Elisabeth and Bennett Flashcards
What is the Interaction Problem in Dualism?
Philosophy: Substance Dualism
Claim: Mind and body are distinct substances—one immaterial (mind), one material (body)—but they interact causally.
Problem: How can an immaterial thing (mind) cause changes in a material thing (body) without physical contact or spatial location?
Princess Elisabeth’s Objection to Descartes
Argument: Physical causation (per Cartesian physics) requires:
Contact (or)
Extension in space
Objection: The immaterial soul has neither. Therefore, it cannot move the body.
🧠 Philosophical Category: Problem of Interaction
Descartes’ Response to Elisabeth
Reply: The union between mind and body must be accepted as a primitive notion—not reducible to physical models.
Defense: Misapplying physical categories (extension, contact) to mental causation leads to confusion.
Karen Bennett: Causal Argument for Materialism
- Mental events cause physical actions (e.g., thirst causes walking).
- Only physical causes are needed in physics.
3.⇒ Therefore, mental events are physical.
Philosophy: Causal Closure of Physics
Implication: Undermines dualism.
What is Epiphenomenalism?
Claim: Mental states are caused by physical brain states but cause nothing in return.
Criticism: Fails to account for why thoughts influence actions.
Bennett’s View: Implausible and widely rejected.
The Pairing Problem (Jaegwon Kim)
Scenario: Two indiscernible minds do the same thing—only one causes a physical effect.
Objection: Without spatial properties, dualism cannot explain which mind causes what.
Reply: Dualist might claim causation is primitive, not reducible to spatial pairing.
Bennett’s Suggested Dualist Response
Move: Argue that the pairing problem exists even for physical causes (e.g., spatio-temporal coincidences).
Alternative: Embrace anti-reductionism about causation—causal facts are brute and unanalyzable.
The Exclusion Problem (Bennett/Kim)
Claim: If physical causes suffice, there’s no room for mental causes—mental causation is redundant.
Five Conflicting Principles:
1.Mental ≠ Physical (Distinctness)
2.Physics is causally complete
3.Mental causes physical effects
4.No systematic overdetermination
5.No two full sufficient causes for one effect
🧠 A consistent theory can’t hold all five.
Responses to the Exclusion Problem
Reject mental efficacy → Epiphenomenalism
Reject completeness of physics → Anti-physicalism
Reject distinctness → Type identity theory
Accept overdetermination
Compatibilism: Mental events supervene on physical events and can both cause outcomes in a noncompetitive way.
Functionalism vs. Reductionism in Mental Causation
Role Functionalism: Mental states = causal roles
Realizer Functionalism: Mental states = physical realizers of those roles
Challenge: Can roles (abstract patterns) cause anything, or only realizers?
Supervenience and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessitated Effects
Problem: If mental states supervene on physical ones, they add nothing causal.
Analogy: A painting’s beauty doesn’t cause change—its physical features do.
Bennett’s View: Without type identity, causation by mental properties remains problematic.
Dualist’s Philosophical Commitments
To sustain interactionism, dualists must:
Reject epiphenomenalism
Accept causation as primitive or non-spatial
Reject causal closure or reframe causation metaphysically
