David Armstrong’s “The Causal Theory of the Mind”

Question 1

What is Armstrong’s Causal Theory of the Mind?

Answer 1

Philosophy: Materialism / Physicalism

Claim: Mental states are internal states of the person that causally produce behavior. They are not identical to behavior, but internal causes of it.

Question 2

Behaviorism According to Armstrong

Answer 2

Claim: Mental states are behavioral dispositions (e.g., pain = tendency to cry out).

Objection: You can have the feeling of pain without outward behavior.
E.g., “Feeling an itch ≠ disposition to scratch”

Question 3

Physicalism vs. Behaviorism

Answer 3

Physicalism: Mental states = brain states
Behaviorism: Mental states = behavioral patterns
Armstrong’s View: Physicalism is better because it recognizes the inner causal mechanisms behind behavior.

Question 4

Functionalism as Successor to Behaviorism

Answer 4

Claim: Mental states are functional states—defined by their causal role, not specific physical makeup.

Example: A vending machine’s state is defined by what it does, not how it’s wired.

Question 5

Armstrong on Functionalism vs. Physicalism

Answer 5

Functionalism: Focuses on causal roles (e.g., pain = state caused by injury, leading to avoidance).

Physicalism: Focuses on realization in brain states.

Armstrong’s View: Functional states must be realized physically.

Question 6

Mirror Image Machine Argument

Answer 6

Thought Experiment: Two machines with flipped internal setups can be in different physical states but the same functional state.

Lesson: Functional identity doesn’t imply physical identity.

Question 7

Analytic vs. Synthetic Identity Statements

Answer 7

Analytic: True by definition (e.g., bachelors = unmarried men)

Synthetic: Empirically discovered identity (e.g., water = H2O)
Armstrong: “Mental state = brain state” is synthetic—not definitionally true, but scientifically supported.

Question 8

Objection: Conceivability of Mind Without Brain

Answer 8

Claim: “I can imagine being turned to stone but still having thoughts.”

Inferred: Sensations ≠ brain processes.

Reply: Imagination ≠ metaphysical possibility. This confuses conceivability with reality.

Question 9

Supervenience Argument

Answer 9

Definition: Property A supervenes on property B if no change in A without change in B.
Examples:

Beauty supervenes on arrangement of paint.

Mental states supervene on physical (or functional) states.
Implication: Same brain state ⇒ same mental state.

Question 10

Conceptual vs. Psychofunctionalism

Answer 10

Conceptual Functionalism: Mental states are defined by their causal roles (analytic).

Psychofunctionalism: It’s an empirical discovery that mental states are functional roles.

Question 11

Armstrong’s Final Position

Answer 11

Mental states = causally efficacious internal states of the body/brain that explain and produce behavior.

This preserves scientific realism and mental causation without dualism.