reading 13 - Critical/Non-Traditional Security Studies Flashcards
ch36 - climate change
the evolution of environmental security
environment is a backdrop to geopolitics and the pursuit of security + environmental issues have emerged as secuity concerns in their own right
environmental issues ere security issues bc they could threaten human survival (1970s/80s)
- normative thrust: advocates of env security wanted to see attention, priority and funding to address env change
1990s: ‘wave’ of env security scholarship focus on potential relationship between env issues and armed conflict
- upside: less challenging to traditional approaches of security concerned mostly with threat and use of force
- downside: environmental issues not seen as security issues in their own right
2007: UNSC held first meeting to discuss security implications of climate change (this coincided with increasingly prominent claim that we are in a new geological era: the Anthropocene)
ch36 - climate change
- the Anthropocene
term suggests that humanity has become a force shaping the plenatory system profoundly (scale that requires scientists to consider the present as a new geological period)
+ suggests that rich powerful decisionmakers in the global econ are increasingly shaping the future of the planets biological systems and thus humanity’s future
- confirms with colonial patterns -> some want to all it Eurocene or capitalocene
combustion of fossil fuels, coal, oil and natural gas -> changes composition of atmosphere -> more heat retained -> accelerating climate change
Anthropocene = age of humanity
were it not for human changes to the system, the world would be slipping into another ice age, we are instead experiencing rapid global warming
+ increasing human penetration into wild spaces -> more contact with wild animals -> conditions for onset and spread zoonotic diseases (e.g. covid)
ch36 - climate change
earth system boundaries/safe operating space
Earth Systems Boundaries framework - humanity is pushing crucial ecological systems beyond what seem to be safe boundaries -> may lead to dangerous disruptions
9 key ecological boundaries to the ‘safe operating space’ of the Earth system
- climate change
- rapid decline in biospheric integrity due to extermination of species and related destruction of biodivese systems and loss of genetic material
- depletion of stratospheric ozone: has been partly solved by int’l agreements to ban production of cholofluorocarbons
- ocean acidification: carbon dioxide levels rise
- rapid increase in the flows of nitrogen
- rapid change in land use (urbanization and agriculture expand)
- fresh water
- addition of nitrates, sulphates and other aerosols (esp in Asia bc direct health consequences)
- introduction ‘novel’ entities into the earth system: new chemcial substances, micro/macro plastics
if humanity is to flourish in the future -> planet has to be maintained within parameters that shaped the remarkably stable period of the Holocene
traditional environmentalism has failed to constrain overall damage to the Holocene conditions for humanity
security studies must grapple whose security matters
ch36 - climate change
- climate change
changes in global temperatures and weather patterns associated with the rise in greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere
industrialization -> emission greenhouse gases -> more heat trapped in atmosphere -> warmer temp + higher sea levels + changing rainfall patterns + more frequent/severe extreme weather events + ocean acidification -> implication for human health, economies, and communities (esp in the developing world)
effects of climate change potentially devastating for to ecosystems and plants and animals that compose them
hope?
- increasing scientific consensus that climate change is happening
- international agreements on climate change
but emissions continue to rise + global temperature with it
whose security matters?
- e.g. issue of refugees: welfare/security of the refugees OR receiving states integrity of borders
- need not only look at effectss of climate change, but of responses to it: e.g. unilateral deployment of geoengineering may have negative effects for ecosystems -> trigger tension and armed conflict between states
- who we see as threatened has implications for how we see the threat and possible responses
is linking climate change and security a good thing?
- dangers of militarizing responses to envi change positioning defence forces as key actors (such arguments echo with concerns about dangers of securitization more broadly)
- designation of existential threat enables exceptional measues characterized by secrecy, urgency and use of illiberal means
- potential benefit of mobilizing urgency, priority and funding
heart of this question = theoretical debates around what security means (protect integrity borders or human communities) and what security does in practical terms
ch36 - climate change
- climate security discourses
see table p. 606
ch36 - climate change
- climate change and armed conflict
potential role in triggering or contributing to armed conflict
conflict in Darfur labelled as ‘first climate change war’:
- drought and dsertification linked to climate change saw contestation over increasingly scarce arable land
- role of climate-induced displacement and population movement
Syria
- claim: climate-induced drought and agricultural collapse -> unemployment + urbanization + higher prices + general privation -> protests, violent crackdowns and broader violence
!in both cases role of climate change is contested, didn’t cause the wars, doesn’t downplay other important factors, but still limited/partial role
why do we see claims about climate change rol e in driving armed conflict if the role is partial or limited?
- climate change clearly played some role in these episodes: drive privation, inequality and displacement that can intersect with other factors like existing grievances to make violent conflict more likely
= climate change as threat multiplier - climate change wars can be read as normative or political interventions by those making them (targeting the developed world: do more to address climate change + creates sense of obligation (bc we cause climate change))
- climate-induced scarcity and contestation over natural resources fits with assumptions about scarcity leading to violence (realists)
*assumptions are questionable: Wolff demosntrated that contestation over transbounary water resources was historically far moe likely to lead to cooperation than conflict
ch36 - climate change
- security institutions and climate change
traditional security institutions are preparing for its effects
nr of states explicitly recognize security implications and develop strategies to address it
- US: need to green the military (reduce emissions)
- need to protect and prepare the military and its infrastructure: e.g. from rising sea levels, prepare equipment for new forms of fuel or to withstand higher temperatures
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief missions
beyond states: in’tl security organizations also recognizze security implications of climate change
- UNSG, UN Environmental Program, UN Development Program = noted potential implications of climate change for itn’l security
- UNSC: ambiguous = China and Russia argue it overloads the agenda -> UNFCCC should handle it -> no resolution tha taccepts a role of UNSC in addressing potential int’l security implcationsof climate change
ch36 - climate change
beyond conflict, beyond states
threat posed by climate change can be immediate, direct and existential -> threat to existence of states and communities rather than a security threat to armed conflict (e.g. pacific islands)
Boe Declaration 2018 = Pacific Islands
defines climate change as the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security an well-being of the people of the pacific
= emphasis on human and environmental security
-> recognition and prioritization of immeidate harms of climate effects, regardless of whether thes efit with traditional accounts of security
other accounts argue need to focus on posthuman, worldly, ecological or Anthropocene security = recognition that humanity and human collectives are mebedded in, etnangled with and reliant on the natural world
- involves changing who we are: not focusing on self-contained entities
ch36 - climate change
conclusion
Anthropocene context necessitates a shift from security as .. to …
- protection, preservation, maintenance, primacy of self-contained human collectives or institutions
- recognition of embeddedness int he world
can we respond effectively?
requires more than defence planning: changing modes of dev, consumption, eco exchange, ways we think about obligations
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
intro
defense intellectuals are virtually all men who use deterrence to explain why it is safe to have weapons of a kind and nr it is not safe to use
- they are civilians moving in and out of gov
- formulate “rational” systems for dealing with the problems created by nuclear weapons (manage arms race, deter, fight if deterrence fails)
- their calculations explain necessity of having nuclear destructive capability
how can they think this way (abstraction of horror)?
participant observer university’s center on defense technology and arms control (the center)
found own thinking was also changing -> how can I think this way? how can any of us?
ubiquitous weight of gender: in social relations and language itself
work most closely linked to development of feminist critiques of dominant Western concepts of reason
goal = discuss nature of nuclear strategic thinking, role of specialized language (technostrategic)
technostrategic language reflects and shapes the nature of American nuclear strategic project
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- state 1: listening
- clean bombs and clean language
striking = men usually charm, humor, intelligence, concern, decency
but cold-blooded discussions on things like nuclear weapons = use of extraordinary language such as “clean bombs”
- elaborate use of abstraction and euphemism: bland words that never touch realities of nuclear holocaust that lay behind the words (e.g. bombs like that of Hiroshima are called clean bombs (high quantity energy not as radiation but as blast))
language has enormous destructive power but without emotional fallout that would result if it were clear one was talking about plans for mass murder (countervalue attacks means incinerating cities)
= astounding chasm between image and reality characterizes technocratic language
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- state 1: listening
- white men in ties discussing missile size
feminists often argue there is a sexual subtext in defense professionals discourse, a “missile envy”
findings:
- American military dependence on nuclear weapons was explained as “irresistible, because you get more bang for the duck”
- “to disarm is to get rid of all your stuff”
- disarmament seems to mean emasculation -> won’t consider it
- language as thrust-to-weight ratios, soft lay downs, deep penetration, vertical erector launchers, protracted vs spasm attacks
- “face it, the Russians are a little harder than we are”
- “releasing 70-80% of our megatonnage in one orgasmic whump”
!sexual imagery comes from broader cultural context (sexual imagery part of world of warfare since before nuclear weapons) -> that defense intellectuals use it not surprising + does not constitute grounds for imputing motivations (acc to writer)
how does this imagery make it possible for strategic planners and other defense intellectuals to do their macabre work? how does it function in their construction of a work world that feels tenable?
imagery can be seen to display connection between masculinity and the arms race or as way of minimizing the seriousness of miltiarist endeavors, of denying their deadly consequences
- e.g. “patting”: “pat the missile”, so that our enemies can pat them, I heard you go to pat = assertion of intimacy, domination = thrill and pleasure of patting a missile is the proximity of all that phallic power
- !!patting is also what you do to babies, small children, pets , one pats that what is small, cute and harmless, not terrifyingly destructive -> pat it and its lethality disappears
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- state 1: listening
- fathers, sons and virgins
“virginity” also made frequent arresting appearances in nuclear discourse
initiation into the nuclear world involves being deflowered, losing innocence, knowing sin
double standard: US is no virgin
double standard raises the question of whether or not a woman is still worth anything to a man once she has lost her virginity
- New Zealand refusal to allow nuclear-armed/powered warships into its ports prompted similar reflections on virginity
-> nuclear virginity in a negative tone
also son-analogy with deterrence
- imagine having a son whose TV watching habits a father disapproves. he threatens to break his son’s arm if he turns on the TV again = deterrence
- seems inappropriate: been taught to believe it is between two countries of more or less equal strength (not a father vs a son, not one using it to coerce rather than protect)
- revealing about US nuclear deterrence as an operational rather than rhetorical or declaratory policy
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- state 1: listening
- domestic bliss
sanitized abstraction + sexual and patriarchal imagery seemed to fit into the masculinist world of nuclear war planning
what did not fit but was there = set of domestic metaphors
- nuclear missiles based in silos = “the Christmas tree farm”
- weapon systems can “marry up”
- nuclear bombs aren’t dropped: a “bus” “delivers” them
- pattern in which bombs fall = “footprint”
domestic images must be more than simply one form of distancing: ordinary abstraction is adequate for that
words may serve to domesticate/tame wild and uncontrollable forces of nuclear destruction:
- metaphors minimize, make ti seem smaller and safer, way of mastering the unmasterable
- the fire-breathing dragon under the bed who threatens to incinerate your family becomes a pet you can pat
using language evocative of everyday experiences also may simply serve to make the nuclear strategic community more comfortable with what they are doing
imagery that domesticates and humanizes may paradoxically serve to make it all right to ignore sentient human bodies, human lives
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- state 1: listening
- male birth and creation
= set of domestic images that demands separate attention
= images that suggest men’s desire to appropriate from women the power of giving life and that conflate creation and destruction
bomb project is rife with images of male birth
- atom bomb referred to as “Oppenheimer’s baby”
- “We’ll do the motherhood role - telemetry, tracking, and control - the maintenance”
(in early tests before certainty the tests would work they were hoping the baby was a boy, not a girl)
the entire history of the bomb project seems permeated with imagery that confounds man’s technological power to destroy nature with the power to create = it converts men’s destrution into their rebirth
= possibility that the language reveals an attempt to appropriate ultimate creative pwoer
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- state 1: listening
- god and the nuclear priesthood
religious imagery - contributes to possibility language reveals an attempt to appropriate ultimate creative power
first atomic bomb was called Trinity (unity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit)
“It was though we stood at the first day of creation”
Oppenheimer: “I am become Death, Shatterer of Worlds”
creators of strategic doctrine refer to themselves as “the nuclear priesthood”
= implicit statement about who/what has become god
(if this new priesthood attains its status through an inspired knowledge of nuclear weapons, it gives a whole new meaning to the phrase “a mighty fortress is our God”)
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- stage 2: learning to speak their language
combi of dry abstraction and counter-intuitive imagery
training the tongue in the articulation of acronyms (which there are many of)
- acronyms remove you from the reality behind the words = they are abstractions
- lot of the terms can be very sexy (e.g. SLCMs “slick’ems” = submarine launched cruise missiles)
- it is the ability to make fun of a concept that makes it possible to work with it rather than rejecting it outright
- talking about nuclear weapons is fun: the words are fun and quick
when you speak it you feel in control = cognitive mastery: feeling of mastery of technology that is finally not controllable but is instead powerful beyond human comprehension
- she said: the more conversations I participated in using this language, the less frightened I was of nuclear war
how can learning to speak a language have such a powerful effect?
process of learning the language is part of what removes you from the reality of nuclear war: focus on solving puzzle of a new language, not on the weapons and wars behind the words
- by the time you are through, the content of what you can talk about is monumentally different, as is the perspective from which you speak
speaking the expert language offers distance, a feeling of control, an alternative focus for one’s energies + an escape (from the victim position in nuclear war to the user of it)
+ suspect that much of the reduced anxiety about nuclear war comes from characteristics of the language itself: abstraction, content and concerns are of users rather than victims
in learning the language, one goes from being the passive, powerless victim to the competent, wily, powerful purveyor of nuclear threats and nuclear explosive power
enormous destructive effects of nuclear weapons systems become extensions of the self rather than threats to it
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- stage 3: dialogue
= attempt to understand more about how the dogma was rationalized : why we “need” strategic triad given submarines “invulnerability” + why it is reasonable to base US military planning on SU military capabilities rather than attempting to gauge what their intentions may be
logic: since we can’t know for certain what their intentions are, we must plan our forces and strategies as if we knew they were planning to use all their weapons = worst-case scenarios
-> come to believe we are in a world where we must “prevent” worst case scenarios from happening
when she asked questions without expert jargon she was treated as ignorant, simpleminded -> continued using jargon -> conversations that helped understand technostrategic reasoning and how to manipulate it
!the language does not allow certain questions/concerns to be asked and values to be expressed, e.g. peace is not part of the discourse (closest option is strategic stability) + if you use it you are soft-headed activist, not an expert
defense intellectuals use abstract terminology that removes them from the realities of which they speak + there IS no reality of which they speak: the reality of which they speak is a world of abstractions (based on mathematical calculus and internal logic)
- e.g. “limited nuclear war” refers to an abstract conceptual system rather than events that might take place in the real world -> there is no need to think about the concrete human realities behind the model; what counts is the internal logic of the system
-> what is the reference point? who/what is the subject here?
= the weapons themselves
- incentive to strike first is present/absent according to a mathematical calculus of numbers of “surviving” weapons
- incentive to start nuclear war not discussed in terms of what possible military or political ends it might serve but in terms of nr of weapons, with goal of making sure you have the most left at the end
- it is a numbers game
weapons as subject of strategic aims has implimcations:
- no way to talk about human death or human societies when you are using a language designed to talk about weapons - human death is simply collateral damage (collateral to the real subject: the weapons)
- makes it illegitimate to ask the paradigm to reflect human concerns: no one claims that such questions are unimportant, but they are irrelevant to the task at hand = body of truths indepdnently of any other truth or knowledge (isolation of technical knowledge from social/psychological or moral thought)
- discourse has become virtually the only legitimate form of response to the question of how to achieve security: the only language and expertise offered to those interested in pursuing peace refers to nothing but weapons
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
- stage 4: the terror
within a few weeks, what had once been remarkable became unnoticable. as i learned to speak, my perspective changed
double impermeability: not longer outside of impermeable wall of technostrategic language + once inside could no longer see it and hear it, find it difficult to get out
i had not only learned to speak the language, i had started to think in it
i would suddenly step back, aghast that i was so involved with the military justifications for not using nuclear weapons - as though moral ones were not enough
SEX AND DEATH IN THE RATIONAL WORLD OF DEFENSE INTELLECTUALS
conclusion
language can help us learn something about the militarization of the mind
listening
- it becomes clear that participation in the world of nuclear strategic analysis does not necessarily require confrontation with the central fact about military activity - that the purpose of all weaponry/strategy is to injure human bodies
- “Language that is abstract, sanitized, full of euphemisms; language that is sexy and fun to use; paradigms whose referent is weapons; imagery that domesticates and deflates the forces of mass destruction; imagery that reverses sentient and nonsentient matter, that conflates birth and death, destruction and creation-all of these are part ofwhat makes it possible to be radically removed from the reality of what one is talking about and from the realities one is creating through the discourse”
learning to speak the language
- reveals how thinking can become more abstract, more focused on parts disembedded from their context
- learning the language is transformative rather than additive : you learn a new way of thinking
-> serious quandary: if we refuse to learn the language, we are vitually guaranteed that our voices will remain outside the “politically relevant” spectrum of opinion. yet, if we learn to speak it, we not only severely limit what we can say but also we allow the militarization of our own thinking
need to recognize we are assuming that the language itself actually articulates the criteria and reasoning strategies upon which nuclear weapons development and deployment decisions are made
!this is an illusion!: technostrategic discourse functions more as a gloss, an ideological curtain behind which the actual reasons for these decisions hide
Our deconstructive task
requires close attention to, and the dismantling of, technostrategic discourse. The dominant voice of militarized masculinity and decontextualized rationality speaks so loudly in our culture, it will remain difficult for
any other voices to be heard until that voice loses some of its power
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
intro
need transition in thinking from nuclear security to human security
- many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations: disease, hunger, poverty, sexual violence
human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced
= concern with human life and dignity rather than weapons
human security
- universal concern: relevant for people everywhere
- components are interdependent: when security o fpeople is endangered anywhre in the world, all nations are likely to get involved (famine, disease, polllution, terrorism)
- human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention
- human security is people-centred: concern with how they live and breathe in society
definition: safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life
! it is not the same as human development (that is broader)
human security is not a defensive concept, it is an integrative concept, can’t be brought about through force
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
components of human security
2 main components:
- freedom from fear
- freedom from want (now not emphasized anymore) = eco and social front
global level means responding to the threat of poverty travelling across borders in the form of drugs, HIV/AIDS, climate change, illegal migration and terrorism
threat of global poverty affecting all human lives is real and persistent (threat of collective suicide by nukes not)
concept of security must thus change in 2 basic ways:
- from exlusive stress on territorial security to a greater stress on people’s security
- from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development
7 main categories of threats to human security
- economic security
- food security
- health security
- environmental security
- personal security
- community security
- political community
Among these seven elements of human
security are considerable links and overlaps.
A threat to one element of human security
is likely to travel-like an angry typhoonto all forms of human security.
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
eco security
assured basic income
problem = job insecurity, unemployment (esp young people), underemployment, lack of social safety nets, homelessness
- most insecure working conditions = informal sector (often only options as manifacturing jobs disappear)
developing countries: one of the main factors underlying political tensions and ethnic violence
real wages in many parts of the world have declined
most developing countries lack social security
increasing poverty (also in developed countries)
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
food security
all people at all times have physical and economic access to basic food
-> availability of food necessary but not sufficient: people need to be entitled to have it
there is enough food in the world, problem is poor distribution + lack of purchasing power
access to food comes from access to assets, work and assured income -> this needs to be addressed upstream, not downstream
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
health security
developing countries main causes of death are infectious and parasitic diseases + often linked with poor nutrition and unsafe environment (polluted water)
industrial countries: major killers are diseases of the circulatory system linked with diet and life style
threats to health security are usually greatest for the poorest, people in rural areas and particularly children + minorities
industrial countries better access to health care, but disparities in health security are sharp and for many people getting worse (e.g. US less people health insurance)
women esp problems: childbirth -> deaths that coul’ve been prevented with family planning + basic support at home during pregnancy and delivery
- widest gap between north and south in any human indicator is in maternal mortality
spread of HIV and AIDS also source of health insecurity (now most new infections in Asia): has health and economic costs (GDP decline)
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
environmental security
human beings rely on healthy physical environment
intensive industrialization and rapid population growth -> planet under intolerable strain
->
- degradation ecosystems and global system
- water scarcity: pollution -> ethnic strife and political tension
- land degradation: deforestation, desertification, salinization
- air pollution
although the character of environmental damage differs between industrial and developing countries - effects are similar almost everywhere
many environmental threats are chronic and long lasting, others are sudden and violent (e.g. Bhopal and Chernobyl)
population growth has pushed people into areas prone to cyclones, earthquakes or floods + poverty and land shortages are doing the same -> increasing exposure to natural hazards
responses to disasters often slow, inadequate and uncoordinated
-> disasters more significant and frequent
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
personal security
= security from physical violence
- from the state, other states, other groups of people (ethnic tension), individuals (crime)
- against women (rape), against children
- threats to self (suicide, drugs use)
in many societies human lives are at greater risk than ever before
for many greatest anxiety is crime: increasing (often connected with drug trafficking)
industrial and traffic accidents
violence in the workplace has also increased
in no society are women secure or treated equally to men (they are getting better educated and entering employment)
kids on the streets + abused at home
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
community security
= membership in a group: family, community, organization = provide identity and reassuring set of values + practical support
traditional communities can perpetuate opressive practices: slavery, genital mutilation
attacks by other groups (ethnic tensions, fight over opportunities)
*modernization -> oppresive practices are being fought
traditional languages and cultures are withering bc mass media
indigenous people are facing widening spirals of violence
human development report 1994 - new dimensions of human security
political security
= people should be able to live in a society that honours their basic human rights
considerable progress: 1980s decade of democratic transition
but long way to go to protect people from state repression
human rights violations most frequent during political unrest (e.g. military intervention)
police can be used as agents of repressions - perpetrators of human rights violations
gov often tries to exercise over dieas and information (press freedom)
new dimensions of human security
global human security
some global challenges to human security spill over from threats within countries
- e.g. environmental threats; deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions affect climate conditions around the world
- e.g. trade in drugs: draw millions of people into a cycle of violene and dependency
other threats have global character bc disparities between countries: leading people to migrate
-> when human security is under threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere
threats to human security can’t be confined within national borders (famines, terrorism etc.)
indivisibility global human security -> prosperity is being globalized, but so is poverty (so is AIDS, so is drug trafficking, so is ethnic conflict)
threats to human security:
- unchecked population growth
-> multifaceted response necessary: family planning + education + human development programs - disparities in eco opportunities
-> reflect unequal access to global market opportunities + breed resentment + create overconsumption + encourage migration - excessive international migration (consequence of population growth and poverty)
-> refugees and migrants + internally displaced people + affluent nations are closing their doors (face stagnating econs, high unemploment)
*policies of indutrial countries can intensify migration pressurs: restrict employment in developing countries by raising tariff + have high demand for workers -> ambivalent attitudes towards migration - environmental degradation
-> biological diversity is more threatened now than ever (main cause tropical deforestation), coral reefs under pressure, destruction marine habitats -> lose ability to provide ecosystem services (e.g. water purification, watershed protection) - drug protection and trafficking
-> growing problem and prices and consumption, lone efforts are no durable answer (as long as demand persists, so does supply)(addiction causes human distress)(decriminalization would reduce violence and more safe consumption BUT might increase overall consumption) - international terrorism
-> 1975-1992 500 international terrorist attacks, victims are general public + spreads fear
new dimensions of human security
needed policy action
discouraging profile of human security demands new policy responses, nationally and internationally
global security network (nuclear deterrents, power balances, alliances, pacts, international policing) now needs change: in its place or by its side needs to be a more compassing structure to ensure the security of all people the world over
early warning indicators
where there are multiple problems there is a risk of national breakdown -> is it possible to get early warning signals about this risk?
- look at deteriorating food consumption, high unemployment, declining wages, human rights violations, military spending (higher means less for social expenditure)
- identifying potential crisis countries is not an indictment, it is essential for preventive diplomacy and active peace policy
- clear set of indicators and early warning system based on them could help countries avoid reaching the crisis point
there are several countries were national and international efforts need to be reinforced to promote human security
preventive action can avoid larger costs for the world community at a later stage
new dimensions of human security
policies for social integration
international community can help prevent future crises, the primary responsibility lies with the countries themselves + often the people themselves
deliberative public policies may work:
- importance of allowing everyone the opportunity to develop their own capacities
- need to esnure that eco growth is broadly based, that everyone has equal access to eco opportunities
- importance of carefylly crafted affirmative action programs
many countreis ahve unfortunately chosen a diff path and allowed inequalities to rise (e.g. Egypt, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa)
World Summit for Social Development offers a fresh opportunit for the int’l community to shift its emphasis from the first pillar of territorial security in the past 50y to the second pillar of humans security in the next 50 y
some of the recommendations:
- job sharing: reduce work week so that more people can share the available work
- endorsing concept of human security as the key challenge for C21
- recommending that all countreis cully cooperateto adopt policy measures for human security
- requesting the UN step up its effort in preventive diplomacy + recognize that war and conflict today are often rooted in poverty, social injustice, and environmental degradation
- framework of instittuions be reviewed and redesigned for upcoming challenges
- credit for all: credit schemes for the poor improve their incomes, small credit can make a diff + research has shown that the poor are creditworthy, they can safe, they have profitable investmetn opportunities to pick from, they are reliable borrowers
!poor ‘s savings need to be reinvested in poor neighborhoods + govs can help with incentive policies
