, the nuclear taboo has constrained the practice of self-help in the international system. States are not free to resort to nuclear weapons without incurring moral opprobrium or political costs. National leaders are forced to seek alternative technologies for use in war or defense or else risk being classified as outside the bounds of “civilized” international society”
analysis highlights mutual shaping of norms and interests: norms enter into, and change, the cost-benefit calculations of interests (constraining) + help to constitute those interests, identities and practices
how do we account for US nuclear arms buildup?
- normative dev doesn’t proceed linearly or coherently: they can develop in the face of seemingly contradictory behavior
- US leaders didn’t want to use it but also didn’t want to give up deterrence (leads to paradox: need to convince others your willing for deterrence to work -> develop more weapons to make deterrence/threat more credible)
how generalizable are the findings?
- opinion polls show most Western democracies are more anti-nuclear
taboo is probably not universal, but it is widespread (domesstic policies and widespread diplomatic support)
+ doens’t have to hold for all countries for imilar reasons (e.g. may work instrumentally in Israel and Pakistan)
how has the norm been strenghtened/institutionalized/enforced? -> politics of nuclear nonproliferation
