Module 3B

Question 1

What is usually taken for granted in orthodox logic texts regarding the acceptability of a premiss?

Answer 1

The natural answer is its TRUTH, and this is usually taken for granted in orthodox logic texts.

Question 2

What is problematic with relying solely on the truth of a premiss?

Answer 2

There are problems with relying solely on the truth of a premiss.

For example, sometimes we NEED TO REASON WITH PREMISSES THAT WE DON’T KNOW TO BE TRUE OR SUSPECT TO BE FALSE IN ORDER TO ANALYSE CONSEQUENCES OR PROVE THEIR FALSEHOOD.

Question 3

Why must premisses not only be true but also recognized as true in certain cases?

Answer 3

If an ARGUMENT AIMS TO PROVE ITS CONCLUSION TO SOMEONE, THE PREMISES MUST NOT ONLY BE TRUE BUT ALSO BE RECOGNISED AS TRUE.

There is an ineradicable epistemic element in the evaluation of an argument.

Question 4

What is the ‘ineradicable epistemic element’ in the evaluation of an argument?

Answer 4

The ‘ineradicable epistemic element’ =

is the RECOGNITION of the TRUTH OF PREMISES.

— Epistemology, theTHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, is a major branch of philosophy, and this RECOGNITION IS CRUCIAL IN REAL-LIFE ARGUMENTATION.

Question 4

What does Govier provide a good discussion of regarding premisses?

Answer 4

Govier provides a good discussion of the conditions under which premisses are ACCEPTABLE and UNACCEPTABLE.

• COMPLEXITY OF ACCEPTABILITY

Question 5

According to Govier, what is one way for a statement to be acceptable as a premise?

Answer 5

According to Govier, being ‘MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE’ is one way for a statement to be acceptable as a premise.

Question 6

What is the difficulty with relying on knowledge as a criterion for acceptability?

Answer 6

The difficulty is that we are often UNSURE WHEN WE HAVE KNOWLEDGE, AND EVEN IF WE ARE SURE, IT CAN TURN OUT THAT WE WERE WRONG.

In UNCERTAIN SITUATIONS, what we have is more like RATIONAL BELIEFS, NECESSARY FOR DECISION-MAKING.

Question 7

What does the term “COMMON RATIONAL BELIEF” suggest about the acceptability of premises?

Answer 7

Common rational belief,

• DISTINCT FROM KNOWLEDGE,
• should be allowed as well for the acceptability of premises,
• especially in SITUATIONS WHERE CERTAINTY IS LACKING BUT RATIONAL JUDGEMENTS BASED ON EVIDENCE ARE MADE.

Question 8

How does Govier define the ‘common’ in ‘common knowledge’?

Answer 8

Govier defines the ‘common’ in ‘common knowledge’ as something known by VIRTUALLY EVERYONE, and she asserts that stating such things should be ALLOWED AS ACCEPTABLE PREMISE.

Question 9

What suggestion does the information provide about constructing arguments tailored to the audience?

Answer 9

When constructing an argument, one should TAILOR PREMISE TO THE AUDIENCE
…ALLOWING FOR THE ACCEPTABILITY OF A STATEMENT AS A PREMISE IF BOTH SIDES RATIONALLY BELIEVE IT TRUE, ….IF NO ONE ELSE HAS AN OPINION ON THE MATTER.

Question 10

According to Govier, how can the acceptability of a statement vary?

Answer 10

Govier states that the ACCEPTABILITY OF A STATEMENT CAN VARY WITH ‘TIME AND PLACE’

– according to what is believed by proponents or recipients of arguments.

Question 11

Is ignorance of something that someone else wants to use as a premise in an argument a valid reason to dismiss that premise as unacceptable?

Answer 11

No, mere ignorance of something that someone else wants to use as a premise in an argument is NOT A LICENSE TO DISMISS THAT PREMISE AS UNAACEPTABLE.

Argument IMPOSES OBLIGATIONS, AND THE IGNORANCE MIGHT BE SOMETHING ONE OUGHT TO KNOW.

Question 12

How does Govier define a PRIORI CLAIMS ?

Answer 12

Those that ‘can be known to be true or false on the basis of reasoning or meanings of terms.’

Question 13

According to Govier, what does KNOWING A PRIORI THAT A CLAIM IS TRUE IMPLY?

Answer 13

Govier states that if we can know a priori that a claim is true, THEN THAT CLAIM IS RATIONALLY ACCEPTABLE.

However, THIS STATEMENT IS CRITICISED IN THE NOTES.

Question 14

Are all a priori truths acceptable as premises?

Answer 14

No, not all a priori truths are acceptable as premises.

— Govier’s examples focus on obviously true cases, but there are non-obvious a priori truths.

IF THEY ARE ACCEPTABLE THEY CAN BE COVERED UNDER THE HEADING ‘COMMON KNOWLEDGE’

Question 15

How does Govier INADVERTENTLY REVEAL HER MISTAKE REGARDING PRIORI TRUTHS?

Answer 15

Govier inadvertently reveals her mistake by using examples of a priori truths that are obviously true GIVEN ONLY A MOMENT’S CONSIDERATION, WHILE THERE ARE NON-OBVIOUS A PRORI TRUTHS THAT MAY REQUIRE REASONING TO DEMONSTRATE.

Question 16

Can the OBVIOUSNESS OF A CONTRADICTION ALWAYS GUARANTEE WHEN DENYING AN A PRIORI TRUTH?

Answer 16

No, the obviousness of a contradiction when denying an a priori truth cannot always be guaranteed, as demonstrated by the example of the statement

‘The square root of 2 is expressible as a ratio of two integers.’

Question 17

According to Govier, when may we ACCEPT PREMISES PROVISIONALLY?

Answer 17

Govier suggests that WE MAY ACCEPT PREMISES PROVISIONALLY ONLY WHEN WE DO NOT HAVE DEFINITE BASIS FOR DEEMING THEM UNACCEPTABLE.

Question 18

Is Govier’s suggestion on accepting premises provisionally TOO RESTRICTIVE?

Answer 18

Yes, the suggestion that WE MAY ACCEPT PREMISES PROVISIONALLY ONLY WHEN WE DO NOT HAVE ‘DEFINITE BASIS’ FOR DEEMING THEM UNACCEPTABLE is considered too restrictive.

Question 19

Why might we WISH TO ALLOW AN ARGUMENT TO BEGIN FROM A PREMISE THAT WE HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE ‘FALSE’?

Answer 19

SIMPLY, FOR THE SAKE OF INVESTIGATING ITS CONSEQUENCES.

Question 20

Does ARGUING FROM PROVISIONAL PREMISES VIOLATE THE RULE THAT CONDITIONALS DO NOT EXPRESS ARGUMENTS?

Answer 20

No, arguing from provisional premises doesn’t violate the rule that conditionals do not express arguments.

Even though the PREMISE IS PROVISIONALLY ASSUMED, and the CONCLUSION CANNOT BE DETACHED AND SEPARATELY ASSERTED … there is STILL AN ARGUMENT.

The CONCLUSION ITSELF IS IN CONDITIONAL FORM…

Question 21

What is the NATURE OF CONCLUSION WHEN ARGUING FROM PROVISIONAL PREMISES??

Answer 21

The conclusion is conditional in form, stating something like,

‘If we accept A, then we shall have to accept B also.’

Question 22

According to Govier, what PROBLEMS ARE PARALLEL TO THOSE IDENTIFIED IN THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF PREMISES?

Answer 22

The problems parallel to those identified in the unacceptability of premises are NOTE EXPLICITYLY STATED, but the reader is encouraged to work them out.

One example mentioned is item 3 in the ‘Summary of Unacceptability Conditions’ on page 135, …..CONSIDERING THAT THE CONTRADICTION MAY ITSELF NEED TO BE DEMONSTRATED BY THE USE OF ARGUMENT.

Question 23

What should be considered when comparing item 3 in the ‘Summary of Unacceptability Conditions’ on page 135 with the related list on page 145?

Answer 23

hen comparing item 3 in the ‘Summary of Unacceptability Conditions’ on page 135 with the related list on page 145,

…..ONE SHOULD CONSIDER HOW THE CONTRADICTION MAY ITSELF NEED TO BE DEMONSTRATED BY THE USE OF ARGUMENT.

Question 24

What COMMON FAULTt does Govier discuss under the heading

‘The Fallacy of Begging the Question’ on page 133?

Answer 24

Govier discusses the common fault of ‘Begging the Question’ under the heading on page 133.

This fallacy is very common and should be taken into account when evaluating arguments

Question 25

FALLACY OF BEGGING THE QUESTION…

Answer 25

The fallacy of begging the question occurs when an “argument’s premises assume the truth of the conclusion, instead of supporting it.”

In other words, you assume without proof the stand/position, or a significant part of the stand, that is in question.

• Vintage furniture is better than new furniture because it’s usually made from real wood.
• Certain topics shouldn’t be taught in school because they’re harmful.
• Blueberries are good for you because they’re filled with antioxidants.
• The ocean is blue because the sky is blue.

Arguments that beg the question work to obscure the actual points in controversy and can be looked at as a form of circular reasoning.

Question 26

“If we do know a priori that a claim is true, then that claim is rationally acceptable.”

Answer 26

FALSE

“If we can know a priori that a claim is true, then that claim is rationally acceptable.”

Question 27

“If we do know a priori that a claim is true, then that claim is rationally acceptable.”

Answer 27

TRUE

Question 28

“The acceptability of a statement depends on what people already believe about its subject matter, whereas a statement’s truth is (except in special cases) independent of what is believed.

Answer 28

TRUE

Question 29

Are all necessary falsehoods obviously false?

Answer 29

NO

Question 30

Can a statement be acceptable as a premiss in an argument even if it is suspected to be false?

Answer 30

YES

Question 31

Does the truth of the statement made in question 1 above need the qualification ‘a priori’?

Answer 31

NO

If you know that a statement is true, you are going to find any assertion of that statement rationally acceptable. It doesn’t matter whether your knowledge is justified a priori or a posteriori.

Question 32

If a statement S is assumed provisionally (i.e., ‘for the sake of argument’), and a conclusion C is then validly deduced from S, can we on that basis justifiably go on to assert C?

Answer 32

NO

If a premise is accepted provisionally, any conclusion derived from that premise is subject to the same proviso. i.e., the conclusion can only be asserted conditionally: If P, then C.

Question 33

Is it sufficient for a statement to be acceptable as a premiss in an argument that the statement be true?

Answer 33

NO

The truth of the statement might be unobvious, or dependent on specialist knowledge.

In such cases it is perfectly possible for some persons to find the statement unacceptable, despite it being true.

They are not in a position to know.

Question 34

Is it sufficient for a statement to be acceptable as a premiss in an argument that the statement be known to be true by the participants in the discussion?

Answer 34

YES

Question 35

Is it sufficient for a statement to be unacceptable as a premiss in an argument that the statement be false?

Answer 35

NO