Complicity

Question 1

NCB v Gamble (1959)

Answer 1

Employee took his lorry full of coal to a weigh bridge to weigh it. The weigh-bridge operator informed him he was overweight but handed him the chit anyway so the lorry could continue. The NCB board was charged with aiding and abetting in commission of the offence. Convicted as there was proof of a positive act of assistance which was voluntarily done.
The question was whether there can be aiding and abetting once the ownership of the coal had already passed from the coal company to the trucking company, it was found that there can

Question 2

Clarkson (1971)

Answer 2

two soldiers hear noise, and found their soldiers raping a young woman. They remained in the room to watch, apparently neither said nor did anything to either encourage or discourage. CoA quashed their convictions for aiding and abetting. While the rapist may have received encouragement from their presence, this needed to be proved. Mere presence which doesn’t encourage is insignificant. “There must be an intention to encourage; and there must also be encouragement in fact.”

Question 3

Calhaem (1985)

Answer 3

D hired a hit man to kill a woman. The hitman claimed he was armed but had no intent to kill V. But V started screaming, and the hitman panicked and killed her. The court upheld Ds conviction for counselling the killing because the offence had been committed by the person counselled, there was a causal connection between the counselling and the murder, and the act done in this case was done within the scope of the authority or advice.

Question 4

Blakely and Sutton (1991)

Answer 4

A1 and A2 put vodka in the drink of P in order to prevent him driving home to his wife, so he would instead stay with A1. Before A1 had a chance to tell P that she had put vodka in his drink, he drove home. A1 and A2 were convicted of procuring because they either knew or were reckless to the fact that P might drive home. The appeal was allowed because liability depended on proof that the accused contemplated that his act would or might bring about, or assist the commission, of the principle offence. This act must have been done intentionally.

Question 5

A-G’s ref (no 1 of 1975)

Answer 5

A secretly laces drinks of P, who was subsequently convicted of driving with excess alcohol (a strict liability offence). A was guilty of procuring the offence.

Question 6

Bainbridge (1960)

Answer 6

D sold oxygen cutting equipment to X and though he know it may be used for some illegal purpose, he did not know it would be used to break into a bank. The Appeal was unsuccessful, the court said it is necessary to show that the type of crime suspected was correct and not details such as date or time of the crime
While it is not enough, on a charge of being an accessory before the fact, to show that the person knew that some illegal venture was intended, it is unnecessary that knowledge of intention to commit the particular crime, i.e., on a particular date and at particular premises, which was in fact committed should be shown

Question 7

DPP NI v Maxwell (1978)

Answer 7

Knowledge of the actual offence committed need not be shown before a person can be convicted of aiding and abetting; it is sufficient to show that he knew the type of offence to be committed or the essential matters constituting the offence. Per curiam. Although aiders and abettors, counsellors and procurers, can be charged as principals, the particulars of the offence in the indictment should make clear the nature of the case against a defendant.
D was a member of the ulster volunteer force which used bombs to attack catholics. He was asked to give some people a ride to an inn which they then tried to bomb. D was helf to be rigthly convicted since he knew the type of attack which was likelt to be comitted

Question 8

Bryce (2004)

Answer 8

B was involved in a plot (by G) to help X kill M. B was uneasy so only agreed to drive X to a caravan near M’s house. X then stalled and carried out the killing the next day. B submitted that there was no case to answer because his involvement ended before murderous intent was formed - no longer engaged as a acessory. He also argued his actions were not aiding and abetting b/c prosecution had failed to proof that what he was aiding and abetting was murder. To 1st point judge said foresight that the crime might happen is enough and 2nd point was for the jury to decide.

Question 9

R v Jogee (2016)

Answer 9

Jogee changed the MR requriemnt for parasitic liability cases from “know or forsee” to only foresight. Foresight may be used as proof of knowledge. The correct approach was to treat foresight as evidence of intent.

Question 10

R v Anwar (2016)

Answer 10

Ds lured a victim to a place where he could be robbed, into a car where they held him at gunpoint and stole a watch. He got away into his own car, D’s shout shoot him shoot him. 2 shots fired and the attackers fled. Crown alledged there was a conspiracy since to shout “shoot him” they must have known that there was a gun and that it was loaded.

• Jogee does not answer questions of no case to answer
• this is still examined by the jury

Question 11

R v Johnson (Lewis) (2016)

Answer 11

Jogee reversed the law laid down in chan wing siu and r v powell. The correct approach was to treat foresight as evidence of intent. Question of whether this would change cases retrospectively - no, for case to be unsafe there has to be a mistake or the facts or something.

Question 12

Gilmour (2000)

Answer 12

D knew that his accomplices were going to throw a petrol bomb onto the premises of anothers property, but thought it merely intedned to frighten rather than kill or cause GBH. It actully killed 3 children. There were no policy grounds why in circumstances where a principal committed an act contemplated by an accomplice, that the accomplice should not be guilty of the level of offence appropriate to the actual intent with which it was carried out, R. v Stewart (Heather) [1995] 3 All E.R. 159 considered. Even so, a verdict of manslaughter was substituted.

Question 13

Bourne (1952)

Answer 13

A wife who was forced into having sex with a dog was found to be aiding and abetting for lack of special provisions. Should have established a duress defecne which would not have proved that there was no offence, but that she had no MR

Question 14

Howe (1987)

Answer 14

Defendants were convicted of murder and sought to plead duress as defence.

Held that duress could not be a defence to murder, whether the defendant is charged as a principal or accessory.

Question 15

Whitefield (1984)

Answer 15

Announcing prior to the crime that you want nothing more to do with it may be sufficient to withdraw

Question 16

Tryell (1894)

Answer 16

The court considered whether a girl between the ages of 13 and 16 could be convicted of aiding and abetting a male who had had unlawful sexual intercourse with her.
Held: A person for whose protection an offence has been created cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting a person who commits the offence against her. Parliament could not have intended that a statute passed to protect girls also made girls punishable under it.

Question 17

Tyrell Principle

Answer 17

You cannot be a secondary party to a crime which was made to protect you. For example, a young girl under 16 cannot be guilty of encouraging someone to have sex with her.

Question 18

R v Gnango (2011)

Answer 18

Two men engaged in a gunfight against each other had a common intention to shoot and be shot at. Where one of the gunmen accidentally shot and killed a passer-by, the intended target was guilty of the passer-by’s murder, either by virtue of transferred malice, the target having aided and abetted his own attempted murder, or as a principal, having been a direct participant engaged by agreement in unlawful violence. The crown appealed and the conviction was held by the supreme court. The case is difficult to interpret because it was justified in a number of ways by a number of judges
Lords Phillips, Judge, Willson and Dyson contended that G was liable as an accomplice to murder. When Bandana Man shot at Gnango that was the crime of attempted murder, By engaging in the gun-fight, Gnango had encouraged the crime of attempted murder of himself. In fact, a passer bu was killed but the doctrine of transferred malice meant Gnango was liable as an accomplice to murder. The judge found this difficult to justify as G was the intended victim of the crime.
Gngago was liable as a joint principal
Lords Brown, Clarke and Dyson said Gnango and Bandana Man had acted together ti cause the shoot out which has led to the death of the victim.
Lord Clarke also said Gnango was liable as a principle because he has caused Bandana man to shoot at him by shooting at Bandana man and this caused the death of the victim.

Question 19

O’Flaherty (2004)

Answer 19

(1) to disengage from an incident, a person had to do enough to demonstrate that he or she was withdrawing from the joint enterprise. That was a question of fact and degree for the jury which had to take account of the nature of the assistance and encouragement already given and how imminent the infliction of fatal injuries was. The jury should have been directed that they had to be satisfied that the fatal injuries were sustained when the joint enterprise was continuing, that the defendants were still acting within that joint enterprise and that the acts which caused death were within the scope of that enterprise, R. v Grundy (Brian) (1989) 89 Cr. App. R. 333 distinguished, R. v Grundy [1977] Crim. L.R. 543 and R. v Perman (Sam) [1996] 1 Cr. App. R. 24 considered. (2) In the instant case, the jury had not been directed that even if they had concluded that the incident was one evolving event, they had to be satisfied that the fatal injuries were sustained when the joint enterprise was continuing and that a particular defendant was still acting within that joint enterprise. (3) O’s conviction was safe since, on the evidence, the jury would have had to conclude that he was still a party to the joint enterprise when it moved to the second location. (4) The convictions of R and T were unsafe because they were only involved in the first incident and there was no evidence that any fatal injury had been caused at that time. Accordingly, there was no evidence on the charge of murder to go before the jury and their cases should have been withdrawn.

Question 20

R v JF Alfred (1997)

Answer 20

Appeal against conviction for aiding and abetting NS making false entries on record sheets. There were a number of issues with the case.
Whether the appellants acquiescence was sufficient for conviction
adequacy of the jury direction re: D’s failure to give evidence
It was necessary to show that d intended the act that he knew to be capable of assisting/encouraging the commission of the principle offence
This must be proved against him
Omission counts, but only if D made a positive choice not to intervene

Question 21

Tally (1894)

Answer 21

An American case where Tally stopped a third party from warning V about an impending attack which T’s step brothers were planning. This made it easier for Ps to kill V, even though they were unaware of the assistance

Question 22

Wilcox v Jeffery (1951)

Answer 22

S attended a concert in their role as a jazz critic, and pad a fee to attend. The concert was unlawful at the American artist didn’t have a work permit. S was held to have abetted the Aliens Order since “his presence and payment to go there was an encouragement.”
Ratio: Aiding and abetting can be found through the mere encouragement of criminal activity; the encouragement does not have to be directly communicated to the person committing the criminal offence.

There are no specific qualifying forms of behaviour, and whether action are a case of encouragement is always a question of fact

Question 23

Milward (1994)

Answer 23

D instructed their employee to drive a tractor and trailer, aware that it was not road safe. This caused the death of V on the road. D was convicted of procuring dangerous driving. (The employee (or P) was acquitted of causing death by reckless driving.)
Hence, procuring mops up our cases of innocent agent – the principle difference being that the principle is not entirely innocent (has the capacity to commit the crime, and the relevant mens rea).

Question 24

Cassidy v Reg. Morris Transport Ltd

Answer 24

Owner of a company that employed lorry drivers did not stop them from driving too long hours. Held: even though he was not there, the court thought that by deliberately turning a blind eye to the false records they produced was enough evidence of encouragement by omission. Effectually encouraged the drivers to continue to commit the crime

Question 25

Petters and Parfitt (1995)

Answer 25

This case held that there must be a common unlawful purpose. In this case, A and P had both participated in an assault, but had arrived on the scene independently. V died.
CoA held is was not enough A and P each intended the same thing.
For joint enterprise, the purpose had to be shared. Note: the agreement that makes the purpose common does not need to be explicit or formal, or even pre-arranged.

Question 26

Powell and English (1997)

Answer 26

The accomplice is not liable if P does an act which is fundamentally different from that foreseen by the accomplice.
E appealed against the dismissal of his appeal against conviction of the murder of a police sergeant who had been stabbed by W with a knife while both E and W were attacking the victim with wooden posts. The judge had directed the jury that, even if E did not know W had a knife, they still had to consider whether E realised that W might cause serious injury with the wooden post.
to sustain a conviction, he would have had to have foreseen an act of the type actually carried out and that the use of the knife was fundamentally different from the use of a wooden post.
Use of a knife is fundamentally different because one stab wound is more likely to cause death than one blow with a wooden post
P and D appealed against the dismissal of their appeals against conviction of the murder of a drug dealer, who had been shot by one of a group of three men, although the Crown could not prove who had actually fired the gun.
dismissed, it was enough for conviction that they all knew one of them had a gun which they might use to kill
(English – the knife was outside the scope of the joint enterprise).

Post Jogee – this old law is no longer applicable. There is debate over whether the Fundamental Difference Rule still applies. Be aware of the fundamental difference rule. When answering a PQ, the defence might raise this.