block Flashcards
What is the Hard Problem of Consciousness?
Philosophy: Phenomenal Realism / Inflationism
Problem: Why does a particular neural state (e.g., cortico-thalamic oscillation) give rise to a specific conscious experience (e.g., seeing red), rather than a different experience or none at all?
Block’s Typology of Responses to the Hard Problem
Eliminativism: Consciousness doesn’t exist (Dennett, Rey)
Deflationism: Consciousness exists but can be conceptually reduced (functional, cognitive, or representational terms)
Inflationism: Consciousness is a substantial, irreducible property discoverable by science
Naturalistic Dualism: Consciousness requires new natural laws (e.g., Chalmers’ panpsychism)
What is the Concept/Property Distinction?
Used in: Block’s critique of Jackson’s Knowledge Argument
Mary doesn’t learn a new fact about red, but acquires a new phenomenal concept
Conceptual difference ≠ metaphysical difference
Conclusion: Dualism of concepts, not properties
What is Phenomenal Consciousness?
Definition: The what-it’s-like aspect of experience—subjective feel or qualia
Example: The taste of chocolate, the pain of a stubbed toe
Block: This is what the Hard Problem is really about
What is Access Consciousness?
Definition: A mental state is access-conscious if its content is available for use in reasoning, reporting, or behavior
Example: Knowing your PIN when prompted
Block: Distinct from phenomenal consciousness, though often conflated
Reflexive Consciousness (aka Introspective Awareness)
Definition: A conscious state that the subject is aware of having—second-order awareness
Example: Realizing you’re in pain vs. just being in pain
Not necessary for all conscious experience (e.g., infants, animals)
Empirical Paradox: Neural Correlates Without Experience
Finding: Same brain regions (e.g., ventral stream) activate in both conscious and unconscious perception
Problem: Activation ≠ awareness (e.g., blindsight, neglect)
Conclusion: Activation is insufficient—what is the missing “X”?
What is “X” in Consciousness Studies?
X = the missing ingredient that turns neural activation into experience
Theories:
Neural synchrony
Fronto-parietal integration
Global Neuronal Workspace (Dehaene)
Binding to token time/place (Kanwisher)
Functionalism vs. Physicalism
Functionalism: Consciousness = causal/functional role (can be multiply realized)
Physicalism: Consciousness = specific biological/physical states
Block: Theories are not mutually exclusive, but answer different questions
Block’s View on Functionalism
Critique: Functionalism misses the phenomenal feel
E.g., a zombie could implement all the same functions without experience
Support: Empirical data must capture more than just function
