Homicide

Question 1

Cunningham (1957)

Answer 1

Subjective recklessness. D stole a gas meter and in doing so fractured a gas pipe. As a result coal gas escaped to the adjoining house with the result that V inhaled a considerable quantity of gas. He was charged with unlawfully and maliciously causing V to take a noxious thing as to endanger her life. The judge directed the jury that maliciously meant wickedly.
Recklessness means D has foreseen a type of harm yet continued the action anyway
The question of recklessness should be left to the jury

Question 2

Steane

Answer 2

D broadcasted in Nazi germany which was an act that aided the enemy. However, he did so under threat of violence and with the view to ultimately save his family, who were living in Germany, from a concentration camp. Initially convicted but conviction later quashed.
Someone who does something out of duress is not guilty
guilty intent must be proved

Question 3

Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA (1986)

Answer 3

Doctor prescribed V, an underage girl contraceptives. He was charged with aiding and abetting underage sex. Found not guilty because giving bona fide medical advice to a patients completely negates the guilty mind.

Question 4

Moloney (1985)

Answer 4

D and V, who was D’s stepfather whom D was fond of, were intoxicated. V challenged D to a duel in which he said he would be able to draw and shoot faster than D and therefore they took out two guns. D drew the gun and shot V, leading to his death. D was convicted of murder but his conviction was quashed and replaced by manslaughter.
When the judge is directing the jury as to the meaning of intention he should refrain from elaboration and leave it to the jury to decide if the necessary intent existed.

Question 5

Woollin (1999)

Answer 5

D lost his temper and threw his 3 year old child against a hard surface. The child suffered a fractured skull and died. D was charged with murder but conviction quashed and replaced with manslaughter following a misdirection from the judge.
The Nedrick direction was followed initially then changed in the summing up
When the simple direction for intent is not enough, the jury should be directed that they are not entitled to find the necessary intent for murder unless they are sure that death/serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty of D’s actions and D appreciated this was the case.

Question 6

Re A (children) 2000

Answer 6

M and J were conjoined twins at the hip in which M was using J’s oxygenated blood to stay alive. The doctors applied for an action to separate the two twins, which would inevitably cause M’s death but give J a relatively normal life. If the twins were not separated, both of them would die within months.
It was recognise that this would be a murder as it is the deliberate taking of life
The Woollin test was binding and it was seen that death was a virtual certainty
However Re A was reasoned as a self defence case which allows a defence to murder, it was said that the doctors were acting on J’s behalf. The “lesser of two evils” argument was also brought

Question 7

Matthews and Alleyne (2003)

Answer 7

Ds robbed V, drove him to a bridge and thew him off it, despite the fact that that V had told them he cannot swim. Ds were held to have intended to kill V.
Acting deliberately with an appreciation of virtual certainty of death did not necessarily amount intention but was evidence from which intention could be inferred
In an appreciation of virtual certainty there is very little to choose between a rule of evadence and one of substantial law.

Question 8

R v Clinton (2012)

Answer 8

D’s wife admitted to D that that she had been having an affair and described in detail her sexual encounters. D then told V that he would kill himself, to which V replied that he didn’t have the balls to do it . D then killed V by beating her with a baton and strangling her. He was convicted, later the conviction for murder was quashed and reduced to manslaughter.
The question was raised whether according to the application of s55 of coroners and justice act 2009
Pure sexual infidelity cannot be relied on as only trigger
mixed sexual infidelity can allow infidelity to be considered as a circumstance in which the trigger led to loss of control

Question 9

R v Asmelash (2013)

Answer 9

D and V were drunk. V was taunting D. D picked up a knife and stabbed V, feeling he could not do anything else. They started grappling and D stabbed V again, this time fatally. D initially denied murder as he was too drunk to know what was happening. Convicted of murder as intoxication is not a defence but judge misdirected the jury, however on appeal, the conviction was held.
If D is intoxicated he must show the tolerance and self control of a sober person
D’s voluntary intoxication will not be considered one of his circumstances
If a sober individual in D’s circumstances with normal tolerance and restraint might have behaved in the same way as D, D would not be deprived of the defence because he was not sober.

Question 10

R v Dowds (2012)

Answer 10

Dowds consumed a vast amount of alcohol and killed his partner by stabbing her over 60 times. He was not suffering from alcohol dependency syndrome but was heavy elective drinker. He was convicted of murder and appealed against his conviction on the basis that acute alcohol dependency was a medically recognised condition.
The statutory conditions for diminished responsibility do not intend to reverse the well established rule that voluntary intoxication is not capable of being relied upon to found diminished responsibility.
A recognised medical condition is necessary, but not always a sufficient, condition for diminished responsibility.
Voluntary acute intoxication, whether from alcohol or other substance, is not capable of founding diminished responsibility.

Question 11

R v Golds (2016)

Answer 11

D pled guilty to the killing, issue was whether he had made out the defence of diminished responsibility due to a medically recognised psychotic illnes. The jury rejected the partial defence of diminished responsibility. ‘substantal’ in ‘substantially impaired’ to be given its normal meaning.

Question 12

R v Blackman (2017)

Answer 12

A marine’s conviction for the murder of a wounded insurgent would be replaced by a verdict of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. At the time of the killing, the marine had been suffering from an adjustment disorder which substantially impaired his ability to form a rational judgment and exercise self-control.

Question 13

R v Brennan (2014)

Answer 13

Where there was unchallenged medical evidence of diminished responsibility and no other evidence which, looked at in the round, was at least capable of rebutting the defence, the trial judge should withdraw a charge of murder from the jury.

Question 14

Church (1966)

Answer 14

D took V back to his van for sexual purposes. V mocked D for failing to make her cum. D knocked her unconsious. D tried to rouse V for half an hour but when V did not awake D threw her in the river. V died from drowning not from the initial hit.
Not every unlawful act that results in death leads to a conviction of manslaughter and there should be some mens rea.
The test for danger is that: the unlawful act must be such as all sober and reasonable people would inevitably recognise would subject the other person to the risk of some harm resulting, albeit not serious harm.
A person who is already dead cannot be injured so is relevant whether D believed V to be dead/alive when he did an act to her.

Question 15

Lamb (1967)

Answer 15

Appellant convicted of manslaughter. D pointed gun at V as a joke and pulled the trigger. V was killed. D thought the gun would not fire as he did not understand the mechanism of a revolver. Trial directed jury that firing gun is not a lawful act, even when there is no intent to harm or frighten. CoA allowed appeal and quashed the conviction, as the act could not be unlawful in this context unless there was and assault and this required proof of the mens rea element of an assault: an intent to frighten.
Sachs LJ held that the jury had to decide whether what D thought he was doing was safe and whether this view was formed in a negligent way.
Manslaughter cannot be established except by proving the element of intent without which there can be no assault.

Question 16

DPP v Newbury and Jones (1977)

Answer 16

Ds convicted of manslaughter. Pushed a paving stone over a railway bridge onto a passing train killing the train guard. CoA and House of Lords dismissed the appeal. House of Lords held that in a constructive manslaughter it is unnecessary for D to recognise the danger or harm of their actions. It is an objective test of whether a reasonable person would foresee the risk, not foresight of the accused.

Question 17

Dawson (1985)

Answer 17

2 Ds, one carrying a pickaxe handle and another carrying a replica gun, and a third man keeping watch outside, demanded money from V, who was a 60 year old petrol station attendant who had a heart condition that was unknown to the three men. V pressed an alarm button and the three Ds fled. Shortly after the police arrived V collapsed and died from a heart attack. It was held that the attempted robbery was responsible for V’s death. Ds conviction for manslaughter was quashed due to misdirection.
An unlawful act which caused an emotional disturbance is not enough to constitute harm.
An unlawful act must be one that all sober and reasonable people would realise was likely to cause some, albeit not serious, harm in the physical sense.
The knowledge of the sober and reasonable man should be of the information D had at the time of the act and not what the jury knew during the case.

Question 18

Watson (1989)

Answer 18

D and another threw a brick through the window of a house and entered where a man of 87 with a serious heart condition lived alone. They confronted V as he awoke, abused him verbally and left without stealing anything. V died within 90 minutes of entry. D pleaded guilty to burglary under §9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968 and was tried for manslaughter. D’s conviction for manslaughter was quashed on a misdirection to the jury.
The unlawful act of burglary does not end when the foot crosses the threshold but continues throughout.
If D became aware of V’s approximate age and frailty during the course of the unlawful act, a sober and reasonable bystander would be aware of those circumstances and should therefore be considered.

Question 19

Lowe (1973)

Answer 19

D was low average intelligence knew that his child was sick but did not call a doctor. The child died from dehydration and emaciation. D was charged with manslaughter and wilfully neglecting his child. He was initially convicted on both accounts but due to misdirection of the jury D’s conviction of manslaughter was quashed.
An act of negligence will not amount to manslaughter unless there is a high degree of negligence amounting to recklessness.

Question 20

Kennedy (2007)

Answer 20

D prepared a syringe of heroin and handed it to V, who injected himself and returned the syringe to D. V died shortly after as a result of the injection. D’s conviction for administering a class A drug and manslaughter were both quashed.
Informed adults of sound mind are autonomous beings that can make their own decisions.
If D had not committed a criminal act which was a significant cause of V’s death, he would not be convicted of manslaughter.

Question 21

Adomako (1995)

Answer 21

D was an anaesthetist who failed to notice for six minutes that a tube that supplied oxygen to his patient had become disconnected from the ventilator and as a result the patient died. D was convicted of gross negligence manslaughter. The test for negligence from Andrews v DPP was required, thus the appeal was dismissed. Recklessness could have been utilised in this case also.
Ordinary principles of the law of negligence applies to determine breach of duty of care.
Once duty of care was established, the question would be whether it caused the death of the victim, and if so if it was gross negligence.
It is for the jury to decide whether D’s conduct was so bad to amount to a criminal act or omission.
The jury must take into account the seriousness of the breach of duty, the circumstances of D, and whether D’s conduct departed from the proper standard of care expected of him in determining gross negligence.

Question 22

Evans (2009)

Answer 22

D gave her half sister V some heroin. V self injected the heroin and developed and complained of symptoms which D recognised as being consistent with a heroin overdose. D and her mother believed they were responsible for V but did not seek medical assistance because they feared they would get into trouble. Instead they put V to bed hoping she would recover and remained in the house, checking up on her at intervals and sleeping in her room. The next morning V died from the overdose. D was charged and convicted of gross negligence manslaughter.
If a person creates or contributes to the creation of a state of affairs which he know or ought reasonably to have known, had become life threatening, a consequent duty would normally arise on him to act by taking reasonable steps to save the other’s life.
The existence of a duty of care is a question of law for the judge and whether the facts established the existence of the duty is for the jury.
If the existence of duty is not in dispute the judge can direct the jury the duty of care exists.
If the existence of duty is in dispute, the jury should be directed that if specified facts were established a duty would arise but if other specified fact were present the duty would not be established.