full stack Flashcards
Mary Anne Warren – “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”
Claim: A fetus is not a person because it lacks key traits (e.g., consciousness, reasoning), and thus abortion is morally permissible.
Objections addressed: Fetuses are human and thus deserve rights.
Replies: Being biologically human ≠ personhood; moral rights depend on personhood traits.
Examples: Personhood checklist (consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, communication, self-awareness).
Don Marquis – “Why Abortion is Immoral”
Claim: Abortion is seriously immoral because it deprives a fetus of a valuable “future like ours.”
Objections addressed: Fetuses aren’t persons yet, so abortion is permissible.
Replies: What matters morally is the value of the future, not current personhood status.
Examples: Loss of future goods; analogy to wrongful killing of adults and terminally ill patients.
Peter Singer – “All Animals Are Equal”
Claim: Moral equality should extend to animals based on their capacity to suffer, not species membership.
Objections addressed: Humans are more intelligent, so they deserve greater moral consideration.
Replies: Intelligence is not morally relevant; capacity to suffer is.
Examples: Comparison to racism and sexism; disabilities in humans.
Thomas Huxley – “On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata”
Claim: Animal behavior may be purely mechanical without consciousness (epiphenomenalism).
Objections addressed: Animals seem to show conscious behavior.
Replies: Reflexes can explain behavior without invoking consciousness.
Examples: Frog leg reflex even after decapitation.
Terrel Miedaner – “The Soul of Martha, A Beast”
Claim: Observing emotional behavior in machines doesn’t necessarily prove they have consciousness or a soul.
Objections addressed: Behavior identical to humans implies mind/soul.
Replies: Behavior may mimic mind without real subjective experience.
Examples: Martha the AI displaying fear and loyalty but remaining possibly non-conscious.
John Searle – “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Chinese Room)
Claim: Manipulating symbols (like a computer) is not the same as understanding; strong AI is false.
Objections addressed: System as a whole understands Chinese.
Replies: Even if the system responds correctly, it lacks genuine understanding.
Examples: The Chinese Room thought experiment (person following a rulebook without knowing Chinese).
David Chalmers – “Could a Large Language Model Be Conscious?”
Claim: Advanced LLMs could be conscious if consciousness depends only on functional organization.
Objections addressed: LLMs lack real-world grounding or embodiment.
Replies: Internal complexity and causal structure may be sufficient for consciousness.
Examples: Hypothetical future LLMs with complex inner states.
Brian Aldiss – “Super-Toys Last All Summer Long”
Claim: Emotional behavior in machines raises ethical questions about mind and personhood.
Objections addressed: Behavior ≠ real emotion or personhood.
Replies: Emotional realism (desire for love) complicates dismissal of artificial beings.
Examples: David, the robot child longing for his mother’s love.
René Descartes – “Meditations on First Philosophy”
Claim: Mind and body are distinct substances; mind is better known than body.
Objections addressed: Interaction problem — how does mind move body?
Replies: Appeals to primitive notions; focuses on certainty of thought.
Examples: Wax example (changing physical properties, unchanging understanding).
Princess Elisabeth – “Correspondence with Descartes”
Claim: Criticizes dualism for failing to explain how mind and body interact.
Objections addressed: Dualist claim that immaterial minds move physical bodies.
Replies: No clear mechanism; interaction requires contact, which mind lacks.
Examples: Moving limbs implies a causal force that minds can’t produce.
Jeff McMahan – “The Ethics of Killing” (Excerpt)
Claim: Identity and moral status are based on psychological continuity, not just biological life.
Objections addressed: Biological life alone guarantees identity.
Replies: Persistent vegetative states show biological survival without personal survival.
Examples: Brain-damaged patients losing consciousness but remaining biologically alive.
Daniel Dennett – “Consciousness Explained”
Claim: Consciousness is a distributed process with no central “Cartesian Theater.”
Objections addressed: Unity of subjective experience implies a single center.
Replies: Multiple drafts model — experiences are processed in parallel across the brain.
Examples: Optical illusions; post-hoc edits to perception.
Karen Bennett – “Mental Causation”
Claim: Mental events are causally effective even if realized in physical states.
Objections addressed: Causal exclusion problem — physical causes already explain events.
Replies: Mental and physical causes can coexist at different explanatory levels.
Examples: Pain causing withdrawal reflex while being realized physically.
J.J.C. Smart – “Sensations and Brain Processes”
Claim: Mental states are identical to brain processes.
Objections addressed: Different meanings imply different things.
Replies: Identity can exist despite different meanings (e.g., “morning star” = “evening star”).
Examples: Lightning and electrical discharge analogy.
David Armstrong – “The Causal Theory of Mind”
Claim: Mental states are internal states defined by their causal roles.
Objections addressed: Behaviorism denies internal states.
Replies: Internal causal states cause behavior but are more than behavior alone.
Examples: Thermostat analogy.
Martine Nida-Rümelin – “Pseudonormal Vision”
Claim: Inverted qualia challenge functionalism.
Objections addressed: Functionalism says same inputs/outputs = same mental states.
Replies: Functional duplicates can have different inner experiences.
Examples: Pseudonormal vision — inverted red-green experiences without behavioral differences.
Frank Jackson – “Epiphenomenal Qualia”
Claim: Physicalism is false because qualia are non-physical.
Objections addressed: Knowing all physical facts = knowing all facts.
Replies: Mary learns something new upon seeing red, showing that qualia are extra.
Examples: Mary’s Room thought experiment.
Hedda Hassel Mørch – “Is Matter Conscious?”
Claim: Consciousness might be a fundamental feature of matter (panpsychism).
Objections addressed: Panpsychism is extravagant and implausible.
Replies: It solves the hard problem better than emergence from non-conscious matter.
Examples: Consciousness alongside mass and charge as basic properties.
Ned Block – “Philosophical Issues about Consciousness”
Claim: Access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness are different; science mostly studies access.
Objections addressed: Explaining reportability = explaining consciousness.
Replies: Reportability (access) can occur without subjective experience (phenomenality).
Examples: Blindsight; overflow arguments.
Thomas Nagel – “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness”
Claim: Split-brain cases show one body can have two minds.
Objections addressed: One body = one mind.
Replies: Independent behavior and awareness suggest two centers of consciousness.
Examples: Split-brain patients’ conflicting actions.
Arnold Zuboff – “The Story of a Brain”
Claim: Psychological continuity, not strict identity, matters.
Objections addressed: Identity must be singular.
Replies: Consciousness may survive division or duplication.
Examples: Brain-splitting and uploading scenarios.
Eric Olson – “The Metaphysics of Transhumanism”
Claim: Personal identity is biological — you are your living body.
Objections addressed: Mind uploading preserves identity.
Replies: Psychological duplication ≠ identity; survival requires bodily continuity.
Examples: Uploading mind to computer doesn’t preserve the animal.
John Perry – “A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality”
Claim: Personal identity is not simply about soul, memory, or body — psychological connectedness matters.
Objections addressed: Soul theory, memory theory, bodily continuity theory.
Replies: Psychological connectedness may matter even if strict identity fails.
Examples: Duplication thought experiments, bodily survival vs. memory survival cases.
