reading 5 - alliances and regional security Flashcards
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- intro
alliance theory = one of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of IR (focus on either system structure or individual alliances)
scholars reluctant to attempt comprehensive theories of alliances
what explains the neglect?
- ubiquity of the phenomenon: how are alignments and alliances (informal and formal) to be distinguished from international politics in general?
article: suggest some central elements and problems in theory of alliances and alignments emphasizing alliance formation and intra-alliance politics (bc these are affected by the structure of the international system)
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- definition alliance
alliance = formal association of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified
- excludes e.g. voting blocs in IOs, customs unions, collaboration on environment
- rules out transnational associations (bc state focus)
- “specific other states”: calls attention to need for an adversary AND differentiates alliances from organizations (e.g. LoN) for collective security against any aggressor, incl. members of the organization itself
alliance = subset of “alignment”
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- definition alignment
= set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other’s support in disputes or wars with particular other states
- arise from perceived common interests
formal alliances strengthen existing alignments (or create new ones)
political reality lies not in formal contract but in expectations they support or create
alignments are dynamic + have diff origins (e.g. also ententes: agreements that settle conflicts to such a degree that from then on they expect each other’s diplomatic or military support)
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- typology of alliances and alignments
= identify important variations in the subject:
- peacetime alliances vs those formed during war (often called coalitions)
- coalitions lack many political functions (e.g. deterrence of attack, preclusion and restraint of the ally) that characterize peacetime alliances - offensive or defensive
- ad hoc or permanent
- bilateral or multilateral
- unilateral guarantees or mutual commitments
non-formal alignments run from “special relationships” to ententes to merely good relations
major class of alliance is the mutual defense pact (Snyder has this type principally in mind for the remainder of the essay)
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- allies, adversaries and systems
alliances are means to protect against adversaries -> can’t be studied apart from other security policies (those of the adversary)
alliance and adversary games play at 3 policy levels:
- armament = burden sharing (alliance game) vs arms racing (adversary game)
- action = aid/not-aid/intervene/not-intervene victim of attack (alliance game) vs attack/not-attack (adversary game)
- declaration = use of communication to manipulate others’ expectations of one’s future behavior (in both games)
- unilateral declarations and bargaining, joint declarations
- coercive, accomodative
structure and process
anarchy is stimulus to ally (not always sufficient)
polarity has impact on nature of alliances and alliance politics
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- alliance formation in a multipolar system
summary: pattern of conflict, common interest and capabilties (pattern of alignment) lie “between” structural anarchy and formal alliance
multipolar system: 3 or more major staets with approx equal military power, no particular conflicts between these states, infomplete info on each others’ intentions, communication is not permitted (alliances can’t form in peacetime)
all will feel somewhat insecure: each perceives that it might be attacked by others + some states may want to attack to acquire resources (to gain security)
!each will feel some motivation to come to defense of any state that is attacked, otherwise the attacker’s power resources may be substantially increased
= logic of BOP theory
but also incentive to step aside in hope that another state will stop the aggressor = logic of passing the buck / free riding (collective goods theory)
not possible to determine which of the tendencies will prevail in a particular instance, but balancing tendency becomes stronger as an aggressor gains repeated increments of power
revise model: pre-war communication is possible -> peacetime alliances may occur to reduce insecurity or reduce armament costs
when an alliance forms (also when not specifically against a specific (group of) state) others will see it as threat -> form counter-alliance
- new interests form: preserve alliance + protect allies power resources + maintain reputation of loyalty
___
revise model: permit conflicts and affinities (e.g. specific territorial disputes, ideological attractions) + marginal inequalities of military strength
- conflicts and common interests -> pattern of alignment prior/independent of formal alliances (some expectation of being supported by states with same interests and values + expectation of being opposed by states with whom they have conflicts) -> STRATEGIC INTERESTS in defending states that are expected to be supportive
- strength inequalities -> e.g. weak states against strong state and if weak state between two strong, the strong will rival and protect the weak against each other
-> increases incentives to ally + increases predictability of who allies with whom
BUT not sufficient to explain which alliances form: depends on bargaining (bargaining may overcome conflict-affinity-strength pattern to produce alliances, in this case this changes alignments)
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- the values of alliance
what do states gain from allying?
primarily security:
- deterrence (reduced probability of being attacked)
- defense (greater strength in case of attack)
- preclusion (prevention of ally’s alliance with one’s adversary)
costs: increased risk of war + reduced freedom of action
size of benefits and costs determined by:
- alliance “need” (perceived threat + state’s capabilities)
- extent to which prospective partners meets that need (depends on their capabilite and reliability)
- actual terms of the alliance contract
*benefits and costs also include effects on states other than the adversary: e.g. when Bismarck made alliance with Austria 1879 he counted England as “sleeping partner” bc convergence of British and Austrian interests in the Balkans
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- negotiating the alliance contract
contract delimits and distributes the inherent values that accrue to the members from their security positions and may also introduce non-security values
terms are product of bargaining, may favor one party over another, depending on relative bargaining power (balance of dependence)
relative bargaining power determined by:
- comparative inherent valuations (comparative need for alliance)
- comparative attractiveness of other alliances
party that values the alliance least or has better alternatives will be able to demand and get more advantageous terms (e.g. get side payments or get stronger/broader commitment from the partner than that they wanted)
-> this equalizes pay-offs
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- alliance management in a multipolar system
management tasks e.g. coordinating foreign policies, coordinating military plans, allocating preparedness burdens
states don’t always agree on management -> intra-alliance politics or bargaining
twin anxieties => alliance security dilemma
(security dilemma bc more of one reduces the other)
- ABANDONMENT: principal common interest = hold alliance together
- ENTRAPMENT: principal source of conflict = stance to be taken toward adversary(s)
*fear of being dragged in conflict against interest
risk of abandonment can be reduced by strengthening commitment, but this increases risk of advancement: ally is emboldened to stand firmer and take more risk against opponent + one becomes more firmly commited to the ally
cost of entrapment highest when parties have diff opponents or diff interests at stake vis-a-vis same opponent
abandonment vs entrapment is a trade-off: want to optimize between them
greater bargaining leverage for the party least dependent on the alliance (have greater ‘flexibility of alignment’ which makes for ‘rigidity of strategy’) = this is dynamic (it shifts e.g. based on behavior of the opponent)
alliance games must always be seen next to adversary games: e.g. In the adversary game, conciliating an opponent may be seen as preferable to firmly resisting him, but it may also be perceived by the ally as a move toward realignment and cause the ally to defect
- adversaries face a prisoner’s dilemma when they see mutual advantage in collaborating to restrain respective allies who are in conflict, but also fear losing their allies as result
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- adversary vs alliance bargaining
no theory of bargaining between allies remotely comparable to the rich theory about bargaining between adversaries
but there are many parallels and analogies between the two, both can be coercive or ammodative
- coercive: threats to destroy the common interest = avoid war (adversary game) or preservation alliance (alliance game)
- accomodative: sacrifice interests in conflict in order to realize a common interest
tactics employed in either games has side-effects on the other
- when adversaries compromise to reduce tension, alliances are weakened
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- importance of alignments
fundamental focus of analysis is, or ought to be alignment
exepectations of states regarding the likelihood and degree of support from others
alignment management problem for any state is to optimize across twin goals of security and independence
when armament and action levels of behavior are thrown in the equation the calculus becoms considerably more complex
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- alliance formation in a bipolar system
= much simpler than in a multipolar system
who allies with whom much less matter of choice and more matter of systemic determination
superpowers have no incentive to ally with each other bc no third party strong enough to threaten both
in their own interests, they will throw protective arm around the lesser states in closest geographical proximity
- protection is formalized as alliance, but it is more a “unilateral guarantee”
many states will remain without guarantees bc they don’t feel sufficiently threatened by either super powers + feel confident that if attacked, they will be protected by the other
e.g. forces bind formation NATO and Warsaw Pact
alliance formation NOT against backdrop of crosscutting patterns of conflict, common interests and capabilities that left a state uncertain about who its natural allies and enemies were
bargaining: high degree of common interest bc common opponent + absence of alliance alternatives -> “game of pure coordination” rather than “mixed motive” game with multipolar system
- less bargaining, more problem-solving
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- alliance management in a bipolar system
= easier in bipolar than in multipolar alliances because structure of the system provides little opportunity or incentive for defection
- allies have no incentive to realign to the opposite superpower, or they will be prevented from acting upon it by their own patron
danger of abandonment is low -> weak alliance security dilemma
fear of entrapment is present for both superpowers and their clients, but distancing measures do not significantly increase the risk of alliance collapse
!alliance security dilemma not absent
- e.g. US alliances = complicated bc coexistance general commitment mutual defense, and implicit US commitment to use nuclear weapons in that defense -> intense anxiety entrapment and abandonment for allies (US military doctrine and perceived credibility andeffectiveness of US nuclear deterrent also matter)
bipolar structure accounts for phenomenon not present in multipolar system: capacity of allies to take quite different stances toward a common adversary (e.g. European states detente with SU while US was fighting a cold war with them) = it is only an annoyance rather than that it fractures the alliance
- Europeans are dependent, but this weakens is offset by known US strategic interest in defense (indirect dependence) = neither can credibly threaten withdrawal
the general truth seems to be that allies get along very well on issues were interests coincide (where there is nothing to bargain about) and that other issues are handled by unilateralism
Europeans enjoy freedom of the irresponsible: confident that US will not withdraw protection
US has freedom of the powerful: free of worry about its’ allies defecting -> can safely take unilateral initiatives
alliance theory: a neorealist first cut (Snyder)
- alliances outside Europe
global structure of power is less determining of alliance formation and alliance behavior outside of Europe
regional states are more concerned about threats of local rivals than of threats from a superpower (when they ally with superpower it is for aid against local enemy)
ideogoical affinity is frequently important
alignments shift fairly easily
reason these small states are indifferent to the global balance: they are so weak that they are unable to affect the balance, that neither superpower is seen as serious threat and that even if one were a threat, they could be confident of being protected by the other
!relative importance of global structure varies among regions (more determining in East Asia than in South Asia than in the Middle East)
-> diff alliance political processes in less central regions: more flexibility + more options + closer similarity to the multipolar model outside of Europe
->possible for clients of the superpowers to use the threat of realignment to extort more support
->outside of Europe the aliiance security dilemma affects the superpowers more than their clients : superpowers are most subject to entrapment and abandment (entrapment most worrisome). Smaller allies are hardly likely to be entrapped by their patron’s initiative and if abandoned, they can simply shift their patrons
general trend away from formal alliances in the Third World in favor of other kinds of military and political collaboration (e.g. military aid, arms sales)
- reluctant to ally with super powers bc carries overtones of colonial domination
- great powers prefer to strengthen clients by arms transfers rather than alliance: less risk of direct confrontation with their nuclear opponent
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