“Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion Flashcards
What Is the Main Argument of Nida-Rümelin’s Paper?
Philosophy: Critique of
Functionalism / Qualia Realism
Claim: A case of pseudonormal vision—where individuals are functionally identical to normal observers but experience inverted qualia (e.g., see red as green)—is possible.
I
mplication: Functionalism cannot account for the subjective feel (qualia) of experience.
What is “Pseudonormal Vision”?
Definition: A hypothetical case where:
A person has normal color discrimination and behavior
But their subjective experience of color (qualia) is inverted
E.g., they call roses “red” and grass “green” just like everyone else—but internally experience them the other way around.
Why is This a Problem for Functionalism?
Functionalism’s Claim: If two individuals are in the same functional state, they must be in the same mental state.
Nida-Rümelin’s
Counterexample: Two functionally identical individuals (a normal and a pseudonormal) may have different qualia.
⇒ So, same function ≠ same experience.
What is the Supervenience Principle at Stake?
Functionalism: Mental states supervene on functional states
Physicalism: Mental states supervene on physical states
Nida-Rümelin’s Objection: If qualia inversion is possible, then supervenience on function fails.
Analogy: Picasso and Forgery
Beauty may supervene on paint placement
Value does not
Parallel: Qualia may not supervene on functional or physical structure.
Functionalist Replies and Their Limits
Reply: Color science explains the variations functionally.
Nida-Rümelin’s Critique: Even if science describes the physiology, it doesn’t rule out that two people could experience radically different qualia.
Quote:
“No hypotheses accepted or seriously considered in color vision science should be regarded according to a philosophical theory to be either incoherent or unstatable or false.”
What is the Philosophical Significance of Qualia Inversion?
Implication: There is something non-functional and non-physical about conscious experience—what-it’s-like-ness cannot be captured by functional roles alone.
→ Supports qualia realism and possibly property dualism.
Conceptual Functionalism vs. Psychofunctionalism
Conceptual Functionalism: Mental states = commonsense causal roles (analytic truth)
Psychofunctionalism: Mental states = empirically discovered brain functions (synthetic truth)
Nida-Rümelin’s Point: Neither fully explains qualia.