Property Offences Flashcards
Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Comissioner (1972)
An act may be an appropriation notwithstanding that it is done with the consent of the owner. Consent to or authorisation by the owner of the taking by D is irrelevant. The question of consent should not be considered when defining appropriation.
Morris (1984)
D appropriated items by switching the sticky labels on the items in a shop indicating their price. This was considered a right only belonging to the owner. Obiter dicta states appropriation involves an act by way of adverse interference with or usurpation of the rights of the owner.
Gomez (1993)
Gomez was assistant manager in a shop who allowed his friend to use stolen cheques to pay for goods even though he was aware that they were stolen. He persuaded the manager by lying and saying that the cheques were as good as cash. He was charged and convicted of theft.
Appropriation should be regarded in isolation as being an objective description of the act done irrespective of the mental state of either the owner or the accused.
Supports Lawrence and rejects obiter in Morris.
Hinks (2000)
D had become friendly with V, a 53 year old man. She successfully encouraged him to make a series of gifts totalling £60,000 and a TV set. The transfers were, valid gifts; though unintelligent, V clearly had the necessary capacity to dispose of his property if he chose. Girfts made by vulnerable persons to those who make abusive use of their moral power over them, like frauds, are potentially voidable, and V’s gifts to D might well have been voidable on this ground (crosswell v potter) However, this was not explored at trial, only dishonesty.
There was only a requirement of dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive for theft. Any narrowing of the definition of appropriation beyond this could lead to the acquittal of guilty persons.
Dissenting judgement of Lord Hutton revealed that it is against common sense to hold someone receiving a gift to be acting dishonestly. He held that linking mental capacity to the circumstances of dishonesty would be wrong.
Briggs (2003)
D was involved in selling a house to an elderly couple. She acquired money fraudulemtly and there was an issue of whether this money had been appropriated within the meaning of the theft act. Where a victim caused a payment to be made in reliance on deceptive conduct by the defendant there was no “appropriation” by the defendant within the meaning of the Theft
Pitham and Hehl (1977)
Hale was charged with robbery. D and another knocked on V’s door, D covered her mouth with their hand while the other took a jewellery box. D and another tied V up before leaving the house.
Held that appropriation does not suddenly cease and it is a continuous act. Intention to deprive the owner permanently was continuing at all material times. Both the tying up and the covering mouth therefore correspond to appropriation.
Oxford v Moss (1979)
Theft Act 1968
Moss, a student at Oxford obtained a proof copy of an examination paper, and after having examined its contents, returned the paper to its original location. Although the contents of the paper was no longer confidential, it was found that because the university had not been deprived of any ‘property’ there had been no theft.
R v Smith, Plummer and Haines (2011)
Drugs are a property which can be stolen or robbed. the fact that they are unlawfully in D’s posession is not a mitigating factor in this. There are other exceptions which cannot be stolen but drugs is not one of them
Turner (no 2) (1971)
D took his car from the garage where it was being serviced without paying for it. D convicted for theft. Garage has posessory interest in the car sufficientl to qualify for §5(1). Judge directed jury that the question was whether the garafe has possession or control of the car, not related with lien - essential that D had acted dishonetly. Court did not qualify grounds doe possession or control. Strange decision since without the lien the car belongs only to D
Ghosh (1982)
Gosh concerned a sergeon who cailmed fees he didnt deserve. The case provided the test for dishonesty until Ivey v Genting Casions overturned the 2nd limb.
1. According to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people was D’s act dishonest
2. Did the defendant realise that reasonable and honest people would regard what he did as dishonest?
Additionally,
The standards of honesty of the ordinary person are determined by the jury. The jury applies contemporary standards of what is honest (decided in Feely).
It is irrelevant whether D believes his conduct is dishonest. It is whether D thought reasonable people would regard his conduct as dishonest.
Facts must be taken as understood by D and how D believes most people would think them so to be.
Lloyd (1985)
D, a film projectionist, borrowed films and passed them to E, who made and sold pirate copies of the films. The Court of Appeal ruled that this was not theft. Although §6 makes it clear that some borrowings do involve an intention permanently to deprive, the court held that a mere borrowing is never enough to constitute the necessary guilty mind unless the intention is to return the thing in such a changed state that it can truly be said that all its goodness or virtue is gone.
Mitchell (2008)
D, who were a gang of thieves, having crashed their own getaway car took V’s car and abandoned it a few miles from V’s house in a street with the hazard lights on. This was held not to amount to a disposal. D did not intend V to lose her car permanently and D’s intention to take it temporarily could not be converted into an intention permanently to deprive by invoking §6(1).
Hale (1978)
Hale was charged with robbery. D and another knocked on V’s door, D covered her mouth with their hand while the other took a jewellery box. D and another tied V up before leaving the house.
Held that appropriation does not suddenly cease and it is a continuous act. Intention to deprive the owner permanently was continuing at all material times. Both the tying up and the covering mouth therefore correspond to appropriation.
Dawson (1977)
D nudged V and was pushed off balance. While he was trying to retain his balance his wallet was stolen.
Whether or not force has been used in a robbery is a question for the jury. It was decided that the nudge amounted to force.
Collins (1973)
D was drunk and was ‘desirous of having sexual intercourse’. He looked into an open window of a house and saw V’s light was on and she was asleep in a bed close to the window. He undressed and approached her window with a ladder. V, seeing a naked form, thought D was her boyfriend and allowed him to enter the room and have sex with her. D was convicted of burglary with intent to commit rape, contrary to §9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968. His conviction was quashed since the jury had not been invited to consider whether D intended to enter knowing that he had no invitation or was reckless of whether or not he had permission.
D entered a premises as a trespasser if he entered knowing that he was a trespasser or was reckless as to whether or not he was entering premises unlawfully.
This is a question for the jury to decide.