Inohate Liability Flashcards
Sadique (2013)
Criminal law Appeal. The defendant had been convicted of assisting in the supply of controlled drugs of class A and class B contrary to s46 of the and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. He appealed against conviction in circumstances where he contended that the indictment was bad for duplicity and defective for uncertainty due to the fact that the offences came under s46 to the Act and not some other section. Further, the defendant contended that the judge’s directions to the jury had been flawed. In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, found no error in the indictment nor the judge’s summing up and confirmed the permissibility of an indictment charging a s46 offence of encouraging one or more offences.
Anderson (1986)
D agreed to supply diamond wire to enable a prisoner to escape. D did not believe the plan would succeed and intended to go abroad after supplying the wire.
Held:
(1) Conspiracy may be committed even without intending the agreement to be carried out.
(2) An intention to play some part in the agreed course of conduct must be established.
Lord Bridge:
‘Neither the fact that he intended to play no further part in attempting to effect the escape, nor that he believed the escape to be impossible would … have afforded him any defence.’
Siracusa (1989)
D and many others agreed to import prohibited drugs over a period of time.
Held: D and others and the organisers, who remained in the background, were guilty of conspiracy.
O’Connor LJ:
‘Participation in a conspiracy is infinitely variable: it can be active or passive.’
Yip Chiu-Cheung (1995)
D met with a US undercover policeman, and arranged for him to transport heroin from Hong Kong to Australia.
Held:
Lord Griffiths:
‘The crime of conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act with the intention of carrying it out. It is the intention to carry out the crime that constitutes the necessary mens rea for the offence. As Lord Bridge pointed out [Anderson] An undercover agent who has no intention of committing the crime lacks the necessary mens rea to be a conspirator.’
The policeman intended to traffic in drugs by exporting the heroin (albeit for the purpose of combating drug trafficking and with full knowledge of immunity from prosecution).
Saik (2006)
Saik ran a money exchange beauro and suspected some of the money could be from the proceeds of crime. He appealed his conviction saying that he did not know for sure that it was.
Does the offence of conspiracy require proof of an intention to carry out an intended act or is the mens rea of the underlying offence sufficient for a conspiracy to exist?
Appeal allowed b/c to be guilty of conspiracy, the defendant and at least one other party must intend every element of the underlying offence.
Conspiracy to launder money could only exist where the parties knew that the property to be dealt with was the proceeds of crime.
Gullefer (1990)
The appellant’s action in jumping onto the track during the running of the race could not properly be said to be an action which had gone beyond mere preparation and to be part of the process of committing theft from the bookmaker. The appeal would therefore be allowed and the conviction quashed
Geddes (1996)
D caught hiding in school bathroom wiht kitchen knife rope and duct tape. convicted of attempted false improsonment but quashed on appeal. It was not clear whether his acts were merely preparatory or not, in this case it was apparently.
Jones (1990)
Although the appellant’s actions in obtaining the shotgun, shortening it and going to the victim’s car were merely preparatory, his actions in getting into the car, taking out the loaded gun and pointing it at the victim with the intention of killing him provided sufficient evidence for the jury to consider whether those acts were more than merely preparatory.
Campbell (1991)
Found not guilty of attempted robbery becuase he was not in a position to carry out robbing the post office yet - he was only doing preparatory action.
the test for an attempt was contained in section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, it was wholly unnecessary to direct the jury to references to the law before the passing of that Act
the appellant had not even gained a place where he could be in a position to carry out the offence, it was extremely unlikely that it could even be said that he had performed an act which could be properly said to be an attempt
Tosti (1997)
Ds had taken oxygen cutting equipemnt to a barn at midnight then inspected the lock before leaving. The question of whether acts are more than merely preparatory remains for the jury.
Khan (1990)
After a discotheque a 16-year-old girl accompanied five youths in a car to a house where they were joined by other youths. Three youths raped her. The four defendants tried to do so but failed. The defendants were charged with attempted rape and appealed. It was argued that the judge misdirected the jury by telling them that, even if a defendant did not know the girl was not consenting, he was guilty of attempted rape if he tried unsuccessfully to have sexual intercourse, being reckless whether she consented or not - ie, it was sufficient that he could not care less whether she consented or not.
The Court of Appeal held that a man may commit the offence of attempted rape even though he is reckless whether the woman consents to sexual intercourse since the attempt relates to the physical activity and his mental state of recklessness relates, as in the offence of rape itself, not to that activity but to the absence of the woman’s consent. The appeals against conviction were dismissed.
A-G’s ref No 3 of 1992
The defendants threw a petrol bomb towards the victims, four of whom were inside their car and two of whom were on the pavement outside. It passed over the car and smashed against a nearby wall. The defendants’ car then accelerated away. The defendants were charged with attempted arson, being reckless whether life be endangered, contrary to s1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971. The trial judge ruled that, on a charge of attempt, intent to endanger life was required; recklessness was not sufficient. The Attorney-General referred the issue to the Court of Appeal.
The Court of Appeal held that on a charge of attempted aggravated arson, it was sufficient for the Crown to establish a specific intent to cause damage by fire and that the defendant was reckless as to whether life would thereby be endangered, because if the state of mind of the defendant was that he intended to damage property and was reckless as to whether the life of another would thereby be endangered, and while in that state of mind he did an act which was more than merely preparatory to the offence, he was guilty of attempting to commit that offence. It was not necessary that he intended that the lives of others would be endangered by the damage which he intended.
Pace and Rodgers (2014)
Proof of a mental element of suspicion was insufficient for the purposes of a count of attempted money laundering.
Shivpuri (1987)
The defendant was paid to act as a drugs courier. He was required to collect a package containing drugs and to distribute its contents according to instructions which would be given to him. On collecting the package the defendant was arrested by police officers, and he confessed to them that he believed its contents to be either heroin or cannabis. An analysis revealed the contents of the package not to be drugs, but a harmless vegetable substance. The defendant was convicted for attempting to be knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring a controlled drug, namely heroin.
His appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. Lord Bridge said, in applying s1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 to the facts of the case, the first question to be asked was whether the defendant intended to commit the offence. The answer was plainly yes. Next, did he do an act which was more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence? The acts were more than merely preparatory to the commission of the intended offence. This analysis lead to the conclusion that the defendant was rightly convicted.
