Mens Rea and Actus Reus

Question 1

Larsonneur (1933)

Answer 1

French national ordered to leave UK went to Ireland but was deported back under custody of Irish police.

This was found to be a strict liability offence
It is immaterial that the AR happened to the defendant - this causes much controversy
imposes situational liability where neither MR nor AR was present

Question 2

A-G’s ref no (no 2 of 1992)

Answer 2

D caused death by driving without awareness, plead automatism
Case established that automatism is only available where there is total destriction of voluntary control

Question 3

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland (1993)

Answer 3

B was patient in a persistent vegetative state. No hope of medical improvemnt. Hospital sought permission to withdraw feeding and watering and allow death. Legal because its an omission.
Sanctity of life is not absolute.
Aim of medicine is to aid the patient - no duty to continue treatment when it no longer does this
omission to perform what is no longer a duty is legal
liability exists only where there is duty of care

Question 4

Miller (1983)

Answer 4

Initially, same reasoning as in Fagan was applied, later the court ruled that there was creation of a dangerous situation where Miller had a duty to act but did nothing.
D becomes guilty when he recognises the danger but does nothing to counteract it
There may be no action taken because D did not consider that there is a dangerous situation, where the reasonable person would (caldwell recklessness) or he simply chose not to

Question 5

Stone and Dobinson (1977)

Answer 5

Anorexic sister became ill and died.
D and S convicted on basis that they created a duty of care for V.
Attempt to help V creates duty of care thus liability if she suffers
Once duty established it can be breached
Must be shown that D was either indifferent to risk or foresaw risk but ignored it

Question 6

Roberts (1971)

Answer 6

V jumped out of a moving car to get away from D’s unwanted sexual advances. The question was whether this was a novus actus intervenes.
D was charged with ABH, and it was held that it was no required for the accused to foresee the actions of the victim.
The test is whether it could be reasonably foreseen as a natural consequence of the circumstances

Question 7

Jordan (1956)

Answer 7

D stabbed V who was admitted to hospital. Stab wound had mainly healed at the time of death. Doctor ordered the resumption of administration of a drug which the patient was intolerant to.

Held that ordinarily, the circumstances and medical treatment following serious bodily harm are not relevant in establishing defendant’s liability. On the facts tho, a reasonable jury would not be satisfied that the defendant’s acts had been the material cause of the victim’s death.

Question 8

Smith (1959)

Answer 8

D convicted of stabbing a guy twice in an army barracks fight. The guy was then dropped twice on the way to the hospital, received inappropriate care and died. D was convicted of murder.
The original cause was still substantial and operating so the death can be said to be resultant from it - no break in causation
Contrary to jordan

Question 9

Malcherek (1981)

Answer 9

V was injured by appellants and was put on life support which was later switched off when V was considered brain dead. The jury was initially misdirected on issues of causation as switching off life support does not equal an actus novus interveniens
No proof that original cause was no longer substantial and operating
if V dies despite medical treatment no break in causation
withdrawing medical treatment is not an ANI

Question 10

Cheshire (1991)

Answer 10

D shot V in a shop and V was taken into medical care where he needed a trachomaetry. He then died of rare but known complications in his treatment.
Question is whether original cause is substantial and operating - if it is causation is not an issue
This is the case even if there was negligence
Doctor can also be held liable in a separate trial
D’s actions need not be the main or sole cause - significant contribution is enough

Question 11

Blaue (1975)

Answer 11

D stabbed V who was an 18 year old Jahova’s witness. She needed a blood transfusion but rejected it on religious grounds. She probs would have survived if she accepted the transfusion. She died and D convicted of manslaughter.
Protest on religious grounds does not break causation - COA dismissed argument that causation was not established
eggshell skull rule also applies to religious beliefs
reasonableness rule not applied, but it was argued that refusal of treatment is reasonable


Question 12

Pagett (1983)

Answer 12

The Police were attempting to arrest D for various crimes. D was hiding in his house holding his 16 year old girlfriend against him as a meat shield and shooting at police. The Police retuned fire and killed the girl. D found guilty of killing V as it was his unlawful and dangerous act which led to her death.
A reasonable act performed for the purpose of self preservation, including a reasonable act to self defence and acts done in the execution of legal duty are not novus actus interveniens.
The judge should direct the jury as to the relevant principles of causation and leave it to the jury to decide whether or not a causal link exists.

Question 13

Kennedy (2007)

Answer 13

D prepared heroin for V who injected himself, handed it back and later on died. D not convicted on basis that to inject was a free and informed choice by V
Autonomous adults of sound mind can break the chain of causation
Criminal law assumes existence of free will
matter of facts not of philosophical debate

Question 14

Hughes (2013)

Answer 14

D was driving without a licence. V was on heorin and overtired. V veered into D and died in the crash. D charged with causing death bu driving under s 32 b of the Road Traffic Act 1988. Appeal held because the phrasing of the law implied causation “causes…death…by driving” since D’s driving was faultless, he was not convicted.

Question 15

R v Taylor

Answer 15

A driver charged with an offence of aggravated vehicle taking contrary to the Theft Act 1968 s.12A and with causing the death of a scooter driver while driving uninsured contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988 s.3ZB. Not criminally responsible for the death where his own driving had been completely faultless. The both offences required a direct causal connection between the driving and the injury, which was not present in the circumstances. (same reasoning as Hughes)

Question 16

Steane (1947)

Answer 16

D broadcasted in Nazi germany which was an act that aided the enemy. However, he did so under threat of violence and with the view to ultimately save his family, who were living in Germany, from a concentration camp. Initially convicted but conviction later quashed.
Someone who does something out of duress is not guilty
guilty intent must be proved

Question 17

Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA (1987)

Answer 17

Doctor prescribed V, an underage girl contraceptives. He was charged with aiding and abetting underage sex. Found not guilty because giving bona fide medical advice to a patients completely negates the guilty mind.

Question 18

Moloney (1985)

Answer 18

D and his stepfather V had been drinking. V bet D that he could outdraw him, so the two partook in a shooting game. D, accidentally shot at V and killed him. He claimed he did not know that the gun was pointing in V’s direction, nor that it would go off or hurt V. D’s conviction of murder was replaced with manslaughter because of lack of intention.
because murder is a specific liability offence, drunkness is a defence
D lacked foresight because he was drunk
For probability of consequences foreseen to be intention it must be little short of overwhelming

Question 19

Woollin (1999)

Answer 19

D thew his 3 month old son against a hard surface. He got a skull injury and died. D was initially convicted of murder. This was later reduced to manslaughter. D was convinced because the jury were directed to find intention if the result of the action was virtually certain. There was initially a misdirection that intent could be found where there was substantial risk, but this would unacceptably widen the scope of murder.
When simple direction of intent is not enough, the jury should only find intent when the consequence is a virtual certainty and D appreciates that it is so.

Question 20

Re A (Children) (2001)

Answer 20

J and M conjoined twins. J, the stronger twin was supporting M. They were both going to die if no medical interventuon. J could be saved with medical interviention at the cost of M’s life.
ermitted notwithstanding the lack of consent from the parents and M’s certain death.
The causing of death in this case is legal because the purpose was to preserve the life of J and not end the life of M, thus it is not right to criminalise this situation
Intention applies only where the purpose of the prohibited action was to cause death
M and J were predestined for a shorter life thus terminating the life a few months early was seen as a lesser evil compared to both twins dying

Question 21

Matthews and Alleyne (2003)

Answer 21

D were convicted of murder of V, in which after they robbed him, they threw him off a bridge into a river, even after V told them he could not swim. They later watched him try to swim out and say help but did nothing to help. The judge directed the jury that they would find intent if they were satisfied that there was appreciation of virtual certainty. Ds were convicted.
The judge went further than the Nedrick/Woollin test by changing the law as a substantive rule of law rather than a rule of evidence.
The proper direction should be ‘not entitled to fund unless…’
The jury may find intent, there is no requirement that they must.
Once virtual certainty is established, it is almost impossible to not find intent. In this case the misdirection was not a significant error of law.
There are cases, including Matthews, where having answered the Nedrick question affirmatively, a finding of intent would be irresistible for the jury.

Question 22

Cunningham (1957)

Answer 22

Subjective recklessness. D stole a gas meter and in doing so fractured a gas pipe. As a result coal gas escaped to the adjoining house with the result that V inhaled a considerable quantity of gas. He was charged with unlawfully and maliciously causing V to take a noxious thing as to endanger her life. The judge directed the jury that maliciously meant wickedly.
Recklessness means D has foreseen a type of harm yet continued the action anyway
The question of recklessness should be left to the jury

Question 23

Caldwell (1982)

Answer 23

Objective recklessness (no loneger used). D set fire to a residential hotel where he had been employed and had a grudge against the proprietor. D was so drunk that it did not occur to him that there may be people inside whose lives may be in danger. D was convicted.
To decide whether someone has been reckless as to the harmful consequences of his act, the mind of the ordinary prudent person should be considered.
This is no longer in use and while it was in use applied only to criminal damage.

Question 24

R v G (2003)

Answer 24

G and R ran away from home to go camping w/o parents permitsion. They snuck into the back of a co op and lit some newspapers on fire. They put these under some bins and then left without extinguishing the fire. The fire caused approximately £1 million in damages. Ds believed the papers would extinguish on their own against concrete floor.
Ds not guilty because did not foresee consequence so no recklessness.
The case abolished Caldwell recklessness, and established this as a misinterpretation of recklessness
D culpable if aware of the risks and risks are unreasonable

Question 25

Parker (1977)

Answer 25

D, in a fit of rage slammed down a public telephone receiver twice, damaging the cradle. He claimed he did not consider that this could damage the phonebox, thus, he was not reckless as to criminal damage. D convicted.
If D is aware of a risk yet pushes it to the back of his mind he is still cunningham reckless

Question 26

Stephenson (1979)

Answer 26

Schiophrenic D climbed into haystack and lit a fire to keep warm which spread n damaged things. Unsafe conviction because judge did not direct jury that recklessness was a subjective test thus schizophrenia may impact whether D was reckless.

Question 27

Morgan (1976)

Answer 27

D told his 3 friends that his wife is “kinky” and wants to have sex with them and that any protest is pretence. This was not agreed with the wife and initially all 4 were convicted of rape. On appeal it was discovered that mistaken belief of the 3 friends was valid even if there was no reasonable grounds for it. Convictions were quashed

Question 28

R v K (2002)

Answer 28

Established that where age is a genuine mistake it does not constitute an underage rape contrary to Sexual Offences Act 1956. There is no indication that there was an intention to make this a strict liability crime.

Question 29

Sweet v Parsley (1970)

Answer 29

D was the sub tenant of a farmhouse and later gave up living there and only occasionally visited. Under §5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965, if a person is concerned in the management of any premises used for smoking cannabis resin, he will be guilty of an offence. D was unaware that the premises had been used for such purpose but was convicted under §5. Her conviction was quashed.
The offence created by §5 was not an absolute offence and the conviction should be quashed.
MR is an essential ingredient in every offence unless some reason can be found for holding that it is not necessary.
The court ought not to hold that an offence is an absolute offence unless it appears that that must have been the intention of Parliament.

Question 30

R v G (2008)

Answer 30

D was aged 15 and had sex with a girl under the age of 13. Convicted of the offence of rape of a child under the age of 13 contrary to §5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. V had told D that she was 15 and that she consented to the act. D pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a twelve month detention and training order. D appealed because the offence was one of strict liability, so his ECHR Article 6 right to a fair trial had been interfered with and violated his right to respect for his private life under Article 8 of the ECHR because he was not charged with the lesser offence under §13.
Proof of intention of penile penetration of a child under 13 years of age is all that is required for a conviction under §5 of the 2003 Act.
There is no defence that D believes V to be aged 13 or over since §5 is an offence of strict liability but penetration has to be intentional so the mental element is not wholly eliminated.
Offence under §5 and offences of strict liability are not incompatible with Article 6.

Question 31

R v Latimer (1886)

Answer 31

The prisoner, in striking at a man, struck and wounded a woman beside him. At the trial of an indictment against the prisoner under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 20 , for unlawfully and maliciously wounding her the jury found that the blow was unlawful and malicious and did in fact wound her, but that the striking, of her was purely accidental. The prisoner was convicted
The questions:
Was the blow struck in self defence or maliciously?
Did the blow cause injury?
Was the striking of V purely accidental, or was it such a consequence as the prisoner should have expected to follow from the blow he aimed at the other guy?
This would establish whether the initial malice could be transferred to the other victim
Although the blow was purely accidental, it was malicious thus there was a conviction because general malice could be established

Question 32

Fagan v MPG (1969)

Answer 32

D, while being directed by a police constable accidentally reversed his vehicle onto the constables foot. He remained there despite protest from the constable, before eventually dismounting from the foot. He was found guilty of battery.
Q was whether the action was continuing, allowing for concurrence of MR and AR or whether it was finite and therefore did not allow for concurrence.
It was ruled by the majority that it was continuing.
Miller was decided differently in that in creating a dangerous situation, one has a duty to do everything to diminish it. However this does not work in the case of conduct crimes such as battery.

Question 33

Thabo Meli (1954)

Answer 33

Ds tried to kill V. Took v to a hut and struck him over the head. Believeing him to be dead, they left him at the bottom of a cliff to make it look like an accident. The dead injuries were incufficient to cause death, V died later from exposure.
Held that their acts were part of a plan and could be described as one transaction. As long as the act with mens rea and the act with actus reus were part of the transaction they can be convicted.

Question 34

Chuch (1966)

Answer 34

D attacked a woman with the MR for murder. He thought he had killed her but in fact she was only unconscious. He put her body in a river and the victim died in the water. Judges directed jury that if they saw all the acts as a means to inflict GBH or death then MR and AR were concurrent. This applied even where there is no preconceived plan, as in Le Brun.

Question 35

Le Brun (1992)

Answer 35

D and his wife had an argument in the street. He wanted her to come with him but she did not want to. He hit her and she fell over. He tried to pick up her body to drag her inside the house. He dropped her and she bangs her head, which kills her. Although the dropping was an accident, D had the MR when he hit V. CoA argued that although these were not a precociouseived plan, they constituted a “single transaction”
Generally seen that if he had tried to undo the previous harm e.g. by taking her to the hospital the verdict would have been different.

Question 36

A-G’s ref no 3 of 1994 (1998)

Answer 36

D stabbed preggers woman in the abdomen with intent. He is later charged with murder after the child is born prematurely and survives only 121 days. Ruled as not murder because could not prove link between wound and death of child? (double transferred malice, from woman to foetus, and from foetus to child)

Question 37

R v White (1910)

Answer 37

W gave his mother poison. Before it could take effect, however, she died of an unrelated heart attack. W was guilty of an attempted murder. But he did not commit murder because the poison played no role in his mother’s death. He was instead convicted of attempted murder.
The case established the ‘but for’ test.