Lecture 9.2 Rise of China

Question 1

Thucydides

Answer 1

“What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.“

Question 2

Thucydides

Answer 2

“What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.“

Question 3

Bargaining Model and china

Answer 3

“commitment problem” - no bargaining range

Question 4

Commitment problem

Answer 4

state cannot credibly commit to a deal or agreement. The other side does not believe that he will honor that agreement, specifically that he will not use force to revise that settlement in the future.

Question 5

Commitment problem example 1

Answer 5

1) When the “bargain” is over goods that are a source of future bargaining power.
- Crucial question is once that “good” goes over to the other side, can you be sure they won’t use it?
- Examples include strategically important territory like Golan Heights or Alsace Lorraine. It can also be nuclear weapons programs like those of Iran and North Korea.

Question 6

Commitment problem example 2

Answer 6

2) The commitment problem also arises when the balance of military capabilities is shifting in favor of one party over the other.
- Crucial question is, when they are more powerful then you are, can you be sure that they won’t use that power?
- This logic arises whenever there are likely to be power transitions in the near future.

Question 7

Containment Strategy

Answer 7

Shambaugh

-> the policy implication is to delay China’s rise as much as possible, and to prepare for a possible coming conflict.

Question 8

Engagement Strategy

Answer 8

Obama

-> conflict is much less likely than those argued by the containment crowd and that there are powerful forces that would discourage war in both countries.

Question 9

Bargaining Model and china

Answer 9

“commitment problem” - no bargaining range

Question 10

Commitment problem

Answer 10

state cannot credibly commit to a deal or agreement. The other side does not believe that he will honor that agreement, specifically that he will not use force to revise that settlement in the future.

Question 11

Commitment problem example 1

Answer 11

1) When the “bargain” is over goods that are a source of future bargaining power.
- Crucial question is once that “good” goes over to the other side, can you be sure they won’t use it?
- Examples include strategically important territory like Golan Heights or Alsace Lorraine. It can also be nuclear weapons programs like those of Iran and North Korea.

Question 12

Commitment problem example 2

Answer 12

2) The commitment problem also arises when the balance of military capabilities is shifting in favor of one party over the other.
- Crucial question is, when they are more powerful then you are, can you be sure that they won’t use that power?
- This logic arises whenever there are likely to be power transitions in the near future.

Question 13

Containment Strategy

Answer 13

Shambaugh

-> the policy implication is to delay China’s rise as much as possible, and to prepare for a possible coming conflict.

Question 14

Engagement Strategy

Answer 14

Obama

-> conflict is much less likely than those argued by the containment crowd and that there are powerful forces that would discourage war in both countries.