Non Fatal Offences Against the Person Flashcards
Logdon (1976)
D threatened to hold V hostage until something was done about money which D allegedly owed his client. He showed V a gun and when he asked if it was loaded he replied affirmatively. He phoned the board and threatened to kidnap V. When he saw V was shaking he handed him the gun and revealed it was a replica. D claimed he had no intention or ability to hurt V. D convicted of manslaughter.
Assault is a threat by a person to inflict unlawful force on another and the offence is committed when by some physical act D intentionally or recklessly causes V to believe such force would be inflicted on him.
Assault is committed regardless of V’s intention to actually apply force.
Venna (1976)
D and other youth created a disturbance in the street and continued to do so after a police officer tried to persuade them to go home, The officer placed a hand on the boy and told them all they were under arrest. Other officers arrive to assist the arrest. D resisted arrest and fought violently, and there was an attempt to restrain him. D continued to kick and in doing so fractured an officer’s hand. D charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Recklessness in the use of force is sufficient to satisfy the mens rea element of criminal assault.
A physical injury inflicted deliberately or recklessly constitutes the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Ireland (1998)
D made a large number of phone calls to three women and when they answered, D remained silent. As a result, the women suffered psychological harm, as they expected immediate unlawful violence. D convicted of assault occasioning ABH.
Psychological harm is sufficient for ABH
Silence is a sufficient form of violence
Recognisable psychiatric illnesses fall within the phrase ‘bodily harm’ under §20 and §47 of the Act of 1861.
‘Inflict’ includes the infliction of psychiatric injury on another and does not mean that whatever caused the harm had to be applied directly to the victim.
The threat was “immediate” because the attack could take place at any point in the future
Martin (1881)
D was in a theatre and right before the ending of the performance, with intent to cause fear, put out the gaslights in the theatre and placed an iron bar across a doorway through which people would exist. When the lights went out people panicked and the audience rushed down the staircase, forcing those in front against the iron bar which led to injuries. Because of the pressure and struggling of the crowd, several people were thrown down or severely injured. D was convicted of unlawfully and maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Even though there was no direct application of force by D, if he has the necessary intent/recklessness and injury results he can be held to have committed a battery.
Collins v Wilcox (1984)
Two police officers suspected two women were soliciting for prostitution. D walked away. One of the police officers followed her and continued to speak to her but D continued to walk away and swore at the police. The officer took D’s arm to try to restrain her and D scratched the officer’s arm. D’s conviction for assaulting a police officer in the execution of his duty was quashed since the police officer had applied unlawful force to D.
There is no implied power for police officers to stop people to implement the system of cautioning
The test for whether a physical contact is acceptable or not is whether the physical contact so persisted that it has gone beyond generally acceptable standards of conduct. This will depend on the particular facts of the case.
Any conduct that goes beyond the generally acceptable conduct of touching a person to engage her attention is unlawful.
DPP v Santana-Burmudez (2003)
D was a ticket tout in an underground station. A police officer informed D that they intended to perform a full body search and to inform them whether they had anything sharp in their pockets. After turning out most of his pockets, D said he had no further dangerous items. The police officer began the search and her finger was pierced by a hypodermic needle. Initially the court ruled that there was no battery because of the omission, but on appeal the reasoning in Miller was used that in putting needles in his pockets D had a duty to reduce the danger.
An assault cannot arise out of an omission, but an omission where there is a duty to act can lead to an assault.
remains for prosecution to prove intention or recklessness
Savage and Parnamenter (1992)
Savage intended to throw beer over her husband’s former girlfriend but the glass slipped off her hand and broke, injuring the victim. Parmenter injured his child by rough handling but did not realise he would harm him significantly.
Held that the mens rea for s47 was that necessary for assault or battery and that for s20 was foresight of some harm (not serious harm).
T v DPP (2003)
D was in a group that chased V. V fell to the ground and lost consciousness for a short time when he was kicked by D. D contended that V’s loss of consciousness was too transient to amount to actual bodily harm. D was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm.
Actual bodily harm is to be given its everyday meaning.
Loss of consciousness amounts to an impairment of sensory function, therefore amounts to actual harm.
DPP v Smith (2006)
V was woken by D, her ex. D pushed V down, sat on top of her, and cut off her ponytail and some hair off the top of her head. He was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary so §47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. He was convicted of the assault.
External bodily injury, break in or bruise to the surface of the skin is not required for an actual bodily harm under §47 of the 1861 Act.
Hair is a part of the human body that is intrinsic to each individual.
Cutting off a substantial part of a person’s hair, without that person’s consent, is capable of amounting to actual bodily harm.
Bollom (2003)
V, a baby, sustained several abrasions and bruises. V was with several drunk adults including D and V’s mother. D admitted that he had dropped V at some point, which might have caused bruising to her leg, but denied causing the other injuries. D charged with causing GBH with intent, inflicting GBH and ABH. Convicted of causing GBH with intent, on appeal.
In deciding severity of injuries the situation of the victim must be taken into account. The same injuries may have amounted only to ABH on an adult
Dica (2004)
D was aware that he was HIV positive. Regardless, he had unprotected sex with two women who were subsequently diagnosed HIV positive. D was charged with inflicting GBH contrary to §20 of the 1861 Act. The trial judge directed the jury that they could convict D even if he could show the women were aware of his condition. D was convicted and appealed. Due to the misdirection the conviction was quashed and a retrial was ordered.
The word ‘inflict’ has the same meaning as ‘cause’ and grievous bodily harm can be inflicted through infecting V with sexually transmitted diseases.
Unless activity is lawful, V’s consent to deliberate infliction of serious bodily injury (§18) on her does not provide D with a defence.
V’s consent to a risk of infliction of serious bodily injury (§20) can be a defence under §20. The question here is not knowledge but consent.
Konzani (2005)
D was convicted of inflicting GBH on three women contrary to §20 of the 1861 Act. D knew that he was HIV positive and was aware that by having unprotected sex he could infect his partners. He still had sex with three women without informing them he had HIV. D was convicted.
D will not be convicted unless he was reckless. Recklessness is a question of fact to be proved by prosecution.
D will not be convicted if there is an informed consent by his partner to the risk of transferring HIV. Consent is a question of fact.
Where consent provides a defence to the offence, D’s honest belief in V’s consent also provides a defence. D’s honest belief must be in accordance with the consent of V. Unless consent provides a defence, an honest belief in it would not assist D.
A-G’s ref no 6 of 1980 (1981)
D and V were out in the street arguing. They agreed to a fist fights which resulted in ABH being caused to V. D was charged with assault. The jury were directed that D might not be guilty if V agreed to fight and D used only reasonable force and he was acquitted. The AG referred the court’s opinion on the question “When two people who fought otherwise than in the course of sports in a public place, could V’s consent be a defence for D on a charge of assault?” The question was answered negatively.
D is not guilty of an assault if V consents to it but the exception is where public interest is concerned.
It is not in the public interest for people to try to cause each other actual bodily harm for no good reason.
Whether the act occurred in public or private is immaterial.
If D believes he is committing a battery to which V has consented but instead causes actual bodily harm or more serious injury, V’s consent would not provide a defence.
Brown (1994)
Ds were a group of sadomasochists who engaged in consensual acts of violence against each other for sexual gratification. Ds were convicted of offences under §20 and §47 of the 1861 Act. Ds tried to rely on consent of Vs but the trial judge ruled that the prosecution was not required to prove that Vs did not consent.
When no actual bodily harm is caused, the consent of the person affected precludes him from complaining.
Even when violence is intentional and results in actual bodily harm, wounding, or grievous bodily harm, accused is entitled to be acquitted if the injury was a foreseeable incident of a lawful activity in which the person injured was participating.
Consent of V is not a defence to §20 unless the circumstances fall under one of the exceptional categories.
The point of sadomasochism is pain, thus it cannot be an exceptional category because there is no ultimate end other than pain, unlike the other categories.
Because of this it was argued that it was for parliament to decide whether it should be lawful, not the courts
The opposition brought issues of private life, which is protected under the ECHR.
Wilson (1997)
D and V were a married couple. V asked D to carve his initials on her buttocks and D did so with a hot knife. D was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He applied against his conviction on the basis that his wife’s consent provided him with a defence to the charge. His conviction was quashed.
There are exceptions to the general principle of Brown.
Tattooing is an activity which, if carried out with the consent of an adult, does not involve an offence under §47, albeit that actual bodily harm is deliberately inflicted.
The law should develop on a case by case basis rather than general propositions to which exceptions may arise from time to time not expressly covered by authority.
Wilson ruled contra the decision in Clarence
